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This dissertation examines the ethnicization of Islam among a specific ethnic group in 
China, namely the Hui. It is based upon sixteen months of multi-sited fieldwork 
conducted in China’s Henan Province and Ningxia HuiA tonomous Region from 2010 
to 2012. I argue that the particular ethno-imaginary of the Hui and their positioning vis-à-
vis the Han majority – that they are both non-Han and more Han than the Han – are 
predicated upon a particular sexual economy. Islam is situated in an imagined 
dissymmetrical exchange of woman as that whose presum d truth can procure for the Hui 
the feminine “Han blood.” The “nativization” of Islam among the Hui, i.e. its supposedly 
never complete “sinicization,” occurs through the figure of the Han woman.  
In Part I of this dissertation, I trace the itinerary of this figure in both historiographical 
narratives of the Hui in the early twentieth century and the organizational variations of 
their contemporary life as Muslims in a swiftly-changing China. In Part II, I move to a 
more general level, and study two major institutions in the Chinese state’s governance of 
ethnic difference, namely ethnic regional autonomy and ethnic cadre. I situate them 
within the socialist tradition and unpack their specificity in contrast to other political 
configurations in the governance of ethnic difference (e.g. liberal multiculturalism). I 
suggest that this socialist governance of difference is defined by a biopolitical logic, and 
argue that the link to sexuality that is intrinsic to the concept of biopolitics renders the 
Hui a particularly privileged site for exploring the complex relationship between the 
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ethnicity without her extraordinary work on the liberal politics of recognition. Katherine 
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My life in NYC would have been much less enjoyable without the companionship of 
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Tzu-Chi, Tseng Tsun-Hui, Shen Chang-Chen, and Lin Chih-Yuan. Our discussion on 
Taiwan politics opened my eyes to a whole new world, and it continues to encourage me 
to re-think radical politics at a time when Occupy Central in Hong Kong is in its 
inevitable decline. I also thank Ma Chi-Ping, Eileen Lin, and Shen Hsiu-Hua for the 
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joyful conversations and the warm support they provided at a time when my writing was 
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There are those moments in ethnography when the anthropologist cannot extract a 
clear, articulate, and unequivocal interpretation of certain acts from the “informants,” 
when, in other words, the “native’s point of view” begins to contradict itself, even 
unknowingly. This happens when Cunhu, a young Hui Sfi living in Ningxia in 
northwest China, started to explain to me a daily show of etiquette among the Jahriyya 
Sufi that had befuddled me for quite a few days. “You have seen that we zuoyi every time 
we meet each other,” he named the ritual before he set out to offer an explanation. “Now,” 
he continued, “the Han also zuoyi. But we do it in a different way.”  
How it was different I did not perceive. It seemed to me that the Jahriyya Sufi zuoyi 
in exactly the same manner as the Han do: both forma fist with two hands, raised to the 
chest and swinging gently as the body bowed politely to greet the other. The degree of 
the bow depends on the assumed difference in social hierarchy between the two meeting 
parties: 90 degrees, when the upper body is in straigh  angle to the legs, indicate the 
highest degree of respect and deference. Cunhu, however, did insist that there was a key 
difference: “When we bow, the arms in fact draw a cres ent.” But shortly afterwards, he 
supplemented this interpretation with another comment. “You see,” he said proudly, “the 
Han no longer zuoyi. But we the Hui still practice it. They have dumped their propriety 
(li ), the essence of their civilization. We the Hui have preserved it for them. It is we who 
carry on the best of their culture.”  
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But one is left confused, since an obvious contradiction can be seen between the two 
explanations otherwise supposed to complement each other. On the one hand, it seems 
that the particular emphasis laid on the “crescent” is intended to emphasize the minute 
difference considered nonetheless significant enough to distinguish the Hui variation of 
zuoyi from its Han “original.” On the other, however, the comment on “preserving…the 
best of their culture” appears precisely as an attemp  to write over the difference, and to 
write it over by means of a particular operation: we are different from the Han because, 
somewhat peculiarly, we are more Han than the Han. The Han will find “themselves” in 
us, yet the “them” they find in “us” would be slightly transfigured. We are both Han and 
non-Han, we are more Han than the Han precisely because we are not and can never be 
completely Han. We are, in other words, not-not-Han. Perhaps in the symptomatic 
contradiction revealed by Cunhu’s explanation, the little “crescent” stands less for the 
insertion of Islam than for the intrusion into consciousness of a particular structuring of 
ethnic relations by means of which Islam as a “world religion” is necessarily mediated for 
the Hui. 
Not all Jahriyya Sufi shared Cunhu’s explanation. Some would laugh at my 
interpretation that took its cue from the “crescent,” while others would merely say “yes, I 
heard some would go with that.” Neither did the daily instantiations of the rite confirm 
Cunhu’s explanation, as few would draw a “crescent” in their practice of zuoyi and most, 
according to my observation, merely performed it in a perfunctory manner that did not 
differ much from how it had been done among the Han. No one knew for sure what this 
daily rite meant specifically for the Hui, and no one was able to provide a specifically 
Hui explanation. The “crescent” bears its own mark of ambivalence, especially when it is 
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inscribed, not in any ritual, but in a particular kind of rite: the rite of daily etiquette, that 
through which social exchange occurs and by means of which human subjectivity is 
instituted. Does the “crescent,” if it is ever intetionally drawn, demand recognition from 
the Han, as a sign that could mark out the Hui variation of zuoyi? What kind of 
recognition is requested and what message conveyed, especially when the Hui – 
specifically the Jahriyya Hui – only zuoyi to their fellow Sufis and never practice it when 
greeting a Han? Cunhu’s contradictory interpretation p ints to a desire structured in a 
particularly intriguing way: the desire – of his and of all others’ who either share his view 
or other views similarly self-contradictory – to ber cognized in such a way that their 
difference only proves their proximity. They are so similar to the Han and so more Han 
than the Han that the Han could not recognize them as Han, or at the very least as the site 
where “authentic Hanness” – different from what thecontemporary Han signify – is 
located but in the name of the Hui, and through the prism of Islam.  
But how is this possible? How can an ethno-religious minority deny their complete 
assimilation into the majority while meanwhile asserting their difference, perhaps 
unconsciously, in such a way as to locate them within the majority? How can one be 
different in order to be “the same,” as this sameness is in itself idealized and fantasized, 
for the Han but by the Hui? What kind of structure has situated the Hui in such a shadowy 
position and rendered them into spectres of the Hanwhich nonetheless constantly 
struggle to assume more substantive shapes? How can a shadow rise to the level where it 
attempts to usurp the role of the body? How has Hui Islam been transformed by this 
structuring of ethnic relations? What are the specific symbolic, institutional, and political 
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conditions that both effectuate the ethnicization of Islam among the Hui and lead this 
ethnicization in particular directions that reflect and reconstruct their ethnic imaginary?  
This dissertation is in part a response to these critical questions. Though the Hui 
Muslims, with a general population of over ten million, live practically in every single 
province, city, and county on China’s vast territory, this dissertation itself is based upon 
16 months of fieldwork in Henan Province (in the city of Zhengzhou and its immediate 
vicinity) and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (in Yinchuan, Wuzhong, and 
Qingtongxia). My work in Henan focuses primarily upon the sociological forms that Hui 
Islam assumes in an urban milieu, with a particular emphasis on the urban mosque as a 
localized institution by means of which the Islamic religion acquires its tenacity in the 
concrete social world. Despite the fact that cities are often supposed to be the nodal 
points around which both trans-local and transnatiol socio-economic and religious 
connections build themselves, my fieldwork shows that t e institutionalization of Islam 
through the mosque produces a specific localization and laicization (in contrast to 
“secularization”) that structurally marginalize the role of the clerical power in the daily 
management of the mosque. Instead of a spiritual island where religious obligations are 
performed and religious dispositions cultivated, a mosque is sociologically embedded and 
politically inscribed within the local community whic  it serves, and its “democratic” 
management, defined by a largely nominal “election” facilitated and at times dictated by 
the local government, systematically excludes clerial power from its governmental body 
and renders the mosque into a “communal property” managed by lay members of the 
local Hui community. Islam does not and cannot spread on its own. It is the institutional 
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arrangements and the material conditions – in other words, its political economy – that 
underpin its survival and flourishing that I am interested in.  
My fieldwork in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, on the other hand, focuses on a 
different form that Hui Islam assumes in an entirely different socio-economic context. 
Ningxia, among other northwestern provinces of China, s a major site where Hui Sufism 
prospers and produces its resonances both within Chi a and beyond. In stark contrast to 
the urban Islam in Henan, which is largely confined within the local community and 
governed primarily by a group of lay and ordinary Muslims, Sufi orders among the Hui 
maintain vast trans-local networks that often travese immense geographical distances. 
What sharpens the contrast is the fact that most – if not all – Sufi orders in China are 
located in the rural or recently urbanized areas, and their spiritual centers are almost 
invariably lodged in rural villages and towns. They might have unassuming stations in the 
city, either in the form of mosques or humble praye halls adapted from the residence of 
deceased saints. But it is always the rural daotangs (“hall of Dao”) that pump fresh blood 
into the veins that nourish the trans-local connections among the Hui Sufi.  
To say this is not to reify the contrast between urban Islam in Henan and rural Sufism 
in Ningxia. Neither do I intend to imply that only the Sufi orders sustain and develop 
trans-local networks in which knowledge, information, donation, and personnel circulate 
either continuously or with specific calendrical punctuations. As I shall try to 
demonstrate in this dissertation, even the localized Islam in the urban milieu is integrated 
into trans-local networks that do not necessarily rely upon Sufi organization. These 
networks are often instituted by the movement of travelling imams and Islamic students 
in pursuit of advanced training and possible employment opportunities, and are often 
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separate from the lay institutions that govern the localized urban mosques. In other words, 
even in an urban environment, the mosque is not the exclusive site where Hui Islam 
maintains its material presence. The movement of imams and students often weaves vast 
geographical networks that cut across the rural-urban division, though this travelling 
often follows routes carved out by specific denominational affiliation. A non-Sufi imam 
would rarely visit Sufi shrines, and a Sufi imam would perhaps never drop by a mosque 
presided over by a Wahhabi cleric. Although some form of unintended and reluctant 
exchange might occur in some politically orchestrated occasions, different variations of 
Hui Islam seldom engage in systematic and purposeful interactions, and the travel of 
imams, therefore, could hardly be taken as an indication of the existence of a general 
umma among the Chinese Hui. Nonetheless, I still consider it worthwhile to describe and 
analyze the complex socio-economic and political factors that definitively frame the 
forms assumed by these profound movements. To a large extent, and across different 
denominations, the very job of a cleric is defined by its mobile character.  
To be sure, ethnicization of Islam happens not merely among the Hui. There are ten 
ethnic groups in China officially recognized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as 
taking Islam as their “ethnic religion,” and the Hui constitute merely one of them, though 
perhaps the most populous and influential. The Hui dominate the ranks of the All-China 
Islamic Association, though this association professes to represent all of China’s Muslims. 
The ethnicization of Islam, therefore, goes beyond the Hui, but it is critical to note that 
the mechanism of this ethnicization might differ across different ethnic groups. This 
dissertation is interested in the mechanism of ethnicization specific to the Hui. Compared 
to the Uyghur whose rich religious and cultural world is often overshadowed by the 
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interlocked discourses of “ethnic secessionism” (the Chinese state) and “oppression of 
religion” (international media)1, the Hui Muslims do not bear any remarkable characte  
that might draw upon them the attention of international media: they do not have a 
territorial claim (not a single Hui whom I have interviewed has such claim, and I haven’t 
come across any historical evidence that suggests otherwise), and living among and 
alongside the Han has been a “normal” form of residence rarely questioned. They do not 
speak a different language, and Chinese is indisputably their native tongue – even their 
form of Islam is heavily mediated by the Chinese language. They do not even have an 
incontestable ethnic identity, and there have been and continue to be inconclusive debates 
as to whether they constitute a distinct ethnic group different from the Han. Their less 
exposure and comparative (not total) invisibility to Western observers, especially their 
similarity to the Han majority, have also given Hui Islam a more capacious and flexible 
space in the CCP’s governance of Islam. It is precisely in this flexible but no less 
complex space that I shall locate my study of Hui Islam in this dissertation.   
But why do we need to focus on the Hui, if, as I have mentioned, the ethnicization of 
Islam happens among other Muslim minorities as well? What is it that makes the 
ethnicization of Islam among the Hui special, and therefore worthy of our ethnographic 
                                                   
1 What is equally overshadowed and with much graver consequences is the serious deterioration of socio-
economic conditions in the contemporary Uyghur society. First-hand information in this respect is 
extremely sparse, due to the CCP’s barring of extensiv  fieldwork in Xinjiang and its strict censorship of 
media. Nonetheless, two figures prove to be particularly important and reliable in providing this much 
needed information. Huang Zhangjin, an excellent edi or of the Pheonix Weekly (Fenghuang Zhoukan) 
based in Hong Kong, published his extraordinary and e ormously influential analysis of the Uyghur society 
in 2012 on iSun Affairs (Yangguang Shiwu Zhoukan). (Huang, 2012) And Illham Tohti, a Uyghur professor 
of economics teaching in China’s Central University of Nationalities, is another critical figure in spreading 
up-to-date information on contemporary Xinjiang. He is the founder of Uyghur Online, an influential 
Internet bulletin board service where topics pertaining to the Uyghur are freely discussed, both in Chinese 
and in the Uyghur language. He was arrested by the police in Urumqi in 2013 on the charge of “separatism” 
and the website was shut down by the state. Another “s cular” Uyghur intellectual who has written 
tirelessly on contemporary Uyghur society is Gheyret Niyaz, who was arrested in 2009 and sentenced to 
fifteen years of imprisonment in 2010 on the charge of “crime against national secutiry.” 
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and analytical attention? How is the specifically Hui ethnicization of Islam articulated 
with the peculiar structuring of ethnic relations according to which the Hui are situated in 
a position that makes them more Han than the Han? What kind of affective economy 
organizes and strengthens this articulation? 
Islam, Gender, Recognition 
Imam Mai was one of those rare clerical figures who could, even in a mosque, crack 
dirty jokes. None of those who work with him are exempt from his at times embarrassing 
humor. Imam Zhu, his colleague and assistant at Down Mosque in Zhengzhou and a shy 
man who often speaks softly, is a frequent target. Upon knowing that a Hui woman – an 
old friend of Zhu – somehow by mistake sent the latter a seducing text message initially 
meant for her Han husband, Mai winked to me and laughed. “Well,” said he, “she 
certainly misses a halal dick (qingzhen jiba)!”  
Woman figures prominently in the world of Imam Mai in more than one way, and all 
relate back to his position as a Hui cleric. “The most important channel for conversion is 
marriage,” he told me. And not long afterwards, I myself witnessed one such conversion 
at Down. A young Hui man in his early 20s married a Han girl, and his family insisted, 
like many other Hui families, that the girl visit a mosque and proclaim the faith in Islam 
under the lead of a male imam. Whether the girl “truly believed” no one knew, and the 
boy’s family cared less about the felicity of the conversion than the success of the 
marriage. Mai hated such occasions. To him, these are merely nominal rituals which 
cheat no one, but no body, for reasons he equally deplores, would “pierce the thin veil 
(tongpo chuanghuzhi)” and reveal their purely deceptive and hollow formality. “The Hui 
9 
 
families want to keep face,” he said, “They want the Han girl to convert. But they don’t 
care whether she is sincere. You know what? She doesn’t care either. She just comes, 
listens to our jibber jabber, reads whatever she has to, and then proceeds to her wedding.”  
The rite I witnessed did confirm Mai’s denouncement. The Han girl looked puzzled 
when Imam Hai, a junior cleric dispatched by Mai, was teaching her the shahāda and the 
basic tenets (“five pillars”) of Islam. She stared at Hai for about five minutes, then rolled 
her eyes, and pushed up the small cap that only covered the top portion of her hair, 
leaving the rest falling down from the sides. The cap (libaimao, or “the cap for prayer”) 
was in fact often worn only by Hui men and was obviusly grabbed in a hurry by the 
boy’s family merely as an expedient for the superfluous yet necessary ritual. The boy’s 
mother did not expect this ritual to be long (I heard that all the families were then waiting 
in the nearby restaurant for the wedding ceremony), and when Hai’s sermon became 
tedious, she stood up and walked out. Then her son followed. The impatience of the Han 
girl surfaced on her face, and Hai had to wrap it up q ickly. The rite ended minutes after 
the boy and his mother left the room.  
“How could I continue?” Hai later complained to me. “The Hui themselves didn’t 
want to hear. They didn’t care whether their bride was a Muslim or not. They walked out 
first. How could you expect the girl to be sincere? It’s a complete fraud.” But Imam Zhu 
disagreed, “Isn’t that how we the Hui originated in the first place? Our ancestors are Arab 
men. Our shifus (master) were Muslims, but our shimus (‘wife of the master’) were all 
Han. Aren’t we in fact enacting the same thing?” Zhu’s optimism soon shifted into a 
general claim on Hui identity: “We the Hui are Chinese Muslims. We are rooted in China 
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and we are every bit Chinese. Our shimus were all Han! Our ancestors were foreigners, 
but we are not!” 
His view was not contradicted. Both Mai and Hai shared it, however much they hated 
the nominal conversion rituals. Instead of refusing to preside over such rituals, Mai rather 
attempted painstakingly to perfect them. He put up a oster shortly afterwards in the 
mosque, announcing that all Hui families who wanted to take Han brides must send the 
girls to the mosque for a weekly course on Islam lasting for two months. “Otherwise,” 
proclaimed the poster, “the imams will not preside ov r her conversion.” Lodged firmly 
in the patrilineal line and speaking always to the Hui groom’s family who “must send the 
(Han) girls to the mosque,” Imam Mai’s indignation resides in the (male) Hui’s failure to 
properly assume their masculine position and convert th  Han girls with their patriarchal 
power that was thought to lie at the fountainhead of Hui identity. Hui Islam is for him 
constitutively engendered, and the power of conversion is reinforced by that of the 
patriarch. He has monopoly over the ritual field, and he merely wants the Han girl to 
consent to his symbolic hegemony. 
But the patriarch is not always on Mai’s side, and Hui Islam is not always at the 
“receiving” end of an essentially asymmetrical exchange of women that structures the 
imaginary of these clerics. One of Mai’s daily obligations as a Hui imam involves leading 
Janāza prayers for deceased Hui whose families send the corpses to the mosque where 
they are properly cleansed, wrapped, and then carried to the graveyard for ritualized 
burial. Because Down is one of the only two mosques that could still perform this ritual 
ablution in the old city of Zhengzhou, it is not uncommon that two or more bodies need 
to be washed on the same day and one single Janāza prayer is simultaneously conducted 
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for all in order to shorten as much as possible the time between death and burial. 
Completely legal according to Islamic jurisprudence, this practice might nonetheless 
come up against particularly vehement resistance whn t e rite itself is subjected to 
disputed interpretations. On one such occasion, two unrelated Hui bodies – one male, the 
other female – were laid in Down, properly processed and awaiting their Janāza prayers. 
As usual, Mai suggested one, instead of two, Janāza. The man’s family agreed 
immediately, while the woman’s family protested almost as soon. The particularly 
intense sentiment and stubborn insistence of her husband shocked Mai. “I have been 
doing this for a long time, and it’s been done this way from time immemorial,” he told 
me, “so why did he object?” Mai tried all he could to convince the man of the legality 
and appropriateness of this combination in sharī’a. He quoted the Quran, the Ḥadīth, and 
all the relevant legal commentaries he had learned and could relate at that moment. Yet, 
all his efforts were in vain – the man persisted angrew increasingly impatient. “It was 
as if he would not allow this unless over his own dea  body,” Mai recalled. 
Somehow mysteriously, as if an epiphany all of a sudden dawned upon Mai – he did 
not tell me and could not remember how this happened – he realized that this man, the 
surviving husband of the Hui woman whose body now laid wrapped in the mosque 
waiting for her Janāza, was a Han. “So the woman married a Han man! No wonder!” Mai 
scoffed. But the drama did not end with this realization and could not be contained by 
this reproach. The major reason behind the man’s resistance was not his lack of 
knowledge. He did not protest because he did not knw what was about to happen. He 
protested because he thought he knew all too well what would be performed by Imam 
Mai or what would necessarily ensue from his ritual performance. He thought Mai would 
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marry the two deceased in yincao difu (“dark afterlife,” the conception of the hereafter in 
Han popular religious traditions). He thought Janāza was no different from other “similar” 
rituals in Han popular religions where the death riual, when conducted for a man and a 
woman collectively, is meanwhile a wedding ceremony. As a man, he could not allow 
this to happen. He could not allow his woman to be married to another man right under 
his nose – especially not in the eternal afterlife. H  protested for his monopoly over the 
woman. It was not Imam Mai as much as the dead Hui man whom he took to be his 
archenemy in the struggle to keep his woman. 
Mai was furious, and desperate. For some reason, he could not convince the man to 
accept his interpretation of Janāza. The more he spoke, the more what he said appeared 
suspicious and powerless – the seemingly endless proliferation of words merely revealed 
their fatal hollowness. The man simply would not lis en – he heard, but did not listen, and 
would not listen. He insisted upon his own interpretation – to him, that was not an 
interpretation. That was fact, pure and simple. The factualization of his interpretation 
stems from the deep anxiety about the loss of one’s ma culinity by losing the woman 
through whom one’s masculinity is mediated. Mai was no longer able to monopolize the 
ritual field. He was dislodged and exiled from his authoritative position. “So the woman 
married a Han man! No wonder!” Indeed, no wonder. Reluctantly, Mai was identified 
(instead of choosing to identify) with the matrilineal line, the line that gives women 
without receiving in return. He was relocated on the other side of the asymmetrical 
exchange and was deprived of the phallus. His interpretation became merely that, an 
interpretation, and a questionable one at that, pushed to the side by a “fact” that 
commanded the power of the apparently invincible patriarch. The man did not listen to 
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Mai because he didn’t have to, in the same way as Mi did not need to ask the Han girl 
what she thought of the two months’ course on Islam she had to take in order to marry a 
Hui boy – supposing, of course, the young man’s family bothers to take her to the 
mosque for a rite of conversion (again, it’s the boy’s family who takes the initiative). For 
a brief moment, Mai was given the position of the maternal voice to inhabit. And for a 
brief moment, he experienced what it meant to be heard but not listened to, as though his 
voice did not and could not reach an addressee. Mai did not dwell on his fury. “Allah 
knows all,” he said, and then proceeded to design the two-month course.  
Imam Zhu was not the only Hui who recapitulated the popular origin myth whenever 
the religious endogamy stipulated by Islam is threatened by Hui-Han marriages. 
According to both officially canonized ethno-history and popular narrative (the former 
largely refines the latter without fundamentally altering its inherently gendered structure), 
the Hui’s ancestors moved to China primarily through two completely unrelated routes. 
Some – almost exclusively of Arab and Persian origins – travelled to China in the 
medieval Tang (618-970 A.D.) and Song (960-1279 A.D.) dynasties as maritime 
merchants who settled down in affluent port cities, concentrating in the so-called 
fanfangs (“fangs for foreigners,” as most urban Chinese live in such fangs, them being 
special residential units enjoying limited administrative autonomy, with their own 
segregating walls and gates) that dotted the eastern coast of China. A fanfang populated 
by Muslims is said to be allowed to administer its fang affairs in accordance with the 
particular version of the sharī’a which its residents had grown used to. The Muslim 
fangmin (“people of the fang”) were free to follow the particular Islamic legal school in 
which they had been trained and by which they had been governed in their own land. It is 
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said that the imam who presided over the central mosque in the fang often commanded 
much religious and secular power, as the two were not sharply distinguished. The same 
cleric who led the daily prayers might also act as the local qāḍī (judge) in adjudicating 
legal disputes. Sharī’a functioned less as a textualized legal “code” than a complex, 
dynamic and internally heterogeneous collection of jurisprudential judgments and 
practical advice that did not necessarily bear the non-negotiable and coercive power 
modern codified law often possesses.  
The maritime route, however, is not the only one the Muslim ancestors of the Hui are 
thought to have taken. For some, it is not even the more important and profound of the 
two routes canonized in popular narratives. If the Arab and Persian Muslim merchants 
were thought to primarily reside in their confined urban quarters, the Central Asian 
Muslim warriors, conscripted by the Kublai Khan in his eastward conquest of the Chinese 
Song Dynasty in the 13th century, on the other hand, were considered to have truly spread 
Islam across the vast territory of China. The old saying that “the Hui spread everywhere 
under heaven during the [Mongolian] Yuan Dynasty (1206-1368 A.D.) (yuandai huihui 
bian tianxia)” still resonates with much affective power among the Hui with whom I 
spoke, and many cited the names of specific Hui villages – such as “huihui ying (the Hui-
Hui Battalion)” to demonstrate the presumed truthfulness of this narrative. It is often said 
that the consequence of the triumph of the military expedition of the Mongolian cavalry 
was an enormous migration of Central Asian Muslims nto every single part of China, 
concentrating particularly in the northwest. Efficient and tightly-knit military units were 
converted en masse and en bloc into rural agricultural production units, and co-existed 
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with the local Han and the Mongolian rulers who occupied the highest rung in the 
racialized scheme by means of which the Mongols secured their dominance. 
To what extent these accounts are based upon “historical evidence” might be 
subjected to perpetual debate, as the “evidence” themselves would presuppose conditions 
of silencing that exclude certain voices from the regime of perception their language 
institutes. As a matter of fact, the voicing of history that surfaces in the two origin stories 
recounted above already shows its silencing mechanism in broad daylight. Both stories 
are structured by a specific libidinal economy constitutively engendered: both myths 
operate along the axis of a masculinist ideology, since it is always the male Muslim 
merchants and the male Muslim warriors who take center stage in the supposedly epic 
migration from the “Heavenly Square (tianfang, the mythological name for the place 
where Islam is presumed to have originated)” to China, the place that the Prophet advised 
his disciples to visit in the pursuit of knowledge – “Seek knowledge even as far as China.” 
Both stories can be reduced to one singular origin myth that narrates a penetration of 
China by an army of all-male Muslims. And this myth does not terminate with this 
penetration – or perhaps more accurately, this penetration assumes a more substantive 
form as the popular narrative advances. It is said that the Muslim merchants and the 
Muslim warriors, settling down in China and taking China as their new home, married2 
the local Han women, and the Hui are descendants of these inter-ethnic marriages. “We 
the Hui have half of our blood from the Han,” a Hui once told me.  
                                                   
2 Note that it is a marriage relationship that figures prominently in this masculinist imaginary – even in the 
story that features the Muslim warriors, women are not portrayed merely as spoils of war captured and 
appropriated by the victor. The – perhaps unconsciou  – emphasis on marriage relationship and its 
particular institutional function in mending the wound of war and violence says much about the posture the 
Hui adopt vis-à-vis the Han majority.  
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But this “fusion of blood” is structurally asymmetrical and constitutively engendered: 
the Hui are always situated in the position that receives women from the Han, and the 
ethnicization of Islam – its “sinicization” into an Islam “native” to China – seems 
precisely to depend upon this non-reciprocal “exchange” of women, as if Islam as a form 
of being-in-the-world cannot be cathected and its value cannot be fully expressed unless 
channeled through the female body; as if, in other words, Hui Islam has to speak through 
the woman in order to acquire its unmistakably masculine voice. To be more Han than 
the Han and to claim the faith in Islam within this special ethnic dynamic is therefore to 
simultaneously assume this masculinist position andto be subjected to its structural 
exclusion of women. It is at this specific structural juncture where the question of gender 
emerges as a particularly critical point in analyzing the ethnic and religious imaginary of 
contemporary Hui that I would like to locate the arguments of this dissertation. It is also 
this irreducible structuring of sexual difference that distinguishes the ethnicization of 
Islam among the Hui from other forms of ethnicization that do not necessarily rely upon 
an imagined dissymmetrical exogamy for its operation. The specificity of the Hui and of 
Hui Islam – instead of a generalized “Islam” abstracted from concrete social worlds – 
therefore requires me to situate the dual construction of ethnicity and religion within the 
more general framework of the (re)production of sexual difference.  
The anthropological study of the production of sexual difference has a long history, 
one fraught with both disquieting quarrels and productive debates that go far beyond the 
confined concerns of this dissertation. One might perhaps even argue that the dispute on 
sex – and the constellation of concepts that cluster around it, kinship and gender being 
two – constitutes the major dispute in 20th century anthropology (Malinowski, 1962, 1927; 
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Lévi-Strauss, 1969, 1971; Rubin, 1975; Reiter, 1975; MacCormack & Strathern, 1980; 
Strathern, 1988; Schneider, 1984; Sahlins, 2013). The masculinist imaginary of the Hui 
substantiates, in a completely different context and u der completely different historical 
conditions, the classical – and classically masculinist – myth of Lévi-Strauss’s 
structuralist argument: that the exchange of women is the sole medium by means of 
which the institution of the social can be accomplished (Lévi-Strauss, 1969). For Lévi-
Strauss, the formation of sociality necessarily presupposes the objectification of women – 
women must be numbed and their voice(s) must be rende d inaudible, so that society 
itself can be possible in the first place. For the Hui, Islam cannot become world-able – 
that they cannot world Islam – unless when it is cat in a dissymmetrical exchange that 
procures women. For Lévi-Strauss, (male) society speaks and can only speak through 
silenced women. For the Hui, (male) Islam can be inhabited and is inhabitable only by 
consigning women to the site of the unsignifiable. For Lévi-Strauss, the exchange of 
women is the primary exchange that organizes all other exchanges which are merely 
subsidiary and secondary. Woman is not one object among others but the object through 
which all other objects are integrated into the social world. For the Hui, the acquisition of 
women is the definitive moment in the formation of their ethnicity and the foundational 
condition for the “nativization” of their Islam – they do not become “native” Chinese 
until “half of our blood” comes from the Han women. It is neither co-habitation nor the 
appropriation of the Han language as much as the infusion of the female “blood” that is 
seen as the mark of a specifically Chinese Huiness. If Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist 
understanding of kinship, incest taboo, and sociality in general constitutes the patriarchal 
myth as it poses male-dominated society as the only ne possible and imaginable for the 
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human world, the Hui’s worlding of Islam demonstrates in a particular historical context 
the power this myth still commands among some people. 
But my interest lies not merely in showing that theHui unconsciously subscribe to the 
same patriarchal myth that Lévi-Strauss consciously articulates. The feminist critique 
since the 1970s, especially in its French iteration, has already revealed the constricting 
masculinist ideology that drives both Lévi-Straussian structuralism and Freudian 
psychoanalysis (Irigaray, 1985a, 1985b; Cixous, Cohen, & Cohen, 1976; Wittig, 1992, 
1985; Kofman, 1985). The searing political debate on feminine sexuality both 
emblazoned Lacanian psychoanalysis in the 1970s and prompted, among other factors, 
the ultimate dissolution of the Lacanian school (Mitchell, 1982, 2000; Rose, 1982). 
Irigaray, among others, argues in a Lacanian vein that in a libidinal economy structured 
by male dominance, women are necessarily located at the site where the acquisition of 
signifier is structurally precluded. Women are not subjects as much as they are objects, 
and they do not speak as much as they are spoken of. They form the very substrate upon 
which (male) speech becomes possible in the first place (Irigaray, 1985b, 1985a). 
Deriving less from theoretical feminism than from con rete feminist political struggles in 
a wide array of domains in the US, Catherine MacKinnon similarly argues that in a 
society dominated by male power, female sexuality in and of itself is a violation of 
women. Violence is intrinsic to the very being of women in a masculinist society 
(MacKinnon, 1982). Applying this radical feminist argument to the specific – specific yet 
particularly acute with its irreplaceable provocative force – case of rape, MacKinnon 
strategically reformulates the question “What is the violation of rape?” with “What is the 
19 
 
nonviolation of intercourse” (MacKinnon, 1983, pp. 646-7)?3 Gayle Rubin’s classical 
1975 essay, in fact, already extends the feminist critique of structuralism and 
psychoanalysis beyond the scope of a narrowly defined “feminism.” Rubin is not merely 
interested in how women are silenced and objectified – objectified yet rendered into signs 
that convey a message imposed from outside; she also reveals that both Lévi-Strauss and 
Freud (at least some of Freud’s writings – for insta ce, his famous case history of Dora) 
have to presuppose a heterosexual norm in order for their respective argument to hold. A 
certain tendency toward “queerness” can already be discerned in this early essay: the 
objectification of women and subjectification of men in a masculine society and the 
theory that poses this society as the only one possible are not merely oppressive to 
women; they are oppressive to all human. It is, in other words, the normalization of 
sexuality and the regimentation of sexual difference a cording to the heterosexual norm 
that should be questioned and dismantled. The feminist project is not to liberate women 
as much as to revolutionize the organization of sexual difference and to work for a new 
politics of sexuality (Rubin, 1975; see also Rubin, 1984). The masculinist imaginary of 
the Hui, therefore, is predicated not merely upon the silencing of women. The 
ethnicization of Islam among the Hui equally presupposes a heterosexual norm. Although 
Islamic religious doctrines might have indeed lent some theological and moral support to 
heteronorm, these operations of normalization are overdetermined among the Hui by this 
specific mechanism of ethnicization.  
                                                   
3 Though I agree with Catherine MacKinnon’s feminist cri ique, it does seem that the feminist mobilization 
sometimes tends to shift into a movement seeking state censorship against certain forms of sexual variance 
and produces subsequently its own form of exclusion and violence. It is therefore critical to distinguish 
between different senses of “the public” and not to conflate politics with state intervention. For a 
sophisticated disambiguation of “the public” as a concept, see Warner, 2002. For an application of this 
analysis to queer politics and ethics, see Warner, 2000. Gayle Rubin’s recent article on the background to 
her famous “Thinking Sex” essay provides ample information on the late 1970s and early 1980s feminist 
“sex wars.” See Rubin, 2011.  
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The meaning of this overdetermination can be further elaborated. In Foucault’s now 
canonical History of Sexuality Vol.1, he distinguishes what he terms the “deployment of 
sexuality” from the “deployment of alliance” which he attributes to an earlier historical 
period of the West.4 Instead of being marked by abstinence and “repression” of sexuality, 
the modern West, according to Foucault, is characteized by an explosive proliferation of 
discourses on sexuality and a complete re-organization of the sexual landscape. 
Homosexuality, for instance, is no longer attached to certain acts but becomes a marker 
of identity – homosexuals become a new “species” under the transformed historical 
condition. On the one hand, psychoanalysis is part and parcel of this historical shift 
specific to the modern West and contributes to the proliferation of sexual discourses and 
identities. The “talking cure” itself, according to Foucault, is both a process for 
transforming sex into words and an occasion that in its own turn produces sexual pleasure. 
At the site of sexuality, the classical Foucauldian doublet – power-knowledge – is 
complicated by the transformative addition of a third term, that of pleasure. 
Psychoanalysis not only produces “truth” about sex; it also produces pleasure in the 
course of its loquacious interpretation. On the other and, Foucault considers the 
psychoanalytic focus on the structural function of incest taboo and sexual prohibition as a 
“defense” against the rising deployment of sexuality. He sees both psychoanalysis and 
Lévi-Straussian structuralism as a stubborn insistence on the deployment of alliance and a 
resistance to the historical shifts in the trinity of power-knowledge-pleasure –  
                                                   
4 According to Foucault, by the time of his writing, the deployment of alliance had yet to recede into 
historical obsolescence. However, he does seem to subscribe to a certain teleological point of view: “It is 
not exact to say that the deployment of sexuality supplanted the deployment of alliance. One can imagine 
that one day it will have replaced it. But as things stand at present, while it does tend to cover up the 
deployment of alliance, it has neither obliterated the latter nor rendered it useless. Moreover, historically it 
was around and on the basis of the deployment of alliance that the deployment of sexuality was constructed” 
(Foucault, 1978, pp. 107). 
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If for more than a century the West has displayed such a strong interest in 
the prohibition of incest, if more or less by common accord it has been 
seen as a social universal and one of the points throug  which every 
society is obliged to pass on the way to becoming a culture, perhaps this is 
because it was found to be a means of self-defense, ot against an 
incestuous desire, but against the expansion and the implications of this 
deployment of sexuality which had been set up, but which, among its 
many benefits, had the disadvantage of ignoring the laws and judicial 
forms of alliance.  By asserting that all societies without exception, and 
consequently our own, were subject to this rule of rules, one guaranteed 
that this deployment of sexuality, whose strange eff cts were beginning to 
be felt – among them, the affective intensification of the family space – 
would not be able to escape from the grand and ancient system of alliance. 
Thus the law would be secure, even in the new mechani s of power.  
(Foucault, 1978, pp. 109) 
One cannot ignore the historical specificity that conditions Foucault’s argument and to 
which his argument is primarily addressed. The shift from alliance to sexuality is specific 
to modern Western societies, and it does not follow that the expansion of colonial power 
necessarily entails the proliferation of sexuality and the gradual displacement of alliance 
by sexuality in the colonized or semi-colonized societies – in fact, Foucault has not 
attended to the possibly colonial conditions that underpin the apparently “Western” 
transformation of sex (Stoler, 2002, 1995). We can ask, in the context of this dissertation, 
whether a similar story of the rise of the deployment of sexuality can be charted in 
contemporary China and whether, consequently, the enicization of Islam among the 
Hui and the masculinist imaginary that subtends it constitute a local mechanism – 
certainly one among many – that “defends” against the emerging deployment of sexuality. 
In other words, does the ethnicization of Islam among contemporary Hui inadvertently 
play into a much larger historical shift in the Chinese sexual landscape? Does being a Hui 
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constitute a way to subject one’s sexuality to the rule of the “law?”5  What is the 
relationship between ethnicity and sexuality as is embodied particularly by the Hui? 
Instead of providing a direct answer to these difficult questions, this dissertation is 
oriented in the direction pointed by them and situates itself in relation to these critical 
concerns. The kind of recognition sought by the Huiand expressed in their imaginary 
reception of the Han women is overdetermined by the (re)production of sexual difference. 
It is not the Chinese state as much as an abstract and monolithic – hence fantasized – 
“Han people” that constitute the imaginary subject from whom such recognition is 
requested. And the recognition demanded cannot be su sumed under the liberal claim to 
“equal rights” but comes close to the Hegelian conception of recognition. To have what 
the other wants but can never have and to imagine oneself as possessing that which the 
other desires yet can never acquire is to request a kind of recognition that locates one at 
the site of the master. In a society dominated by male power, both the master and the 
slave are men. The slave is not silenced as much as prompted to speak, and to speak in 
order to give his recognition to his master. It is a male voice that is extorted as a 
                                                   
5 Though I accept Foucault’s historical argument, I nonetheless find his conception of power insufficient 
for thinking about the imbrication of subjectivity and sociality with sexuality. It is one thing to argue that 
there is a history to sexuality, and kinship relations and organizations (“families”), among others, have 
undergone tremendous shifts in the past several centuri s both in the West and elsewhere. It is quite a 
different matter to argue that incest taboo is the only social form prohibition could assume and that the
production of sexual difference can occur without the operation of a foundational prohibition. Perhaps  
radical politics of sexuality that celebrates the transformative power of sexual variance is not necessarily 
incommensurable with a psychoanalytically informed analysis of the limited set of structural positions i  
the social production of sexual difference. The point, I think, is not to ask whether prohibition is necessary 
for the formation of the constitutively sexual subject; it is rather to question if a radically new re-
distribution of the unsignifiable is possible. In other words, if the division between subject and object is a 
necessity for the institution of the sexual social, it does not necessarily follow that both cannot be embodied 
by the same individual, either successively or perhaps even simultaneously (then both temporality and 
sociality have to be radically re-thought). It is in this sense that I think a contemporary reworking of 
psychoanalysis and its feminist critique might constitute a way of theorizing “queerness” alternative to the 
theory of performativity. For a psychoanalytic critique of Foucault, see Copjec, 1994. For the queer theory 
of performance, see Butler, 1993, 1990, 2004. For recent theories on queer temporalities, see Freeman, 
2010. For an early critical review of the performance theory of gender and sexuality, see Morris, 1995. 
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consequence of the master-slave dialectic, and the mat rnal voice is no less excluded 
from the position of subjection than from that of subjectification.6 The master considers 
himself to be the site where the truth of the slave is located. He is not the slave yet bears 
that which the slave desires; he is different from the slave only to the extent that he sees 
himself to be what the slave would ultimately want to become. The dialectic between 
master and slave therefore is an identity-in-difference. It is precisely this (masculine) 
dialectical differential that marks the ethno-religious imaginary of the Hui (men) and 
characterizes their self-location vis-à-vis the Han (men).  
In this dissertation, no chapters are devoted exclusively to a study of Hui Muslim 
women (or the Han women who “marry into” the families of Hui men). Instead, the 
problematic of gender looms large and surfaces at particular points in the progression of 
my ethnographic narration: in chapter one where modern historiographical works on Hui 
ethnicity written primarily by Hui intellectuals are critically addressed side by side with 
the popular narratives that form their backdrop, from which they draw their historical 
commonsense, and in which one could discover a somewhat mysterious connection 
between the figure of the Han woman and the Dao of Islam; in chapter three where the 
figure of a Han woman is located at a critical junct re in the modern genealogical and 
religious imaginary of Jahriyya Sufi Hui, to the point where her importance manifests 
precisely in her exclusion and marginalization; and i  chapter four where I discuss 
                                                   
6 Though Judith Butler clearly knows that the positin of women is excluded from the master-slave 
dialectic (e.g. “In post-Hegelian terms, she [the woman] is ‘cancelled’ but not ‘preserved.’”), she 
occasionally slips into the contrary view. While discussing the Lacanian conception of the symbolic order, 
for instance, she argues that “The Symbolic order cr ates cultural intelligibility through the mutually 
exclusive positions of ‘having’ the Phallus (the positi n of men) and ‘being’ the Phallus (the paradoxical 
position of women). The interdependency of these positions recalls the Hegelian structure of failed 
reciprocity between master and slave, in particular, the unexpected dependency of the master on the slav
in order to establish his own identity through reflection” (Butler, 1990, pp. 56-7). 
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women’s mosques and whether the existence of female imams indeed constitutes an 
indication of women’s agency in the world of Hui Islam. In all instances, I attempt to 
locate the question of gender in a structural(ist) analysis without reducing the difference 
of gender to the difference of “woman,” and without replacing my analysis with an 
empirical interest in letting “women” speak. Not all women’s voices are necessarily the 
maternal voice, as I shall try to demonstrate in the course of my analysis (especially in 
chapter three), and a concern with the “empirical” women, with their voices and their 
specific discourses, nonetheless should not absolve one from a more careful structural 
analysis. In this dissertation, the exclusion of the maternal voice is seen as constitutive of 
the formation of the male-centered Hui ethno-religious imaginary. It is this structural 
function of gender that I shall try to show at various points in my ethnographic analysis. 
Ethnicity, Difference, Socialism 
The proximity of the Hui to the Han and the attachment of the Hui to a China defined 
largely in Han terms have long been noted by Western anthropologists. Dru Gladney, in 
his rich ethnography of the Hui, calls them “Muslim Chinese,” to deliberately emphasize 
a critical point which he insists upon against those who argue that the Hui are not and do 
not consider themselves to be “Chinese:” that the Hui, being Muslims, nonetheless 
imagine themselves to be an intrinsic part of China (Gladney, 2004, 1998a, 1998b, 1991, 
1987). Keeping a distance from the Han and constantly denouncing the latter as “unclean” 
and “idolatrous,” they nonetheless think that the Han are an “internal other,” someone 
neither me nor completely non-me. The Hui speak the Han language (a common name 
for Chinese is hanyu, “language of the Han”), and despite the intermixing of certain 
Arabic and Persian transliterations largely confined within religious and ritual contexts, 
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the Hui do not speak a separate ethnic language. Jonathan Lipman calls the Hui “Sino-
Muslims,” particularly to emphasize this linguistic dimension (Lipman, 1997). 
Western missionaries in the early twentieth century often had a somewhat ambivalent 
attitude towards the Hui, much the result of the often confusing and contradictory 
characters the numerous Hui they encountered on their travel presented to them. On the 
one hand, compared to the Han whose practice of ancestor-worship and popular religions 
often earned them the name of “polytheists,” the Hui were seen as a distinct group whose 
monotheistic belief rendered them particularly amenable to the Christian message. On the 
other, however, the very closeness of the Hui to the Han in their language, ethnicity, and 
even some apparently syncretic ritual practices (e.g. donning Han-styled mourning 
garments during funerary rites), also shrank their critical distance from the Han so much 
desired by the missionaries: the Hui must be seen as different enough so as to become the 
kind of subject most open to the good news.  
Samuel Zwemer (1867-1952 A.D.), the prominent American missionary nicknamed 
“the Apostle to Islam,” traveled to China twice in his life. The first time was in 1917, in 
the middle of his term in Egypt as an instructor in the theological seminary of the Arabian 
Mission and Cairo Study Center. He traveled to Shang i to see his sister, Nellie Zwemer, 
who was at the time serving her own mission in China. Zwemer met Isaac Mason – a 
British missionary of the Quaker Friends’ Foreign Mission who had lived in West China 
for over twenty years by this time – on this trip and inspired the latter to focus his 
missionary activities on Muslims in China. But Zwemr’s interest in China’s Muslims, 
particularly the Hui, dated to long before this short encounter. Seven years earlier, in 
1910, while preparing for the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh,  Zwemer was 
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in the same commission (Commission I) with Marshall Broomhall, to whose work Islam 
in China: A Neglected Problem, published in the same year, Zwemer contributed a short 
preface with other members of Commission I, according to whom “[T]he accessible 
Moslem population of China is larger than the Moslem population of Egypt, Persia, or 
Arabia; and yet practically nothing has been done for them….The critical hour is at hand 
when Moslem mission in China must be faced, and specialists set to work to win this 
great neglected class for the Christ” (Broomhall, 1910, pp. ix-x). 
Isaac Mason, the British Quaker missionary that Zwemer inspired on his 1917 trip, 
published a series of works on the Hui from the lat1910s till the end of the 1920s (Liu 
& Mason, 1921; Mason, 1928a, 1928b, 1922; Mason, Committee, & Moslems, 1919). 
One work, List of Chinese-Moslem Terms, was so popular as to have to go through 
numerous re-printings in order to meet the large demands of those missionaries intent on 
preaching Christianity to the Hui. The recognition that in order for proselytization to 
progress smoothly and effectively among the Hui Arabic and Persian as two major 
languages of Islam were hardly sufficient and that one needed to learn how critical 
Islamic terms were transliterated and translated into the Han language was widely shared 
among Western missionaries. Sixteen years after his first trip, in 1933, when Zwemer 
visited China for the second time and hiked with his son-in-law, Claude L. Pickens, Jr., 
into the high mountains of Northwest China, he had to grapple with this linguistic 
difficulty on his own: he tried to communicate with e Hui in Arabic, even reciting 
certain Quranic verses. These certainly won him warm welcome, admiration and respect 
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among the Hui, but he was nonetheless disappointed that the Hui could not speak Arabic 
– their Quranic recitation, unfortunately, proved largely unintelligible to him.7 
But the so-called “sinicization” of the Hui is by no means limited to the linguistic 
domain, and it often puzzled the missionaries as to how two apparently incompatible 
belief systems – Islamic and Han Chinese (both were essentialized and homogenized) – 
could sometimes function simultaneously in the world of the Hui, supplementing instead 
of contradicting each other. G. Findlay Andrew, another Protestant missionary of the 
China Inland Mission, recounted numerous instances which he thought proved that 
although the Hui “have obtained quite a number of converts from among the Chinese 
through the medium of force and persecution, as well as by the practice of taking Chinese 
wives and concubines [the missionary here is following the colloquial story, and the 
taking of women is here seen to supplement brutal violence and the act of war]…they 
have undoubtedly lost through these practices some f their personality and religious 
fervor” (Andrew, 1921, pp. 65). He proceeded to substantiate this proposition with 
concrete examples: “One young Hwei-hwei [Hui] visiting our Mission station at Sining 
for medical attention, was so unfortunate as to have his three animals stolen. Without 
hesitation he went to heathen temple of the City God to cast lots which he hoped would 
lead to the discovery of the thief and the recovery of the stolen animals. Another, visiting 
the same place, had a Moslem charm around his neck,but finding this failed to cure his 
ailment he applied to a Taoist priest, who supplied him with a fresh one consisting of one 
bean and a few grains of barley bound in a red cloth of riangular shape…” (Ibid., pp. 65) 
                                                   
7 See a series of reports published in 1933 on the missionary journal Friends of Moslems: the quarterly 
newsletter of the Society of Friends of the Moslems in China. This newsletter was based in Hankou and 
under the auspices of China Inland Mission. 
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The list went on, and at one point, there was even a case when a Hui master burned 
incenses and paper money to appease the disgruntled spirit of his dead servant, despite 
the fact that he had already conducted for him a proper Islamic funerary rite (Ibid., pp. 
66). 
All these are not unknown among the Hui. The anxiety of complete “sinicization” 
haunts many I have come to know in my work and promts still more to resort to a quasi-
racial discourse that attempts to solidify the vague line which supposedly separates the 
Hui from the Han. “As a Hui, you might forget your religion for a moment, but the seeds 
planted in your heart never die. The religion is in your blood. Sooner or later, you will 
find your root.” I was once told by a young Hui who “did not become a real Muslim until 
I read the history of our ethnic group.” Exotic physical features constitute a constant (and 
very often the first) topic in many conversations I participated in, and the significance of 
a long and carefully tended beard far exceeds the meaning given to it in the Islamic 
religious tradition. The racialization of Hui identity can in part be seen in how the beard 
is fetishized among the Hui, and how this fetishization produces unanticipated yet critical 
consequences which reveal the contradictions intrinsic to this racialization. 
Imam Mai, whose sex joke was recounted above, had been thinking about cultivating 
a beard for a long time. He was a locally renowned imam, one of the vice-presidents of 
Henan Islamic Association, and recognized by the state with a political position in the 
Provincial CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). He didn’t have 
a beard, though. He tried multiple times, and once he ven promised to his God in one of 
his prayers that he would – however difficult it may be – cultivate one, tend to it carefully, 
and clean it daily when he performed his ritual ablution. But he could not. Or perhaps 
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more precisely, his body could not. He abstained from shaving for several weeks, and 
then what he had was a messy moustache and sparse hai  under his chin – none of the 
kind it was often expected a Hui could grow. Once cornered by Imam Hai, his junior and 
assistant in the mosque, on why he did not keep his romise with God, he blushed, turned 
away his face, and mumbled, “well…it doesn’t look good…” “And God will interrogate 
you (nawen) when the Day comes!” Hai giggled over his joke. But Mai did not at all find 
it funny. “I can’t,” Mai later told me, “I just cannot.” 
The point is not simply to grow a beard, but to grow a particular kind of beard that 
looks exotic and foreign. And Mai’s incapacity to grow such a beard and his reluctance to 
acknowledge it highlight the specific form many Hui prefer to imagine their difference: 
one cannot will  to grow this particular kind of beard, because “real” difference does not 
and cannot exist by will. “Real” difference manifests itself only at a level beyond 
intentional intervention. The body of the Hui is mystified, given a depth, and placed 
squarely at the center in the imagination of difference, as though religious difference – a 
kind of difference presumed to be based upon voluntary and conscious pronouncement of 
faith – can only be realized and secured in a space wh re it is “objectified” and 
“factualized” in physical terms, where Islam is built into the body and manifests itself in 
the latter’s ability to grow an exotic beard in spite of the will of the man who possesses it 
(or does he still possess the body?).  Dru Gladney also notes the iconic character of the 
beard in bodying forth the difference of the Hui: “Upon one’s first arrival in a Hui village 
or home, the locals frequently bring out the indiviual with the largest nose, longest beard, 
fullest eyebrows, most extended earlobes, and say :‘Look at this guy, he’s a real Hui!’” 
(Gladney, 1991, pp. 24) The irony is that one has to painstakingly look for a “real Hui” 
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who is different from all other Hui simply because h  alone is seen to be able to body 
forth an authentic Hui-ness which no one else possesses. The example made to stand in 
for the type acquires its exemplariness precisely bcause it does not belong to the group 
to which it stands as a representative.   
To be sure, this racialization of difference through the fetishization of bodily features 
is strongly male-centered. Only men are seen and offered to be seen, presented to a gaze 
that tries painstakingly to recognize a difference often difficult to perceive. It is the 
patrilineal line that is thought to have preserved the racial purity of the Hui and the 
religious piety that is “planted” in the blood that flows from father to son, mediated by 
the necessary yet secondary role of the (Han) woman. As will be shown in chapters one, 
three and four, there is a specific structural connection between the figure of the woman 
and the position the Han are assigned to occupy in the dominant imaginary of the Hui, to 
the point where even a Hui woman would be situated in a position of religious and ethnic 
impurity (as they are inextricably linked among theHui). She’s not given to be seen not 
merely because women are supposed to be confined within the intimate and dark 
chamber of the family. Her subtraction from the visible world is also due to the imaginary 
position given her to inhabit which renders her unworthy to be seen, since it is presumed 
that the “authentic” difference does not reside in her. She is seen as the hinge that links 
“foreign Islam” to the native land of the Han, and the ethnicization and indigenization 
(“sinicization”) of Hui Islam in China take place through her and by means of her. She is 
not and cannot become “pure.” The presumed “impurity” of women is the very condition 
for the Hui both to acknowledge their “Chineseness” (this Chineseness is almost 
31 
 
synonymous with Han-ness) and to sustain a certain distinct ethnicity that reifies their 
religious difference from the Han.  
The sociocultural and religious sectarian diversity among the Hui have been well 
documented in a variety of anthropological and histor cal accounts, and this diversity 
might not come as a surprise given the Hui’s wide distribution across the immense 
territory of China and the vast differences in loca socio-economic and ethnic dynamics 
(Dillon, 2009, 1999, 1996; Ben-Dor Benite, 2005; Israeli, 2002, 1980; Wang, 1996; 
Caffrey, 2008; Fan, 2001; Atwill, 2006). An urban Hui in Henan would surely differ from 
a rural Sufi Hui in Ningxia, and a Hui cadre in Beijing would also differ from a Hui 
imam in Yunnan. This dissertation does not profess to describe a highly simplified and 
homogenized Hui world which does not exist ethnographically. Neither does it claim to 
introduce the reader to all the diversities among the Hui. It is not and does not intend to 
be a general introduction to the Hui, but attempts to ethnographically describe and 
analyze the complex mechanisms and politics by which an ethnicized Hui Islam is 
defined – by the Hui and by the Chinese state – and governed. I try to move between 
ethnographically rooted descriptions and structurally informed analysis that unfolds at a 
level slightly removed from the empirical plane. Different chapters give different weight 
to the religious and the ethnic sides of the story, but the intertwinement of both runs 
throughout the dissertation. My main point is not merely that they cannot be separated 
when we subject the Hui to the analytical gaze – a point already well known. I would like 
rather to examine why and how they cannot be separated, and the institutional and 
symbolic conditions that both produce and are produce  by this entwinement. 
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One side of the story this dissertation attempts to narrate and analyze is how the 
entanglement of Islam and ethnicity is imagined andformulated among the Hui, and how 
an ethnicized Hui Islam acquires its social, symbolic, and material traction within the 
Chinese Han-centered world. The other side of the sory is how the intervention of the 
Communist state inflects and even transforms the form f this entwinement and its 
consequences. The official classification and categorization of ethnic minorities by the 
newly established People’s Republic in the 1950s is often seen as a story similar to other 
modern state efforts (either colonial, postcolonial, or non-colonial) that attempt to build 
official governance upon the basis of politically driven ethnographic knowledge 
(Mullaney, 2011). The specificity of the socialist nature of this classification is mentioned 
and occasionally addressed as a carry-over from the political practice of the Soviet Union, 
but seldom is the question asked as to why – perhaps for the Soviet Union as well as for 
Communist China – so much weight is given to ethnic difference, and how this socialist 
politics of ethnicity differs from the now dominant liberal international legal framework 
that takes its cue from the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, transformed by the 
enormously influential decolonization movements in the 1950s and 1960s. Walker 
Connor summarizes what he considers are the classical Leninist principles on the so-
called “national question,” which have profound consequences for the Soviet Union’s 
governance of its multinational citizen subjects: 
Pared down, then, to its basic elements, Lenin’s strategy for harnessing 
nationalism is reducible to three commandments: 
1. Prior to the assumption of power, promise to all n tional groups 
the right of self-determination (expressly including the right of secession), 




2. Following the assumption of power, terminate thefact – though 
not necessarily the fiction – of a right to secession, and begin the lengthy 
process of assimilation via the dialectical route of territorial autonomy, for 
all compact national groups. 
3. Keep the party centralized and free of all nationalist proclivities. 
(Connor, 1984, pp. 38)  
According to Connor, national self-determination in the socialist tradition is predicated 
upon a basic premise: that as a bourgeois ideology derived fundamentally from the 
capitalist economic condition, nationalism will necessarily wither away with the 
transformation of the mode of economic production, a d granting all national minorities 
the rights to self-determination and national equality is merely an intermediary step to 
exorcise the historically residual national and ethnic resentments and a preparation for the 
ultimate fading of all nationalistic consciousness. National and ethnic differences are 
emphasized merely to produce the condition for eventual “assimilation” – hence the 
“dialectical route” of territorial autonomy. 
The paradoxical consequence of this “dialectical route” is now well-known. The 
moment of “sublation” appeared to have been permanently postponed, and ethnic 
consciousness in the Soviet Union, instead of gradually subsiding and being replaced by a 
non-ethnic proletarian consciousness, merely strength ed. The reason for this 
strengthening differs across different ethnic groups, artly a result of the differential 
mediation of the same preferential treatments by different local ethnic and economic 
dynamics. The SU continued to divide its population nto two broad and traditional 
categories – eastern and western nationalities – onthe basis of “developmental” level, 
and the preferences given to the Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Jew, and Germans 
were mapped onto historical and political conditions drastically different from those in 
34 
 
Central Asia (Martin, 2001; see also Brubaker, 1996). No China’s minorities can rival the 
Ukrainians in their sheer number and percentage in the total Soviet population, and no 
ethnic groups in China have such a strong cadre of experienced national communists as 
the Ukrainians once had in the Soviet Union. 
For some Chinese sociologists and ethnologists, the eventual political break-up of 
both the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia is due precisely to the failure of the 
Leninist dialectic. Ma Rong, a prominent sociologist of ethnicity based in Peking 
University, has over the past two decades been a devout propagator of what he calls the 
“de-politicization (qu zhengzhihua)” of the ethnic question in China (Ma, 2001, 2004; R. 
Ma, 2007, 2010b, 2010a, 2010c; Ma, 2012b, 2012a, 2012c). Initially published in the 
1990s, his view gradually acquired traction in the 2000s among the top echelon of the 
CCP, as a sense of political urgency after the violent ethnic clashes in Xinjiang and Tibet 
pushed them to reconsider their long-term ethnic policy. The language Ma speaks – that 
of possible political turmoil and territorial disintegration were the ethnic issue not 
properly addressed – plays into the worst fear of the Chinese ruling power and helps 
spread his view across the political spectrum. To Ma, the systematic preferences extended 
to ethnic minorities, including but not limited to ethnic regional autonomy, appointment 
of ethnic cadres, and affirmative action in the domain of education and economic 
development, both create the situation of reverse di crimination (hence consigning the 
Han majority to a secondary and disadvantaged position) and reinforce ethnic 
consciousness by coupling economic and political benefits with ethnic identities. He does 
not, however, argue that the state should abolish al economic aids to ethnic minorities – 
it is not whether preferences should be given as much as in what name should the 
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preferences be given that he finds most important. He proposes that state funds for 
poverty relief should be distributed not along ethnic lines but alone lines of economic 
deprivation – so that both the impoverished minorities and the impoverished Han can 
receive what they need, and the gap between those well-to-do minorities and their 
relatively poor Han neighbors would not widen as a result of ethnic preference. Even 
where the division of wealth might trace the line of ethnic difference, Ma argues, the 
distribution of welfare should nonetheless take economic indicators instead of ethnic 
identities as its preliminary criteria. The point, i  other words, is to render ethnic identity 
utterly irrelevant and reduce the question completely to one of economic redistribution.8  
What Ma Rong means by “de-politicization” is a privatization (“culturalization” in 
his own term) of ethnic difference and its exclusion from both public policy and public 
discourse. To Ma, the presence of “ethnic talk” in public discourse is a redundant 
nuisance and political landmine: the relief of economic inequality can be accomplished 
and the life of ethnic minorities improved without a public political acknowledgement of 
ethnic difference, and this acknowledgement, conversely, merely aggravates ethnic 
consciousness without actually conducing to the allviation of poverty and inequality. 
The kind of political society Ma envisions is not merely one in which “reverse 
discrimination” is a thing of the past; it also includes a classically liberal public/private 
division according to which ethnic difference is confined within the private while a 
unified “Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu)” alone is allowed in the public political sphere. 
To be sure, this supposedly “political” nation speaks Chinese, since for Ma Rong, 
Chinese is “by accident” the language spoken by modernity in contemporary China, and 
                                                   
8 For a general review of the debates provoked by Ma Rong’s argument, see Leibold, 2013. 
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ethnic minorities must learn Chinese in order to be “competitive” in the job market. 
Multilingualism is seen as intrinsically contradictory to the formation of a political 
community and necessarily disruptive to the operation of the capitalist market 
(“development,” furthermore, is a goal rarely questioned – ethnic minorities either perish 
or learn to “adapt”).  
Ma Rong is not the only Chinese intellectual advocating for a unified “Chinese 
nation.” A more nuanced – yet still ambiguous – view is offered by Wang Hui, the 
leading Chinese intellectual in the “New Left” who is based in the prestigious Tsinghua 
University. His view of the socialist legacy – especially ethnic regional autonomy – is 
diametrically opposed to that of Ma. Instead of suggesting its complete dismantlement, he 
proposes that it provides a particularly intriguing model which, if perfected, can lead to 
the formation of what he calls a “tran-systemic society” in China (Wang, 2011, 2010). 
According to Wang, ethnic regional autonomy – particularly its Chinese iteration which 
is essentially different from its Soviet “original” – does not address ethnic difference by 
carving out territorial space along ethnic lines. To the contrary, it necessarily includes a 
multiplicity of ethnic groups within the same region and is designed precisely to facilitate 
inter-ethnic social and economic exchanges. The purpose of this early socialist institution 
is not to segregate minorities into ethnic enclaves but to create the socio-economic 
conditions upon which an inter-ethnic social world can gradually take shape. By “trans-
systemic society,” he means a society in which ethnic difference is not privatized as 
much as publicized in such a way that each ethnic “system” both penetrates and is 
penetrated by all other systems. The “mutual penetration (xianghu shentou)” presupposes 
the existence of a public political sphere where difference is not reduced as much as 
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foregrounded. For Ma Rong, the issue of paramount importance is the weakening of 
ethnic consciousness and the rectification of “revese discrimination,” and his main focus 
is on the alleviation of economic inequality while ethnic difference is privatized and 
strictly excluded from public politics. For Wang Hui, on the contrary, the 
acknowledgement of ethnic difference in the public sphere and the mutual penetration of 
different ethnic “systems” through “public communication (gonggong jiaowang)” (hence 
not confined to the economic domain) are the preconditi  for the formation of the 
“Chinese nation.” He does not advocate for the privatization of difference; neither does 
he subscribe to an essentialist view of ethnic ident ty. At the heart of Wang Hui’s 
argument is a strongly Habermasian ideal of public communication: 
Public communication means not merely the dialogue and exchange 
between different ethnic groups and cultures; it also means unencumbered 
communication within each ethnic group. Without thelatter condition, the 
politics of acknowledgement9 will easily degenerate into a process through 
which the powerful few manipulate ethnic politics. Therefore, in order for 
“multiplicity (duoyuan xing)” not to be the basis for secessionist ethno-
nationalism but the precondition for co-existence, w  must activate an 
autonomous politics of communication both within each ethnic group and 
between different ethnic groups, without treating them as separate entities. 
In this sense, to acknowledge difference is not to perpetuate it, but to 
facilitate inter-ethnic exchange, co-existence, andintegration on the basis 
of diversity and equality.  
(Wang, 2011, pp. 137-8) 
All these, however, are idealized conceptions with heterogeneous ideological 
underpinnings: that there is such a thing as “unencumbered” and “autonomous” 
                                                   
9 I have translated what Wang Hui calls chengren de zhengzhi as “politics of acknowledgement” instead of 
“politics of recognition” which he explicitly borrows from Charles Taylor.  This is due to the fact that 
Wang Hui has a highly decontextualized and personalized understanding of “politics of recognition” whic  
is not necessarily what is meant by Taylor. For insta ce, Taylor’s conception does not include the meaning 
of “mutual penetration.” To a certain extent, however, Wang’s apparent disagreement with Ma Rong may 
be seen as a reformulated expression of the differenc  between classical liberalism and liberal 
communitarianism detached from the Western context and grafted onto the politics of ethnicity in 
contemporary China. For Taloy’s politics of recognition, see Taylor, 1992; Taylor & Gutmann, 1992. 
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communication that takes place in a transparent public space where relations of power are 
ideally excluded; that between “unencumbered communication” and “inter-
ethnic…integration” there is necessarily a causal relationship and “secessionist ethno-
nationalism,” across different socio-economic contexts and in whatever form, is 
necessarily to be prevented. The political meaning of this “public communication” 
becomes particularly clear in Wang Hui’s critique of “depoliticized politics” which he 
considers is a backlash of capitalist ideology after th  fading of the socialist class politics. 
For him, a “depoliticized politics” overlooks the historical formation of “the Chinese 
people (zhongguo renmin)” in the course of modern anti-colonial movement ad socialist 
revolution. This newly formed “Chinese people” is intr nsically multi-ethnic, and its 
integrity and solidarity are derived less from cultural homogenization than from the 
common revolutionary experience. This means that the new “Chinese people” is 
necessarily mediated by class politics, and it was – t least according to Wang Hui – the 
ethnic “proletarians” and “oppressed masses” who had engaged in “public 
communication” with their Han comrades in the course of the revolution that was seen to 
emancipate all equally.  
Wang cites Tibet as one particularly important example to buttress this argument. The 
relationship between the CCP and Tibet is cast in terms of social emancipation: Tibetan 
serfs were liberated from the yoke of serfdom and their livelihood completely 
transformed by the radical shifts in the social relations of production. This was supposed 
to have produced among ordinary Tibetans a strong se se of solidary with the CCP and a 
staunch support for the Maoist regime. Wang deliberately distinguishes between two 
forms of “secularization” that to him have entailed completely different – even 
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diametrically opposed – political consequences: on the one hand, the socialist revolution, 
with its secular class struggle and its relentless separation of religion from politics, is 
considered to have produced among the Tibetans a new “g neral identity (pubian 
shenfen)” beyond their specific cultural identification. He defines this new “general 
identity” – supposed to be “political” in the sense of being abstract and devoid of 
particularity – in terms of a new “quasi-religious value system” which creates for the 
Tibetans a new form of unison between politics and faith. The cult of personality that 
centers upon Mao is taken by Wang to be an expression of the success of this “general 
identity.” On the other hand, the reform era, with its dismantling of the socialist scheme 
(hence “de-politicization”) and economic liberalization, has prompted the emergence of a 
different kind of secularization in which the absenc  of the “socialist value system” left a 
vacuum quickly re-filled by the rise of particularistic identity politics and the resurgence 
of Tibetan religious passion. If the socialist politics and class struggle had – at least 
according to Wang – produced a class-based “general identity” that overrode the 
particularity of the Tibetan culture, the liberaliztion and capitalization of the economy 
since the late 1970s have practically abolished this abstract political identity and lent 
support to segregating and particularistic identity politics.  
But this socialist “general identity” – suppose it indeed had ever existed in Tibet – is 
hardly compatible with the vision of “trans-systemic society” initially proposed by Wang 
Hui. It is not “mutual penetration” of difference as much as the overriding of difference 
by an apparently abstract political status – or an alternative unison of politics and 
theology – that is celebrated by him. The only difference between his view and that of 
Ma Rong seems to lie in the specific name in which they think difference can be 
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justifiably excluded: for Ma Rong, it is in the name of a liberal political public that ethnic 
difference should be privatized; for Wang Hui, it is in the name of a socialist proletarian 
“general identity” that ethnic difference should berendered irrelevant. Paradoxically, 
though Wang appears initially to argue for the publicization of ethnic difference, he 
eventually arrives at a conclusion not distant from the privatization thesis Ma Rong 
insists upon. He speaks of “mutual penetration,” but he never speaks of general 
multilingualism in national education (e.g. the promotion of the Uyghur language or 
Tibetan to the status of an optional second language in school curriculum nationwide) 
and political deliberation (e.g. in the national congress). The apparent radicality of his 
vision is merely contradicted by the conservativeness of his example and the 
interpretation he provides of it.  
I trace the arguments of Ma Rong and Wang Hui not merely because they are the two 
most influential voices in contemporary China on the politics of ethnicity. What I find 
critical is a hidden commonality shared by both, though they offer apparently 
contradictory solutions: both are against identity politics, and both propose to offer 
possible political alternatives according to which ethnic difference is subordinated to 
inter-ethnic exchange. Both attempt to stand in a “neutral” position untainted by 
particularistic ethnic concern, and both try to rend r ethnic difference governable by 
reducing the question to one of inter-ethnic relation. For Ma Rong, the privatization of 
difference and the eradication of redistribution along ethnic lines will clear the political 
obstacle to “ethnic fusion (minzu ronghe)” and strengthen a Chinese “national 
consciousness” beyond ethnic identification. Inter-ethnic marriage constitutes for Ma 
Rong a major factor in gauging the extent of this “fusion.” Wang Hui, on the other hand, 
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seldom speaks of inter-ethnic marriage. His version of i ter-ethnic relations is dominated 
by a politico-economic framework: he speaks of the organization of the regional 
economy and changes in modes of production, and how ethnic difference and inter-ethnic 
relations are embedded in the networks of economic circulation that cut across the 
boundaries of ethnic territories.  
As will be seen in this dissertation (especially in chapter six), Wang Hui’s view 
represents the apotheosis of a biopolitical logic that defines the socialist governance of 
ethnic difference. To subsume Wang Hui’s view under this biopolitical regime is 
simultaneously to enquire into the potential relationship between this governance and the 
governance of sexuality under the late socialist condition. Though he does not speak 
explicitly of sexuality, the terms Wang adopts to describe the dynamic formation of 
“trans-systemic society” have strong sexual implications: ethnic “contact (jiechu), 
blending (hunza), alliance (lianjie), and fusion (ronghe).” Slightly beneath the analysis of 
economic circulation, there lurks the spectral figure of sex. The formation of the 
“Chinese nation” appears to be the result of the constant circulation between two 
interlinked economies: the political economy of production and the sexual economy of 
(re)production. The ultimate question would be, What is the relationship between 
biopolitics and the organization of sexuality as manifested particularly in late socialist 
China’s governance of ethnic difference? Put differently, Is there an intrinsic connection 
between the socialist politics of ethnicity and the socialist governance of sexuality?10 
                                                   




It is within this specific conceptual field measured by the mutually complementary 
views of Ma Rong and Wang Hui that we can find the particular yet intriguing 
connection between the Hui and the politics of ethnic difference in contemporary China. 
To the Hui ethno-religious imaginary, “ethnic fusion” through “inter-ethnic marriage” is 
not a vision but a “fact;” “mutual penetration” is not a political program but the definitive 
moment in the ethno-historical narrative. The organiz tion of inter-ethnic relations is 
internal to the Hui’s self-imagination, and this internaliztion hinges precisely upon the 
normalization of sexuality according to the heteronormative and masculinist “deployment 
of alliance.” Seen through the prism of the Hui, the t eoretical and political limit of 
Wang Hui’s Habermasian notion of “public communication” becomes particularly clear: 
there is no guarantee that this “communication” is not intrinsically bent by power 
relations and structured by specific symbolic orders. “Mutual penetration” could easily 
degenerate into a politics of sexual exclusion and ethnic discrimination.  
China’s socialist politics of ethnicity cannot be sub umed under the liberal framework 
not merely because of the reign of an authoritarian regime. As chapter five will 
demonstrate, ethnicity under the socialist condition is endowed with a special political 
publicity not present in liberal politics. The orthodox communist position on the ethnic 
issue – that the ethnic question can be reduced to class politics – prompted the early CCP 
to adopt a radical stance in the 1930s. The paradoxical consequence is that it is precisely 
because the ethnic question was considered politically irrelevant to socialism that it had 
been – and continues to be – politicized to such an extent as to have become the 
touchtone of socialist politics. This dialectical break betwen theoretical invisibility and 
political hyper-visibility is precisely the general dilemma that haunts contemporary 
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China’s governance of ethnic difference. It is also within the general political field 
measured by this dialectic that I attempt to situate the arguments of this dissertation. 
Outline of Chapters 
This dissertation is divided into two parts, complemented by a short conclusion and 
an epilogue. Part I consists of four chapters. In chapter one, instead of providing a 
comprehensive historical introduction of the Hui, I conduct a critical reading of the 
historiographical narratives on Hui ethno-history proffered by Hui historians and 
intellectuals in the early twentieth century. I argue that the discourses formulated to 
buttress the view that the Hui constitutes a distinct ethnic group both presuppose and 
entail an imaginary predicated upon an exclusion that is at least two-fold: the exclusion of 
women and of Han Muslims. These two exclusions are not parallel to each other but 
entwined in a spiral topology, braided and one reinforcing the other in producing 
profound effects. A third exclusion which is situated at a different level but which results 
directly from the spiral entanglement of the woman figure and Han Muslim is the 
exclusion and marginalization of Uyghur Muslims, manifested in the portrayal of them in 
the Hui imaginary as “backward,” “ignorant,” and “savage.” I discuss how this 
exclusionary imaginary is embedded in concrete politica  actions of the Hui intellectuals 
whose books and speeches were and still are widely read and circulated among the Hui. 
Chapter two is based upon my fieldwork in the city of Zhengzhou, provincial capital 
of Henan Province. My main focus is on how urban mosques and the residential structure 
of fang function to produce the institutional conditions by means of which Hui Islam 
takes root in the local social world. I discuss how state laws and administrative 
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regulations transform the institutional structure of the mosque by legally reifying the pre-
existing yet largely informal distinction between the clerical and the lay power that used 
to complement each other in mosque management. This reification entails the rise of the 
localized secular “commission for the democratic management of the mosque” 
(qingzhensi minzhu guanli weiyuanhui, or siguanhui, as it is often shorthanded) and the 
displacement by this secular institution of clerical power in the domain of the mosque. I 
locate this displacement in the larger urban (and to a lesser extent rural) socio-economic 
context that directly influences the material condition upon which the building and 
demolition of the mosque are predicated. Islam as areligion does not spread on its own, 
and its tenacity in the Chinese social world cannot depend exclusively upon the 
formulation of imaginaries. It is because of this that I focus in this chapter on the material 
anchor that fortifies the institutional existence of Hui Islam in the fast changing local 
world. This fortification cuts across ethnicity and religion, and renders the governance of 
the mosque into a form of territorially bound communal autonomy.  
In chapter three, I turn to a different institutional form by virtue of which Hui Islam 
acquires traction in the Sino-centric world. The resid ntial structure of fang, according to 
what I have observed in my fieldwork, exists almost in every Hui settlement, and its 
localized character is discussed in chapter two. Each f ng closes in upon itself and is 
granted a certain (ethnic) autonomy by the local government. In contrast to this 
segmentation and localization of fang, I discuss in chapter three the trans-local and trans-
fang institution of Hui Sufi order in northwest China, focusing more specifically on the 
Jahriyya order due to the fact that Jahriyya is particularly influential in Ningxia and its 
relative organizational strength compared to other orders renders it a good example in 
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examining the institutional existence of contemporary Hui Sufism. Although the 
distribution of Hui Sufism is not limited to northwest China, it is considerably less 
common compared to the prevalence of the institution of fang in Hui Islam. A Sufi 
menhuan, as Sufi order is specifically termed within the Chinese context, often controls 
more than one fang, and the localized “commission for the democratic management of 
the mosque” is often subjected to this trans-fang clerical control whose source of power 
lies ultimately in the hands of the murshid, the Sufi saint presumed to be a close and 
“secret” friend of God who possesses special power of intercession in the Hereafter. I 
unravel the logic of murshid-hood by concentrating on the function of secrecy and its 
various ramifications in the dual and entwined domain of genealogy and materiality. 
Secrecy produces a particularly strong organizationl solidarity which enables the trans-
local link that sustains the continual existence of a Sufi menhuan. I draw a distinction 
between the rule of the actually existing saints and the rule of abstract sainthood itself, 
and discuss the contrastive interpretations applied to each among the Hui Sufi. Gender 
comes up at particularly significant points in my analysis: the figure of the Han woman 
appears at the very site where the saintly genealogy risks irretrievable interruption and 
discontinuity, and her position is seen as both necessary and secondary. By means of her 
ethnic Han identity and her female position (both are inextricably intertwined – this 
constitutes a point of correspondence to the position assigned to the Han woman in the 
modern Hui historical narrative discussed in chapter one), she is able to function as a 
hinge that temporarily conserves the semen of sainthood and later passes it on to the 
subsequent male descendants. She is seen as the “reflection of the glaring light that 
emanates essentially from the man who conquers her” (Zhang, 1990, pp. 216).  
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Chapter four moves on to a different kind of trans-local network that exists among the 
Hui. I study in this chapter the world of Hui clerics: how they are trained, what kind of 
collegial relationship is established in the course of training, how this relationship 
influences both the spread of Islamic knowledge and the attainment of clerical positions, 
and how clerical position is marked by a mobile nature. I also focus on the economic 
situation of Hui clerics and how their basic sustenance, social insurance, and medical 
benefits are provided and by whom. I outline the lega  and administrative space in which 
the clerics are implicated and the specific laws and regulations that unwittingly unchain 
them from the binding of local mosque commissions which hire them. I also compare 
female imams and male imams, and by discussing the particular symbolic ordering 
indexed by the dual term shimu/shiniang, I reveal the structural logic that organizes the 
exclusion of women in the Hui clerical world. 
Chapter five is the short transitional chapter that opens Part II. In this chapter, I 
situate the contemporary dilemma of China’s late socialist politics of ethnicity in the 
broader world of the Chinese communist movement from the 1920s onwards. I trace the 
theoretical and ideological vicissitudes in the communists’ attitude to the ethnic question, 
and demonstrate the central paradox that it is the political irrelevance of ethnicity to the 
communist movement that has made the politics of ethnicity the cross the CCP has to 
bear in its long political journey. I hope to be able to show with concrete detail why it is 
critical not to reduce the itinerary of the ethnic question in the (late) socialist China to a 
liberal genealogy of self-determination, which perhaps has become the hegemonic 
political imaginary in theorizing and analyzing the politics of ethnicity after the Second 
World War and the decolonization movements.    
47 
 
Both chapters six and seven confront the socialist poli ics of ethnicity in a more direct 
manner. Although the arguments proposed therein are not specific to the Hui, the 
historiographical and ethnographic work conducted drives primarily from my study of 
the Hui and is necessarily limited by this basic parameter. In chapter six, by critically 
reading the communist archive, I trace the formulation of a major socialist political 
arrangement in the governance of ethnic difference, amely ethnic regional autonomy. 
Instead of adopting the commonplace view that the Cinese ethnic regional autonomy is 
merely a reiteration of its original in the Soviet Union, I argue that this “Chinese version” 
bears its own specific logic irreducible to both the classical socialist practice and to the 
liberal politics of redistribution and recognition. Neither self-determination nor the legal-
juridical framework of individual or collective rights can fully account for the specificity 
of the Chinese variation of ethnic regional autonomy. On the one hand, I maintain that at 
particularly critical points, this regional autonomy takes on a decidedly biopolitical form 
and follows a biopolitical logic in its governance of ethnic difference. On the other, I also 
attend to the spectral character of the socialist poli ics of ethnicity as it manifests itself in 
the strangely tenacious power regional autonomy commands in the imaginary of the Hui, 
to the point where one cannot locate a “properly” ethnic question and the line which 
separates a question i volving ethnic minorities and a “properly” ethnic question cannot 
be effectively sustained. A dispute on property relations involving ethnic minorities, for 
instance, could easily somersault into an ethnic issue, and the politics of ethnicity is 
invoked in order to stake claims that do not intrinsically pertain to ethnicity. I try not to 
completely reduce this pervasiveness of “the ethnic question” to the instrumentalist point 
of view (although instrumentalism is certainly present), since the ghostly grip on the 
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minorities of the spectral politics of ethnicity is empirically observable. More often than 
not, ethnic minorities themselves – here I can in fact only speak of the Hui whom I have 
studied – cannot draw a clear distinction between th  question involving ethnic minorities 
and a “properly” ethnic question, for, if I am a Hui and my house has been razed to the 
ground just to clear the space for a lucrative housing project, should I not take this to be 
an “ethnic question” since I am indeed a member of the ethnic minorities and my 
livelihood has been gravely endangered? 
In chapter seven, I study a different aspect of the socialist politics of ethnicity. Based 
upon my ethnographic work among the Hui cadres both in Zhengzhou and Ningxia, I 
examine in this chapter the institutional logic in the state appointment of ethnic cadres. In 
contrast to the ethnic deputies in the National Congress and the CPPCC who are often 
seen as puppets barely able to represent the interests of ethnic minorities to the state, 
ethnic cadres, given their more “direct” form of power in the administrative domain, are 
looked on as possessing “real” power. However, due to the basic constitutional premise 
that “the ethnic question” had already been solved by the time when socialism was first 
established and secured in China in the 1950s, the political representation of ethnic 
minorities is not mediated by a public sphere that c n re-frame the parochial ethnic 
interests in universal terms exposed to public debate and recognized by all sides. The 
political representation by ethnic cadres therefore bears an internal paradox: the absence 
of the public sphere and the relocation of ethnic iterests in the administrative domain 
create a short circuit and essentially privatize thpolitical representation of ethnic 
minorities. This paradox manifests itself in the double-edged character “ethnic sentiments” 
assume in the regime of representation: on the one ha d, the representative power of 
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ethnic cadres is seen by the Communist state to reside in their “ethnic sentiments,” in the 
“natural bond” that supposedly connects them to “their own people.” The immediacy of 
this “natural bond” is considered to guarantee thatey are most capable of relaying the 
interests of their own ethnic group to the state. On the other, however, it is precisely the 
same “natural bond” that simultaneously silences the voice of ethnic cadres, since what 
they say would immediately be seen as a direct reflection of their unmediated and 
spontaneous “ethnic sentiments” by definition not based upon logical reasoning. The 
privatization of the political representation of ethnic minorities locates ethnic cadres in a 
position where speaking is structurally foreclosed. They cannot not betray what they are 
supposed to do, and the institutional position they are given to inhabit is itself an 








Narratives of Exclusion: History, Ethnicity, 
Politics 
 
A criticism one frequently comes across when going through Hui Muslim 
publications in the Republican period (1912-1949) pivots on the notion of the “state.” It 
was often argued, by the Hui imams who could read and write Chinese and by a selective 
few young Hui intellectuals receiving education from modern colleges and universities, 
that the Hui Muslims in China – that is, the ordinary Hui who were different from them – 
did not have a clear idea of “state;” that they often confused “religion” and “state,” to the 
extent that they took an imaginary land of the “Arabs” as their true “homeland” and 
denied outright that China was the “state” to which they had belonged and would 
continue to belong and in which they had become or were in the process of becoming 
modern citizens. To them, this fantasized political loyalty had made the ordinary Hui 
particularly resistant to sending their children for an education in Chinese, despite the fact 
that Chinese had long been the native language spoken among the Hui. In an article 
published in 1929 in the most prominent Hui journal i  the Republican period, Moonlight 
(Yuehua), an author with the penname “Liu Zhou” (Six Continents) took upon himself a 
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rehearsal of this hackneyed critique. In his view, the major sickness of the Hui was two-
fold: on the one hand, many Hui refused to send their c ildren for an education in literary 
Chinese and thereby deprived their descendants of the opportunities of learning the 
language of “their own country” and absorbing the “igh culture” (gaoshang wenhua) 
that came with this education. On the other, notwithstanding the efforts of a few 
“knowledgeable Hui,” most ordinary Hui Muslims – the ones who were “insane” (hunkui) 
in Liu Zhou’s opinion – continued to refuse to accept China as their “fatherland” and 
Chinese as their “native language,” and continued to take Turkey and the “Arab countries” 
as their genuine home and Arabic as their mother tongue, despite the fact that Chinese 
was practically the language under daily use (Liu, 1929, pp. 2). 
Liu Zhou’s criticism was intended to waken the ordinary Hui from their “insanity” 
and to set them to face up to their most urgent poli ical responsibility as citizens of the 
new Republic. He did not take time to question the essentialized and reified relationship 
established between Islam, Arabic, and the Arab in the imaginary of the Hui he criticized. 
Perhaps he himself was not exempt from this quite tenacious essentialization that was 
prevalent among the Hui, both the elites and the comm n poor. A homogenization of 
both Islam and “the Arab” was endemic in the Hui literature of this (and later) period. In 
an essay published in 1930 in the same journal, for instance, an eminent Hui intellectual 
professed to introduce to his readers “the Islamic culture,” although what followed, in his 
own words, was exclusively “the Arab culture.” The dual fact that Islam was far more 
complex and heterogeneous than the “Arab culture” and that the kind of “Arab culture” 
he hastened to present was by no means exclusively “Arabian” (e.g. the adoption of 
Greek philosophy into Islamic theology, the “House of Wisdom” in Baghdad, the 
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exquisite Persian literature, the groundbreaking contribution to Islamic learning made by 
the Muslim scholars in Al-Andalus, etc.) was merely overshadowed by his anxious desire 
to demonstrate the past grandiosity of the Islamic civilization (Li, 1930b, pp. 1). 
But the gaze of the Hui elite intellectuals was fixed primarily inward and upon the 
still fledgling Republic of China. A particular saying, either openly criticized or 
implicitly attributed to those who were placed under criticism, haunted the writings of 
many of these Hui intellectuals: that the Hui should “fight only for [their] religion, and 
leave the state to whoever cares (zhengjiao bu zhengguo).” It was so paraphrased by 
another author who presented this saying to foreground his own critique, “It is the state of 
the infidels, not mine. So why do I have to fight to protect it?” (bi waijiao de zhongguo 
yuwo hegan?) (Ma, 1930, pp. 2) 
Although it was often acknowledged that this saying had a long history among the 
Hui, no one who made this criticism seemed to know where and how it originated. Even 
the nuance and ambiguity of the expression are erased both by the paraphrasing above 
and by my own expedient English rendition. Zhengjiao bu zhengguo could in fact also 
have an entirely different meaning. Instead of portraying a population of disinterested, 
even inactive Hui, unconcerned with the invasion and occupation of China by Western 
colonial forces, it could also be taken to transmit a different message that had become 
almost completely illegible to some (by no means all) Hui intellectuals after the fall of 
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911): zhengjiao bu zhengguo could also be translated as “[we] 
fight only to preserve [our] religion, and not to take over [your] state.” It could be re-
located in a history of imperial suspicion by the ruling Manchus, violent state oppression, 
and enforced expropriations as a result of failed military revolts; it could be connected to 
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the successive and invariably defeated Hui rebellions in northwest and southwest China 
that spanned the entire period of the Manchu dynast11. I  could, in other words, be read 
as a defensive slogan, a message sent perhaps by Hui elites in order to anxiously 
pronounce their loyalty to the Qing court and to demonstrate their disinterest in the 
pursuit of political power. “What was the meaning of zhengjiao bu zhengguo [in imperial 
times]?” asked an essay published in Huizu Qingnian (“The Hui Youth”) in 1934, and the 
author proceeded to provide an answer, 
If our faith was in danger, we would spare no effort in defending it against 
the perpetrator. But if it was a question of conquering the polity and 
snatching the throne (zhengniantian zuohuangdi), we the Hui would not 
participate – that was not what we wanted.  
(Xue, 1934, pp. 1) 
This view was shared by Bai Chongxi (Omar), a prominent Hui military general in the 
Nationalist KMT whose unwavering political support of Hui Islam earned him long-
lasting respect among Hui intellectuals despite thedisrepute he later suffered in 
Communist propaganda: “After the devastation we the Hui have suffered at the hands of 
the Manchu Qing Dynasty, many of us are afflicted by a resistance to engage politics. As 
                                                   
11 These rebellions do not share a common mode, nor a c mmon purpose, and for most, only tenuous and 
disputable connections can be established between Islam and the oppressions. Some initially started as 
infightings among the Hui (in fact, many participants and protagonists were Salar Muslims). The 
successive revolts of the Jahriyya Sufi order in northwest China, for instance, started from a quarrel 
between Jahriyya Sufism and the older Khufiyya Sufism both on religious issues such as how dhikr should 
be performed (whether silently or loudly) and on organizational matters, as the younger Jahriyya was 
attracting more followers at the expense of the Khufiyya order. The Qing troops were brought in to quench 
the fight and to exterminate Jahriyya Sufism defined, with much intervention of the Khufiyya order, as  
“heterodoxy” of the Hui religion that should be purged for the sake of local peace. The Hui revolts in 
Yunnan, for another example, had as much to do with local economic competition between and among the 
Hui and the Han in terms of the extraction of mineral resources as with ethnic conflicts that eventually 
invited state suppression. One could not, in other words, reduce them to a singular and uniform model f 
political rebellion intended to conquer the imperial polity or to realize some millenarian Islamic vision. 
There is an enormous amount of literature on almost every aspect of these complex movements. For Hui 
revolts in northwest China including but not limited to Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai, see Feng, Li, & 
Zhang, 1990; Zhang, 1990; Lipman, 1997, 1981; Bai, 1953; Gao, 1998; Li & Yu, 1988; Shao & Han, 1992; 
Wang, 1968. For Hui rebellions in southwest China, see Atwill, 2006; X. Ma, 2007, pp. 45-53; Wang, 1968. 
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a result, some of us have the conviction that we zh ngjiao bu zhengguo. But this is 
wrong…” (Bai, 1943, pp. 3)  
Still, we cannot be sure when, where, and how this ub quitous saying originated. But 
the lack of this knowledge should not prevent us from pondering with caution the 
contrastive meanings given to it by two opposed readings situated in two completely 
different political contexts. A slogan presumed to result previously from a self-defensive 
gesture that attempted to preserve Islam by claiming political subjection was now 
seriously accused of buttressing the passivity and indifference of the Hui to the political 
destiny of an endangered China. It was thought that although zhengjiao bu zhengguo had 
been a strategy conducive to the precarious survival and periodic thriving of Hui Islam in 
the imperial times, it now stood in the way of the Hui’s performing their new roles as 
actively engaged citizens of the new nation-state. Instead of closing in upon themselves 
as minorities only conditionally tolerated under the domination of a Manchu dynasty, the 
Hui should – in the eyes of the elite intellectuals – reach out to the broader world and let 
their voices be heard in the collective making of the new state. There was, in other words, 
nothing worse than indifference and apathy under such circumstance. 
It is around this particular stance of the Hui intellectuals in the Republican period that 
I shall organize this chapter. These intellectuals were constantly on the watch and in the 
position of speaking out and to a general Han audience; they situated themselves not as a 
parochial minority confined either geographically or politically within their own world, 
but as a minority that was tightly bound up with the Han majority, even as an i ternal 
part of the latter, thinking for them, in the place of them, perhaps at times even as them. It 
was as if, paradoxically, the Hui were seen as an intrinsic part of a new China imagined 
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to belong primarily to the Han. It is this peculiar maginary and its ramifications in the 
historical narratives and political actions of the Hui intellectuals that form one major 
theme of this chapter. 
This means, first and foremost, that this chapter deals only with a fraction of the more 
general world of Hui Islam in the Republican period. This does not mean that the 
historiographical discourses and political positions of the Hui intellectuals formed a 
completely separate world detached from the life of ordinary Hui. As a matter of fact, 
many of these so-called elite intellectuals were deply involved in the local Hui world 
and attempted, by means of writing and travelling, to intervene in the wider world of Hui 
Islam. Their historiographical narratives, buttressed by professional historical knowledge, 
were not telling a story considerably different from what was imagined in popular 
narratives. To a large extent, what they did came close to a crystallization that gave to the 
popular narratives their coherency and made them more c nvincing by providing 
whatever historical “evidence” might come handy. Neither should we underestimate the 
contemporary effects of these discourses and political positions. Their books are still read 
and recommended, and their politics still admired among many Hui whom I interviewed. 
For countless times, I was told to refer to “history” so as to learn more about the Hui, and 
the “history” to which I was referred was almost invariably these historiographical 
discourses laid down in the first half of the 20th century.  
But the limit of what is subsequently discussed should nonetheless be emphasized. 
For even if the elite intellectuals might be seen as merely intervening to give popular 
narratives their coherency and relative accuracy, their intervention nonetheless moved in 
different directions. They grappled with the popular stories instead of merely 
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recapitulating them, and they made their own share of changes so as to lead the narratives 
in particular directions that closely followed their political concern. They built upon 
popular sayings and reworked them into canonized historiographical discourses which 
were then spread by print media and public speeches. It i  arguable that these Hui 
intellectuals played the role of professional writers and speakers among the Hui: they 
monopolized the field of speaking and their voices w re made by later Hui to stand in for 
the entire “Hui” taken as a group. Both readings of zhengjiao bu zhengguo, for instance, 
were proposed by Hui elite intellectuals. All voices that could be heard – i.e. recorded in 
publications and still in part legible to me the contemporary student of the Hui – 
belonged to those who were literate in Chinese, and who bothered to send their essays 
and comments to the publishers. The fact that the historical narratives from which this 
chapter develops much of its argument are in Chinese already partially determines whose 
voices would be audible and how those voices could become legible.  To be sure, not all 
Hui were interested in constructing a coherent narrative on Hui history, and perhaps even 
fewer were interested in being included as modern “citizens” in the new Republic, as 
many other Han who were equally seen by Han activists a  the “ignorant ”subjects 
waiting to be “enlightened” by the truth of modern statehood. This certainly does not 
mean that they preferred to be excluded or they indeed thought of the imaginary “Arab 
land” as their “state” in the sense given to this word by the politically impassioned elite 
intellectuals. Their image could come to us only distorted by the criticism to which they 
had been subjected, and we could only surmise their pos tions – if they indeed had them – 
negatively through the words of those who professed to be their educators. In other words, 
what this chapter discusses cannot be presumed to represent any general viewpoint of 
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“the Hui.” The conditions both of the speaking whose effects were recorded in print and 
the reading which proposes to decipher the message implicated therein might well limit 
what is reachable and what not, what is legible and worthy to be deciphered and what not. 
However much the voices presented in the following differ from each other, they 
nonetheless fall within an intellectual circle, an exclusive discursive field only some had 
access to and were qualified to enter. 
To accentuate this point is also to foreground another crucial fact that subtends this 
chapter: only some Hui, because of the particular institutional positions they inhabit (e.g. 
as intellectuals educated in modern universities where they are surrounded by Han peers, 
or as eminent clerics traveling widely across the country and invited to deliver speeches 
to a general multi-ethnic audience for the purpose of introducing Hui Islam – to mention 
only two such positions), feel the compulsion to explain to others who the Hui are, why 
and how Hui Islam differs from Han popular religions, what belongs to “Islam proper” 
and what belongs to local Hui variations (“customs and folklores”) that should be 
reformed, and what shall be done to lift the Hui masses out of their “ignorance” and 
political insensitivity. The anxiety to speak and to converse with a broader world is 
unevenly distributed among the Hui, and this uneven distribution might owe as much to 
the differential institutional positions different Hui inhabit as to the different environment 
(rural or urban, the density of Hui population, or the residential pattern according to 
which the local Hui and Han population is distributed) in which they are inscribed.  
The emergence of modern print media has certainly reconfigured the structure of this 
uneven distribution. Both between 1912 and 1949 and after the Communist take-over, for 
instance, there had been an enormous number of cases of Hui protest – some particularly 
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vehement – that targeted “insults” of Muslims in popular readings and school textbooks 
that included Islam as a chapter on world history. What counted as “insult” was highly 
heterogeneous: it ranged from the explanation of the Islamic taboo against pork in terms 
of a totemic worshipping of the pig, to a secular ch onological location of Islam as a 
religion established by Muhammad at a particular point in history (instead of a religion 
created by God at the same time he created the world). Some protests demanded that a 
judicious history of Islam be published, while others attempted and invariably failed to 
replace the (biased) secular teaching on Islam in the textbook with a presumably 
orthodox Muslim viewpoint. In 1930, a public letter addressed to the State Bureau of 
Education was published in Moonlight, accusing the Commercial Press – the leading 
press for publishing academic literature and school textbooks in China – of letting out 
“misleading” world history and geography textbooks used for junior high school. After 
insisting that Islam was not an exclusive and intolerant religion and attributing the 
stigmatization of Islam as violent militarism to West rn imperial slander, the letter 
proceeded to provide what in its author’s view was a “correct” presentation of the Islamic 
religion that should be used in public education: “The Hui religion, or Islam as it is called 
in Western history, was established at the time of Adam, the ancestor of all humanity. It 
was gradually forgotten, until the time of Muhammad…” (Yi, 1930, pp. 3) 
Whether many of those who had been provoked into the occasionally fiery protests 
had read those “insulting” essays on their own remained a question. The spread of print 
media was not an indicator of an increase in popular literacy, and many of the Hui 
protestors might in fact only have heard such insults from those who either had read the 
articles themselves or heard it still from others. Furthermore, the anxiety to speak is not 
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necessarily the same as the desire to converse – to replace an “insult” with one’s own 
viewpoint presupposes a gesture of speaking that loc es the other purely in the position 
of listening. In the example above, it was not a conversation that was sought, but merely 
a unilateral imposition. The purpose was not so much to provoke public debates that lead 
in directions no one could foresee as to “educate” o hers into an “orthodox” view which 
was acceptable to oneself. In other words, not onlywas the anxiety (and the ability) to 
speak continued to be unevenly distributed despite the flourishing of the modern print 
media, there also existed more than one stance and more than one posture that could 
materialize the desire to speak – this desire could as well lead to a refusal to converse 
with the broader world. 
Having foregrounded the complexity, heterogeneity and intrinsic limit of the 
discursive field discussed in the following, I shall l y out what I intend to explicate in this 
chapter. My interest in this chapter is two-fold: first, instead of providing a necessarily 
disputable history of the Hui, I engage in a critical reading of the historiographical 
discourse on Hui ethnicity crafted and canonized by Hui intellectuals from early to mid-
20th century. The canonization of this discourse was abetted by the propaganda work of 
the rising Communist Party (CCP), which based its own argument on Hui ethnicity 
largely upon the narratives published in Hui journals, periodicals, and pamphlets, and 
whose interpretations of historical “evidences” fell much in line with those offered by 
Hui elite intellectuals. This discourse, as I shall try to demonstrate in the following pages, 
is organized by a sexual economy characterized by an imaginary dissymmetry in an 
exchange of woman: the Hui are always located on the side that accepts wives in a 
unilateral marriage that binds the Hui to the Han. This fantasized dissymmetry relates 
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directly to another imaginary that structures this discourse: that the Hui possess the truth, 
the genuine Dao, or the hope of political redemption hat is much desired by the Han. The 
Hui are seen in this discourse as situated at the site where the desire of the Han is 
imagined to be located. This sexual economy at onceeffectuates two founding exclusions: 
on the one hand, by trying to argue that the Hui are not Han Muslim converts and Islam is 
a “special religion” that simultaneously entails an ethnicity, “Han Muslim” is rendered 
into a contradiction in terms. According to the logic of this discourse, one cannot become 
a “Han Muslim” without necessarily becoming an ethnic Hui.12 The possibility that one 
could be a Han and a Muslim at one and the same time is from the outset foreclosed. This 
foreclosure paradoxically locates the Hui intellectuals at the very site of “Han Muslim,” 
despite – or precisely because of – their verbal disavowal. On the other, because of the 
particular kind of relationship between the Hui and the Han organized by the 
dissymmetrical sexual exchange of woman, this discourse positions the Hui at a place 
internal to the Han majoritarian republic, and Hui Islam in this context is turned into 
something that is both Han and non-Han. This ambiguity entails an ambivalent attitude to 
the Uyghur Muslims manifested in this discourse. Sharing the same religion, Uyghur 
Muslims are nonetheless seen as “ignorant” and “backw rd” subjects easily duped by 
                                                   
12 I might be criticized as deliberately making a distinction that to some scholars did not exist for the Hui at 
this time. Dru Gladney, for instance, argued that te name “Hui” in the Republican period was a generic 
religious term that designated all Muslims (Gladney, 1991, pp. 65-115; see also Gladney, 1998a; 1998b, 
2004). In this context, a Han Muslim is immediately a Hui – but not an “ethnic Hui,” only a “religious Hui.” 
I agree with him on the wide usage of “Hui” in designating all varieties of Muslims in imperial and 
Republican China: Uyghur Muslims were called “chantou Hui” (turban Hui), Salar Muslims Salar Hui, 
Kazakh Muslims Kazakh Hui, etc. However, I think to reduce “Hui” merely to a religious marker and to 
argue, for instance, that when the Hui intellectuals were talking about Hui ethnicity they were in fact only 
thinking of a generic Muslim identity, might gloss over the critical ambivalence implicated in their 
discourse. I have chosen, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, to take the discourse I study literally, and to probe 
what is meant or what might have been meant by “Hui ethnicity” differentiated from a “purely religious” 
identity defined in this discourse. It is also because of this that I would take caution against Gladney’s 
assertion that Hui ethnicity is merely “invented” by the Communist state which imposes its scheme of 
ethnic classification upon previously interacting “co-religionists” (Gladney, 1991, pp. 17). 
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colonial powers and who therefore must be “enlightened” by the more “civilized” Hui 
closer to the “advanced” Han. Many Hui intellectuals professed to speak for Chinese 
Islam in general and freely expressed what they thoug t the future of the Uyghur 
Xinjiang should be, without for a moment bothering to listen to any Uyghur voice (and 
most, if not all, of them could not speak the Uyghur language). The exclusion of Uyghur 
Muslims strongly marks this discourse and the politics hat goes with it.13 
Second, in this chapter, I am also interested in how at the same time when these Hui 
ethno-historical narratives were crafted and debated in the print media, the same group of 
Hui intellectuals and clerics were also carrying their staunch commitment to the Chinese 
(Han) nationalistic cause into actual politics, both domestic and international. The 
attempt to argue that the Hui were not Han Muslims went alongside with a strong 
conviction, that were China to be defeated and colonized by the Western colonial powers, 
Hui Islam would necessarily lose the condition of its existence, and forced apostasy (“the 
West” was rendered tantamount to a militant and intolerant white Christianity – the 
Western racist and biased image of Islam was merely versed and attributed to 
Christianity itself) would necessarily ensue. It was argued that the protection of Hui Islam 
and its continual flourishing in China urgently demanded that the Hui rise up and become 
responsible modern citizens for their own sake; that o persist with the old wisdom of 
zhengjiao bu zhengguo amounted to no less than engaging in an active complicity with 
the colonial powers against the good of the Hui religion itself. The struggle against 
                                                   
13 By solely emphasizing the exclusion of Uyghur Muslim  in this discourse, I run the risk of yet again 
excluding other even less visible Muslim minorities n China. I should therefore remind the readers that
compared to Uyghur Muslims who received much attention because of Xinjiang’s political significance in 
the early 20th century, other Muslim minorities – many of whom also live in Xinjiang or its surrounding 
areas – had largely been consigned to oblivion, or placed far at the margin of the visible field. We should 
not forget this critical point as we read how Uyghur Muslims were excluded or rendered inaudible by the 
Hui intellectual discourse discussed in this chapter. 
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colonialism and the imagination of a modern nation-state became in this context an 
integral part of the new religious reformation propounded by many Hui activist 
intellectuals. The particular kind of Pan-Islamism or global Islam envisioned and upheld 
by these Hui elites was very different from the nostalgia for a unified, politically 
centralized, and militarily invincible Islamic caliphate (one reason behind this, as we 
shall see, is the strong connection between Pan-Islmi m and Pan-Turkism in this period). 
Few – if any – criticized the abolition of the caliph by Ataturk. Modern Turkey, as a 
matter of fact, was unreservedly celebrated as a succe sful political model worth 
emulating for the entire “Islamic world.” The basic attitude among these Hui elites was 
that it was only modern statehood (no clear distinctio  was drawn between an Islamic 
state and a secular state with Muslim majority) that could save Islam from its doom in the 
hands of the Western imperial forces. Specifically for the Hui, this state was and could 
only be the modern Republic of China. In the same manner yet somewhat 
counterintuitively, these Hui thought in the 1940s that it was only the modern state of 
India that could be the political redemption of Indian Muslims. The establishment of an 
independent state of Pakistan, according to the dominant view among the Hui elites who 
observed from afar and attempted to intervene to help their Indian brothers, would 
inevitably play into the hands of British colonial power and subject Islam to the 
imperialist strategy of divide-and-conquer (Kin, 1943). For them, the most effective 
resistance to world capitalism was a transnational u ited front of all subjugated nations 
and races with Muslims at its core – the Hui, in this vision forming a particularly 
significant link that could connect world Muslims and the Chinese Han (seen by the Hui 
intellectuals as two major populations that constitute a considerable part of the entire 
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subjugated world), was situated in a special strategic position in the broader global 
struggle against Western colonial imperialism.  
Ethnicity as Icon 
Two stories that both feature an exchange relationsh p pervade the popular accounts 
given of the Hui history. One revolves around a royal dream: it was said that one night in 
the second year of Zhenguan (628 A.D., during the Chinese Tang Dynasty [618-970 
A.D.]), the Taizong Emperor – later commemorated in the Chinese imperial history for 
his supposedly cosmopolitan ambition and open-minded acceptance of multi-ethnicity 
under his jurisdiction – had a curious dream. He dreamt of being attacked by a vicious 
monster. The image painted of the devil was ghastly: fire-red beard, charcoal-black face, 
an immense gaping mouth with sharp tusks projecting outward. Frightened and stunned, 
the emperor was rescued in the dream by a strange figure: a bearded man with sharp 
facial characters, wearing an exotic turban, and dressed in exquisite clothes. Somewhat 
curiously, he held in his hands a mysterious scroll that seemed to possess special magical 
power. The next morning when the emperor met his ministers for a regular meeting and 
shared his dream requesting an interpretation from his courtiers, one of them advised that 
according to his astrological observation and calcul tion, a sage – a “Hui King” – had 
been born in “the West” whose morality was “impeccable” and whose governance 
“commendable” – “His realm overflowed with riches and his troops were invincible 
(guofu bingqiang)” (Baoshantang, pp. 1). Of all lands under Heaven, the courtier 
continued, only “the West” could give birth to this “real man” (zhenren) who brought 
with him a sacred revelation that was the most auspicious of all words. If Taizong wanted 
to overcome the evil power of the haunting ghosts, he said, he must send for this “Hui 
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King,” invite him to the Tang court for an exorcism, and treat him and his disciples with 
respect. The Taizong emperor heeded this suggestion and immediately sent an envoy to 
“the Western Dominion” (xiyu). According to the storyline, this initiated the vry first 
official communication between the “Heavenly Realm” (tianfang) of the Prophet (the 
“Hui King”) and the Chinese empire.  
Different names have been given to this story whose variegated versions were first 
orally transmitted and then printed as flimsy pamphlets as the technology gradually 
evolved in the late imperial and Republican periods: one name being Hui-Hui Yuanlai 
(the origins of the Hui-Hui), another Xilai Zongpu (genealogy of the migration from the 
West). A third name, however, might be more indicative of the hidden message conveyed 
by the structure of exchange that runs through this story: Tangwang Tandao (the Tang 
emperor seeking Dao). The Hui, in other words, were portrayed as possessing the true 
Dao, the efficacious Dao, which was actively sought after by the people of “the East,” 
and especially by the open-minded and somewhat anxious Chinese emperor. The story 
does not merely narrate a fantasized history of migration initiated by a “dream.” It also 
reveals how those who narrated and passed off this s ory imagined themselves in the 
Sino-centric world: they were invited to this land to fulfill a royal obligation, and to 
spread a true Dao that could only come with them from “the West.” Although 
numerically a minority, they nonetheless considered themselves far superior spiritually. 
Various print versions of the story (and all those which I have read and heard) spoke an 
unmistakably Confucian language and tried – sometimes in too direct a manner as to 
become self-defeating – to show that it was the teaching of the Hui – i.e. Islam – that had 
spoken the Confucian message in a much better and more coherent way, as if 
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Confucianism was teleologically realized by Muhammad and culminated in a “Western” 
teaching that both fulfilled its ethical mission and at one and the same time canceled the 
necessity of its continual existence. Islam was turned in this story into the apotheosis of 
Confucianism, and the truth of the (Han) other was re-located at the site of one’s own 
being. The Hui became in this story not the descendants of foreign Muslim migrants as 
much as the spiritual mentors necessarily demanded by the intrinsic inadequacy of 
Confucianism in its aspiration to realize its own moral and ethical ambitions. This initial 
myth founded – again, only among those who narrated nd believed – an imaginary mode 
of relationship that located the Hui w thin the Sino-centric world and as an integral part 
of its cosmological and ethical pursuit. To become th  desire of the (Han) other – or to 
imagine oneself as possessing the object desired by the other – may be seen as the 
fundamental structure that organizes the libidinal economy that runs through this story. 
The second story is no less – perhaps even more – dr amy than the actual dream 
thematized in the first. A different structure of exchange forms the backbone of its 
narrative. Compared to the first story, it was more diffused, less structured, and certainly 
lacking in details – which made it, paradoxically, rarely questioned (even resistant to 
questioning) by both Hui intellectuals and non-Hui historians and anthropologists.  It was 
said that the Hui were descendants of a particular kind of marriage: the male Arab and 
Persian merchants who travelled to China in imperial times married local Han women, 
and the Hui were the offspring of this union. The gender asymmetry in this narrative of 
ethnic origin was barely hidden and much emphasized among those who upheld its 
historical truthfulness. The Hui’s ancestors were situated invariably at the “receiving” 
end in the exchange of woman, and it was the female H n wives who in this story 
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converted the Arab and Persian merchants into “Chinese” and who, with the same stroke, 
“translated” Islam into the Sino-centric world. The figure of the Han woman was 
assigned a structural position that resembled a connector that functioned to link two 
masculinist patriarchal worlds. Her importance was marked, however, only by her blatant 
invisibility. In the beginning of this popular Hui history, there was always a woman 
figure, but this woman was always nebulous and portrayed invariably as a “wife,” and 
even her shadow was barely recognizable either in the narrative of provenance 
constructed exclusively by male Hui intellectuals – as we shall see shortly – or in popular 
stories orally transmitted within a male-centered Hui world.  
The historical narratives discussed in this chapter all professed to go beyond the 
above two stories which, certainly not denied, were nonetheless thought to be derived 
from legends and hearsay tainted by the inaccuracy and vulgarity often attributed to 
popular sayings. But the dual structure of exchange – the imagining of oneself as the 
object of the other’s desire and the fantasized portrayal of oneself at the “receiving” end 
in a unilateral and asymmetrical exchange of woman – u dergirds most, if not all, of the 
narratives of history I am interested in. It is criti al, I think, that we mark the place of 
woman in this economy of desire, especially when the two storylines from which I have 
crystalized the dual structure converge at certain sites whose apparent insignificance 
might be thought precisely to be indexical of their irreducible importance. In one version 
of Tangwang Tandao which I have acquired in my fieldwork, it is the following sentence 
that ends the entire story, 
The Tang emperor sent three thousand troops to the Western Dominion in 
exchange for three Hui soldiers [who would accompany the Hui envoy 
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and help them spread the Islamic teaching in China]. These Hui soldiers 
stayed in China and reproduced a  infinitum (shengyu wuqiong).  
 
(Baoshantang, pp. 11) 
 
“[The male Hui soldiers] reproduced ad infinitum” – the figure of the woman is not even 
mentioned, let alone named. This is the particular kind of language whose more 
intellectual version we shall be dealing with in this chapter. It is perhaps only with a 
complete turn of mind and a hyper-sensitivity to the text that we may start to render 
visible the female figure submerged in the masculinist archive. We can continue to ask: 
What is that object which one possesses that is thought to be desired by the other? Why 
does it seem that the “true Dao” bear a special affinity to a figure of the Han woman? 
Why does it appear that possessing the other’s woman and possessing a Dao desired by 
the other are inextricably intertwined? What is the relationship between the Islamic “Dao” 
and the figure of the Han woman as manifested in this last sentence of Tangwang Tandao? 
The question of “Hui ethnicity” and the particular relation Hui Islam has to the Sino-
centric world cannot be critically addressed unless we keep constantly in mind the hidden 
yet ingrained itinerary of the figure of the Han woman that runs through the narratives on 
Hui history. The making of the Hui Weltanschauung seems to presuppose a specific 
sexual economy in which the woman is structurally muted.  
The intellectuals’ narration of Hui ethno-history in the Republican period was 
situated in a specific historical context and spoke to a “misconception” politically 
injurious in their view. Early on in the Republican period (1911-1949 in mainland China), 
the Nationalist Party (KMT), the ruling party established by Sun Yat-sen, subscribed to 
the view that the Chinese-speaking Hui, different from the Uyghur, were no more than 
Han converts to Islam. The politically correct view was that the only difference between 
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the Hui and the Han was the former’s religious affili tion. According to the official point 
of view, the Hui were not and should not be seen as a minzu, whether in the sense of a 
nation, a nationality, an ethnic group, or a race.14 Those who argued in favor of a minzu 
status for the Hui risked being accused at least of ignorance and at most of treacherous 
agitation intended to decompose the presumptively unified Han precisely at a time when 
nationalistic solidarity was urgently called for in the face of the onslaught of Western 
colonial powers. According to the orthodox view attributed to Sun Yat-sen, the new 
Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu), the nation that was still in the making and without 
which a modern, industrialized and powerful China could not emerge, consisted of five 
different ethnic groups: the Han, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Hui, and the Tibetans. 
But the obvious immediately becomes obscure the moment one starts to push further:  
even if the presumption that the Han is a unified an internally homogeneous group was 
relatively unquestioned in the Republican period,15  the category “Hui” remained 
conspicuously problematic. Since Hui as a single word was often used with an additional 
marker to distinguish between different kinds of Hui (While chantou Hui [turban Hui] 
was the name of Uyghur Muslims and sala Hui the name of Salar Muslims, only the 
name Hui-Hui designated the Chinese-speaking Hui this dissertation is interested in.), 
                                                   
14 The complexity of the term “minzu” and its historical translations and circulations (from Chinese to 
Japanese and then back) in China have been well studied in an enormous amount of academic literature. Its 
particular mutation in relation to the Soviet notion f natsiia undergirds the contemporary debate on the 
politics of ethnicity in China. See, for instance, Ma, 2004; Mullaney, 2011; Pan, 2009b, 2009a; Schein, 
2000; Harrell, 1995, 2001a, 2001b; Litzinger, 2000; Mueggler, 2001; R. Ma, 2010a, 2010c. This might 
constitute a particularly interesting and politically significant case in terms of the so-called “transli gual 
practice” in modern China theorized by Lydia Liu. See Liu, 1995. 
15 This simplified view has of course been questioned by recent scholarship in the field of critical 
historiographical studies. See, for example, Mullaney, 2012. For a specific ethnographic example that takes 
an ethnic group with the name of Qiang to question the homogenous view of the Han, see Wang, 2003. For 
a more general critique that predates and grounds this particularly anthropological insight, see Wang, 1977. 
For earlier work on the historical formation of the “Chinese nation,” see Luo, 1953; Lv, 2008; Li, 1967. 
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who the Hui were that were thought to form a key comp nent of the five founding ethnic 
groups remained vague if without further clarificaton. 
Four years before his death, in 1921, Sun Yat-sen, in a lecture given to the central 
office of KMT, clarified in passing what he meant by “Hui” in his political scheme for 
the multi-ethnic Republic: 
As to the number of the five ethno-nationalities, the Tibetans are just 
around four to five million, the Mongols not even oe million,  the 
Manchus perhaps only several millions, and the followers of the Hui 
teaching [i.e. Islam], although of a big number, are mostly Han. 
(Sun, 1927[1921], pp. 2) 
In other words, whoever the “Hui” designated in Sun Yat-sen’s vision of the new China 
might be, it did not include the Chinese-speaking Hui- ui. There were many who were 
followers of the Hui religion, and many, therefore, had “Hui” as a marker in their names, 
but the Hui-Hui were not considered as belonging to the “Hui” of the five major ethno-
nationalities, and they were seen simply as Han converts to the Hui teaching. This 
deliberate exclusion of the Chinese-speaking Hui could in part be explained by the 
territorial imaginary that subtended Sun’s ethnic differentiation. In the Declaration of the 
Provisional President of Republic of China that he delivered in 1912 minutes after he was 
sworn into office, Sun Yat-sen said after a short preface: 
The foundation of a country lies with its people. To unify the territories 
that belong to the Han, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Hui and the 
Tibetans into one single country, and to unify all of them into one single 
people – this is the unification of the whole nation. 
(Sun, 1912) 
The Chinese original (合漢、滿、蒙、回、藏諸地為一國) established a much stronger 
connection between the ethnonyms and their respective territory, harking back more 
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particularly to the Qing dynastic tradition that named the Uyghur Xinjiang (East 
Turkistan) as Hui-jiang. The Hui land that Sun Tat-sen wanted to incorporate and unify 
into the new Republic was the territory thought to be occupied primarily by the Uyghur 
Muslims. It was, in other words, the paramount concer  with territorial integrity that was 
the foremost consideration in Sun’s mind (cf. Yao, 2004; Matsumoto, 2003; X. Ma, 
2007).  
But there was also an additional consideration that prevented Sun and his KMT from 
drawing a possible distinction between the Han and the Hui. On multiple occasions and 
even after his pronounced affirmation of the formal equality of all of China’s ethnic 
groups under the pressure of the Comintern, Sun argued explicitly for an assimilationist 
Han nationalism, which, however, was slightly different from an unequivocally racist 
Han chauvinism reigning supreme among some Han intellectuals and revolutionaries in 
late Qing and early Republican period. He took the US as the quintessential modern 
nation-state and was clearly aware of the multitude of races and ethnic groups that 
resided within its borders. Sun was an enthusiastic dvocate of the “melting pot” model 
which had, according to him, successfully created a new “American nation” whose 
centripetal force underwrote the extraordinary strength of the American state and its 
global power. In the same vein, Sun aspired to “melt” al  five of China’s ethnic groups 
into one single nation. But this “nation,” however, was ambiguous from the outset and 
constantly vacillated between a new “Chinese nation” modeled on the exemplar of a 
politically defined “American nation” (in which the Han were merely one component and 
progressively de-centered), on the one hand, and an expanded “Han nation” that had 
assimilated all other four, on the other. He was not unaware that this inconsistency might 
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elicit harsh criticism from those who were unreservedly in favor of granting ethnic 
minorities unconditional political equality upon the basis of which alone – in their view – 
a new China could emerge and triumph over her enemies. As if to preempt this critique, 
Sun argued in his 1912 lecture: 
Someone might say that since we have been advocating for the equality of 
all five ethnic groups for quite some time now, if we start to talk solely of 
Han nationalism, shouldn’t we be worried that the Manchus, the Mongols, 
the Hui and the Tibetans might become disgruntled? I on’t think we 
should bother with that. Now the Manchus are practic lly the protectorate 
of the Japanese, the Mongols that of the Russians, and the Tibetans that of 
the British. These are all indications that they could not effectively defend 
themselves. At the end of the day, it would still be our Han who assume 
the responsibility of salvaging and reinvigorating them. I now propose a 
middle way: we take Han as the core, and let all other four be assimilated 
into us, join us, so that they at least have a chane to be part of an 
independent state. We replicate the US model and assimilate the Manchus, 
the Mongols, the Hui and the Tibetans into a single Chinese nation, and by 
means of this establish a modern nation-state. We will be another state that 
professes a certain Pan-nationalism, a replica of the US in the Eastern 
Hemisphere. 
(Sun, 1927[1921], pp. 3) 
The logic that Sun followed was worth noting: his asimilationist view was not 
unconditional, nor based completely upon an unreserv d presumption of the cultural 
superiority of Han civilization. To him, the four ethnic groups (curiously, the Turkic-
speaking Uyghur Hui were missing from his list, although Xinjiang was no less under the 
threat of the Russians) were faced with two options: either they fared on their own until 
they necessarily fell into the hands of the imperialists and lost once and for all any chance 
for political independence, or they joined the Han, sought assimilation into the latter, so 
that they could become political citizens in the new Republic of China instead of colonial 
subjects under imperial domination. The possibility – which could easily be imagined by 
a reader from one of the ethnic groups – that in the new Republic of China the minorities 
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would be no less “subjugated” or “colonized” and no m re independent than they would 
be under the rule of the British, the French, or the Russian colonial power did not seem to 
enter Sun’s political imagination. To him, assimilation was a necessity for the good of the 
four ethnic groups themselves, since “they could not effectively defend themselves.” If 
all four must by force of circumstance be assimilated into the Han in order to avoid the 
fate of enslavement – if, in other words, the Turkic-speaking Uyghur Hui would after all 
is said and done be eventually “melted” in the Han-ce tered Chinese nation, what was the 
point of reversing the timeline and driving a wedge between the Chinese-speaking Hui-
Hui and the Han? The very logic that Sun followed foreclosed a thematization of the 
possible distinctions that might exist between the Hui and the Han – since all would 
become the Han, why bother with the Hui who, according to Sun Yat-sen, were 
obviously already Han, or perhaps had been Han all along? 
It was not just Sun Yat-sen, a Han revolutionary for that matter, who saw the 
Chinese-speaking Hui as Han Muslims. Many influential Hui themselves subscribed to 
the same view. Bai Chongxi (Omar), a prominent KMT general and a pious Hui Muslim 
who threw his unconditional support behind the reformation of Islam in Republican 
China, believed firmly that the Hui were no more than Han converts to Islam, to the 
extent that he deliberately prioritized the word Huijiao (the Hui religion) over the more 
obscure Huimin (the Hui people/nation/ethnic group) in naming thecivil organization 
established for garnering Hui support for the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)  
(Bai, 1939, pp. 10). An enthusiastic patron and unfaili g protector of the Hui culamāɔ and 
a remarkable contributor to the political and economic well-being of the general Hui 
population, Bai’s basic conviction as to the fundamentally religious character of Hui 
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identity nonetheless remained unshaken throughout the years. And he was not alone. Ma 
Hongkui, the valiant warlord that ruled over the fertil  Ningxia Plain which later became 
the central area of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in Communist China, shared the 
same view. Ma even thought that the Hui and the Han descended from the same ancestor, 
the Yellow Emperor (Huang Di), i.e. the imaginary patriarch thought to have initiated the 
Han civilization and who aroused so much Han nationl stic sentiment in late Qing and 
early Republican period. In Ma’s view, the Hui and the Han were different in the same 
way as a Han Catholic or a Han Protestant was different from a Han ancestor-worshipper  
(Fan, 1980, pp. 188-9). The presumptively religious character of Hui identity could 
hardly be stated in a more matter-of-fact way. 
Both Bai Chongxi and Ma Hongkui were political elits deeply entrenched in the 
complex and multi-dimensional politics of the newly emergent and still fledgling 
Republic of China and both had high stakes in every public pronouncement that may 
potentially jeopardize their long-term career. One could perhaps surmise that their 
position regarding the Hui was determined largely, if not exclusively, by the strategic 
concern with polishing a political portfolio and securing KMT support for their military 
power. After all, Sun Yat-sen and his autocratic sucessor Chiang Kai-shek never for a 
moment questioned the principal evaluation that the Hui were merely Han Muslims (cf. 
Chiang, 1976). What might appear more curious in this context, therefore, is the fact that 
some independent Hui intellectuals and social activists, even those well trained in the 
traditional madrassa-style mosque education, shared the same view as well. Yin Boqing, 
among others (e.g. Da, 1937), argued staunchly that a conceptual differentiation between 
“religion” and “ethnicity (minzu)” be clearly drawn as the first step towards a 
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disambiguation of what he thought a grave confusion. Following an orthodox point of 
view still dominant in contemporary historical accounts given of the Hui (cf. Editorial 
Board on the Brief History of the Hui, 1978; Qiu, 1996), he did not deny that the Hui 
were primarily – though not exclusively (let’s mark this ambiguity where the figure of the 
Han woman appears only evanescently at the margin, obliterated by a masculinist 
historical narrative that nonetheless and most importantly circles around the question of 
sexuality) – of non-Han origin. He still accepted, like many of his opponents, that the 
Hui’s ancestors were either seafaring Arab and Persian merchants traveling to China in 
Tang (618-907 A.D.) and Song (960-1279 A.D.) Dynasties for commerce or Central 
Asian warriors who settled in China due to the mass eastward migration of Central Asian 
populations conscripted by the Mongols in their military conquest of the Song empire. 
His point of dispute resided less in this narrative of origin than its relevance for justifying 
a separate Hui ethnicity in the Republican period. Yin compared the Hui to both the 
Manchus and the Mongols: 
Since Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.), the Mongols who ad settled all 
over China during the Yuan period (1206-1368 A.D.) had changed their 
names and mixed with others. Now they have been trasformed so 
completely that their current descendants have almost f rgotten their 
origin. They have been absorbed into the Han and becom  ultimately 
indistinguishable. Take the Manchus for another example: they entered the 
heartland of China only about a century ago, but now their language and 
physical feature are already the same as the Han….How could it ever 
happen that a small amount of people from the Western Dominion 
(xiyuren) could still remain what they were and keep their distinctions 
intact, after a thousand years of mixed residence alongside and among the 
Han?  
(Li & Feng, 1985, pp. 264) 
Anxious to prove his point and motivated, like many of his Hui compatriots, by a strong 
(Han) nationalistic aspiration, Yin did not mind reducing the complex imperial history of 
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multi-ethnicity to a simplified linear story of sinicization. Departing from this Sino-
centric perspective, Yin continued to wage polemical and at times aggressive objections 
to his opponents. If, as some had argued – which I will discuss shortly – it was Islam as a 
religion that had endowed the Hui with a distinct ethnicity then, Yin objected, why didn’t 
we call the Han Christians the Jesus minzu, the Han Daoists the Daoist minzu, the Han 
Buddhists the Buddhist minzu? Furthermore, since the Mongols, the Tibetans and the 
Manchus were all followers of variations of Buddhism (–Yin’s simplification and 
reduction obviously went beyond the Sino-centric linear narrative of sinicization, and his 
lack of accurate knowledge of the respective religious tradition of each ethnic group by 
no means held him from making sweeping generalizations.), why couldn’t they, were 
such logic to establish itself, be considered to bel ng to the same “Buddhist minzu” as the 
Han Buddhists (Li & Feng, 1985, pp. 263)? Carrying the logic ad absurdum, Yin tried to 
demonstrate the ultimate untenablility of the propositi n that the Hui were an ethnic 
group. 
The editorial note that prefaced Yin’s essay pointed to several other places where the 
same view had been put forth in passing, but nowhere, as the editor emphasized, was the 
argument so forcefully made as in Yin’s essay (Li & Feng, 1985, pp. 262). We should 
note that it was not merely the point of dispute (whether the Hui could be seen as an 
ethnic group) that deserved attention. It was, perhaps more importantly, what was not 
questioned and therefore conserved and shared among the two opposing sides that should 
at least be given equal attention. Yin did not nailhis argument to a historical genealogy – 
he accepted whole-heartedly the popular historical narrative that told a story of migration 
and asymmetrical affinal relations. The “small amount of people from the Western 
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Dominion” was a rehash of the male Hui soldiers who mythically initiated the history of 
the Hui in the story Tangwang Tandao – note that Yin did not cite any historical 
reference yet he presupposed that this was the truth no one would deny. This imaginary 
history was preserved and its founding force in organizing the hidden sexual economy of 
the Hui historical narrative left much unquestioned. Having re-affirmed this foundational 
imaginary, Yin based his objection primarily upon what he thought the Hui had already 
become by the time of his writing: he seemed to argue that even if one accepted the 
(partially) foreign origin of the Hui, this acknowledgement of history could by no means 
lead to an indisputable argument that the contemporary Hui had not become completely 
absorbed into the Han and the Hui teaching had not been reduced entirely to a “religion” 
that must be rigorously distinguished from “ethnicity.”  
We must read Yin’s essay alongside the opposing arguments in order to grasp the 
critical point under dispute. These arguments, to be sure, did not resort to a racial 
discourse to buttress their proposition of a Hui ethnicity – the presumption that the racial 
origin of the Hui is heterogeneous and no singular racial “bloodline” could be imagined 
as running through the Hui history was equally accepted. No less accepted was the 
presumption – which we have seen prevailed in popular narratives – that the Han, 
primarily by means of asymmetrical marital relations, also constituted one major 
racial/ethnic source of the contemporary Hui. The insufficiency of a purely racial 
discourse in supporting the argument in favor of a Hui ethnicity was known from early on, 
and its blatant contradiction both to “history” and to popular imagination prevented it 
from gaining traction in the narratives of the Hui intellectuals. The point of dispute, 
precisely as Yin criticized, was whether or how Islam could be seen as a religion that 
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entailed ethnicity. The question, as should become clear subsequently, was more 
ambiguous and nuanced than a straightforward debate on he substantive ethnicity of the 
Hui.  
One view that set itself against that of Yin Boqing was represented primarily by Jin 
Jitang, a self-taught Hui historian who made his name by writing one of the first histories 
of the Hui and spearheading modern Hui Islamic education with his Muguang (“Light of 
Muslim”) Elementary School. In an essay written in 1936, he confronted Yin’s argument 
explicitly: “Someone might ask: if those who believe in the Hui religion [Islam] 
constitute a Hui minzu, why are Buddhists not called Buddhist minzu, Confucians 
Confucian minzu, Daoists Daoist minzu, Christians Christian minzu? Why is it the case 
that only those who believe in the Hui religion arecalled Hui minzu?” (Li & Feng, 1985, 
pp. 248) The reply he proffered was hardly convincing: that Islam was not one religion 
among others but a “special religion” with particular characteristics that all other 
religions did not possess. In his opinion, Islam was not just a “religion,” but also “an all-
encompassing social institution” that attempted to organize the entire world of its 
followers: “…it’s the social institution of Islam that elevates it above all other religions. 
It is because of this social dimension of Islam that Muslims can constitute a minzu, while 
the followers of other religions cannot” (Ibid., pp. 248). 
Much of Jin’s argument, especially his opinion on the “social dimension” of Islam, 
was derived, somewhat ironically, from a passage he retrieved from an obscure Chinese 
translation of Herbert George Wells’ The Outline of History, published to feed the 
craving for modern Western knowledge among the general r ading public in early 20th 
century China. Wells, a best-selling writer and later remembered for his enormously 
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popular science fictions (e.g. The Time Machine), could hardly be considered as 
apologetic of Islam and many of his views (e.g. that “[Muhammad] seems to have been a 
man compounded of very considerable vanity, greed, cunning, self-deception and quite 
sincere religious passion” (Wells, 1922, pp. 240) would probably not appeal to the pious 
Jin. Even the particular passage he cited – which, however, could not be found in the 
English original and might probably be apocryphal – was strangely misplaced and 
painted an ambivalent picture of Islam that could easily be exploited to level criticism 
against it: “Islam is not merely a religious revolution. It is also a social revolution. It 
revolutionizes all previous religions, and Muslims differ from all other religious 
practitioners in their faith, thinking, and interest. They keep intact their own organization 
wherever they go and separate themselves out from all others. They become conquerors 
when they are strong, and secretly maintain their distinction when they are conquered. 
Although one cannot always observe it on the surface, the possibility that they could 
mingle with others absolutely does not exist” (Ibid., pp. 248). 
We do not know from which particular Chinese edition of Wells’ book Jin retrieved 
this passage. He certainly did not check his book, and it might even be possible that he 
did not read the entire volume, but only excerpts that dealt specifically with Islam 
published in some obscure journal. Whatever the cas, it is a noticeable fact that even the 
like of Jin acquired the knowledge of his own religion from translations of Western 
works, which, in many cases, were accused precisely as the source where slanders of 
Islam initially originated. A passage that could be read as a critique of Islam as an 
intolerant and narcissistic monotheism was used to bu tress Jin’s argument that Islam was 
a “special religion” with a “social institution” that organized Muslims into a separate 
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world. Somewhat ironically, a slander was almost completely carried over but recast in 
positive terms and slightly inflected to fit into a general proposition on the minzu status of 
Muslims. Jin’s lack of knowledge, his highly biased view of other religions, and his self-
centered view of Islam as the religion (which was also not a religion, at least not one 
among others) were paradoxically corroborated by the s ereotypical treatment of Islam in 
the passage he cited – it may well be the case that Jin knew as little about European 
Christianity as the author of the text knew about Islam. But this irony also reveals a 
crucial fact: in Republican China, some – by no means ll – of the modern historical and 
sociological narratives about Islam could only draw their references from the vocabulary 
and texts translated and introduced from the West, and many – again, not all – Hui 
intellectuals were themselves not entirely innocent from unknowingly spreading 
stereotypical understandings of Islam. 
But the argument of Jin Jitang, shared by many who published in Moonlight (cf. Zhao, 
1929; Ding, 1932), was not completely about the Hui in China. He argued that all 
Muslims the world over constituted a singular minzu. In his imaginary, there existed not 
merely a Hui minzu, but this Hui minzu was only a fraction of the broader Islamic minzu 
that included all Muslims. For him, it was precisely a shared religion that had produced a 
binding ethnicity, as if the latter was a natural sequel that necessarily followed from 
practicing the former: “The obligation that a follower of Islam obeys is not simply sincere 
belief. It is also a matter of closely following a set of stipulated acts and behaving 
accordingly. Prayer is such an example….The shared religious faith breeds a minzu 
consciousness; Muslims coalesce with each other and therefrom results the minzu 
sentiment, henceforth the minzu character. This is particular to Islam. Therefore, only 
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Muslims can constitute a minzu” (Li & Feng, 1985, pp. 249). Ethnicity followed so 
closely on the heels of religion in this proposition as if no logical justification – at least 
Jin did not offer any and did not even see the need to offer any – was necessary; as if, 
when religion was “shared,” when it was actively upheld by a collective of interacting 
adherents, it necessarily exceeded its “proper” limit and acquired a power that could only 
be named in terms of an ethnicity; as if, furthermore, even the individual act of prayer 
and the pious performance of avowedly religious obligations contributed to the formation 
of an ethnicity. It seems that in the mind of Jin Jitang, every act that demonstrated belief 
and every individual or collective action that materialized and historicized the teaching of 
the Islamic religion were always already an indication of an Islamic ethnicity. The 
proposition that religion “breeds” (we should here mark the implication of historicity) 
ethnicity locates “belief” in a movement of temporaliz tion – it is not belief as much as 
believing (and all the acts that both historically sustain and ontically concretize this 
temporality) that ultimately “breeds” an ethnicity. In order for his proposition to acquire 
the particular affective value and apparent incontrove tibility in his own mind, Jin had to 
assume, perhaps unknowingly, that an originary historici y always already inhered in the 
act of belief, which was the very condition for ethnicity to be rendered into the ultimate 
realization or culmination of the religious teaching of Islam. To those who accepted the 
truth value of Jin’s proposition, ethnicity incidentally became the icon by means of which 
alone Islam could be known and seen in the actual historical world – it was from the 
concept of Islamic ethnicity that the Islamic religion obtained its visibility. 
Jin’s position could hardly be defended on the ground of historical evidence, and even 
a brief glimpse at the immense differences that exist d among Muslims worldwide could 
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easily reveal its invalidity and expose the naiveté and ignorance of its advocator. But a 
critique waged primarily at the level of historical f ct, however, could not fully defeat 
this position either.  To the contrary, the fact of enormous empirical differences may well 
bolster and reinforce instead of contradict Jin’s stance: an Islamic ethnicity that is the 
iconic representation of the Islamic religion does not necessarily have to presuppose a 
common substance shared by all Muslims. Ethnicity ma  be seen as an empty frame that 
circles a field in which the Islamic religion could become visible as a sign, but it does not 
necessarily determine to what this sign refers and what kind of interpretant – to use a 
Peircean term – it is supposed to entail. This certainly is not the direction in which Jin 
himself carried his own argument, but the particular logic that emerges in his text does 
not exclude this radical possibility.  
This same logic, however, also reveals another latent paradox in Jin’s argument: by 
proposing an Islamic ethnicity, it erases precisely the line it struggles to maintain between 
the Hui and the Han Muslims. This erasure is performed in a somewhat peculiar manner: 
for Jin, the Hui are not Han Muslims because one cannot become a Muslim without 
meanwhile assuming an Islamic ethnicity – in other wo ds, there is no such a thing as a 
Han Muslim since Islam necessarily “breeds” an ethnicity and gives to the Han converts a 
distinct ethnic identity that differentiates them from non-Muslim Han. The proposition 
that the Hui are not Han Muslims is substantiated by an argument that completely denies 
the conceptual possibility that a Han Muslim could ever exist in the world.  
82 
 
There Is No Such a Thing as a Han Muslim 
Although not all Hui intellectuals shared the same boldness in arguing for a global 
Islamic minzu, the self-serving and stereotypical view was nonethel ss widely shared that 
Islam was a “special religion” different from all others; that only Islam included a “social 
dimension” which went far beyond a confined field of belief and reached out to all 
aspects of its followers’ life. Even the Chinese Communists who struggled to acquire the 
political support of the Hui adopted this view whole-heartedly, despite – or precisely 
because of – their suspicious attitude towards any religion. The presumably “social” 
traction of Islam made the CCP Red Army particularly lert to its mobilizing force both 
as a potential threat and as a possible exploit.  
From the outset, the Communists painstakingly distinguished themselves from the 
KMT in their position on the Hui. In contrast to the KMT who treated the Hui merely as 
Han Muslims, the Communists took a diametrically opp sed view and did not hesitate to 
proclaim their unconditional acknowledgement of a separate Hui ethnicity. This 
unreserved pronouncement was a crucial part of a bro der propaganda campaign that also 
included assisting the ordinary Hui in establishing i dependent self-governance, even at 
times their own “autonomous government (zizhi zhengfu).” All these were designed to 
polish the image of the Red Army in the eyes of the disturbed Hui peasants and intended 
to induce, if not active Hui support for their military operation, at least passive tolerance 
or silent complicity. To increase the force of their position and to demonize the KMT, the 
Communists argued that different from the Tibetans, the Mongols, the Uyghur and other 
ethnic minorities, the Hui were oppressed by the ethnocentric KMT in a more 
fundamental way: they were not even considered to be an ethnic group. If oppression, 
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prejudice and poverty were the common fate suffered by all ethnic minorities, as the 
argument goes, the Hui were also victims to a particular injustice: they suffered an 
existential annihilation because their entire history as an ethnic group was completely 
denied by the KMT. It was as if they, as an ethnic m nority, had never existed in Chinese 
history. The Communists held that no graver violatin could be committed to an ethnic 
group than subsuming their history completely under th  history of the Han.  
In Hui-Hui Minzu Wenti (The Ethnic Question of the Hui-Hui), a small but politically 
profound pamphlet published by the CCP in 1941 that became the backbone for 
constructing an officially sanctioned history of the Hui after 1949, it was argued that 
“Islam is not merely a religious belief. It also includes beneath a religious surface a 
system of social institutions and a body of customs and folklores. It is precisely because 
of this that Islam is intimately linked to the formation of the Hui as an ethnic group” 
(Commission on the Study of the Ethnic Question, 1980[1941], pp. 55). The book further 
specified why “social institutions, customs and folkl res” could be seen as pertaining 
particularly to the ethnic – contra religious – identity of the Hui: “[Foreign Muslims] 
came to China with their own customs and folklores. But when they settled in China, 
these necessarily changed as the specific social conditions shifted with the evolution of 
Chinese history. This is the major factor that went into the making of Hui ethnicity. A 
second and minor factor has to do with the new characte istics Islam had acquired along 
with the formation of Hui ethnicity. The appearance of these new characteristics is due 
primarily to the adaptation of Islam to the historical and social specificities in which the 
Hui have lived” (Ibid., pp. 55). One example of the“social institution” used to justify Hui 
ethnicity was the Sufi brotherhood, or menhuan as it had been named by a Qing official 
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in late imperial times (Ma, 2000b, pp. 74-5; 2000a). The pamphlet argued that although 
Sufism was not specific to China, menhuan, however, was a social institution that 
emerged within the particular social and political onditions of northwest China: on the 
one hand, different from many other Sufi orders for whom the appointment of the 
charismatic murshid (the saint) was merit-based, the murshid position of menhuan was 
hereditary and the religious privilege was passed down exclusively along bloodlines. A 
monopolization of the menhuan by a single and powerful family was particular only to 
Chinese Sufism. In the analysis of the Communists, thi  monopolization along bloodlines 
came close to a feudalization since the murshid concentrated in himself both religious 
and worldly powers – he was the feudal lord who als commanded spiritual directorship. 
On the other, menhuan was by no means merely a religious congregation. It possessed 
large tracts of often fertile land and collected zakat from all of its followers. It hired its 
followers to cultivate its land and extracted rents on a regular basis. It had, in other words, 
an institutional arrangement which looked extremely like a church. The Communists 
continued with a Marxist description of the economic dynamic that they thought 
determined the historical appearance of menhuan in northwest China, 
Foreign Muslims initially settled in China in collectives and engaged in 
agricultural activities. Each collective centered upon a mosque and each 
was organized independently from all others. Within each collective, the 
residents hired a jiaozhang (“master of the religion”) and paid him for his 
religious service. Islam stipulates zakat…and jiaozhang was the one 
person who was in charge of managing this fund. With the evolution of the 
economy and the increase of wealth, the amount of zakat increased 
accordingly. This gave the jiaozhang an immense endowment to purchase 
and concentrate large tracts of land in his own hand. He hired poor 
peasants to cultivate these lands and continued to xtract rents and taxes. 
With the continual metamorphosis of zakat into rent, the jiaozhang also 
became a big landlord. The clerical distinction between jiaozhang and 
ordinary Hui gradually turned into a class antagonism. This economic 
transformation was the major reason behind the shift from merit to 
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heredity as the sole criterion for choosing the jiaozhang. [Note that no 
distinction is made between jiaozhang and murshid.]…The continuous 
growth of the economic power of jiaozhang demanded that his rule exceed 
the confinement of his own collective and the lands of other collectives be 
placed also under his jurisdiction. A menhuan led by a big landlord who 
possessed an enormous amount of land therefore grew up at the expense of 
independent collectives.  
(Commission on the Study of the Ethnic Question, 1980[1941], pp. 58-9) 
To the Communists, the particular economic conditions in northwest China provided the 
critical social condition for the emergence of menhuan. It is this sociological specificity 
and the process of cultural particularization (the “customs and folklores” adapted to these 
new socio-economic conditions) which followed closey on its heels that had established 
the supposed “Chineseness” of menhuan. Even the “new characters” that Islam was 
considered to have assumed in China (whether these “n w characters” should be seen as 
belonging to the transformed “customs and folklores” remained unaddressed) were 
reduced to  reflections of economic conditions: the religious disputes between different 
Sufi orders were thought to be determined ultimately by the class antagonism between 
peasants and landlords, and the doctrinal split within one order was thought to be a 
representation of the resistance of the poor peasants against the hegemonic power of their 
jiaozhang (Ibid., pp. 61-3).  
None of these, however, fundamentally distinguished t  stance of the CCP from the 
position of Jin Jitang. The disputable proposition that Islam is a “special religion,” which 
includes a “social dimension” (the Communists appended to this “social dimension” 
axillary “customs and folklores”) absent from all other religions, figured prominently in 
both. But the CCP’s argument did differ from that of Jin Jitang in one crucial aspect 
which directly related to their political consideration at the time: they emphatically 
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argued that Hui ethnicity was the product of a special conversion that both preserved and 
transformed the “social institution, customs and folklores” brought by “foreign Muslims” 
to China as an intrinsic part of their Islamic way of life (not their “religion”). Although 
still holding on to the argument that Islam is a “special religion,” the CCP accentuated the 
inherent “Chineseness” of Hui ethnicity while at the same time struggling not to reduce 
this “Chines-ization” to a complete sinicization. They explicitly opposed Jin’s argument 
on an Islamic ethnicity and found it politically pernicious and unwittingly complicit with 
the Japanese agitation among the Hui for an independent Hui Islamic state. Pan-Islamism, 
in the eyes of the Communists, was merely a prop that could easily fall prey to the 
exploitation of Western and Eastern colonial forces (more on this later in this chapter). 
They must, in other words, find an argument that could kill two birds with one stone: they 
must be able both to say that the Hui were not Han Muslims and to give the Hui a 
specific “Chineseness” and turn them into a particularly “Chinese” ethnic group. The 
“social dimension” of Islam was inserted into this argument to fulfill a particular function: 
the sinicization of “foreign Muslims” (i.e. their becoming “Han Muslims”) could never 
be completed since this sinicization happened primarily t the level of “social institution, 
customs and folklores,” and as long as Islam continued to be practiced, the “social, 
customary, and folkloristic” differences derived from this practice could always be made 
to refer to an imaginary residue of “foreignness” which was progressively but never 
completely sinicized. Put differently, as long as Islam was a “special religion,” the 
complete sinicization of “foreign Muslims” and their complete transformation into “Han 
Muslims” were fundamentally impossible; their siniczation would necessarily always 
include a certain ethnic “foreignness,” which was always thought to be the object to 
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which all observable differences in the Hui’s actual practice of Islam constantly refer as 
signs.  
An obvious inadequacy of this argument to its own purpose was that by locating the 
“Chineseness” of Hui ethnicity at the site of social and cultural transformations in the 
Islamic lifestyle of the “foreign Muslims,” the CCP could never fully demonstrate that a 
singular and internally homogeneous Hui ethnic group existed. The heterogeneous 
sociological and cultural conditions in China necessarily led the “foreign Muslims” in 
different directions, and their sinicization may produce drastically different outcomes. 
The “social dimension” of Islam could well entail so many variations of “Chinese Islam” 
that the Hui as one ethnic group never existed and would never come into existence. But 
in addition to this obvious problem, another question was also systematically excluded 
from this argument: to what would the practices (e.g. the contribution of zakat) of an 
explicitly Han Muslim convert refer, especially as these conversions were not unknown 
both in the voluminous historical records and in contemporary publications which the 
Communists and the Hui intellectuals drew upon as their references (Zhang, 1930; Wang, 
1930)? What if, for instance, a newly converted Han Muslim also practiced the very same 
“customs and folklores” and was included in the same “social institution” (e.g. either the 
Sufi menhuan or a collective living quarter that centered upon a mosque) as the Hui? 
Where and how could the CCP locate that imaginary ethnic “foreignness” among these 
perhaps undeniably non-foreign Han Muslims? What if he sign (“social institution, 
customs and folklores”) persisted while the object assumed (the “foreignness”) was 
emphatically missing? In order for their argument to acquire a persuasive power, the 
possible (and actual) existence of Han Muslims must necessarily be excluded. Again, and 
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similar to Jin Jitang’s argument but in a slightly different way owing to a different 
political project, the argument of the CCP in fact did not draw a sharp line that 
substantively separated the Hui from Han Muslims – it  logic rather operated on the basis 
of a foundational exclusion: there was no such a thing as a Han Muslim. 
This commonality shared between the CCP and Jin Jitang was by no means 
coincidental. Much of the CCP’s view of Islam was based upon secondhand explanations 
of it in Hui publications such as Moonlight, and they drew from exactly the same body of 
historical literature in their argument as did the Hui intellectuals writing during this 
period. The presumption that Islam was a “special religion” with a “social dimension” 
that differentiated it from all other religions was lmost completely replicated from the 
view shared among many Hui intellectuals. Limited by their linguistic incompetence and 
the inevitable difficulty in procuring sufficient reference during war time, but also 
prompted by the need to make their discourses famili r and appealing to the ears of the 
Hui elites, the Communists could only reassemble and reorganize the “evidences” and the 
lines of argument already well explored by the Hui intellectuals themselves. They could 
not and need not start from scratch. They only had to intervene by learning to craft their 
intervention in the language shared in this discursive field and inflect the discussion in 
the direction they desired. This was precisely what t ey did. And in the same stroke, they 
reproduced the same founding exclusion presupposed by the language shared among the 
Hui intellectuals.  
Although the dubious view that Islam was a “special religion” with a “social 
dimension” was a major factor in effectuating the exclusion of Han Muslims as the 
condition for the modern narrative on Hui ethnicity (cf. Bai, 2001, pp. 92), it was, 
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however, by no means the only one. Oftentimes, this exclusion was cast only in nebulous 
terms, and the figure of the Han Muslim (somewhat curiously covered up by the figure of 
the Han woman) appeared fleetingly in the text only to show its structural invisibility. 
Consider, for instance, the definition of Hui ethnicity provided by Yang Zhijiu, a 
prominent Hui historian trained in Peking University and specializing in the history of the 
Mongolian Yuan Dynasty (1206-1368 A.D.): “The Hui-Hui in Yuan Dynasty were not of 
a single race (zhongzu) or ethnic group (minzu). They spoke different languages and 
practiced different scripts, the only commonality they shared with each other being their 
Islamic faith. Although many of them spoke Persian, t was nonetheless not used widely. 
It was not until they had studied Chinese that they ad the tool to communicate with each 
other thoughts and emotions, and transfer information among themselves, by means of 
which a sense of shared identity first emerged. It was from here that a new minzu 
gradually formed which shared an Islamic faith, spoke Chinese and lived in the vast 
territory of China. This is the Hui-Hui minzu. This process was not accomplished until 
mid to late Yuan Dynasty.” The figure of the Han Muslim followed closely upon the 
heels of this definition: “During Yuan, in addition to the Arabs, Persians and the Turkic 
people from the West, some Mongols and Han also converted to Islam….Conversions of 
the Han were due to several reasons: they might have been slaves kept by Muslims, or 
they wanted to become Muslims by their own will, or still they married Hui-Hui. Today’s 
Hui-Hui minzu (especially those living away from Northwest China) were physically 
similar to the Han except for certain characteristics, and this is the result of the Hui-Han 
inter-marriage” (Yang, 2003, pp. 2).  
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The self-contradiction of this definition circles precisely around the figure of the Han 
Muslim: for at the very site where Yang located the imaginary zero point in the 
appearance of the Hui-Hui minzu (the sharing of the Chinese language as the lingua 
franca and later the only native tongue and the major l nguage by means of which Islam 
was communicated and discussed among the Chinese-spaking Muslims), the repressed 
figure of the Han Muslim returned and haunted his apparently lucid definition. The 
“conversion” of the Han was attributed to several reasons, but it was the affinal 
relationship that took center stage and somehow displaced all other possibilities: 
“Today’s Hui-Hui minzu (especially those living away from Northwest China) were 
physically similar to the Han except for certain characteristics, and this is the result of the 
Hui-Han inter-marriage.” In addition to the problematic claim on the “residual” racial 
characters of the current Hui, this affinal relationship was emphatically asymmetrical in 
the sexual economy of the exchange of woman: “I personally think (qieyiwei) that among 
the Hui from the Western Dominion in Yuan Dynasty, i  should (dang) be natural that 
women were fewer than men. Since most of them were soldiers, many should be 
bachelors. Even if (ji ) some wives and daughters might have come along, they should not 
have survived the long trudge across Central Asia. With few Hui women available, it was 
inevitable that the Hui men married Han women. (Emphasis mine)” (Ibid., pp. 476) 
Conjectures were boldly given. Though no actual historical record could bolster the 
presumption of this asymmetrical exchange of woman, it was nonetheless upheld. A 
strong resistance to think about the symbolic functio  fulfilled by this sexual economy 
was particularly visible in Yang’s treatment of “the only example in recorded history” of 
a marriage between a Han man and a Hui woman: “In the very end (zongzhi), this 
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example could not be used to prove that it was commn for a Han man to marry a Hui 
woman. It could in fact be taken as an example to prove the rarity of such marriages. The 
reason behind this [– here begins the conjecture] was that there were few Hui women at 
the time, and the number was even too small to meet the needs of all Hui men (jia benzu 
yi bu fuyong). How could they marry Han men?16 More important, the Hui were different 
from the Han both in religious faith and living habits. If a Han woman married a Hui man, 
it should be easy for her to follow her husband. But if a Hui woman married a Han man, 
she definitely would not be able to get used to the daily life of her husband’s family. 
Therefore, the Hui-Han marriage could only be asymmetrical (emphasis mine)” (Ibid., pp. 
478).  
The masculinist tone of this resistance was barely hidden, and the unquestioned 
presumptions (that “it should be easy” for a Han woman to follow her Hui husband, while 
a Hui woman “definitely would not be able get used to the daily life” of her Han 
husband’s family), buttressed by an uncritical attitude to the institution of patrilocal 
marriage in which the woman was necessarily in an auxili ry position (however much 
they might appear to possess some form of “agency” in their intervention in the family 
through their husband), symptomatically revealed the structuring function of the 
asymmetrical sexual economy in forging the imaginary that operated Yang’s argument. 
This economy was seen to be intimately linked to Chinese becoming the lingua franca 
among “foreign Muslims,” the language through which a particularly Hui Islam was 
spoken and on the basis of which Hui ethnicity established itself: “With the increase of 
Hui-Han marriages, the blood of the Han was mixed into that of the Hui-Hui. The 
                                                   
16 Let’s mark the ambiguity of this question: how could they marry Han men? 
92 
 
linguistic homogenization of the Hui-Hui and their sharing of Chinese as the common 
language should also be linked to this” (Ibid., pp. 477).  
But suppose we take up the position of a Muslim Hanco vert whose native language 
was already Chinese and follow Yang in assuming that the Chinese language was already 
the major (certainly not exclusive) language by means of which she grasped the teaching 
of the Islamic religion. The argument of Yang would amount to saying that as soon as she 
began to be able to speak Islam through Chinese and speak of Islam with other “foreign 
Muslims” in this Chinese language, she immediately became an ethnic Hui. Put 
differently, the very position of a Chinese-speaking Han Muslim who understood Islam 
by and through the Chinese language was in fact colonized by an ethnic Hui identity. To 
a certain extent, it might even be arguable that in the imaginary of Yang and those who 
shared his view (cf. Bai, 2001, pp. 93), there was no such a thing as a Han Muslim 
because, structurally (instead of historically) speaking, the Hui were always already Han 
Muslims. They could not imagine a Han Muslim without much reluctance, disavowal, 
and anxious conjectures because this figure was structurally repressed and this repression 
was presupposed by their narration of a Hui history based not upon a racially oriented 
imaginary. This history, in other words, could not be imagined without presupposing a 
structural exclusion of the figure of the Han Muslim. The foundation of this intellectual 
narrative on Hui ethno-history therefore depended upon a fundamental denial and a 
separation between the Hui narrators and their own unacknowledged and perhaps 
unacknowlegeable “truth” as Han Muslims. This “truth,” placed under quotation marks, 
was not positioned at the level of historical evidence. I am not making any historical 
claim as to who the Hui, substantively speaking, really are or are not. I am instead 
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interested in what must necessarily be excluded and repressed in the historical narrative 
proffered by the Hui intellectuals in order for their non-racial argument in favor of a Hui 
ethnicity to appear coherent and persuasive both to emselves and to their mainly Hui 
readers. It is in a strictly structural sense, therefore, that I maintain the hypothesis that in 
this historiographical discourse, “there is no such a t ing as a Han Muslim.” 
A Different Political Islam 
The imagined self-positioning of the Hui actively advocated by the Hui intellectuals 
whose narration of Hui history we have read so far went beyond the narrow domain of 
academic discussion and reached deep into their attitude to the Chinese (Han) 
nationalistic politics. On the one hand, many Hui intellectuals, as we have seen, tried 
painstakingly to argue that the Hui were not Han Muslims and should be seen as one 
minority among others. On the other, however, the same Hui intellectuals often thought 
in political terms in place of the Han, for the Han, and even at times unwittingly as the 
Han. This peculiar conflation of opposites (verbally denying proximity while in political 
practice assuming a position as the “shadow” of the Han) seems to me a symptomatic 
representation of the paradox that the structural truth of the Hui intellectuals, the truth of 
their discourse, resides precisely in the figure of the Han Muslim which they 
unknowingly impersonated while simultaneously disavowing this impersonation. In this 
section, I will link this paradox to the critical social, historical and political factors in the 
Republican period that went into the sharpening of this basic paradox and triggered 
among the Hui elites a political vision that was both Han and Islamic.  
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At the same time as the Hui intellectuals were debating the ethnic status of the Hui, 
Japanese secret agents were already insinuating themselves into the Hui in Northwest 
China, agitating for an independent Islamic “Hui-Hui state” seceded from China (Zhou, 
2006, pp. 24-66; Ando, 2003; Li & Feng, 1985, pp. 1777-1793). The new “Hui-Hui state,” 
envisioned by the Japanese imperial power, would range from the Tarim Basin to the 
fertile Ningxia plain, placing under its jurisdiction both the Turkic-speaking Uyghur and 
the Chinese-speaking Hui-Hui. But the Japanese were not the only predator. The 
territorial ambition of Soviet Russia, its surreptitious plan to render Xinjiang into a quasi-
protectorate after the model of Mongolia, abetted by the Chinese Communists, only 
aggravated the political threat posed to the new Republic.17 As a timely response to these 
political ruses, the KMT established in 1929 the Committee on Mongolian and Tibetan 
Affairs (meng zang wei yuan hui) to supervise specifically all religious and ethnic affairs 
pertaining to minority areas, including especially Xinjiang and Manchuria. A new and 
fast-expanding academic discipline also gradually took shape, and was later named 
“Study of Border Politics” (bian zheng xue). It served the purpose of assembling 
empirical knowledge about peripheral minority areas so that the hand of the new state 
could reach beyond its immediate center and its military could effectively petrol every 
mile of its precarious border.  
The Uyghur Xinjiang, by the time of the 1930s, had been ruled by successive Han 
warlords and deliberately insulated from the rest of China. Practically an independent 
kingdom only nominally subjected to the rule of the KMT government, Xinjiang well 
                                                   
17 A series of works written by the British agents posted to defend the interests of the Empire in Central and 
South Asia provide interesting and at times brilliant first-hand accounts of the contest between the British, 
the Russians and the Chinese in strategically tilting he balance of power in Xinjiang (and Tibet) in their 
own favor. See Younghusband, 1904; Skrine, 1996; Skrine & Nightingale, 1973. For general histories that 
pertain to this particular competition, see, among thers, Alder, 1963; Clubb, 1971; Lattimore, 1972, 1950. 
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into the 1940s kept only tenuous communication with the political center of Republican 
China. The limited power of the official authority could hardly intervene in the 
tumultuous “Great Game” in Central Asia which risked wresting Xinjiang, perhaps even 
a large part of northwest China, away from the hands of the KMT government. This 
worry on the side of the KMT was aggravated by the loss of Manchuria to Japan in 1931, 
and by the onslaught of the Japanese forces further into northern China. Previously 
marginal and relatively insignificant, northwest China was now becoming strategically 
critical as the heartland, the base behind the enemy lines which could serve as the haven 
for a temporary retreat and for re-assembling resistant forces for retaliation.  
But northwest China became the gem not just for military reasons. In the early 1920s, 
Sun Yat-sen was already laying out developmental plns in which Xinjiang and 
northwest China figured prominently, primarily for their presumably enormous reserves 
of mineral resources (coal and iron, foremost among thers) and huge tracts of 
unpopulated land. In The International Development of China, a detailed elaboration of 
his plan published in English in 1922, Sun prioritized the construction of railway systems 
that reached far into the hinterland of northwest China, and he talked therein explicitly of 
“the colonization of Mongolia and Sinkiang (Xinjiang)” as a necessary supplement and 
natural sequel to the development of the railway systems (Sun, 1922). Migration of the 
Han to the northwest was encouraged and reclamation of u cultivated land propounded. 
The message was fairly unambiguous: the peripheral minority areas, more particularly 
northwest China and the Uyghur Xinjiang, were crucial both for providing badly needed 
resources for modern industrialization – which in turn would bolster the production of 
modern weaponry and machinery – and for alleviating he daily decreasing land-man 
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ratio in central and eastern China (cf. Zhu, 1944). If the Han did not want to suffocate in 
a progressively contracted environment with gradually exhausted resources, the argument 
went, northwest China must be conserved, protected from foreign insinuation, and placed 
under well-planned and efficient exploitation. Put this way, the periphery in fact became 
the center, and the minorities (or their land) became the redemption of the majority.  
There is yet a third reason for the northwest to become for the KMT the destiny of the 
new Republic. Huang Di, the Yellow Emperor, the supposed ancestor of all H n, was 
thought to be an extraordinary leader of a tribal coalition that originated in northwest 
China. It was said that he later conquered the eastern tribes, colonized their land, settled 
down in what is now called “China proper,” and initiated the long process which 
culminated in the ultimate formation of the Han civilization (Division of the Study on the 
Northwest Question, 1942, pp. 2). In this narrative, northwest China was the gem not just 
for military and economic reasons; it was also the pearl because it was thought to have 
preserved, with its arid climate and sparse population, both the material traces of the 
ancient Han civilization and the spiritual legacy of a “magnificent race” whose soul, 
according to many, must be re-invigorated so as to rid the Han of the impending danger 
of colonial subjugation and racial extermination.  
This is the particular historical juncture in which t e political vision of the Hui 
intellectuals took shape. Many volunteered to take up the burden of bringing northwest 
China – especially Xinjiang – back under the control of the KMT. Prominent Hui 
intellectuals and military generals were appointed into the Committee on Mongolian and 
Tibetan Affairs. Ma Fuxiang, father of the Ningxia w rlord Ma Hongkui, was chair of the 
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Committee from 1930-1931.18 Tang Kesan, an imperial scholar-official in the Qing 
cabinet and a graduate of Peking University during the Qing Dynasty19, was an influential 
member of the Committee, and a founding trustee and president of the renowned 
Chengda Normal School, the institution for modern Hui Islamic education in China. In a 
lecture delivered on a Committee meeting in 1929, Ma Fuxiang laid out his brief project 
for reshaping the governance of Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang. The passage that 
pertained specifically to Muslims was reprinted in bold font in Moonlight,   
In addition to the Mongolian and Tibetan questions, I personally have a 
more intimate knowledge of the Uyghur Hui in Xinjiang and the Salar Hui 
in Gansu and Qinghai. Eighty percent of the Xinjiang population is 
Uyghur, and the Salar’s residential area spans across Linxia, Xunhua, 
Barong, and Guide. The number of their total population is huge, but their 
lack of knowledge, their ignorance, is even more serious than the Mongols 
and the Tibetans. Even the Hui-Hui living closer to China proper are not 
considerably better. 
 (Ma, 1929, pp. 5) 
But Ma himself was a Hui-Hui, and his lecture was reprinted for a Hui-Hui audience who 
could read and were eager to read. Its publication in Moonlight was intended to elicit 
ambitious Hui activists to step in and fill the missing link, to strengthen the tenuous tie 
between “China proper” and the peripheral Muslim areas. In a series of provocative 
essays published in Moonlight in 1930, Li Tingbi, a Hui Muslim scholar and political 
activist, provided an exposition of the complicated political situation in the northwest and 
the danger of losing Xinjiang to the Britain and the Soviet Russia in the same way as 
Manchuria was lost to Japan. He took pains to demonstrate the economic transformations 
Xinjiang had undergone since the early 20th century, and reiterated the crucial role of 
                                                   
18 For a well-documented biography of Ma Fuxiang, see Ding, 2001. 
19 The interesting and complex relationship between Islam and Confucianism in imperial China, primarily 
in late Ming and Qing Dynasties, has become an increasingly popular topic among scholars of Chinese 
history and philosophy. See, for example, Ben-Dor Benite, 2005; Murata, Chittick, & Tu, 2000, 2009.   
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Xinjiang in providing the rising China with indispensable mineral resources for modern 
industrialization. The key point that subtended this series of essays is a basic judgment: 
that the Uyghur, although sharing the same religion with the Chinese-speaking Hui, were 
nonetheless so “backward” and “ignorant” that they could not but easily fall prey to the 
insinuation of the Russian Communists, who exploited the linguistic, cultural, and even 
religious commonalities the Uyghur shared with their Central Asian neighbors in order to 
wrest Xinjiang from China and place it under Russian protection (Li, 1930a). The urgent 
mission of the Hui, argued Li and many of his contemporary Hui compatriots, was to 
devote themselves to a fierce competition with the Soviet Russians, to salvage the 
Uyghur from the evil hands of the atheist Communists into which the Uyghur were 
falling unknowingly, and to save the new Republic from losing this strategically critical 
land. That the Uyghur were “less civilized,” not far rom a “savage state,” and were too 
“naïve” and “credulous” to recognize the nature of the imminent danger was the major 
reason that Li thought necessitated the intervention of the Hui. The Hui were portrayed as 
most suitable for this task primarily because, in the eyes of the Hui activist intellectuals, 
they could bond with the Uyghur by means of a shared Islamic faith while at the same 
time keeping their loyalty to the Han Chinese state.  
Talks of expanding and developing education among the Uyghur were pervasive 
when Xinjiang became the subject matter in the essays published in Hui journals. But the 
education proposed (it was seldom actually carried out and stayed largely on paper) was 
organized primarily within a Chinese framework, and i tended more as propaganda in 
line with the political demand of the new nation-state. The Uyghur were often presumed 
to be not yet mature enough to realize both what kind of political situation they were 
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facing and what specific political obligation they should fulfill in the new state, and it 
was believed that only the Chinese-speaking Hui living in or near the China proper, 
especially those with a clear understanding of what w s happening both within and 
without the country, were well positioned and specially disposed to serve this mission of 
converting Uyghur into Chinese citizens. A common feature of these “civilizing” 
proposals was their conciseness. It often remained obscure what kind of “education” and 
what form of “knowledge” were presumed by the Hui intellectuals to be indispensable for 
the “enlightenment” of the Uyghur, and more specifically, how the Hui could fulfill this 
daunting mission. One piece published in Moonlight in 1932, for instance, compared the 
Mongols to the Uyghur living in northern Xinjiang: “There still exist among the Mongols 
some old Confucians who could read and teach Confucian lassics, although their 
teaching remained much tangled and confused. But the Uyghur were not even there!” 
(Xue, 1932, pp. 17) This lack of “knowledge,” to the author, was the direct cause for the 
lack of “an idea of the state” among the Uyghur. His education proposal was both short 
and obscure: “I think at places where culture is still backward, it is not higher education 
that should run first. The most urgent need is to establish elementary schools and let the 
Uyghur know they are Chinese citizens. This shall be the very first step” (Ibid., pp. 17). 
But should the education be given in Chinese or the Uyghur language? Should the “idea 
of the state” be taught alongside “the Confucian classics” which the author seemed to 
think marked the relative cultural superiority of sme Mongols? How could “an idea” of 
the new state, a state whose “center” was far removd from Xinjiang (the name “Xinjiang” 
literally means “the new border”) and tightly controlled by a Han government, be 
conveyed in the complex Uyghur language, if the Uyghur language was ever thought to 
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be an option at all? Not even a single voice of the Uyghur could be heard in such 
proposals, and given the tone of them, it might not be far-fetched to surmise that to these 
Hui intellectuals, the Uygur were thought to be unable to speak; that they had yet to 
acquire the ability to speak to others about their “real situation.” Most of the Hui 
intellectuals who were eager to “help” could not speak the Uyghur language. Perhaps, the 
Hui elites could not and did not bother to listen to the Uyghur. They thought they knew 
better than the Uyghur themselves did who the Uyghur were or who they should be, and 
the Hui elites thought they were qualified to decid on the Uyghur’s future. 
Sun Yat-sen’s project for “colonization” by means of large-scale migration was again 
put on the agenda, but this time, it was forcefully re-proposed by Hui intellectuals. Wang 
Zengshan, a Hui intellectual educated in China’s elite Yenching University and then 
moving to Turkey for a graduate study in politics, was appointed upon his return a 
congressman in the KMT parliament and selected by Chiang Kai-shek in 1931 to be the 
Special Commissioner for Xinjiang Affairs (xinjiang tewu weiyuan). One of a few 
selected Hui who could acquire such an eminent position, Wang was well respected and 
his speeches were often reprinted in Hui journals and referenced in numerous other 
speeches and essays published in the same set of peri dicals. His view in the 1930s 
followed almost step by step Sun Yat-sen’s project for “colonizing” Xinjiang, and 
explicitly proposed in 1934 that large-scale migration projects should be planned by the 
state in order that “the Xinjiang culture (xinjiang wenhua)” could “harmoniously mix 
(tiaohe)” with “the Chinese culture (zhonghua wenhua)” (Wang, 1934). His view was 
well corroborated by some prominent Hui clerics, one f whom, Wang Mengyang, even 
advised in a public letter addressed to him upon his inauguration as the Special 
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Commissioner in 1931 that the Uyghur in Xinjiang should be “assimilated (tonghua)” 
into “the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu)” (M. Wang, 1931). 
The political loyalty of the Hui to a Han China reached far beyond the border of the 
new Republic. Immediately following the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-
1945), an official Hui delegation consisting of five elite Hui set out on their journey 
around the Muslim world. The constitution of this delegation was worth noting: led by 
Wang Zengshan who could speak Turkish, it also consisted of Ma Tianying (a civil 
servant in the State Ministry of Foreign Affairs who could speak both French and 
English), Zhang Zhaoli (a Hui intellectual who could speak English), Xue Wenbo (a Hui 
intellectual and social activist), and Wang Shiming (a prominent Hui cleric who joined 
the group in Egypt, and the only one in the group who could speak Arabic). They 
professed to represent Islam in China, but none of its members, however, came from the 
Uyghur or other Muslim minority groups. Departing from China, travelling across Hong 
Kong, South and Southeast Asia, and finally arriving i  the so-called “Near East” which 
on their map included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria (notably, Iran was 
missing from the list), the group’s intention was not to bond with other Muslims in 
pursuit of a political Pan-Islamism which would place all Muslims – the entire umma – 
under the political jurisdiction of a single caliph and mobilize the entire “Muslim world” 
as a unified force in the face of Western colonialism. They were not proponents of any 
Pan-Islamic state or empire. To the contrary, they wanted to garner help from around the 
Muslim world by demonstrating to them the perseverance of the Chinese (Han) people in 
resisting the onslaught of the Japanese imperial forces (Wang, 1942).  
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This trip came in the midst of what seemed to these Hui elites an urgent political 
situation: secret Japanese agents were infiltrating Xinjiang and northwest China to 
convince primarily the Turkic Uyghur and the Hui to secede from China and to establish, 
together with other Inner and Central Asian Muslim populations, a Pan-Islamic empire. 
What complicated this situation was the fact that te Japanese had already lent much help 
to the Uyghur “rebels” in their independence-seeking military operations in the 1930s and 
there existed a strong pro-Japanese sentiment among some Uyghur elites because of such 
collaboration. The Japanese scheme even included a plan to enthrone an exiled Ottoman 
Prince, Abdul Kerim Efendi (1904-1935), as the head of the Pan-Islamic Empire they 
envisioned (Esenbel, 2004; Aydin, 2007). 
The Hui intellectuals, however, did not fully realize how complex and ironic a 
politics they were involved in. The Japanese infiltration of northwest China was in fact a 
fraction of a much broader Japanese Pan-Asianist vision that dated back to the late Meiji 
period in the early 20th century. This Japanese Pan-Asianism, from the outset, attempted 
to cultivate a close coalition with the Pan-Islamic political project of the Muslim world, 
especially the Pan-Islamic Turkic intellectuals in Central Asia and the Ottoman Empire. 
Early 20th century Pan-Islamists saw Japan as a “rising sun” in Asia that had acquired a 
political and military power strong enough to counter the hegemony of Western 
colonialism, and even looked to Japan as the model to be emulated and replicated 
throughout the Muslim world (cf. Worringer, 2001). Some even argued that the Japanese 
should be systematically converted so that they could, as pious leaders of the Muslim 
world, become “the savior of Islam.” Japanese Pan-Asian nationalist elites skillfully 
maneuvered this Muslim passion for a Japanese liberator and some of them sincerely 
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believed that the future of Asia as a whole hinged upon the melding of Japanese Pan-
Asianism and (largely but not exclusively Turkic) Pan-Islamism. It was thought that such 
a coalition would wrest Asia from the domination of Western colonialism and set it on a 
path to independence, emancipation, and development. 
It was not merely the West that was seen as the enemy to be defeated, as a matter of 
fact. This coalition between Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism propounded both by 
Japanese nationalists and Pan-Islamic Muslim intellectuals also saw Soviet Russia as a 
major threat to be contained, especially when a majority of the exiled Pan-Islamic 
Muslim activists in Japan were from Central Asia and the Ottoman Empire, and when 
Russian communism was seen as a grave menace for the expansion of the Japanese 
Empire in Asia. Specifically for the Japanese Pan-Asian nationalists, a close 
collaboration with Pan-Islamists and the “Muslim world” would help obstruct the 
encroachment of Russian forces in Central Asia and the Near East, and create a buffer 
zone for the emergent Japanese Empire while simultaneously – and this was the part of 
the story that the Hui intellectuals well knew – reducing the influence of the Chinese state 
in East and Inner Asia. A notable fact in the course of forging this alliance whose irony 
was lost to the Hui elites was that among all the participants who signed in 1909 on the 
scroll that marked the foundation of Ajia Gikai (Asian Awakening Society), the major 
propaganda machine of Japan in the Islamic world, there were three Hui Muslims. One of 
them, Wang Haoran, was a prominent Hui cleric who was much respected in China for 
his effort in initiating modern Islamic education for the Hui in the renowned Niujie 
Mosque in Beijing. The irony went even further. Many of those Japanese participants 
who signed the scroll were close associates of Kokuryukai, or Black Dragon Society, a 
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Pan-Asianist, but also strongly nationalistic Japanese organization with an avowedly 
imperialist bent which later became a major source of assassinators, infiltrators, and spies 
in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) (Esenbel, 2004). 
The point was that the Hui elites who traveled to the “Muslim world” in 1938 did not 
share this internationalist sentiment. Although Japan was seen as an Asian exemplar of 
modernity closer to home and worth emulating in early 20th century, its Pan-Asian vision 
in the 1930s was viewed in China completely in a negative light as the Second Sino-
Japanese War gradually picked up. We should note that the particular kind of Pan-
Islamism propounded by the Japanese Pan-Asianists was largely, though not exclusively, 
a Pan-Turkic political vision. The image of “the Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent,” 
and even the imaginary historiographical discourse that a historical connection could be 
established between Japanese culture and the Altaic culture of the North Asian nomads 
(“our Altaic brothers”), reigned supreme in this coalition between Pan-Asianism and Pan-
Islamism. Wang Haoran’s support of Ajia Gikai was somewhat curious and certainly 
short-lived, replaced by a wide-spread enmity to both Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism 
among the Hui intellectuals. To a certain extent, it is arguable that the explicitly Pan-
Turkic undertone of the Japan-backed Pan-Islamism ran directly contrary to the strongly 
Chinese (Han) nationalistic commitment of the Hui elites. They even went to the length 
of arguing that taking advantage of the adversity China had been plunged into and 
seceding from it in order to establish either an independent Islamic state or to merge into 
an emergent Pan-Islamic empire would be precisely against the well-being of Islam. A 
“Hui state” or a new Islamic empire that took shape by splitting extant countries, in their 
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view, would precisely be detrimental to Hui Islam in particular and to world Islam in 
general.  
In their view, an independent Islamic state established with the help of colonial 
powers (either Japanese or Western) would be no more than a semblance of 
independence, a puppet state, and would inevitably lead to the ultimate extinction of 
Islam. Japanese propaganda of liberating China’s Mulims from the yoke of the Chinese 
Han empire was looked on cautiously and cynically, and one of the gravest accusations 
leveled against the “backward” Uyghur at this time was precisely the latter’s attempt to 
seek help from the Japanese. Seen from the perspective of the Hui intellectuals, the Pan-
Asian and Pan-Islamic scheme advocated by the Japanese as the future of a unified and 
strong Asia was completely a cunning political ruse that would first decompose the vast 
Chinese republic and eventually turn against Islam when its power reached an 
unchallengeable scale. They argued painstakingly for the unconditional devotion of all 
Hui in China to the defense of the Han majoritarian republic, since it was presumed that 
with the loss or even the compromise of China’s political independence in the face either 
of the Japanese or the Western powers, all Muslims living under China’s jurisdiction 
would eventually be deprived of the basic social and political conditions required for the 
free practice of the Islamic faith. Speaking from a position they took for granted, they 
actually assumed that an independent (Han) nation-sate was the precondition for the 
survival and flourish of the Islamic religion in China. An essay published in Moonlight in 
1932, for example, propounded that “We Muslims are still citizens of the Republic of 
China. The protection of our life and property depends upon the fate of the Republic” 
(Wang, 1932). This stance remained consistent through t the 1930s and well into the 
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1940s. The voice of the Uyghur and other Inner Asian Muslims was erased, and the 
Chinese-speaking Hui intellectuals put themselves in a position to speak for all Muslims 
within the Chinese border.  
But this is not all of it. There was yet another discourse gradually taking root among 
the activist Hui intellectuals, which proposed a different politics of global Islam that was 
professedly not Pan-Islamic. If Pan-Asianist Japanese nationalists imagined that Japan 
and “the Muslim world” (primarily a Turkish Muslim world) should collaborate to lead 
Asia out of the colonial quagmire, the Hui activists proposed an alternative vision in 
which the Chinese (read the Han) took center stage as a critical force that the “Muslim 
world” could not afford to ignore. An article published in the first issue of Moonlight 
enumerated the “weak nations” (ruoxiao minzu) which had been subjected to the Western 
colonial rule. The list included China, Turkey, India, Persia, Afghanistan, Egypt, 
Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Its point was to demonstrate that among all the “nations” 
that either had become or were being colonized, the C inese nation (centering upon the 
Han) and the “Islamic nation” (Huijiao minzu) were two major colonized peoples with 
the largest combined population. If, as the essay argued, the emancipation and self-
determination of the Chinese nation depended primarily upon the struggle of the 
majoritarian Han, the liberation of all subjugated peoples from the chains of Western 
colonialism depended upon the alliance of the “Chinese nation” and the “Islamic nation,” 
the combined population of which was thought to constitute well over half of the entire 
colonized peoples. A dual ethnocentrism in terms of “civilizational superiority,” in 
addition to a rough headcount, also underwrote this proposition: in contrast to those 
“weak nations” who had no option but succumb to the oppressive power of the West, 
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both the “Islamic nation” and the “Chinese nation” were supposed to have been blessed 
with long and impressive histories of preeminent civilization. The point therefore was to 
pass the heavy responsibility of liberating all subjugated peoples in the world into the 
hands of the allied forces of the Islamic world and the Chinese (Han) world. This double 
ethnocentrism self-congratulatorily located the Chinese Hui Muslims at a junction 
imagined to be particularly critical: they were seen as the only viable connection that 
could link the two supposedly strongest anti-imperialist and anti-colonial forces. In this 
political imaginary, the rights to self-determination of all “weak nations” ultimately relied 
upon whether the Chinese-speaking Hui could forge that crucial united front upon which, 
according to many Hui intellectuals, depended the life and death of all colonized peoples 
(Wang, 1929). Propounded by Wang Mengyang, one of the founding editors of 
Moonlight and an eminent Hui intellectual and composer, thisview acquired wide 
popularity as one reads through Hui publications of the Republican period. It seemed that 
both Islam and the Han could not survive without the Hui – or so the Hui elites thought.  
Therefore, it should not be difficult for us to understand why from the very beginning 
the Hui intellectuals were against the Partition in India, against the Indian Muslims’ 
secession from India to establish the independent Islamic Republic of Pakistan. To them, 
Britain was to India as Japan was to China, and the position of Indian Muslims was 
compared to the place of Uyghur Muslims. To the Huiact vists, it was the same question 
of anti-imperialism that defined both. But we should be clear that they were not against 
statehood-seeking political Islam per se. As a matter of fact, most Hui activist 
intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s did not clearly distinguish between a secular 
“Muslim state” and an “Islamic state” which proclaimed to rule in the name of God and 
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“codified” the Sharīca in a way never done in the entire history of Islam (Hallaq, 2013, 
2009, 2005b, 2004). Turkey was praised primarily for its political reforms and social 
revolutions that raised it above other “Muslim states” in terms of its strength in resisting 
imperial forces. That its transformation produced a secular state and Atatürk abolished 
the institution of the caliphate seemed to matter less than its political and military success. 
The famous political lecture of Muhammad Iqbal, thespiritual founder of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, was translated and reprinted in Moonlight.20 There was a special 
section on every issue of Moonlight that reported the most up-to-date political 
information in the Muslim world. But there was, however, no clear formulation of a 
modern “Islamism” among the Hui intellectuals, and o intrinsic connection between 
Islam and statehood was established. They cast their political aspiration primarily in 
terms of a (Han) Chinese anti-imperialist nationalism. They thought in place of the Han, 
for the Han, even while they were trying to forge an inter ational coalition with all 
“Muslim/Islamic states” around the world. They were committed to a special kind of 
“global Islam,” the kind that did not contradict asmuch as presuppose a nationalist 
rootedness. But we must insist on the crucial fact tha this “global Islam” was predicated 
upon an essentially double exclusion: on the one hand, “Han Muslim” was rendered 
ultimately unimaginable. And on the other, Uyghur Muslims were invariably relegated to 
a passive position. The former could not speak because they were presumed not to exist, 
while the latter could not be heard because they were s en as underserving of listening. 
The historical narrative proffered by the Hui elite intellectuals and the politics that went 
                                                   
20 See Hai, 1933. The original text was “Presidential Address Delivered at the Annual Session of All-India 
Muslim League at Allahabad on the 29th December 1930,” in Iqbal & Tariq, 1973. Iqbal’s politics bears an 
interesting relation with his philosophy; it both ext nds his philosophical thought and contradicts it in ways 
perhaps not coincidental. For his philosophy, see Iqbal, 1960. For a recent discussion of Iqbal’s political 
vision in relation to his project for reconstructing the religious thought of Islam, see Diagne, 2010. 
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with this historiographical discourse were marked by this dual exclusion which stood at 
the threshold of the self-narration of the modern Hui as a special ethnic minority in the 
new Chinese nation-state. 
Conclusion: Between the Han and the Uyghur 
Slightly more than a year after the violent Uygur protest on July 5th, 2009, which, 
according to the official report issued by the state Xinhua News Agency, claimed 197 
casualties (the World Uyghur Congress, an exile Uygur political association, insisted that 
the real number was much higher, around 600) (Xinhua News, July 18, 2009; BBC News, 
July 6, 2009), I met Qianli on my fieldwork in Henan. Born and raised in Xinjiang, more 
particularly in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Qianli was a Hui who considered 
himself to have an intimate knowledge of how inter-ethnic relations in Xinjiang had 
deteriorated over the past two decades. He was well versed in the historical narratives 
discussed in this chapter, and because of his personal experience, he was particularly 
critical of the absence of the Uyghur voice in them. After graduating from college, he 
spent several years in the 1990s as a journalist working for the official party newspaper 
of the prefecture. “I could earn as much as ten thousand RMB just in a month,” Qianli 
boasted to me, “every businessman wanted to have a pi ce on the paper, and the party 
committee was eager to polish their image as well.”  
But money was not what Qianli was after. A provocative writer and impassioned 
commentator on political topics, he quit the “institution (tizhi)” in late 1990s and began to 
run his own underground magazine, Guanzhu (Perspective). Both the main and sole 
editor of Guanzhu, Qianli wrote ceaselessly on topics that ranged from ethnic relations in 
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China (especially in Xinjiang), Islamic education, poverty in Hui areas, to international 
politics, American imperialism, and the Palestine-Israel conflict. The magazine was 
freely given away and anyone could email him to order a copy – he printed his email 
address on the back cover, together with his bank account information to request 
donations from generous readers. The distribution of the magazine depended primarily 
upon personal networks: Qianli often mailed a dozen copies to the wired Hui clerics he 
knew, who then distributed them both among the local mosques and beyond while they 
traveled. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the magazine, despite occasional contributions made by 
supportive readers such as me, gradually ate away his savings and put him in heavy debt. 
But he continued to write, and he insisted on paying every time we had meals in a local 
Uyghur restaurant. One of his heroes was Edward Sai, and upon learning that I was 
from Columbia where Said used to teach before he passed away, Qianli was very excited. 
“I think Islam must be on the Left (yisilan jiu yinggai shi zuode),” he told me 
determinedly, when he mentioned Noam Chomsky together with Said as the two 
intellectuals he admired in the West.  
But Xinjiang came up only after a short while. As I probed him about his view on the 
so-called “July 5th Incident,” Qianli suddenly wound into a somewhat shocking comment 
on the Hui, 
If that day eventually comes and the Uyghur insurgents have cleared all 
blocks until they finally reach the building complex which is the Xinjiang 
government, they will see that it is the Hui who will form the very last line 
of defense. It is the Hui who will fight for the Han even after the Han 
themselves have given up. They cannot survive in a Xinjiang ruled 
exclusively by the Uyghur, they will struggle to maint in the Han 
government in Xinjiang. 
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Qianli had always been blunt, and I had somehow been used to his sharp comments 
which I often took with a pinch of salt. He did not provide any explanation for his 
relentless critique of what he called the “slave mentality” of the Hui, and upon my 
probably annoying prodding, he hesitantly conjectured that “it might be because the Hui 
do not have their own traditional territory like the Uygur do.” He could not give me a 
persuasive explanation, and his hesitation indicated that he could not even convince 
himself. But he nonetheless insisted that the Hui had a “slave mentality.”  
As the lamb kebab we ordered was put on the table by a Uyghur waiter21, Qianli 
joked with the young man in the Xinjiang dialect of mandarin Chinese which he grew up 
speaking. “You see,” he told me after having his fun, “even while serving, the Uyghur 
did not lose their sense of humor.” And even while condemning the “slave mentality” of 
the Hui, Qianli nonetheless could not displace himself from the position he otherwise 
vehemently criticized. But why “slave mentality” when, it seems, the Hui are imagined to 
be at the site where the life and death, spirit and guts (the masculinist undertone should 
not escape us) of the master are located? In a somewhat twisted manner, the structuring 
sexual imaginary in which one takes oneself as the desire of the other resurfaces in 
Qianli’s discourse, and the redemption of the Han master, again, is seen to depend upon 
the slavish Hui. The Dao of truth, however, is merely placed by the Dao of force. 
  
                                                   
21 I do not know his name, even though I had many meals in this restaurant and saw him many times during 
my fieldwork. I could not, as I write this sentence, find another word to call him except “a Uyghur waiter.” 
My own identity as Hui therefore subjects myself to the same critique which I have leveled against the Hui 
intellectuals whose discourses and politics I have studied in this chapter. This is the limit of this chapter, 
and perhaps also the limit that demarcates the field of the visible in which this dissertation as a whole 
unfolds. I should have made an effort to know his name, and the names of all other “Uyghur waiters” I 
have encountered in my fieldwork. The lack in ethnography points to a lack that founds my own 





Niche of Islam: the Disputed Space of the 
Mosque 
 
Down Mosque was among the very few mosques in the central urban area of 
Zhengzhou that still boasted a small Hui community clustering around it. The weave of 
this daily disappearing community progressively unraveled as multiple tides of 
municipally backed housing projects jostled the Huito other parts of the city. Located at 
the margin of the old inner city which had become th center of the new and still 
expanding Zhengzhou, Down Mosque was only ten minutes away by bus from the place 
where I lived during my fieldwork. Almost every Friday afternoon, I would cleanse 
myself, join the other Hui, and perform my own religious duty, the weekly Jumu’ah 
prayer, under the lead of one of the imams at Down who had become both my informants 
and my friends. The Jumu’ah prayer at Down Mosque on October 22, 2010, however, 
was a bit different – even awkward. As the crowd slowly moved out of the prayer hall 
after the ritual and into the elevated courtyard, a notice posted on the wall directly facing 
the exit of the prayer hall caught the eyes of many. It said that on October 21 – that is, the 
day before – an election had taken place among the Hui Muslims who prayed regularly in 
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Down with the administrative assistance of the Guanche g District Bureau of Religious 
Affairs (to whose jurisdiction Down Mosque belonged), and a new commission for the 
management of Down Mosque had been elected through a completely democratic and 
legally justified procedure. Members of the new commission, according to the notice, 
would soon assume their new roles after a short period of “deliberation” and “advice-
seeking,” in the course of which, as the wording of the notice implied, there might even 
be a change of personnel as a result of “negotiation.” The notice was not put up by any 
Hui – its red letterhead and the seal of the local bureau of religious affairs stamped firmly 
over the date printed at the end indicated that it r ther came from the government.  
Many of those who set their eyes upon the notice were as unenlightened as me 
regarding the happening of this somewhat mysterious and certainly hasty election on 
Thursday. But no one protested, at least in a way th t could make a scene and assemble 
sympathetic support. I was much puzzled as to why the election happened on that 
particular day: shouldn’t a truly “democratic” election be carried out only after all 
qualified voters (i.e. all residents in the local Hui community whom Down Mosque was 
supposed to serve) had been informed beforehand of the exact location and time of the 
election? Shouldn’t a “democratic” election to appoint the commission that would look 
over one’s own communal mosque be carried out precisely at the time when the largest 
number of local Hui would come to the mosque to perform the weekly Jumu’ah prayer 
which could only be performed collectively with other fellow Muslims? Why Thursday, 
just one day before the day for the collective praye ? What was the rush? 
The only reason I could think of at that moment was a commonplace which I had 
been told countless times in my fieldwork, especially by young Hui who initially 
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introduced me into the local world but most of whom in fact were not locally rooted: that 
the government did not want the Hui to control their own mosques, and it only wanted 
“its own people” in the commissions. The nominal “democracy” was frequently ridiculed, 
and every such election I had come across at Down Mosque was invariably seen as a 
shameless fraud. But this prevalent cliché, however, was soon overturned.  
“Did you know about this?” I asked an old Hui man who happened to be reading the 
notice by my side.  
“No, I didn’t. I just saw it.” He shook his head and replied calmly. 
“I don’t understand. Why are people not informed in advance? Why Thursday? 
Shouldn’t this be done after Jumu’ah, when the turno t is perhaps much higher?” I 
expected a confirmation of the cliché which I had heard previously. 
“Of course you cannot do it on Jumu’ah. There are too many people on Jumu’ah.” He 
couldn’t have said it in a more matter-of-fact manner. 
“But isn’t that precisely the point? Shouldn’t people know beforehand that there 
would be an election for a new commission? Isn’t it unfair?” I probed further. 
“You cannot have too many people in. You cannot put up a notice in advance. If you 
do that, it’ll be too complicated. There would be a fierce competition and a huge crowd. 
By the end of the day, the mosque might fall into the hands of someone who never came 
for prayer but who was well-connected and could acquire the highest votes by bringing in 
his relations. This happened a lot elsewhere…” 
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I did not receive the confirmation I initially anticipated, and was much surprised to 
find that the hasty election was not criticized as much as commended precisely for its 
hastiness and unpredictable timing. It was as if inorder for a “democratic” election to be 
conducive to the good management of the local mosque, the procedure must be changed 
and the number of votes deliberately limited. Only those who came regularly for prayer 
should be given the chance to vote, while others living in the same community, although 
de jure qualified, should nonetheless be kept out de facto in order to prevent the situation 
from becoming “too complicated.” Deeply embedded in the local community, Down 
Mosque, to those who shared this view, should by all means be wrested away from the 
complex local network consisting of dense human relations. 
And this view is not uncommon. In fact, for many Hui who frequent mosques for 
daily prayers and casual socializing, the word “democracy (minzhu)” conveys a mixed 
message. On the one hand, it refers to the supposedly universal right to religious freedom, 
to effective political representation, to a world that in their imagination is diametrically 
opposed to the authoritarian rule of the Chinese party-state. On the other, however, 
whenever “democracy” comes up in a conversation particularly within the context of a 
mosque (at least those which I participated in), it almost invariably elicits a comment that 
might seem to be precisely contrary to the dream for liberty: that too much democracy, 
too much freedom, has been allowed by the state in the mosque; that democracy, instead 
of its opposite, has undermined the free practice of Islam – or at the very least, the 
maintenance of the sacred space, i.e. the mosque, by which Hui Islam is thought to 
acquire its most concrete traction in the actual social world of Han China. This 
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contradiction often results in an ambivalent attitude to state intervention: it is both 
resisted and desired, seen as both disruptive and necessary.  
It is this complex and ambiguous space which I propose to discuss in this chapter. My 
primary focus in this chapter is on urban mosques, and this particular concentration is 
mainly due to the fact that a major part of my fieldwork (7 months) was spent in 
Zhengzhou, the provincial capital of Henan Province. But I also travelled to the 
surrounding rural areas either individually or with Hui clerics whom I have known or 
befriended and who brought me on their visits to places where their colleagues and 
students worked (the mobile character of Hui clerics will be discussed in chapter 4). My 
work in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region has also brought me to multiple Hui villages 
and towns. In the course of my discussion, therefore, I will make brief comparisons 
between the management of urban and rural mosques, with emphasis laid still upon the 
former. I hope to be able to demonstrate how urban mosques are inscribed in a more 
complex political economic framework which probably intensifies the problems that are 
common to most mosques I have visited. 
The complicated dynamics in a locally rooted Hui mosque, as shown in the scenario 
at Down Mosque with which I open this chapter, cannot be completely reduced either to 
an overt confrontation with the authoritarian state (which is rare) or a more or less covert 
maneuvering that always engages the intervening local government in a clear-cut duel. 
To a large extent, this chapter is not interested in the (sometimes reified) contradiction 
between “civil society” (of which religion is commonly seen as a key component) and 
atheistic (much stronger than “secular,” given the particularly communist legacy of China) 
authoritarian state – a contradiction that has been amply investigated by an enormous 
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amount of academic literature (Yang, 2012; Yang & Tamney, 2005; Ashiwa & Wank, 
2009; Madsen, 1998; Yang, 2008; Goossaert & Palmer, 2011; Palmer, 2007). What I 
would like to discuss in this chapter, to the contrary, are the concrete institutional 
conditions that subtend the traction of Hui Islam in the Chinese Han social world. Instead 
of treating mosques more generally as places where Hui Islam is discussed, debated, 
taught, or reformed (all these certainly do constitute important functions of Hui mosques, 
as they do perhaps in all other mosques), I choose to focus more specifically on how the 
mosque itself is built and demolished, governed and managed. Islam does not develop 
and spread on its own, and how it develops and spreads cannot be detached from the 
concrete material conditions that both facilitate and contain its expansion. I subscribe to 
the view that the anthropology of Hui Islam should first attend to the political economy 
of the mosque as the very basic condition to which the complexity of religion owes its 
material anchor in the concrete social world. It is to this political economy that I now turn. 
Locating the Mosque 
The first day I arrived in Zhengzhou for my fieldwork, Laoyang took me on a night 
tour to February 7th Square, where a few locally well-known mosques clustered. The 
square was thus named to commemorate an enormously influential strike of railway 
laborers in 1923, a workers’ movement organized by the then developing Communist 
Party still believing – wrongly, as they later would think – that in order to have a 
proletarian revolution, they should work among the actual proletarians and start from 
where they concentrated, i.e. the rusty industrial workshops and factories in the city. 
They had yet to learn the Leninist lesson, turn away from the “strongest point” in the 
capitalist regime, and focus on the rural masses, the peasants, who later became “the 
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natural allies” of the weak Chinese proletarians. I the 1920s, Zhengzhou was located at a 
critical strategic point of the Peking-Hankou railway that ran across Hebei, Henan and 
Hubei Provinces, connecting northern to central China. Railway was still a rarity in early 
20th century China, and its vast power in transporting goods and people (esp. the military) 
across long distances in a relatively short period c mpared to other pre-modern forms of 
transportation earned it crucial political, economic, and military significance. The 
Communist Party believed that by intervening in this strategic point and by paralyzing 
this main artery with a devastating strike, for however brief a moment, they could on the 
one hand weaken the forces of the anti-revolutionary warlords, and on the other, educate 
the proletarians through the power of organization and enlighten them in their theoretical 
and practical role in revolutionizing China. The strike was violently suppressed on the 
night of February 7th by the army of Wu Peifu, the warlord under whose sphere of 
influence the Peking-Hankou railway was laid and who exacted massive profits from it to 
finance his military venture. Fifty-two workers were shot dead and hundreds injured. 
Together with the slightly earlier strike of the mining laborers in Anyuan (Jiangxi 
Province) led also by the Communists22, the February 7th Strike was taken by the CCP to 
be a milestone in the history of workers’ movements organized by the “vanguard” 
Communists before they moved their base to the countryside.   
 But this episode of Communist revolutionary history, and of workers’ struggle 
against capitalist imperialism, was very much overshadowed in the 2010s by the 
overwhelming commercialization and capitalization iChina, readily observable 
                                                   
22 See Perry, 2012 for a detailed account of this strke and the revolutionary politics surrounding it. See also 
Perry, 1993 for the early work of the Communists among the Shanghai proletarians. Perry’s work serves as 
an exquisite introduction to the complex situation of workers’ struggle during this period, although wether 
her approach can be called Marxist remains disputable. 
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precisely in the area where the February 7th Square was situated. A landmark at the center 
of the city, home to the February 7th Tower – which also functioned as a museum of the 
strike, but whose entrance often remained closed during the seven months of my 
fieldwork in Zhengzhou – under which the pale memory of the strike was peddled in the 
form of cheap postcards and costume photography, the Square was the hub where five 
major roads met and department stores, flagship shoping centers, small retailers, fast 
food stands and even wholesale warehouses clustered. Th  Zhengzhou Rail Station was 
only minutes away by walk, and one long-distance bus terminal was located only slightly 
farther, bringing daily in and out a huge amount of ourists and merchandises. The traffic 
on the square was invariably congested, and it becam  practically a parking lot during the 
rush hour. Dust and litter, sweat and exhaust, combined with restless horns, unruly 
driving, and loud music which blasted from the high-volume stereos that flanked the 
entrances to department stores, created a dizzying orgy marked, however, by a glaring 
ephemerality – everyone was rushing towards and then away from the square. Streams of 
traffic converged and then diverged in different directions, and the memory of revolution 
was daily washed away by these restive currents. 
On the night when I paid my first visit, while we were standing on the part of the 
square where vehicles were not permitted and only pedestrians allowed, Laoyang tried to 
point out to me where the mosques he wanted to show me ere located. “There,” he said, 
“one is there.” He moved his index finger across the space and pointed to what I thought 
was no more than darkness that sunk deep into the night sky, shaded and concealed by 
the dazzling neon lights that competed to win the att ntion of passing customers. “Where? 
There?” I pointed in the direction he gestured to, but still could see nothing.  
120 
 
Yes, it’s just there, you see the dome? It’s dark, but do you see the contour? 
Can you recognize it? It’s right there! You see it? Right there! 
Despite the referential efforts made by Laoyang and my strenuous attempt at recognition, 
I still could not see. The neon lights were just too distracting, and the music too loud. 
And while I was still trying to figure out the position of the dome he referred to, Laoyang 
had already set out to tell me about his plan of opening a small eatery in the vicinity of 
the square.   
The mosques on and in the immediate vicinity of February 7th Square – which I later 
frequented in my work – constitute particularly usef l examples in demonstrating the 
general transformations in the Chinese urban landscape that effect a shift in the ecology 
of urban mosques. Journey (lvzheng) Mosque, for instance, was initially built in the early 
20th century on donations from small Hui merchants who travelled from Kaifeng to 
Zhengzhou for business. Being outsiders, these Kaifeng merchants daily commuted 
between the urban market where they peddled their hand-made merchandise and the rural 
villages where they found their temporary residence. Journey Mosque was built by a 
collective fund pooled by these Hui merchants primaly to meet their demands for 
performing timely prayers during daytime. The mosque is situated at the margin of the 
“old city” ( laocheng), which was for a long time the only urban area before rapid 
urbanization set in in 1990s. Neither entirely in the city nor completely outside it, the 
location of Journey Mosque was in the old times a direct reflection of the somewhat 
ambivalent social position of its patrons. 
But other mosques built primarily by local Hui and serving local religious demands 
are no less ambivalent in their locations. We cannot, h wever, expect to find a generally 
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applicable pattern in the locational distribution of all urban mosques in Chinese cities. 
Neither are they subject in equal measure to the urban developmental projects that swept 
across most Chinese cities in the past three decades. Most contemporary Chinese cities 
whose history reaches far back into the imperial days have an old “inner city” which was 
initially the city itself, the “core” from which later expansions shoot out in all directions. 
Some of these “inner cities” are further divided, with a small walled residential complex 
at the center often reserved exclusively for the Manchu elites and military generals in the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.). These small “Manchu ities” (man cheng), as they were 
called in the late imperial days, lost their exclusivity after the fall of the Qing, but the 
“inner cities” which enclosed them remained the commercial and political centers of the 
local world. The location of early mosques – those that would later become the regional 
hubs in developing Hui Islamic education and disseminating information from beyond 
the confined local world – in these old inner cities s similar to that of Journey Mosque. 
They are often situated on the edge of the old city and at the margin of the market. 
Oftentimes their names bear the mark of this obscure position – the word guan, or pass, is 
endemic, and almost every old city, insofar as there are mosques in it, has, for instance, a 
xiguan mosque (mosque at the western pass), or a nanguan mosque (mosque at the 
southern pass). These guan mosques often stand close to the old city wall, either already 
demolished or still existent. In present times, they are every so often used as geographical 
markers on bus stops that quietly narrate the largely forgotten urban landscape now 
barely recognizable.  
Although economic liberalization in China is often traced to the late 1970s in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, most cities in China did not engage in 
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large-scale infrastructure construction and aggressiv  urban developmental projects well 
until the mid-1990s. Some might have started slightly earlier (e.g. Beijing and Shanghai), 
but for most (including Zhengzhou), the conditions – primarily the financial ones – would 
not obtain until late 1990s. The rise of an increasingly unruly banking system that both 
benefited from and actively facilitated risky speculation went hand in hand with local 
governments’ heavy dependence on short and long-term loans from the state banks to 
finance their expensive expansionist projects. Tax revenues, only a fraction of which 
would be kept for local development while the rest must be submitted to the central 
government, could hardly fill the gaping hole in the municipal budget, and getting into 
debt was and continues to be the only option left for most local governments – urban and 
rural – in China. One crucial way – now increasingly the only way – for the local 
governments to pay off these debts was to work withgiant real estate businesses and to 
capitalize on the socialist state monopoly of landed property still officially laid down in 
the constitution.  
What this means is that municipal governments, in the name of modern urban 
planning and claiming to improve the living conditions of local residents (most of whom 
in the 1990s were still living in modest low houses clustered together and squeezed into 
tiny spaces) would force the residents – especially those who were living in and around 
the “old city,” which had by now become the central district with the highest property 
price – out of their old quarters, offer them meager compensation, and “transfer” 
(churang) the cleared land to the highest bidder among the real estate merchants, with 
whom the governments often cultivated a close cooperativ  and invariably lucrative 
relationship. Initially, some municipal governments provided a modest subsidy to those 
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who wanted to purchase their way back to their old home at a price much higher than for 
which they were compensated. Some municipal governmnts even at times reached an 
agreement with the real estate corporations to reserv  several blocks at a discounted price 
only for those old residents who were eager to live in the neighborhood where they had 
grown up. With the progression of time, and especially after mid-2000s, however, these 
sporadic efforts at sharing even a fraction of the government revenue were nowhere to be 
seen. Little hope is left for those who have thus been expropriated from their houses to 
return to their old neighborhood, which will soon become unrecognizable to their very 
eyes. 
It is in this rapidly shifting urban landscape that we shall situate the contemporary 
Chinese urban mosques, especially those that function as regional hubs on the edge of the 
“old cities” (Journey Mosque being one such regional hub, as its patrons gradually settled 
down in Zhengzhou and their descendants became “local” Hui). The expansion of the 
urban area especially in the past two decades has brought significant changes to the 
ecology and political economy in which these mosque are embedded: instead of being 
on the periphery of the Han city, sitting vaguely between the inside and the outside, and 
straddling the border that separates the city and the countryside, they are now lodged at 
the center of the new city, occupying the land over which both municipal governments 
and real estate speculators drool. From the dilapidated ancient city wall and the quiet 
villages which were often minutes’ walk away, their neighbors have now become 
Walmart, McDonalds, and IMAX movie theaters.   
But mosques are not separate islands each closing in upon itself and remaining 
largely independent from its surroundings. Most urban mosques in China have a fang – a 
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relatively compact Hui community that centers upon a mosque as the site for performing 
religious duty. The drastic shifts in urban landscape which often begin from the “old city” 
where mosques are located inevitably put much pressu  on these vulnerable Hui 
communities. In order to have an idea of the concrete consequences these transformations 
have entailed, let us return to February 7th Square and its immediate vicinity. Of the four 
mosques that are situated in this area, Down Mosque (the one that appears at the 
beginning of this chapter) fashions us with a particularly interesting example. Situated 
slightly farther away from the Square than the other ree, Down Mosque is one of the 
two in the area which still boast a small Hui community that concentrates in its 
immediate neighborhood. The urban developmental scheme that commenced in late 
1990s in Zhengzhou slowly picked up speed at the turn of the century and was running 
full steam in mid-2000s, extending well into the second decade of the new millennium. 
The neighborhood that encloses Down Mosque has already been transformed by a 
housing project, which scattered many of the Hui resid nts previously living in the 
neighborhood over other parts of the city often tens of miles of away. Given the steady 
rise of property prices around the Down Street area nd the prospect of a new housing 
project under discussion behind the closed door of the municipal government, there might 
be little hope that those who were displaced in the first round could ever buy their way 
back. But even many of those Hui who could afford an have bought new apartments in 
the revamped neighborhood despite the huge gap between the compensation they 
received and the market price they have had to pay have moved outside the neighborhood 
to seek chances elsewhere – the new districts are spreading their wings, leaving the “old 
city” behind, with its congested traffic and polluted environment. The new apartments 
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purchased around Down Mosque are often rented to ousiders who move into the 
neighborhood either from other parts of the city or – which is increasingly the case – 
from other places in the province. Albeit not exclusively, many of these new residents are 
Han who come to the provincial capital to seek opportunities in their turn. In other words, 
there has been a progressive decrease in the number of Hui that live in the neighborhood 
of Down Mosque, and a rising tendency that the remaining Hui are more sparsely 
distributed in the community – if still there is one – that surrounds it. 
 But this does not mean, however, that the number of Hui who pray regularly in 
Down Mosque would necessarily dwindle. Laozhang, a man of seventy who has long 
retired from a life-long job as a chauffeur, used to live right next to the mosque. The 
housing project in late 1990s hauled him over to a different part of the city. He would 
daily commute by bike to the mosque to “rush” to the prayer (gan bai). “If I go home 
after Dhuhr (the midday prayer), I will have to setout for the mosque again around 3:30 
pm, just to be sure that I arrive in time for Asr (the afternoon prayer).” At my inquiry, he 
started to give me a brief schedule that he daily fol owed – 
You see, if you set out later than that, you won’t make it. From 4 to 5 pm, 
February 7th Square is usually extremely crowded, with pedestrians, bikes, 
motorcycles, big buses, taxis, and cars all congested and jammed. You 
have to count that in, and leave time for that. It often takes me forty 
minutes to one hour to come to the mosque, depending on the traffic. I 
couldn’t come in for Fajr (the morning prayer) – it’s oo early. And I 
cannot come home after Asr, since it’s only about an hour between Asr 
and Maghrib. I need to stay and wait. If Isha (the last prayer) is not too late, 
I can do it in the mosque. Otherwise, I have to go home and pray on my 
own – after dinner and before I go to bed. 
The prayer schedule that Down Mosque follows and is chalked on the board in the 
courtyard is markedly different from what one could retrieve from online calculators that 
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profess to provide accurate prayer timing for all places on earth. For multiple times 
during the early days of my fieldwork, I either missed prayers or arrived too early, since I 
thought only one set of timing was followed in Zhengzhou and I could trust the online 
calculators. It turned out, however, that many local mosques in Zhengzhou (at least those 
which I have visited or where I have prayed) follow a completely different set of prayer 
schedules, and even the specific date of Eid can be su j ct to dispute (whether one should 
literally watch for the moon or follow the pre-designated calendar, and whether the local 
calendar or the calendar in Saudi Arabia – supposed to be the “center” of Islam – should 
be followed). No one in Down Mosque knows exactly why it is this particular daily 
schedule for prayer that they have been following si ce time immemorial, and why it 
differs from the one produced by online calculators. The clerics whom I talk to well know 
this disparity, since they have regular access to computers and Internet connection and 
some even have Adhan software installed on their smartphones. But they still prefer to 
follow the old schedule. What Laozhang told me adds an additional dimension: neither 
time nor space is abstracted from the complex cityscape which, with its rapid shifts and 
rhythmic temporal and spatial punctuations, is constituted by concrete frictions, nexuses, 
bumps, bottlenecks, accidents, rush hours, and (mal-)functional traffic lights. Most of the 
regular mosque attenders are over sixty, and many are over seventy. Those who have 
diabetes – a common disease among many whom I came to know in the field – are even 
more careful in designing their own daily schedules: they must punctuate their days with 
light meals, and the one hour between Asr and Maghrid was for many a time of 
struggling and persevering, a time for jihād, as some said. Few could wait until the time 
of Isha – that would be too risky for a diabetic, who have to have early dinners.  
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The apparently confined act of prayer in such a context necessarily integrates a much 
larger world without the hidden but indispensable support of which the prayer in the 
mosque would be utterly impossible. The discipline of prayer and the bodily 
arrangements by the laborious execution of which “virtue” can be acquired therefore 
presuppose a no less rigorous corporeal discipline outside the more marked and confined 
“religious” field which has been the primary focus of anthropologists interested in the 
materiality of religious and ritual acts (Asad, 2003, 1993; Mahmood, 2005; Keane, 2007, 
1997; see also Mauss, Pickering, & Morphy, 2003). It is certainly true that perhaps 
anywhere the explicitly religious discipline – especially the five prayers in Islam – would 
necessarily demand a re-alignment and re-arrangement of “ on-religious” life, but the 
particular urban environment of Chinese cities might entail an enormous intensification 
and produce a much tighter articulation between prayer and other “secular” acts. To 
believe and to practice one’s faith in such an environment, one has to compartmentalize 
one’s whole life according to the rhythm of prayers that punctuate the waking hours. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this spatio-temporal intensification does not decenter religion as 
much as accentuates it. Previously, Laozhang might only need to walk a few minutes to 
come to Down Mosque to pray – he did not have to make any meticulous calculation in 
terms of time. But now, the three daytime prayers take his entire afternoon (perhaps even 
more), and he has to follow an exacting schedule organized exclusively according to 
these “religious” acts, each of which in itself might take no more than a mere ten minutes.  
Laozhang is not alone in facing this critical intensification of space-time 
arrangements resulting from the rapid changes in the urban landscape. Many of the aged 
men and women I had daily contact with in my work follow a no less punctilious 
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schedule – some (predominantly men) drove small motor-tricycles instead of riding bikes 
in order to be able to arrive on time for their prayer. I constantly heard anxious safety 
concerns among the imams – especially when someone who commuted by such a vehicle 
arrived late or simply did not show up. The imams kept a phone book and would call 
when such an absence appeared two or three times consecutively. It would be an 
exaggeration to argue that the new urban environment has made mosque-going a risky 
activity, but we nonetheless have to register the crucial fact that this spatio-temporal re-
organization has relocated the activity of “rushing” to prayer in a completely different 
ecology – in fact, it is this very ecology which has produced this “rushing” in the first 
place. 
To be sure, there are people who are not willing to quietly succumb to this 
encroaching regime of urban development, and they try painstakingly either to conserve 
or to rebuild the Hui community around the mosque, even when these mosques 
themselves have at times to be demolished and perhaps ebuilt elsewhere to make space 
for department stores and movie theaters. Zhenkun is o e such figure, and an unyielding 
one at that. A prominent calligrapher of Chinese and serving multiple terms as vice-
president of the Islamic Association of Zhengzhou, Zhenkun was in his early 70s when I 
met him at his office in a real estate company. It was a mystery to me how he could move 
so smoothly from his post in an Islamic association  a managerial position in a real 
estate corporation, and the only reason he was willing to offer was that he was merely 
“helping out a friend.” Highly experienced in maneuv ring the dense human relationship 
in the local world, his renown derived largely from his life-long engagement with local 
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affairs. Zhenkun was well respected among the local Hui clerics and his calligraphic 
work is much valued among the district and municipal government officials.  
The project he was working on and which he showed m on a map in his office has to 
do with a Hui community still enduring the at times shocking and for many painful 
process of urban development on the edge of the “old city.” The deterioration of this 
community, however, is already perceptible. Located only fifteen minutes’ walk away 
from Zhengzhou Rail Station and slightly farther removed from the more expensive area 
of February 7th Square than Down Mosque, Fuminli Mosque, the mosque upon which this 
community centers, is somewhat strangely and uneasily situated at a site which is so 
close to the line of cheap brothels that flank the community to which it belongs. These 
brothels often employ young rural female sex workers who come to Zhengzhou looking 
for jobs and serve primarily the long-distance truck drivers who arrive daily from other 
places within the province to transport large amounts of merchandises to the Zhengzhou 
Rail Station for further distribution. Many Hui living close to the mosque in fact benefit 
from this bustling environment: they sell inexpensive and easily made foodstuff to 
passersby and patrons of the brothels, and small-scale retail is among the most common 
occupations among the Hui in this community.  
In 2010, the Zhengzhou Municipal Government, together with the Guancheng District 
Government, decided to revamp the entire neighborhood and to wipe off from the 
landscape what in their eyes was a “slum (peng hu qu),” with its almost iconic brothels 
and its sprawling germ-ridden food vendors. Engineers and urban planners were brought 
in from as far as the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing to conduct investigations 
and to propose feasible plans for redeveloping the area that centers upon Fuminli Mosque. 
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No specific attention, however, was paid to the particularly Hui character of the 
community that would be most severely hit by this top-down developmental scheme. The 
final project pending approval from the municipal government at the time of my 
fieldwork proposes to turn the entire neighborhood – because of its particular location on 
the very edge of the old city separating the innermost circle of Zhengzhou from its “new 
districts” – into a stripe of grassland that would, according to the experts, be conducive to 
improving the air quality of the old city by ameliorating the pollution that results 
primarily from the congested traffic. Both Fuminli Mosque and the old houses that cluster 
around it would have to be completely demolished, and the possibility for those 
expropriated to return to their old neighborhood is entirely ruled out in this proposal. This 
time, it’s not a new housing project that is envisioned – it is the complete elimination of 
any house and the complete transformation of the entire eighborhood into a place where 
no one at all is allowed to live that are planned by the outside experts and silently 
discussed and deliberated over behind the closed door of the municipal government 
Zhenkun politely refused my request to make a copy f the layout with which he 
showed me the details of the proposal. “This has yet to be officially announced to the 
community,” he said, “and it must be kept confidential. A leak would cause too much of 
a commotion, and people might take it to the streets (shang jie le).” But he did not hide 
from me his discontent and the alternative plan he himself charted out, which, according 
to him, was strongly backed by the district governme t but temporarily shelved by the 
municipal government who “only trust the outside exp rts who in fact know nothing 
about the actual local world.” In the proposal submitted by the Tsinghua experts, the Hui 
living around Fuminli Mosque would be hauled n-mass and en-bloc to the fringe of the 
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expanding Zhengzhou, left to fare on their own with a meager compensation. A new 
mosque would be built with government funding to serve their religious demand. “But 
it’s not merely a question of making a home at a different place and praying in a different 
mosque,” Zhenkun continued, “Many of these Hui depend upon a prosperous market and 
a large threshold population for their small busines to survive. Moving them to the 
margin of the city simply means unemployment and poverty. What can they do to survive? 
They have nothing to fall back upon.”  
Zhenkun thinks that this is the major reason why his plan is seconded by the district 
government who in his eyes is more concerned with the concrete social and economic 
consequences otherwise glossed over by the municipal government: “It is the district 
government who would have to deal with the nitty-gritty world, and they don’t want a big 
trouble.” In his alternative plan, Zhenkun proposes that instead of turning the entire 
neighborhood into grassland, the government should clear the space to establish a new 
comprehensive quarter which includes both new resident al apartment buildings and a 
commercial pedestrian street where the Hui who purchase a home in the new buildings 
could continue their small business. “Then you can h ve urban development which would 
not deprive people of their livelihood while at the same time reduce the financial burden 
of the government – which would be tremendous if you have to displace so many people 
just for a piece of grassland at the center of the city.” Five months later by the time I left 
Zhenghou, the dilapidated Fuminli Mosque was still left standing in the shantytown that 
surrounded it – it in fact had a new imam lately, who already knew that where he served 
might soon be buried in rubble. 
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To locate urban mosques in Zhengzhou, therefore, is to come to grips with a highly 
mobile ground whose dynamics could hardly be controlled by the Hui who nonetheless 
have to bear its often grave consequences. The traditional location of the mosque is 
intimately linked to the particular form of life – both economic and social – that many 
Hui have grown used to and have over the years beenable to maintain in the face of 
occasionally cataclysmic transformations. A major shift they have to face since early 
2000s is not violent political oppression that forbids the practice of the Islamic religion in 
everyday life, as it was the case from the late 1950s until the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. What comes as less brutal but no less intrusive and perhaps even much more 
insidious and influential in the long term is a fundamental transformation in urban 
landscape that threatens to dissolve the sociological and organizational conditions upon 
which the institution of the mosque gains traction in Chinese cities.  
By saying this, I am not treating mosques as separate islands that stand on their own. 
What I have called the “institution” of the urban mosque necessarily goes beyond the 
actual confinement of the mosque itself and includes a larger Hui community into which 
it is inscribed and to which it inevitably belongs. The physical structure of a mosque 
could be easily demolished, removed, and perhaps rebuilt elsewhere, as long as there is 
sufficient funding either from voluntary donations of the Hui or from state grants that 
compensate the displaced Hui for the cost of urban development. But the life that has 
long been attached to the mosque cannot be as easily grafted onto a different environment. 
Even when the mosque remains physically unmoved, its re-location in the urban 
landscape as a result of the political economic changes that happen around it could just as 
well render the practice of faith into a more grueling effort. One could perhaps ask, if 
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Fuminli is demolished and rebuilt on the margin of the expanding Zhengzhou and the 
entire Fuminli community is relocated to cluster around this new mosque, would the old 
residents be able to endure the shocking change in livelihood and continue to come to the 
new mosque regularly for communal religious duties? Zhenkun’s worry was emphatically 
not about the rise or decline of Hui Islam. His coner  was not framed in terms of 
religious faith. The question he was most concerned with was how the Hui in Fuminli 
could be able to keep their community intact and meanwhile earn enough to get by under 
the new urban development project. It’s not the mosque itself that he was interested in. A 
new building standing lonely on its own at the margin of the city might as well be an 
elegy dedicated to the Hui community that once surrounded it and as a matter of fact 
substantiated its function in bodying forth the presence of Hui Islam in the Chinese social 
world. Zhenkun well knew this, which was perhaps why after a brief account of his plan 
for rebuilding Fuminli Mosque at a site slightly removed from its current location, he 
spent the rest of our time together talking endlessly about his project for a “gourmet 
pedestrian street” (meishi yitiaojie) which he thought might best help the Hui regain their 
small retail business in an environment that grows daily hostile to the kind of life that has 
sustained their faith and their mosque for a long time. 
Codifying Democracy 
The relationship between a Hui community and its communal mosque is mediated not 
merely by the critical political economic conditions that cannot be detached from the 
general urban transformations in China especially in the past two decades. This 
relationship is no less constricted and constructed by a complex network of state laws and 
administrative regulations. Two of the longest and most detailed sections of the 
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Regulations for Religious Affairs (zongjiao shiwu tiaoli) promulgated by China’s State 
Council in 2005 are devoted to the management of the so-called “sites for religious 
activities” (zongjiao huodong changsuo) and “properties of religions” (zongjiao caichan). 
According to these administrative regulations (they are not laws passed by the National 
Congress), a mosque is under the direct jurisdiction of the bureau of religious affairs of 
its county (in the rural area) or its district (in the urban area). This governmental 
supervision covers a wide range of affairs that are se n to pertain to the running of a 
mosque: from its initial construction, who should be hired as the presiding cleric, to its 
particular location and the management of its “religious property.” A mosque is above all 
a physical presence that has to stand on a site which is deeply entrenched in the local 
dynamics of economic transformations, as we have seen in the previous section. A 
mosque also has its own “properties,” either small tr cts of land, as is often the case in 
the rural area, or extra houses or rooms that could be set aside for collecting rents, as is 
more often the case in the urban area. To be sure, these are not marginal facts, however 
much one might want to assume that a Hui mosque is ent rely about Hui Islam and should 
therefore be seen exclusively in terms of its religious significance.   
Northern Grand Mosque in Zhengzhou is one such example that can well demonstrate 
this point. Undoubtedly the biggest mosque in Zhengzhou, Northern Grand is well-
known both locally and nationally. It was the pivot n which the “leading fang” 
(shoufang, a fang that is locally influential and often forms the cent r for mobilizing 
concerted Hui action in the local world) in Zhengzhou turned before the Cultural 
Revolution and managed a vast Hui cemetery (Laofengang, “the old knoll,” as it is 
remembered by those whom I interviewed) whose land ha  over the years become its 
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quasi-property, secured eventually by a land deed in late imperial days. Northern Grand 
also holds the iconic building which symbolically narrates the more or less mythical 
prominence of Hui Islam in Zhengzhou: it lays claim to Baba Mu, or the Tomb of Baba, a 
legendary Arab Muslim with the name “Mumduha” who is said to have arrived at the 
mosque in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) on his travels to China and settled down here 
in order to preach and make peace out of the long-drawn-out tension that had existed 
between the local Hui and the Han. The Tomb of Baba was the site upon which the entire 
Hui cemetery centered – it is said that many Hui in Zhengzhou chose to inter their 
deceased relatives near the Tomb in the hope that the mystical saint who was said to be 
able to produce amazing miracles could bring upon their beloved ones blessings from 
God in the hereafter.    
From mid-1990s on and especially with the continual progression and gradual 
acceleration of urban development in Zhengzhou, both the Tomb of Baba and the vast 
Hui cemetery on which it stood and to which it consta tly referred became sites of 
intense dispute and protracted negotiation between th  Northern Grand Mosque (i.e. both 
the clerics that lived in the mosque and those Hui who lived around it, buried their 
deceased in the cemetery, and took active part in ma aging affairs that pertain to the 
mosque), real estate corporations, and the cash-hungry Zhengzhou Municipal 
Government. The Tomb of Baba stood right next to February 7th Square, and the Hui 
cemetery, from a piece of wasteland used as a burial ground, became almost overnight 
(the rapidity of the change must be emphasized) a place that could generate tremendous 
profits for whoever could transform it into a commercial venue. What added to the 
intensity of the negotiation was that the rents from the tract of land that enclosed the 
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cemetery also constituted a major source of income for Northern Grand Mosque in 
maintaining its normal operation. The loss of the Hui graveyard would therefore mean the 
fundamental cancellation of the economic condition on which Northern Grand could 
sustain its most concrete physical presence. In one official document which I came across 
in the small archive of the Guancheng District Burea  of Religious Affairs to whose 
jurisdiction Northern Grand Mosque is subject, the very first objection raised by “the 
people of Northern Grand” was that “the land on which the graveyard stands provides a 
major source of income for our mosque,” and “if it is taken away, how can we maintain 
our religion on an independent basis (ziyang)?” The deliberately ambivalent – even 
threatening – tone of this last question might not be immediately clear to those who are 
not deeply entrenched in the local Hui world: on the one hand, it harks back to the official 
“three-self” policy proclaimed by the Chinese state as the basic principle for the 
governance of all institutional (or institutionalized – the history of the institutionalization 
of religions in China has been given much attention in more recent scholarship23) 
religions in China. The “three-self” principle is officially defined as “managing (the 
religious affairs) by oneself (ziban), economically dependent solely upon oneself (ziyang), 
and proselytizing by oneself (zichuan).” The target of this policy is first and foremost 
China’s Catholicism, whose complicated and often hidden connection with the Vatican 
constantly escapes the surveillance and largely failed control of the officially recognized 
“Three-Self Church,” which claims to be completely independent – especially 
                                                   
23 For the debate on the religious character of Confucianism and its complex history of institutionalizat on 
both in China and beyond, see Chen, 1999; Sun, 2013. For the transformations Buddhism has undergone 
since early 20th century, see Welch, 1967, 1972; Tuttle, 2005; Pittman, 2001. For Daosim and the so-called 
“popular religions” in China, see Nedostup, 2009; Goossaert, 2007; Palmer, 2007; Chau, 2006. 
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organizationally – and performs its ordination separately without seeking either 
permission or certification from the Vatican (cf. Lozada, 2001). 
When applied to the mosque, this direct reference to organizational independence 
entails a particular consequence: instead of separating  state-recognized and largely 
puppet Chinese Catholic Church from the Vatican, the “t ree-self” principle segregates 
each fang from all others and legally prescribes that each fang has the right to freely 
decide on how they want to manage their own mosque, what kind of property and how 
much of it should be purchased or sold to maintain the normal operation of the 
community mosque, and who from the community itself hould be given the power and 
the responsibility to manage the affairs of the mosque in place of all other people living 
in the same fang. To a large extent, therefore, the result of the “three-self” principle for 
Hui mosque is a certain local autonomy that is strictly confined within the unit of a 
singular fang. Any notion of a shoufang that previously existed informally among the Hui 
was first officially abolished – though it had never been officially recognized in the first 
place – in the 1990s and this abolition was merely r affirmed in the 2005 Regulations. 
By apparently begging for sympathy from the state, th  “people at Northern Grand” 
in fact led the negotiation in a particular direction by implying that with neither sufficient 
funds nor a stable source of income, they might have to re-invigorate their local influence 
and assemble support from the wide net it could cast in the world of Hui Islam both in 
Zhengzhou and beyond: “if the economic condition for our organizational independence 
(ziyang) is completely eliminated and if we cannot depend tirely upon ourselves, then 
perhaps we should stop closing in upon our own fang, and this is not what we initially 
wanted but completely compelled by the circumstance that was entirely the result of the 
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arbitrary confiscation of our property by the municipal government.” This possibility was 
in part substantiated by an effort to collect an enormous number of signatures on a 
motion to salvage the cemetery and the Tomb from the bulldozer dispatched by the 
government. The long-drawn-out negotiation eventually ended in late 1990s in a deal that 
struck at the middle point accepted by all sides involved: laofengang was not confiscated 
as much as sold to the state at a price (27.5 million RMB – the scale of this sale is indeed 
remarkable) most advantageous to the “people at Northern Grand,” and a tract of 6.752 
mu (≈1.112 acres) was conserved around the Tomb of Baba so that a small memorial park 
could be built.  
Obviously, the “people at Northern Grand” do not include those buried in laofengang, 
or even the living relatives of the recently deceased, although by the time of this 
negotiation, laofengang had long been fully occupied and had not accepted any new 
burial for quite a few years. Sunge, a native Hui of Zhengzhou who had witnessed the 
whole process of the disinterment of the bones, recounted to me his last visit to 
laofengang as the ground was being cleared for what later becam  the first Walmart in 
Zhengzhou, 
There was a family who had been living right next to he graveyard for I 
don’t know how long. They had become over the years voluntary watchers 
of the cemetery. They had a small courtyard and I went through it to the 
back of their house. An old man sat in an armchair, watching his son as he 
squatted on the ground re-assembling the bones that had been excavated 
by the mechanical diggers sent by the government. You cannot imagine 
that scene. Many bones were smashed, some tightly bound in bundles of 
white cloth. They wanted to find a place to re-bury them so that the dead 
could at least have some peace. But how could they find the right place? I 




These bones could be disposed of almost arbitrarily because the cemetery in which they 
were interred is seen to be exclusively the possession of the “people of Northern Grand.” 
We need to be more specific as to who these people are and the particular state 
regulations and legal prescriptions that give them this right to dispose of the cemetery 
defined as their “property.” I have already mentioned the “local autonomy” of fang as a 
unit that stands on its own and remains independent from any other fang. This particular 
institutional arrangement, which some Hui clerics see as a manifestation of the state’s 
cunning strategy of “divide and conquer,” is legally prescribed in a series of 
administrative regulations. That few of these are actu l laws passed by the National 
Congress is a notable point – “religion” is largely reduced to a question of administration 
and governance, instead of the protection of constitutionally determined “rights.” What 
substantiates the nominal protection of the right to religious freedom in the constitution is 
not a body of laws that specify how this protection can be realized as much as a 
configuration of administrative regulations that con retizes how “religious affairs” should 
be governed, controlled, surveilled, and perhaps at times re-defined – when the “religious 
question” exceeds its “proper limit” and becomes a “political question,” as it often 
happens with Tibetan Buddhism and Uyghur Islam. The 1994 Regulations on the 
Management of Sites for Religious Activities prescribe that each such site should establish 
a self-contained and organizationally independent body for self-governance, and the 2005 
Regulations further specifies that each site should be governed i  strict observance of 
“democratic principles (minzhu guanli).” But the actual contents of these “democratic 
principles” often remain obscure and unspecified.  
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In 2006, the Eighth National Congress of China’s Muslims, convened by the All-
China Islamic Association (zhongguo yisilanjiao xiehui), passed a resolution that 
explicitly stipulates what particularly for a mosque these “democratic principles” are. The 
central institutional arrangement codified in this state-backed resolution is the so-called 
“commission for the democratic management of the mosque” (hereafter the commission). 
This is not a national organization, but an institution that is required to be established and 
confined entirely within the confinement of a single fang that is thought to center 
exclusively upon one mosque. According to this resolution, members of the commission 
should be elected through democratic negotiations ad voluntary recommendations 
among the Hui living in the same fang, and the commission is fundamentally a civil 
organization consisting primarily of ordinary Muslims living in the fang in which the 
mosque is located. The wide range of functions this commission is supposed to perform 
is worth noticing: it ranges from hiring clerics to serve the local community (more on this 
relationship of employment in chapter 4), raising funds for the local madrassa, managing 
the properties owned by the mosque, to supervising fire prevention, environmental 
hygiene, and even postponed marriage (wanhun) and birth control (jihua shengyu) among 
the local Hui residents.  
Although hiring clerics and funding the local madrass  might be seen as belonging to 
“religious affairs,” the commission itself is not a body defined by clerical power. It is 
rather a manifestly secular institution. Clerics are not de jure excluded from the 
commission, but it is not as religious figures that they take an active part in the 
supervision and management of “mosque affairs.” They must also pass the “democratic 
procedure” as qualified candidates competing with ot er no less qualified contestants 
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who, however, do not possess the same amount of religious knowledge and the same 
clerical authority as he does. But in most cases, fw Hui clerics are actually included in 
the often ferocious competition for posts in the commission (the extent of ferocity often 
depends upon how much property the mosque possesses and how profitable those 
properties are or can become – I shall demonstrate this shortly) and many would choose 
to excuse themselves for a temporary absence during the time when a competition – i.e. 
an election of the commission within the fang where they work – becomes so intense that 
his presence might put him in a difficult position between two or more hostile sides each 
trying to get their own people into the commission. Shortly after the election at Down 
Mosque and while the “negotiations” were still raging among supporters of different 
candidates, Imam Mai, who holds the highest clerical position in Down, deliberately 
asked for a leave to visit his family in a rural town about two hours’ drive away from 
Zhengzhou. He stayed home for almost two weeks in order to avoid direct confrontation 
with any of the competing sides. Upon my probing when I met him after he returned, he 
said, “Whoever are elected, I will work with them. I will just do my job, but I am not part 
of the competition and do not want to be part of it. If I am here, people might suspect that 
I may have some plan. But I don’t. You see, Guangti, n every mosque, there is evil, 
and you must stand up and fight against it. You cannot waver.” The way to fight, for Mai, 
is precisely to avoid being involved in the ugly and occasionally all-out quarrel from 
which no one could emerge unscathed. To evade both suspicion and victimization and to 
continue to be able to stay at Down Mosque and work for Hui Islam, Imam Mai, perhaps 
wisely, chose to keep his hands off the competition for power and money. 
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But the small amount of property which Down Mosque possesses largely keeps the 
competition relatively mild. Things become much more intense when the mosque 
possesses a considerable amount of property which could easily be capitalized and 
liquidated. Garden Mosque, located right next to Journey Mosque and lodged at the very 
center of February 7th Square, well illustrates this point. The prayer hall constitutes only a 
small part of the enormous building complex it posses es. In addition to a kindergarten it 
runs for the local Hui kids and warehouses it rents out to the merchants and shops whose 
storefronts are located in the prosperous pedestrian street, Garden Mosque also runs a 
convenience hotel whose profit, thanks to the large flow of people daily in and out of the 
February 7th Square area, reaches a high of two million RMB annu lly. At the time of my 
fieldwork, two commissions – one “old” and the other “new” – were engaged in a fierce 
and occasionally violent competition to gain the upper hand in wresting the ludicrous 
property – especially the hotel and several other storefronts rented out to small merchants 
– away from the hands of the other. Details of thiscompetition are not without interest 
for our discussion.  
Around 9 am on a freezing morning in November 2010, a bunch of thugs hired by the 
“old commission” broke into the quiet Garden Mosque. Like in a blitz, they smashed 
everything in sight and, as I was later told repetitively by almost everyone who either 
witnessed the event in person or heard it from others, “they first of all destroyed the 
security camera that hung right above the entrance.” M mbers of the “new commission” 
and their entourage that lived in the mosque were quick in their response. Within an hour, 
the thugs were brought down to their knees. “We shouted Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, 
Allahu Akbar! And we were unstoppable!” Chunguang, a staunch supporter of the new 
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commission who happened to stay in the mosque the night before, recounted to me in a 
passionate tone. “The police were here as well,” he continued, “but they could do nothing. 
They were scared – not by the thugs, but by us!” The excitement of Chunguang made his 
voice quiver and his eyes tearful. As the subdued thugs were beaten and questioned (“we 
almost beat them to death” – Chunguang told me), it came as a surprise that many of 
them were in fact Han hired by the “old commission” at 100 RMB per day to wreak 
havoc on the Garden Mosque which had come under effctive control of the “new 
commission.” Some of the Han thugs who were lucky enough to have fled from the initial 
defeat even came back to Garden in the afternoon for their remuneration, thinking that 
the people who hired them should be “in the mosque” since the entire affair circled 
around it. They could not tell what was going on and why there was such a fight in the 
first place, and they did not know where to find the people who should pay them. 
Tactically exploiting this confusion, supporters of the “new commission” pretended to 
belong to the “old commission” and asked to be led to meet the rest of the escaped fishes 
who could then be paid in person. “We found them in an Internet café,” Renheng, a 
senior member of the new commission told me,  
Some of these bastards hid the white caps in their crotches when they fled from 
the first confrontation. They were given these caps by the old commission in 
order to pass for Hui, and these caps are the proof of participation they need to 
present later for receiving their payment. We were so mad that we roped all of 
them back to the mosque, closed the door behind us, and beat them like we beat 
dogs (guanmen dagou). 
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The intensity of the fight could hardly be overstated. But it is important to notice that this 
fight has gone much beyond an infighting within theHui – the Han were introduced and 
exploited as mercenaries, hired purely to win a battle which was not their own. The new 
commission professes that this battle is for the sake of religion. In their view, the old 
commission has not done enough and has remained largely slothful in responding to the 
new changes in the world. “They take the mosque as their private property, and divide the 
profits only among themselves,” Mabo, another member of the new commission, told me, 
“but the mosque is the property of all Muslims, and the money should be used completely 
and exclusively for the development of Islam.” One figure of the “old commission,” 
Zhenxuan, had been accused – first by members of the “new commission” and then by 
the district government who received the report filed by the former – of embezzlement in 
the management of the property owned by Garden Mosque. The amount of this 
misappropriation was fixed by those whom I interviewed at three hundred thousand RMB, 
while many also insisted that he had a much larger bank account whose source also 
remained suspicious. The intervention of the state is seen as necessary in sorting out 
property relations and in punishing economic misconduct, to the point where the police, 
often considered by the local Hui to be disruptive of the normal operation of the mosque, 
is seen as embodying social justice. Zhenxuan was put under arrest at the time of my 
work and “after this arrest, the old commission are finally giving in,” as Chunguang told 
me. The fight, presumed to be for the purpose of religion, is nonetheless framed in terms 
of a struggle to control the property of Garden andto punish those who have not diverted 
its use in the direction desired by those supporting the “new commission.” “You cannot 
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develop religion without money, so we must gain control of every single piece of the 
property.” Chunguang said determinedly. 
The position of Imam Han, however, is more complicated in this situation. Being the 
leading cleric in Garden Mosque, Imam Han is a particularly experienced figure who had 
studied and travelled widely in the Middle East, spending much of his time working in 
Kuwait to proselytize Islam to the Chinese migrant workers who had been recruited and 
then exported by China’s state and private construction corporations to work on large-
scale road and bridge projects in the Gulf countries. Actively spreading Saudi 
Wahhabism in his own mosque due to his experience i the Middle East, Han is 
constantly on the radar of local police surveillance and was put under house arrest for two 
months after 9/11. “The government always accuses me of intervening in secular affairs,” 
he said, “but it is my mosque that has been smashed. How can I stay away from this? 
There are no secular affairs in a mosque – all affairs are religious affairs. How can I not 
intervene?” As to the most ideal position of clerical power in a mosque, Imam Han 
resorted to the pre-Communist history which he well r membered was told him by his 
teachers, 
Previously the imams had the highest power in a mosque. Everyone had to 
listen to them. However wealthy and powerful you might be in your 
profane life, in the mosque, you must submit to the rul s and suggestions 
of the imams. There were of course people who frequented the mosque 
and tried to offer their helping hands in managing the mosque together 
with the imams. But these people were not independent, and they could 
not make decisions on their own. Their decisions mut be certified by the 
imams in order to be effective and the clerical power could easily veto 
these decisions and come up with a judgment completely independently.   
Although this account might have exaggerated the extent of clerical authority in a 
mosque before the Communist takeover, it nonetheless does not depart considerably from 
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what was the case at least in the Republican period. An informal committee consisting 
primarily of local gentry, headed by an elite member, often assisted the clerics who were 
almost invariably not rooted in the local world bur hi ed as an outsider from elsewhere to 
work in the communal mosque (Xue, 1930; Communique, 1930; G. Wang, 1931). The 
head of this committee bore one of three interchange ble titles: shetou or sheshou, 
meaning “head of the collective,” and xuedong, “chair of the studies,” which refers more 
particularly to the function of the committee in funding the local madrassa held in the 
mosque. These names are still used among many Hui I have known in my fieldwork, but 
those who bear this title do not necessarily assume the more official role as director of the 
state-recognized commission. The degree of divergence between the informal 
concentration of power and the formal position as the legal representative of the mosque 
to whom the state speaks at an official register varies across space and time and depends 
largely upon negotiations and compromises reached purely on a local basis. But a strong 
tendency nonetheless exists that the shetou/sheshou/xuedong are increasingly 
marginalized and replaced by the officially recognized power of the director, for the main 
reason which Chunguang already pointed out in a most atter-of-fact manner: “You 
cannot develop religion without money.” Only the director has the legal power to decide, 
together with other members of the commission, how the property of the mosque can be 
utilized to generate funds for maintaining the normal operation of the mosque. A sheshou 
might have popular support on his side, but any of his actions that touch on mosque 
property might be accused of theft or even embezzlement. The local mosque is no longer 
a civil space governed purely by popular consensus, b t a space saturated with state laws 
and administrative regulations. The displacement of shetou/sheshou/xuedong and the 
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deposition of clerical power from its authoritative place in the mosque are two sides of 
the same coin and happen simultaneously with the rise of the commission which carries 
the certifying seal of the state on its forehead. 
The state codification of the “democratic management” of the mosque, by solidifying 
a separation between the clerical and the lay power hich previously existed only 
partially and informally within the mosque, effects a fundamental shift which largely 
transforms the organizational arrangement of the mosque as the basic institution by 
means of which Hui Islam gains traction both in the urban and the rural areas. In the rural 
mosques which I visited during my fieldwork, it is not uncommon to find a noticeable 
overlap in the personnel that manage the village mosque and the members of the village 
party committee. This convergence is not coincidental and it might even reach such a 
point where the village party secretariat is meanwhile director of the commission for 
managing the communal mosque. Despite the party policy that forbids its members from 
professing any religious belief, a party secretaria could nonetheless be the head in 
managing the local mosque, since the commission, although consisting primarily of Hui 
Muslims, is still a secular body performing definitively secular functions. The Muslim 
status of the Hui secretariat always remains obscure, and the condition for this obscurity 
not being revealed and thematized is precisely the secular nature of the commission to 
which he serves as the head.24 The mosque is turned in this way into a site for communal 
                                                   
24 An additional dimension that pertains to this question should also be mentioned. In the official document 
issued by the Department of Organization of the CCP’s Central Committee in 1991 which addresses 
specifically the question of religious acts among party members, it is emphatically proposed that a 
distinction be rigorously maintained between “religious activities” and “ethnic customs and folklores:” an 
ethnic party member, in order to remain connected to “his or her own people,” should continue to 
participate in “marriage rituals and funerary rites” or other “ethnic festivities,” which are not and cannot be 
seen as “religious activities” (Department of Organiz tion, 1991). This politically imposed distinction has 
on the one hand enabled many Hui party members to continue to practice Hui Islam in the name of “ethnic 
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self-governance that centers not upon religious doctrines and clerical authority, but upon 
the actual physical presence of the mosque as a place th t occupies a site in the spatio-
temporal arrangement of the landscape, with its subtantive property whose value varies 
according to its location and the political economic transformation of the landscape itself.  
Hui clerics are not necessarily excluded from the commission, as I have intimated 
previously. But clerical power is de jure prohibited from acquiring influence in the 
commission. A well respected Hui imam might be willing to provide advice and his 
advice might be heeded by those in the commission, but this is entirely on an ad hoc basis 
and this influence is always based upon the “voluntary” decision of the commission as a 
secular body for communal self-governance. The possible participation of Hui clerics in 
the commission is not contradictory to the legally prescribed separation of the clerical 
and the lay power in the management of the local mosque.  
Another critical consequence of this codification of “democratic management” has to 
do with the increasingly spectral presence of fang especially in the urban area. Both 
Journey Mosque and Garden Mosque, for instance, do not have an actual fang because 
the development of February 7th Square as a commercial district requires that any resident 
that might have settled around them be displaced and relocated. Even Northern Grand 
Mosque and Down Mosque, the two mosques that traditionally have the largest and most 
populous fangs in Zhengzhou, progressively lose the Hui population that used to live 
around them as waves of housing projects and urban development plans daily encroach 
upon their neighborhood. The boundary of their fangs becomes increasingly blurry – 
                                                                                                                                                
customs,” and on the other, it has also effected what for many is an “ethnicization” of Islam that confines it 
entirely to the world of ethnic minorities. It is also this distinction that in part justifies the management of 
the village mosque by the party secretariat. 
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those living close by might not belong to the fang while those who do might live far 
removed from the mosque. The competition for enterig the commission and for 
controlling mosque property for possible profiteering assumes a new form in this context. 
A commission election held at a particular mosque might bring in a huge crowd which is 
more of a show of the network of relations each candidate is able to mobilize for his own 
benefit. Due to the contradiction between the progressive dissolution of ang and its 
continual conceptual existence in the legal prescriptions that define the management of 
the mosque, this crowd that emerges on the election day (suppose the specific date for 
election is determined in advance and publicized among those who are interested – which 
is not always the case, as we have seen in the scenario that begins this chapter) segments 
along the lines drawn by the personal network of each candidate, and these factions do 
not overlap to produce any form of sociality that cn endure the extension of space and 
time. Cronyism is not uncommon, as promises (sometimes true, sometimes false) are 
made that give to one’s supporters the power to monop lize certain mosque properties for 
personal gains after one is elected to the designated position. Warehouses might be rented 
at a discounted price; the hotel might purchase its teabag from certain providers or 
outsource its laundry service to certain laundromats; or the future renovation of the 
mosque and the procurement of new facilities (loudspeakers, blankets, new furniture, etc.) 
might bring new business only to certain stores whose wners have showed up and cast 
their votes for the designated man. Bribery is an integral part of this “democratic 
procedure,” because all state regulations only stipulate and codify a general democracy 
without offering any particular prescription as to h w this local democracy should be 
specified and practiced as a workable process.  
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Almost all possible means are resorted to in this often all-out war among the Hui 
fighting to gain control of the communal property on which stands their local mosque. 
State intervention is not criticized as much as sought after, invited to crush one’s 
adversary and to recognize one’s own legitimacy in assuming the position in the newly 
“elected” commission. However much the “new commission” at Garden Mosque 
professes to work purely for Islam and declares their unreserved position in defending 
their religion in the face of state oppression, they cannot deny the fact that they cannot 
rise so fast and deal the definitive blow to the “old commission” without the help of the 
district government, with its power in assembling support from the police, the public 
prosecutor, and the court, all under the directorship of the district party committee for 
political and legal affairs (zhengfawei).  
It is wrong to assume at this point that the local government is always posed in a 
position to actively intervene in “mosque affairs,” as if it were always a question of 
oppression versus resistance, atheist communist state versus civil religious consciousness. 
Majie, a civil servant working in Guancheng District Bureau of Religious Affairs, was 
one of the government officials who were present at the election at Down Mosque with 
which I open this chapter. In his mid-30s and already experienced in managing the 
“religious and ethnic affairs” particularly among the Hui, Majie insisted that their way of 
doing things, i.e. arbitrarily picking a time, dropping by a mosque after one of the daily 
prayers (not Jumu’ah), making the people then and there cast their votes and accepting 
the result as effective and authoritative, was necessitated by the chaotic disorder that 
often accompanies such elections within a fang. His view was corroborated by his 
supervisor Xiaojuan, chief of the bureau. “Only those who pray regularly in the mosque 
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can enter the commission,” she said, “Otherwise, th mosque will be turned into a 
property people compete to gain control of. We must maintain a stable order.” The state 
codification of an unspecified “democratic management” of the mosque has entailed a 
“big democracy” (da minzhu) or “over-democracy” (guodu minzhu) which paradoxically 
triggers among the local Hui living in a f ng an often fierce competition that constantly 
risks spilling over the limit of infighting tolerable to and possibly desired by the state 
practicing a strategy of “divide and conquer.” Both the local government and the 
quarreling Hui see the intervention of the state as necessary to restore an “order” which is 
conducive to both, although for different reasons: for the former, social stability is of 
paramount importance; for the latter, the state is seduced to buttress one’s own 
candidature and to disgrace one’s opponents. The stat maintains a sustained presence in 
the mosque, and this presence cannot be reduced purly to an intrusion resented by all 
Hui living in the same fang and praying in the same communal mosque. 
Conclusion 
To a certain extent, this chapter does not approach Hui Islam in a direct manner. It 
has not studied how the Hui define their particular practices in substantiating the abstract 
teaching of the Islamic religion (more on this in chapters 3 and 4), and I have deliberately 
left out the countless sermons which were often delivered to me as I first visited the 
mosques that appear in this chapter. To the contrary, I attend to their occasional 
complaints and the kind of “marginal trivia” which t ey would rather hide from outsiders 
and are considered by them to be merely secondary compared to the much grander 
aspiration to continuously sustain and perhaps even to spread the true faith in the Sino-
centric Han world. I am less interested in what they would love to do than in the obstacles 
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that constantly trip them up and prevent them from smoothly realizing their aspiration. I 
often heard criticisms of selfishness and pursuit of ec nomic gain as manifestations of the 
lack of sincere faith, but instead of following these dismissive criticisms, I take those 
actions criticized seriously and probe the political, economic, and legal conditions that 
institute a space in which “selfishness” and the “pursuit of economic gain” can act 
themselves out and perhaps even get intensified by the logic of this space itself. A 
mosque is a physical presence inscribed in a complex landscape whose configuration has 
undergone progressive and increasingly rapid changes in the past three decades in China, 
and Hui Islam cannot be detached from this nitty-gritty world. What I have attempted to 
do in this chapter is to effect a focalization that moves us slightly away from an exclusive 
focus on “religion” (as if there is such a thing called “religion” which can be abstracted 
from its institutional existence) and attends to the often unthematized but daily 
experienced – experienced as annoying interruptions t  a world supposed to be purely 
about faith – complications that constantly pull one back into a world that is so noisy that 
it risks drowning the very voice of the imam standing on the minaret calling the faithful 
to assemble for prayer. 
For every single time the dramatic story that happened at Garden Mosque was 
recounted in my presence, either for me or for others, the one who narrated always began 
with “they first smashed the security camera.” Several days after this event while I was 
sitting with members of the “new commission” who were still trying to think of ways to 
completely push the “old commission” out of the way,  team of technicians came in and 
asked whether someone had ordered a new set of surveillance cameras. Mabo directed 
them to the very position where the old camera used to be installed, and the “new 
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commission” had decided, as a matter of fact, to add the total number of cameras in 
Garden Mosque. Even before they began to fix any of the rest, they must first of all be 
able to subject every corner of the mosque to an anxious seeing, and to prepare for any 
future violent intrusion which they believed would again begin with “smashing the 
security camera.” 
The transformation especially of the urban landscape and the state codification of the 
“democratic management” of the mosque have therefore rendered urban mosques (rural 
mosques to a lesser extent, depending largely upon the local political economy – which is 
why in rural areas experiencing rapid urbanization, similar predicaments can also be 
observed) into a local space constantly subject to a continuous and intense gaze. For 
those who are interested in managing the mosque and in possibly acquiring personal 
gains in the course of this management, everyone is watching everyone else, and direct 
confrontation, however much one would prefer to hide it behind apparent etiquette, is 
often exposed to broad daylight and become topics for conversations both in the fang and 
beyond. The event at Garden Mosque travelled as far as to Changzhi in Shanxi Province 
(about four hours’ drive from Zhengzhou), carried by Zhengzhou imams visiting their old 
classmates in the madrassa. And even the older and no less dramatic story of one Caosi 
chasing his opponent out of Garden with a sharp knife st ll circulated widely among those 
who remembered it at the time of my fieldwork. These stories, while being recounted, are 
often scoffed at, or at least frowned upon, but I submit that they are perhaps more 
important than the countless sermons I heard which often appear to me to float merely in 
midair and which almost invariably fade in the face of the dense quarrels I have studied 
in this chapter. Because of the economic and legal transformations in the past three 
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decades, the mosque is rendered into a keenly exposd and intensely seen public space 
which does not bind the local Hui together as much as divide them up by giving them the 
opportunity to capitalize on communal property whose value has risen exponentially 
thanks to economic liberalization after the Cultural Revolution. The formation of a 
communal public, marked by open competition and anxiously pursued visibility, does not 
necessarily imply the probable appearance of communal solidarity. It is fundamentally a 
question of the emergence of a sociological space by and through the mosque that this 
chapter is interested in, and this space is deeply entrenched in the general socio-economic, 
political, and legal changes in China in the past three decades. Perhaps we might argue 
that the surviving bastion of Hui Islam in contemporary China, i.e. the mosque, is
precisely this sociological space saturated with disputes and occasionally violent 
confrontations – but none of these, let’s note, is the direct result of “religion,” and Islam 
as a religious system in fact only has limited purchase in these apparently trivial yet 







The True Believer Does Not Know 
 
Every Wednesday night at the Jahriyya Sufi Banqiao d tang (“the hall of Dao”), 
located in the rural town of Banqiao on the outskir of the city of Wuzhong in Ningxia 
Hui Autonomous Region, a particularly important ritual would be solemnly and 
exactingly performed among a group of Jahriyya Sufi Hu  sitting in a rectangular circle 
known as dayi’er.25 The ritual is marked by a dignified silence, except for a few vocal 
recitations of commonly used expressions in the praise of God (e.g. Allahamdu lilliahi – 
all praise to Allah). These voiced praises are chanted in long and melodious tones, often 
accentuated at the beginning (the word “Allah” is invariably vocalized), and the voice 
gradually fades out as the reciter moves to the end of the sentence. In accompaniment of 
each of these highly conventionalized utterances, a pebble will be dropped in a small 
wooden box by the particular reciter from whom the words emanate. The perceptible 
change of volume in the vocal recitation creates a strong rhythm followed closely by the 
very hand that drops the pebble as the recitation is vocalized – one raises the pebble as 
                                                   
25 It is said among the Jahriyya followers that a dayi’er is “a circle for the praise of Allah (zanzhu de 
quanzi)” and “a garden in the Heaven” (Wang, 2009, pp. 7, 12). Those who have cleansed themselves in 
preparation for dayi’er must restrain themselves from speaking, as silence is h re seen as a necessity for 
maintaining ritual purity. 
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one is at “Allah,” and the sound of the pebble touching the bottom of the wooden box 
nicely complements the silence as one reaches the end of “lilliahi.”  
There are altogether one hundred such white pebbles, all of the same size and well-
polished due to years of repetitive ritual usage. It is firmly believed by the Jahriyya Sufi 
Hui that these pebbles were initially brought to China and passed down through a line of 
saints by their first and miraculous master Ma Mingx , whose legendary journey to 
Yemen is thought to lie at the fountainhead of the mystic teaching of Jahriyya Sufism.26 
The pebbles fulfill a particularly critical function in Panchi Shanpan, as the ritual is 
named, knowingly after the Persian word for Thursday, Panj Shan Beh (the sunset on 
Wednesday is thought to indicate the beginning of Thursday). Every drop of pebble in the 
wooden box, in tandem with the partially vocal praise of Allah, marks the completion of 
a set number of praises and the recitation of specific Quranic verses by the particular 
reciter. The number of people sitting in the rectangular dayi’er may vary, but insofar as 
the pebbles are distributed (not necessarily evenly) among those who participate in the 
rite, the total number of praises and recitations will remain constant. The silent nature of 
the ritual makes this counting function of the pebbl s particularly important – no one else 
can know how many times one has recited certain verses and whether one has performed 
the required steps crucial for the collective consummation of the rite. The sound of the 
pebble dropping – a crisp and clear sound breaking through the solemn silence that 
engulfs the dayi’er (this sharp contrast in sound punctuates the progression of the ritual 
                                                   
26 For the history of Jahriyya Sufism and its complex r lationship with other Sufi orders both in China and 
beyond, see Ma, 2000b, 2000a, 1991; Zhang, 1990; Yang, 2010; Ye, 2009; Fletcher, 1972; Fletcher & 
Manz, 1995; Lipman, 1997, 1981. 
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and is an integral part of it) – is the only sign by the indication of which other participants 
could assume that one has indeed performed one’s designated role.  
But the extent of secrecy goes even deeper. What specific verses one particular 
participant recites and how many times they should be recited are not always known to 
other members of the dayi’er. A high priest (or reyisi, as his title is named in Jahriyya 
Sufism, and this is exclusively a male position) is given the clerical authority by the still 
living saint of the order to lead this ritual in a p rticular daotang. He is a local proxy seen 
as a sign that stands in for the saint and who therefore could reflect the beam of light that 
emanates solely from the saint, or murshid (“the guidance”), who is thought to be a 
“secret friend” (miyou) of God able to mediate between the Lord of All Worlds and the 
particularly human world in which the Jahriyya Sufi Hui live. A reyisi might possess 
more knowledge than other members of the dayi’er in regard to the minute details of the 
ritual, but his authority is not fundamentally defined by a monopoly on knowledge. He is 
qualified to preside over the ritual only because he has the kouhuan (permission) of the 
murshid, and it is not him who decides who shall recite what and how this recitation 
should be performed in silence. Neither is it a necessity that he must understand every 
single detail of the rite in order for him to be able to lead its performance. Some members 
of the dayi’er might have adopted their recitations from a secret teaching that connects 
them directly and exclusively to the murshid and no one else could ever know the 
substantive content of this teaching. Secrecy is a crucial component of Panchi Shanpan, 
and silence is merely one manifestation – and a literal one at that – of this more general 
theme that defines every aspect of it.  
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All details of this ritual are seen by Jahriyya Sufi Hui to possess cosmic mysteries 
that deserve lifelong meditation. Laoma, a devout Jahriyya disciple who had been a 
participant of the ritual for over thirty years, was still unsure of the exact meanings of 
many apparently nonsensical arrangements which are non theless critical components of 
Panchi Shanpan –  
The rite was performed at night, and we have the daotang so well lighted 
as if it is daytime. But still, two candles will be placed on the table around 
which the dayi’er sits. We don’t read anything, and the hall is already 
bright. Why this redundancy? Why this emphasis on light to the point 
where it seems to be unnecessary? 
Laoma’s bewilderment cannot be dissipated by recourse to an explanation that compares 
light to philosophical and theological illumination, a typical interpretation that takes its 
cue from the ancient tradition of Islamic illuminationism often attributed to Shahab al-
Din Suhrawardi (1155–1191) and Al-Ghazālī (1058-1111).27 It is not light itself as much 
as the redundancy, the apparently unnecessary doubling, that he finds puzzling and 
curious. If the desire for light and illumination is a commonplace among most Sufi, the 
detail of redundancy, however, cannot be subsumed completely under this desire (unless 
when this desire is defined by a fundamental insatiability): we need light, but why so 
much? And what is that light which we want if this redoubling supplementation is seen as 
an intrinsic attribute of this light itself (i.e. light not supplemented is not and can never be 
bright enough)? Furthermore, since “we are not reading,” why do we need this light when 
it seems to be of little use and when all members of the dayi’er would close their eyes 
and rhythmically move their bodies as they silently perform their recitations? Why so 
                                                   
27 For the philosophical illuminationism of Suhrawardi, see Suhrawardi, Walbridge, & Ziai, 1999. For Al-
Ghazali’s reading of light in connection to Sufi mysticism, see Al-Ghazali, 1998. For general introductions 
to the Islamic theological and philosophical tradition of illuminationism, see Nasr & Leaman, 1996, pp.
465-96; Nasr & Razavi, 1996, pp. 125-71. 
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much light in a ritual that could well be conducted in darkness, when, in fact, it is
conducted precisely at night time?  
Repetition and supplementation function not merely to point to the possible 
insatiability of the desire for light and illumination among the Jahriyya Hui. It also effects 
an enframing that produces the condition for mystification – light would not be rendered 
into a sign seen by Laoma to possess an immense repr sentative power without the 
apparently redundant doubling that pulls the light as a familiar trope in Sufism out of the 
familiarity in which it is often located and by whic  it is often explained. The pure 
representability of light as a sign emerges precisely at the moment when Laoma starts to 
wonder why so much light is needed in Panchi Shanpan. 
The same theme of ostensible supplementation can be observed in the ritual use of the 
white pebbles as well. Although their total number is one hundred, only ninety-nine is 
actually used in punctuating the silent recitations, and the remaining one is always 
dropped before those in the dayi’er officially initiate Panchi Shanpan. One member will 
divide the pebbles as all others quietly get prepard for the rite, and he would kiss the one 
pebble to be dropped beforehand in the same way the Quran is often kissed. But why, if 
this extra and somewhat superfluous pebble has every time to be dropped before the rite, 
did not the miraculous master Ma Mingxin leave it ou in the first place and only pass the 
remaining ninety-nine to his pious followers? Why did he choose to keep this apparently 
useless supplement? I asked Laoma these questions. S mehow cornered, he did not reply 
to them directly. Instead, he set out to offer me a story –  
There was once a Sufi master with three students. The master was 
approaching his death and he summoned his students to his deathbed. 
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They were lost as much as sad. “Where should we find our next teacher?” 
They asked. And the master, breathing softly, gave his instructions: “I 
have 17 sheep. Such a man as can divide these sheep in th  following way 
will be your next teacher: he can give 1/2 of them to the oldest of the three 
of you, 1/3 to the middle one, and 1/9 to the youngest.” Now, do you 
know how this can be done? 
After a short silence during which I was trying to figure out whether he was merely 
posing a rhetorical question, Laoma continued, 
You add one and make it 18. 1/2 of 18 is 9, 1/3 6, and 1/9 2. 9 plus 6 plus 
2 is 17, not 18. Now where is that extra one? Has the new master indeed 
added it? But how could he divide the 17 sheep without adding that extra 
one? Where is it after the division is completed? Do you know? Can you 
know? 
My questions were not answered as much as reposed. Th y were shot back to me in a 
manner that only deepened the degree of curiosity to the point where the very 
answerability of these questions begins to constitute a question in itself. In the same way 
the candles enframe light and the extra pebble enframes the remaining ninety-nine 
“useful” ones, the remarkable allegory recounted by Laoma also enframes my questions 
and effectively assimilates them into the internal logic of the weekly Panchi Shanpan 
marked by apparent redundancy, repetition, and supplementation.  
The logic of the “extra” is directly linked to the figure of the murshid – it is he who 
leaves behind the extra pebble as a sign for his disciples to ponder. It is also he who 
creates that impressive mathematical trick in which the extra sheep is both part and no 
part of the total number to be divided among the thr e students. He does not deliberately 
keep a substantive secret which has a content that can be revealed and taught as much as 
constitutes a figure that actively re-enchants the world by rendering the familiar strange, 
and by transforming the mundane into the mysterious. He does not answer as much as 
create a situation in which one is constantly led to ask and to wonder. Both 
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supplementation and mystification (as a result of the enframing effected by 
supplementation) refer back to the inherent miraculousness of the murshid who does not 
possess the ultimate secret as much as renders the world itself into a secret. It is by and 
through him – invariably a male figure – that the world acquires that aura which orients 
the life of a pious Jahriyya Sufi.  
In this chapter, I am primarily interested in how the institution of murshid and of 
secrecy as an intrinsic and crucial component of Islamic sainthood creates a form of 
being Hui Muslim and a way of sustaining Hui Islam in China different from what we 
have seen in the confined space of a mosque and its fang in the previous chapter. If a 
mosque – especially an urban mosque – as a site for “religious activity” nonetheless 
constitutes a place where a largely secular and anxiously exposed communal public 
emerges that displaces clerical power and religious concern with local disputes involving 
property relations, secrecy in Sufism entails a strong solidarity among the members of a 
particular Sufi order due principally to the nature of the relationship that binds each 
follower to his or her murshid. The relationship far exceeds the limit of a ang and is 
based precisely upon the opposite of public exposure. If in Zhengzhou it is a disputed 
public space ridden with open competition and at times violent confrontation that forms 
the basic institutional structure that maintains the presence of Hui Islam in the Sino-
centric social world, in those parts of northwest China where Sufism reigns supreme 
among the Hui, it is secrecy and the binding of oneself to one’s own murshid that fulfill 
in a completely different way a similar function. It is at the level of institution (instead of 
individual Hui Muslim) that I have studied the mosque and will continue in this chapter 
to study Hui Sufism, of which Jahriyya is merely one – although one particularly 
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significant and influential – variation. Due to the fact that my ethnographic fieldwork on 
Sufism was conducted primarily in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, especially in those 
areas (the town of Banqiao in Wuzhong and the village of Honglefu in Qingtongxia) 
where the most prevalent Sufi order is Jahriyya (with its still powerful organizational 
force unrivalled in most – but not all – other relatively smaller and more segmented 
orders), what follows will necessarily be limited by this geographical and sectarian focus. 
But despite irreducible differences in terms of ritual details and the substantive content of 
genealogies of sainthood (“silsila,” as it is often called in Sufism), most Sufi orders in 
Ningxia which I have studied to different extent do share similar institutional structures 
that all center upon the murshid, the saint who is seen to body forth the sacred line of Dao 
in contemporary times and who reflects the beam of light that ultimately emanates from 
the inaccessible God. It is this common institutional structure that I propose to discuss in 
this chapter. 
A Gendered Genealogy of Dao 
Just as the solemn place for Sufi meditation and mystic ritual is called daotang (“the 
hall of Dao”) in northwest China, the institution of Sufi order also bears a proper name in 
Chinese, menhuan. The literal meaning of huan is elite, with a strong implication of 
imperial official connections, while the word men simply means door, indicating a sense 
of entry and threshold. Menhuan is a reversal of the more common noun huanmen, which 
is often used to describe an enormously influential elite family with a grand genealogy 
consisting of a long list of prominent imperial officials and which therefore possesses 
much political capital in landing its current members in eminent positions. One born into 
a huanmen is born into power and wealth, a good literary education and a highly 
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promising political career buttressed by intimate familial connections. The first recorded 
use of menhuan to designate a Sufi order in China initially appeared in a memorial sent in 
1897 to the Guangxu Emperor of late Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.) by Yang Zengxin, 
then the governor of Hezhou (now known as Linxia Hui A tonomous Prefecture, Gansu 
Province) who was later the dictator that ruled with an iron fist the Uyghur Xinjiang for 
seventeen years in early Republican period, turning it practically into his own personal 
kingdom. Yang chose to name the Sufi orders thus with a particular purpose: he wanted 
to convey a sense of urgency and to convince the emperor that an immediate military 
operation was necessitated by the fact that the Hui Suf  order, with its hereditary 
inheritance of both clerical and secular power attached to the position of the mystic 
murshid and its strong force in mobilizing large numbers of f llowers in a highly 
organized manner for either civil or military purpose, constituted a grave threat to the 
imperial rule and might at any moment rebel against the Qing Dynasty already much 
weakened after the two Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860) (Ma, 2000b, pp. 75; Li & 
Ma, 2011, pp. 33-4). Menhuan, therefore, is not a self-designation of the Sufi Hu at the 
very beginning, and it does not describe as much as deliberately portrays the Hui Sufi 
orders in negative terms in order to invite political oppression and military elimination.  
In spite of this initial attempt on the side of an imperial official to subject Hui Sufi 
orders to suppression, menhuan has nonetheless over the years been accepted by most 
Sufi Hui as the designation by which they explain to outsiders the kind of social 
organization that defines their practice of faith. Although it is often established in 
academic literature that there are four major Sufi menhuan in China (Khufiyya, Jahriyya, 
Qadiriyya, Kuburiyya) (Gladney, 1991, pp. 41-53; 1987, pp. 503; Dillon, 1999, pp. 113-
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129), the term menhuan does not necessarily imply the specific organizational level at 
which a particular menhuan might be situated. Khufiyya is called a menhuan, but the 
countless Sufi orders that only claim a nominal andlargely formal affiliation with the 
Khufiyya order are not located in a well-organized intra-Khufiyya hierarchy and do not 
form any strong solidarity among themselves. Each particular Khufiyya order also calls 
itself a menhuan, without reserving this name only for a general and organizationally 
non-existent Khufiyya order unified as a singular group with one murshid as its exclusive 
guide. Hongmen menhuan, initiated by Hong Shoulin (d. 1937) and with its followers 
living primarily in Tongxin, Haiyuan and Guyuan counties in Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region, claims to belong to the Khufiyya menhuan, but it remains organizationally 
independent and the power – both clerical and secular, as they are often not distinguished 
in a Sufi menhuan – of its murshid is lodged safely in the hands of the Hong family, 
whose most recent inheritor is Hong Yang, an extraordinary and shrewd leader in his late 
forties. The specific interpretation given to menhuan by Hongmen demonstrates how this 
name acquires its particular traction among the Sufi H i despite its initially external 
imposition: “Menhuan is the men (“door”) for a Muslim to recognize Allah. Anyone can 
go through this door, but there must be a guide, and this guide is the laorenjia (“the old 
sage,” a different name often used interchangeably with murshid). One can eventually 
cross the threshold only on three conditions: the call (zhaohuan) of Allah, the lead of the 
laorenjia, and personal discipline (gongxiu). This is the true meaning of menhuan as seen 
from inside the religion” (Ma, 2000b, pp. 218). 
In addition to this flexibility of menhuan in designating Sufi orders of different levels 
and of different degrees of organizational existence, not all Sufi orders in China call 
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themselves menhuan. The “door” might exist, but it is not necessarily named. And the 
murshid might not want to reveal his name and might prefer pr cisely to remain hidden 
and confined within a small circle of close disciples. Luojie came from a family whose 
history had produced one such unnaming murshid. Her great grandfather was a Sufi 
master belonging to the Qadiriyya order (also segmented into a variety of smaller 
menhuans without a unified organization)28 and was one of three most promising students 
of an eminent murshid known to be able to perform long meditation and produce 
fabulous miracles. “My great grandfather (taiyeye) was in fact the best of the three, and 
he certainly could have established his own menhuan, just like what the other two did.” 
But Luojie did not feel sorry for her taiyeye. Regret, amazingly, was a word I never heard 
from her in the countless conversations we had when I was in Ningxia. She continued to 
explain why her taiyeye did not choose to name his own “door” (to name the “door” and 
to establish one’s own menhuan are in this case one and the same thing – the act of 
naming is the act of establishment) –  
He could have done it. But he said, “it’s enough that I look after my own 
descendants – that’s enough trouble. I cannot have my own menhuan. I am 
not able to look after so many.” You know what? He was absolutely right! 
Among all his descendants, only those descending from my own 
grandfather are good. You cannot imagine what the others are doing. 
Many are drug dealers, others in gangs. Indeed, that’s enough trouble for 
taiyeye! 
Luojie was the youngest daughter in her family, with her father long passed away and her 
relationship with her mother far from gratifying. She often recollected to me – in the 
same tone of admiration in which she narrated to me the story of her taiyeye – how gentle 
and generous a male figure her father was. A successful businessman nonetheless 
                                                   
28 Luojie’s family belongs to the Shitangling menhuan of the Qadiriyya order. For a history of Shitangli 
and its relationship to other Qadiriyya menhuans, see Ma, 2006.  
166 
 
untainted by the unrestrained desire for profit, her father often left the family well 
maintained. “He was always smiling, and whenever I turned to him for support, he was 
invariably on my side. He did not talk much – but you could feel it. As to my mom, she is 
a hysteric.” After this short comment, she again moved back to the patrilineal line, 
I am always confident. I think all the bad things cannot hurt me. My 
friends and colleagues often wonder how I can be happy all the time. I 
know my taiyeye is protecting me. I know he is looking after me. I went to 
college in Beijing and got my PhD in a prestigious university. While I was 
wondering if I could get a job, an opportunity turned up and took me back 
to Yinchuan. Now I have a decent job and am getting ready for a new 
marriage! It is as if everything has been so well arranged for me in 
advance, as if someone has always been looking after me. I think it’s 
taiyeye. I am never alone. 
But taiyeye could not protect her from all adversities –  
Every time I went back home – I mean every time, I will get sick for a 
couple of days. I will just keep vomiting, but nothing comes out. Every 
single time, exactly the same symptom. We have a theory in our village – 
if such vomiting happens, it means you are being looked at by the ghost of 
a deceased close relative. The closer you are, the more severe the 
symptom, because the ghost simply keeps staring at you. They are 
reluctant to move their gaze away. They love you so much, but they don’t 
know that by looking at you, they unwittingly hurt you. The yinqi (air of 
yin – a Daoist conception prevalent in China’s Han popular religious 
traditions) is simply too strong and you cannot bear it. I think it’s my 
father. He wants to see me, and he wants to see me all the time. He could 
not get enough of me every time I am at home. But I j st cannot stand my 
mom… 
It is always a patronym that proclaims the establishment of a new Sufi order, and even 
when this act of naming is not explicitly performed, the implicit structure of an unnamed 
menhuan is nonetheless heavily defined by this exclusive reliance upon patriliny. Luojie 
strongly identifies with her taiyeye, and the latter’s inability in protecting her from her 
father’s insatiable gaze does not contradict this identification as much as carrying it to a 
different level where it is not taiyeye as much as a generalized yet apparently so intimate 
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patronym with which she identifies: “taiyeye could not protect me from this, because this 
is not one of those bad things that can hurt you. It’s your own father, it’s the love, the 
care, the impossibility of parting with one’s closest family. Who can intervene to 
ameliorate this?”  
Taiyeye does have a small gongbei (a tomb dedicated to a Sufi saint, also a site or a
“shrine” for commemoration and meditation for the followers of the saint interred) built 
for him by his family and the small circle of disciples who knew his teaching. There are 
many such nameless gongbeis in Ningxia – perhaps exceeding the number of the named 
ones (this is, however, purely a guess ventured by those whom I interviewed without any 
statistical evidence). Some of these gongbeis are located right next to the highway (the 
highway is often the latecomer), while a significant number dot the deep mountains of 
Ningxia, almost invariably in the rural area. They are built and maintained only by those 
who either in person or through familial connections remember and still actively uphold 
the teaching of the Sufi master to whom the tomb is dedicated. These gongbeis are not, 
however, sites of purely local commemoration. A Sufi Hui who belongs to one of the 
many menhuans often considers him or herself as “a person of menhuan,” or more 
commonly, “a person who has passed the door” (menli de ren). This identification with 
menhuan in general – instead of any particular menhuan – is substantiated only at the site 
of a nameless gongbei, when the apparent lack of the written patronym occludes the 
recollection of concrete memories that easily lead one away from a calm meditation. To 
visit a gongbei known to belong to a menhuan that is not one’s own is a provocative 




But no one, at least none of those whom I interviewed, seems to have a problem with 
visiting nameless gongbeis. It is not a particular saint as much as sainthood itself that is 
seen to be the object for commemoration. Each of these small gongbeis invariably has a 
table upon which stands a small incense bowl. Packs of incense sticks and matches are 
often placed right next to the bowl for the convenience of the commemorators. These 
supplies are daily refilled by the family or the local disciples of the commemorated saint 
precisely for those who pass by and would like to spend a few quiet minutes in silent 
meditation. The generalization of menhuan identity happens only on the basis of this 
anonymity, and somewhat paradoxically, the lack of a particular patronym induces the 
abstraction and ultimate realization of the rule of the patronym in general. Being a 
promising young scholar in Ningxia University of Medicine and working on the topic of 
“Hui medicine” with a strong interest in Ibn Sīnā, Luojie was most interested in these 
nameless gongbeis: “The well-known ones are still there, but they are lready dead in 
spirit. Most of their descendants, like those of the two fellow disciples of my great 
grandfather, have lost their true faith. I am now only interested in these small gongbeis – 
they are where the true Dao can still be found.” 
Two kinds of remembrance therefore have to be distinguished before we move on to a 
discussion of the named menhuans. One kind remembers a particular genealogy with 
specific names attributed to locatable sites. This substantive memory distinguishes those 
who thus remember from followers of other menhuans and draw sharp distinctions 
between and among different menhuans. The prominence of names and named places 
marks the moral geography imagined and constantly sustained by this memory. This 
segmenting remembrance shifts into a general identification with menhuan as an abstract 
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conception precisely when the patronym is subtracted and sublimated in a hidden way. In 
this second form of remembrance, it is not a concrete history as much as a strong 
consciousness of history that acquires the highest significance. One can fully commit to 
the truth of Dao only when the substantive content of this Dao remains utterly 
inaccessible. The lack of a name of a father entails precisely the assertion of power of the 
Name of the Father. 
For most named menhuans, the scope of their influence goes far beyond the local 
rural world in which their central daotang is often situated.  Followers of the Jahriyya 
order can be found in a wide range of places, from Ningxia, Gansu, and Xinjiang 
Provinces in northwest China, to Guizhou, Sichuan, Shandong, Heilongjiang, Henan, and 
Yunnan Provinces. Huasi menhuan, another prominent Sufi order in northwest China 
which claims an affiliation with the Khufiyya order, boasts at least two hundred thousand 
followers scattered in the four provinces of Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang. This 
broad distribution of menhuan followers across vast geographical distance is a direct 
reflection of two major factors: first, it points to he history of migration of the successive 
murshids in the course of maintaining and spreading their mystic teaching in 
contradistinction to those propagated by their peers. This migration could be a result of 
clashes with local “older” forms of religious practice and might also be due to the 
impassioned invitation of pious followers who were willing to offer the best they could 
for the murshid in their own locale. The institutional existence of the teaching at a 
particular place does not disappear with the emigration of the murshid. A local 
representative (reyisi in Jahriyya) is often picked in person by the murshid himself and 
given objects of “proof” (pingzheng) that certify his qualification in temporarily and 
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partially standing in for the saint in conducting Sufi rituals and advising devout students. 
A subsidiary daotang (fen daotang) or mosque would be built on collective donations 
contributed completely by local followers who are under the specific clerical jurisdiction 
of their reyisi appointed single-handedly by the infallible murshid. This is repeated at 
every stop where the murshid sojourns to attract followers and train disciples. The trail of 
his journey is therefore dotted by numerous daotangs and mosques which, when taken 
together, form the nodes that weave a vast trans-local web. 
The second factor that helps expand menhuan influence across long distance is forced 
expropriation and relocation imposed primarily by the suspicious imperial rulers. 
Different menhuans, given their respective history, are influenced by this factor to 
different degrees. Its long history of violent confrontations with the Qing court since mid-
18th century has particularly subjected Jahriyya murshids and common disciples to 
consecutive purges and forced exiles, which largely explains its exceptionally wide 
distribution both in and beyond northwest China. For one example, Ma Datian, or 
chuanchang taiye (“the Shipyard Papa”), the third and one of the most respected 
murshids in the genealogy kept by Jahriyya followers, was sent in 1817 on a long and 
drudging exile to Heilongjiang in Manchuria on the far tip of northeast China. Travelling 
confined in a wooden cage a distance almost humanly impossible, he persevered until his 
painful journey eventually ended at a place called Shipyard in Jilin. He was accompanied 
by twelve devout followers on his exile, who willfully surrendered themselves to the 
chain merely to stay on the side of their saint andto attend on him throughout the 
preposterous trip. Chuanchang taiye was survived by these pious disciples, who after his 
passing quietly built for him a simple and unadorned gongbei at the very site where he 
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acquired his martyrdom. The small number of Jahriyya followers now residing in Jilin 
trace their ancestry to these twelve brave disciples.  
As perhaps common to most Sufi orders, tombs of saints also figure prominently in 
menhuan. Each particular gongbei, dedicated to one murshid, is also associated with a 
particular date which is often the death date of the interred saint. Not all commemorations 
of the past murshids necessarily take place at the corresponding gongbei, since not all 
gongbeis (like the one dedicated to the Shipyard Papa in Jilin Province) are constructed in 
such a way as to accommodate such grand occasions. But visiting the respective gongbei 
on the correct date is regarded as highly important, lthough remote gongbeis might not 
receive as big a crowd as do others that are closer t  the central daotang, where the 
commemoration ritual often takes place. In Jahriyya Sufism, all followers keep a calendar 
on which are marked the important dates when they have to travel and participate in the 
commemoration ritual either at the respective gongbei or in one of the central daotangs. 
One such detailed calendar reprinted in a pamphlet circulated among Jahriyya Hui is as 
follows – all dates are in the Chinese lunar calendar: 
January 
1st, Birth of Daozu Papa (Daozu, or “the ancestor of Dao,” here designates Ma 
Mingxin, the founding murshid of Jahriyya Sufism.) 
Passing (guizhen, “returning to the True Lord”) of Daozu Taitai (wife of 
Daozu Papa) 
13th, Passing of the Thirteenth Papa (This posthumous title is conferred upon 
Ma Hualong, the fifth murshid in the genealogy, in order to commemorate 
his date of death – a conventional way in giving posthumous names to 
passed murshids among Jahriyya followers.) 
14th, Passing of Dadongjia Papa (the oldest son of the Thirteenth Papa), Daren 
Papa (the second son of the Thirteenth Papa), Sandongjia Papa (the third 
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son of the Thirteenth Papa), Sidongjia Papa (the fourth son of the 
Thirteenth Papa, and father of the Old Papa) 
20th, Passing of Chuanchang Taitai (wife of the Shipyard Papa) 
25th, Passing of Bianliang Papa (Ma Jincheng, one of the two grandsons of the 
Thirteen Papa who narrowly escaped the imperial extermination in late 
Qing, the other being the Old Papa Ma Jinxi) 
February 
13th, Passing of Da Taitai (mother of Benguangyin Papa [“P pa of Present 
Times”], principal wife of the Tenth Papa) 
17th, Passing of Xifu Taitai (concubine of the Thirteenth Papa, a Han woman 
much admired among Jahriyya Hui who unanimously think that it was her 
Han identity that enabled her to escape the massacre of Qing troops and to 
secretly smuggle out the sacred yizhazi [the objects seen as “proofs” that 
certify the authenticity of sainthood, passed down from Daozu Papa and 
successively into the hands of every succeeding murshid], thus preserving 
the continuity of Jahriyya Sufism at the very moment it risked irrevocable 
breaking) 
19th, Birth of Pingliang Papa (Mu Xianzhang, the second murshid in the 
genealogy) 
March 
9th, Passing of the Seven Members of the Thirteenth Papa’s Family, Including 
Old Papa’s Mother 
27th, Passing of Daozu Papa 
April 
8th, Passing of the April 8th Papa (Ma Yide, the fourth murshid) 
14th, Passing of San Taitai (wife of Old Papa, mother of the Tenth Papa) 
28th, Passing of Qi Papa 
May 
21st, Passing of Lintao Taitai (another wife of the Thirteenth Papa, mother of 
the Dadongjia Papa) 
27th, Passing of Pingliang Papa 
June 
6th, Birth of Papa of Present Times (Ma Guoquan, the current murshid) 
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9th, Passing of the Tenth Papa (Ma Teng’ai, the seventh murshid, father of 
Papa of Present Times) 
July 
13th, Elevation of the Old Papa in the Hierarchy of Dao (Ma Jinxi, the sixth 
murshid, father of the Tenth Papa) 
21st, Birth of the Old Papa 
August 
15th, Birth of the April 8th Papa 
23rd, Birth of Shipyard Papa (Ma Datian, the third murshid)  
September 
6th, Passing of Shipyard Papa 
October 
8th, Birth of the Tenth Papa 
22nd, Passing of Baishui Gutaitai (daughter of Pingliang Papa) 
November 
4th, Passing of the April 8th Taitai (wife of the April 8th Papa)  
16th, Imprisonment of the Thirteenth Papa by Qing troops 
22nd, Passing of the Old Papa 
December 
15th, Birth of the Thirteenth Papa 
28th, Passing of Bianliang Papa 
(J. Ma, 2010, pp. 255-6) 
Not all dates thus marked out on the calendar are necessarily accompanied by a 
commemoration ritual, and we should take care to remember that these dates are given 
essentially different weight in the world of Jahriyya Sufism. Some – especially those 
dedicated to female figures who appear primarily due to their subsidiary role in serving 
the cause of their husbands or fathers – are singled out merely to gesture to the relative 
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importance of the respective figure, and visitations can take place all year along without 
being confined exclusively to the designated date. Women are not forbidden from 
entering the gongbei and offering their prayers to the interred saint, although when they 
attend the commemoration ritual in one of the central daotangs, they are invariably 
prohibited from entering the prayer hall and often have to kneel down in the courtyard 
outside the door that separates the men from the women and prioritizes the former over 
the latter. The segregation of sexes is much less marked in gongbeis than in both 
daotangs and mosques.  
But the above calendar is only a partial list, and the genealogy it charts out is not 
unanimously accepted by all Jahriyya Hui. The pedigree of Dao bifurcates after Ma 
Hualong (the Thirteenth Papa), whose significance in the history of Jahriyya is easily 
recognizable in the above genealogy. His execution by the Qing court in late 19th century 
initiated the first major dispute among Jahriyya followers as to who were qualified to 
carry on the teaching passed down by the Daozu Papa. The hereditary logic that all 
accepted in spite of disagreements in the specific hoice was a strong patriliny. The 
patriarchal tone of the genealogy can be discerned ev n on the surface: women are not 
excluded as much as domesticated. They appear either as wives or as daughters. 
Although Xifu Taitai is much respected and her tomb constitutes a major site in the moral 
geography of Jahriyya Sufism annually receiving an enormous amount of devout visitors, 
not a single one of those whom I interviewed know her name. She always goes with the 
suffix taitai, which literally means “wife.” The particular historical juncture (late 19th 
century when the Qing Dynasty was only years away from its fall in the face of Western 
colonial power and the revolutionary passion brewing among the discontented Han 
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nationalists) in which she is seen to be situated only – and paradoxically – reinforces this 
domestication precisely in the form of accentuating her importance for the survival and 
continual existence Jahriyya Sufism. In his immensely influential book29 – the very first 
of its kind – on the history of Jahriyya Sufism, Zhang Chengzhi, an eminent Hui writer 
who turned to Jahriyya after his revolutionary zeal w s frustrated by the Tiananmen 
Massacre in 1989, wrote a three-paged chapter on Xifu Taitai, with the provocatively 
succinct title “Woman” –  
The link between Jahriyya and the history of modern China is established 
by a woman. 
And, she’s a Han woman… 
According the memory of some old Jahriyya followers, “Xifu Taitai was 
from Guangwu, and was an exceptionally beautiful woman. After our 
mullah [Ma Hualong, the Thirteenth Papa] broke into the city of Guangwu, 
the manzi [“savages,” here a pejorative designation of the Han] either died 
or escaped by the skin of teeth. It was a mess. While Tanye [“Tan Papa,” a 
reyisi of the Thirteenth Papa] was walking down the street, purely by 
accident he bumped into this beautiful woman. The Thirteenth Papa 
eventually married this woman, and she acquired the name Xifu Taitai in 
Jahriyya.” 
Later on, when over three hundred family members of the Thirteenth Papa 
were massacred by the Qing troops, only Xifu Taitai survived – because 
everyone knew that she was a Han. This was seen by Jahriyya followers as 
an amazing miracle enacted by the Thirteenth Papa: “He once said to Xifu 
Taitai, ‘take all the sacred yizhazi with you. If you are captured, you just 
tell the captor that I forced you to marry me.’ She did as told, and was 
later released by the Qing troops. She took with her eight chests, and four 
                                                   
29  The book was written with the indispensable help of numerous Jahriyya students who travelled 
extensively in the 1980s across northwest China to collect for Zhang unpublished records and oral histories 
among the Jahriyya followers. Works in Arabic and Persian were meticulously translated for his use, and 
Zhang himself also occasionally travelled to collect stories. The book, in other words, is a product of 
collective work, although it might appear (due largely to the highly personal manner in which Zhang writes 
and presents the findings) to be essentially the work of a single author. It is prefaced and recommended by 
Ma Liesun, the “doorkeeper” of Jahriyya Maqiao menhuan from 1960 to 2012, which partially explains its 
popularity both among Jahriyya followers and beyond.  Since its publication, two of its textual sources 
which previously were unknown to the outside world have been published in Chinese. See Guanliye, 1993; 
Ma, 1997. A revised version of Zhang’s book was published in 2012. For a study of Zhang in the English 
language, see Henning, 2009.  
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of them contained the yizhazi as proofs for authentic inheritance of 
Jahriyya teaching. The Thirteenth Papa had long before known that the 
Qing oppression would inevitably happen, and he married Xifu Taitai 
precisely to prepare for this ordeal.” 
(Zhang, 1990, pp. 214-5) 
Zhang does not deny that “all details about her lif…are unverifiable,” but he nonetheless 
proceeds to venture a generalization on all “women” taken as whole, 
Women, when they are born into a grand epoch, or especially when they 
submit themselves to great men of magnificent deeds in such an epoch, 
will necessarily lead a dazzling life. This can be s en throughout the 
Chinese history. But in the history of the Hui, one can see this only in 
Jahriyya… 
…Xifu Taitai is an unbelievable woman. She is more f a reflection of the 
glaring light that emanates essentially from the man who conquers 
her…She is a woman who obeys her hero, a real woman whose only 
pursuit is to share the fate of the hero whom she lov s. 
(Ibid., pp. 216) 
We don’t know what happened after “Tanye…bumped into this beautiful woman.” Some 
of the male Jahriyya disciples (a distinct and different female voice is emphatically 
missing in all the different narrations of this story) whom I interviewed recounted a story 
of how a stubbornly resisting Xifu Taitai was eventually moved by the sincerity of the 
Thirteenth Papa and overwhelmed by his skillful demonstration of wealth and power. 
“Xifu,” or “the western residence,” is precisely the name of the exquisite pavilion built 
exclusively for her by the Thirteenth Papa. Both her female gender and her Han identity 
are critical components of the story, and they are int rlinked in forging the essentially 
masculinist imaginary of the Jahriyya genealogy: a H n woman as part of the loot 
snatched from the conquered Han men (“the savages”) and who later, precisely because 
she is a Han woman, could secretly conserve the matrial objects upon which hangs the 
destiny of the continuity of the Dao of Jahriyya Sufism. “All details of her life…are 
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unverifiable,” but she assumes, as an outsider (in terms of both religion/ethnicity and 
gender) who is never completely assimilated (this ob cure position is the very condition 
of her structural significance in instituting the masculinist imaginary of modern Jahriyya), 
the crucial role of an indispensable hinge that sutures two different eras in the imaginary 
of the male Jahriyya followers. She is remembered only as “the reflection of the glaring 
light that emanates essentially from the man who conquered her.” The moral geography 
and historical genealogy of contemporary Jahriyya Sufism are marked by this 
foundational sexual dissymmetry.30  The peripheral position of the woman and the 
obscurity of their histories are matched only by the crucial structural role an ethnicized 
female gender plays in instituting the imaginary world in which Jahriyya followers situate 
both space and time. In this particular context, ethnicity is both inserted into and 
overdetermined by sexual difference and this overdet mination is an important feature of 
the modern Jahriyya Lebenswelt. 
The abstraction of the patronym and its elevation above concrete genealogies can also 
be observed in a comparison between the two branches of Jahriyya, although its form is 
markedly different from what we have seen with respect to the nameless small gongbeis. 
The bifurcation of daotong (“genealogy of Dao”) in Jahriyya happened after the demise 
of the Thirteenth Papa in 1871. The Banqiao menhuan, whose ritual of Panchi Shanpan I 
briefly discussed at the beginning of this chapter, claims that Ma Jinxi, one surviving 
grandson of the Thirteenth Papa to whom the sacred yizhazi has been passed precisely 
                                                   
30 In a pamphlet circulated widely among the Jahriyya Banqiao menhuan, it is written that “the Thirteenth 
Papa qu Xifu Taitai weiqi (“took Xifi Taitai as his wife” – note how the marital relation is expressed) and 
used her ‘special identity’ (teshu de shenfen) to protect the genmiao in order to save the door of our religion 
(jiaomen)” (Banqiao Daotang, 2011, pp. 8). The literal rendition of genmiao is “root and sprout,” with a 
strong masculinist undertone. The male semen of the religion is then saved by a woman with a “special (i.e. 
Han) identity.”  
178 
 
through the hands of his grandmother Xifu Taitai, should be the genuine and sole 
inheritor qualified to bear the heavy responsibility of leading Jahriyya followers in their 
religious discipline and secular pursuit. Whereas the Maqiao menhuan, who initially 
accepted Ma Jincheng (the other and oldest grandson of the Thirteenth Papa who was 
castrated by the Qing imperial government at the age of 12 and sent to serve as a slave in 
an elite Manchu family in Kaifeng, Henan Province) as the inheritor, transferred their 
allegiance after the death of Jincheng to Ma Yuanzhg (“the Shagou Papa”), an heir of 
Daozu Papa based in Yunnan Province and whose extraordin ry leadership contributed 
much to sustaining the social organization and economic maintenance of Jahriyya Sufism 
after the devastating execution of the Thirteenth Papa in late 19th century.  
But the difference between Banqiao and Maqiao goes beyond this local bifurcation of 
daotong. The institution of murshid is defined at its foundation by a prognostic time limit 
materialized in the pre-determined number of generations sainthood can be effectively 
inherited. It is theoretically impossible, if this principle is faithfully heeded, for a 
menhuan to have an indefinite number of murshids, and sooner or later, sainthood must 
be sealed and the door closed. All subsequent inheritors can no longer be seen to possess 
any saintly character, and their title, quite literally, is merely shoumenren (“the 
doorkeeper”). The indefinite period between the closure of sainthood and the Last 
Judgment is for the followers of menhuan a time of preparation. A millenarian vision – 
stronger for some, weaker for others – saturates this indeterminate duration of time: the 
End is drawing near as the last murshid has met his Lord. In a certain sense, the seal of 
sainthood is directly comparable to the end of prophethood after Muhammad that 
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constitutes one essential component of the Islamic faith and a major point of dispute 
between “the orthodox” view and the Indian Ahmadiyya movement in late 19th century. 
Because of the bifurcation in daotong after the death of the Thirteenth Papa, and 
especially due to the fact that Ma Jinxi and Ma Yuanzhang co-existed for a considerable 
period of time as the dual head of the Jahriyya order in early 20th century, Banqiao and 
Maqiao have since diverged in their counting of thesaintly generations. Setting the 
Thirteenth Papa Ma Hualong as the point of departure, the following figure shall suffice 
in showing the particular significance of this diverg nce for contemporary Jahriyya: 
            
              Banqiao                                                                        Maqiao 
5th murshid, Ma Hualong (1810-1871)                        5th murshid, Ma Hualong 
6th murshid, Ma Jinxi (1866-1940)                             6th murshid, Ma Jincheng (1865-1889) 
7th murshid, Ma Teng’ai (1921-1991)                         7th murshid, Ma Yuanzhang (1853-1920) 
8th murshid, Ma Guoquan (1942-)                               8th murshid, Ma Zhenwu (1895-1960) 
 
Eight generations is the pre-determined number accepted among the Jahriyya followers 
as the inviolable limit initially imposed by Daozu Papa at the outset when he began to 
spread his teaching after his long study in Yemen. But how these eight generations are to 
be distributed across the indefinite time period before the seal of sainthood leaves much 
space for maneuvering among his disciples in later g s. As can be observed in the above 
figure, the short life of Ma Jincheng and the subsequent co-existence of Ma Jinxi and Ma 
Yuanzhang have entailed a profound divergence between Banqiao and Maqiao that has 
bred and continues to breed theological disputes: the last murshid of Maqiao, Ma Zhenwu, 
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died at a time when Ma Teng’ai, the 7th murshid of Banqiao, was still in good condition, 
and for over fifty years ever since, Banqiao has been njoying a remarkable continuity in 
its daotong enabled by the continual existence of its murshids, whereas Maqiao could 
only hold on to its successive “doorkeepers” (two up till now) who have in principle lost 
their saintly power and whose sole obligation is to sustain what has been left behind 
without contributing any considerable addition that might be suspected to lead the 
followers astray.  
This dissymmetry is not without concrete consequences. Xiaohe, a Banqiao Jahriyya 
Hui whose small shop selling incense bowls, white caps, and Sufi classics was located at 
the entrance to the Banqiao daotang, took pains to explain to me how during regular 
rituals such as the weekly Panchi Shanpan, disciples of Banqiao would position the 
incense bowls in a particular way in order to deliberately demonstrate that “the true Dao 
is still with us,” in contradistinction to its loss among the Maqiao Jahriyya, 
We have three bowls placed on the table around which the dayi’er sits: 
one big bowl at the center, and two smaller ones on each side. These 
bowls are three-legged, and we always face one of their legs inward 
towards our eyisi. This shows that it is us, not Maqiao, who still possesses 
the true Dao. As a matter of fact, it is only us who can still perform rituals 
such as Panchi Shanpan, because we still have our murshid, while they 
don’t. Without the power and permission of the murshid, no one can do 
Panchi Shanpan.  
Xiaohe was not the only one who tried to convince me of the authenticity of Maqiao by 
recourse to ritual minutiae whose interpretations, however, are not always the same for 
different Banqiao followers – and the incense bowls, a  I later observed when I 
participated in these rituals, are not always positioned in such a way as to accord to 
Xiaohe’s explanation. Yiming, a close disciple of Ma Guoquan (“Papa of Present Times,” 
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the current murshid of Banqiao menhuan), was another Jahriyya Hui who could keep on 
talking for hours about ritual niceties which he thought was the essence of Sufi practice, 
although, similar to what I have observed with Xiaohe, he often exaggerated the 
exactingness of these details and was deliberate in forming discourses on ritual steps 
which are not necessarily meticulously stipulated. In one such scenario, Yiming insisted 
that I picture every act of an Imam Ma while he was setting the table for a collective 
ritual at Banqiao daotang. “Stop there. Don’t move.” He said to Imam Ma. “Now take a 
picture!” He then turned to me. Imam Ma did not follow his instructions and continued 
silently with his work. Perhaps wary of Yiming’s frequent interruptions after a few 
minutes, he suggested that I take a picture when evrything had been ready and the table 
well set. “No, it is precisely how you do it that needs to be recorded. He needs to know 
every single step.” Yiming told him, and then turned to me again, “every act of his has to 
follow the rule, and no step is arbitrary. Not everyone can do this. Imam Ma has been 
doing this for years and he is a veteran.” Imam Ma did not speak up, leaving Yiming’s 
voice echoing in the magnificent daotang draped in tapestries in praise of the Banqiao 
murshids.  
For Yiming, to be able to remember these details and to strictly follow their 
instructions in the performance or even the preparation for the performance of ritual is of 
paramount importance. The word ermaili, widely used among the Hui in northwest China 
to designate rituals performed at specific occasions (such as commemorating the dead) 
led by Hui clerics (not necessarily a Sufi murshid or a reyisi), is a direct transliteration of 
the Arabic word ‘amal, whose literal meaning is “to do.” For Sufi Hui across different 
menhuans, a ritual is first and foremost something that is “done,” practiced with bodily 
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movements and vocal recitations. The very materiality of the acts (the voice of dhikr, the 
movement of the head following the rhythm of the recitation, kneeling down while 
keeping one’s torso upright, sitting on one’s legs and closing one’s feet at the back, etc.) 
is an integral component of these ermaili, and “to do” is simultaneously to train oneself 
into the habitus of a Sufi. Even while driving, Yiming would chant “Allahamdu lilliahi” 
while raising one of his hands as if dropping a stone in the wooden box in order to 
demonstrate to me how the repetitive practice of Panchi Shanpan for the past thirty years 
had inscribed in his bodily disposition a habitus that hardly needs conscious manipulation: 
“You watched it so many times, and you heard the vocal recitations almost from the day 
you began to have memory. You don’t need to memorize – it just comes to you. You 
learn it simply because it’s been with you since time immemorial and it is melted in your 
blood.” 
Both Xiaohe and Yiming emphasized the importance of accurate ritual practice as 
proof of the authenticity of Banqiao. But their remarks are not on any ritual – their 
emphasis is on a particular kind of ritual typified by Panchi Shanpan that could be 
performed only with the power – either direct or delegated – of a murshid. It is not 
entirely a question of how demanding proceduralism and the exertion of laborious effort 
in ritual performance justify one’s religious superiority. The performance of Panchi 
Shanpan refers directly to the presence of murshid himself, even though this presence is 
often mediated by his sanctioned local representative standing in for him only partially 
and temporarily. The ritual is null and does not produce any effect – in fact, it might even 
invite divine punishment for infelicitous usurpation when it is not led by a murshid or his 
recognized agent.  
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Those who are in the “door” of Maqiao menhuan do not deny that the absence of a 
murshid has essentially disqualified them from continuing to practice certain key rituals 
(not all of them) that give to Jahriyya a distinct identity. But to them, it is precisely this 
lack that constitutes a mark that paradoxically proves their authenticity in contrast to 
Banqiao. Xiaoyi, a young Jahriyya in his 30s with a college education in Beijing and born 
into a prominent Maqiao family with close affinal ties with the two consecutive 
“doorkeepers,” did not hide his ridicule of Ma Guoqan in our conversation: “People now 
call him Ma Guo‘qian’ (“money”). If someone wants him to preside over a familial ritual, 
several thousand RMB is the minimum price. It could reach as high as tens of thousands.” 
Refusing to accept him as a murshid, Xiaoyi insisted that it was only when one did nottry 
to artificially extend the line of murshid for one’s own benefit (for him as for other 
Maqiao followers, the 8th generation had already ended, and Ma Guoquan’s status was 
merely brought about by arbitrarily accepting some urshids in the genealogy while 
rejecting others, so as to land him squarely in the position of the 8th murshid) and 
willfully accept the absolute termination of sainthood that one is a true Jahriyya. For him, 
it is not filling the void left behind by the murshid as much as actively preventing its re-
occupation that constitutes the touchstone that can test the authenticity of one’s faith.31 
Sainthood is not and cannot be subject to human intervention, and perhaps unsurprisingly, 
this Jahriyya dictum acquires its concrete force in interpellating subjects precisely when 
the prognosticated time limit is rigidly obeyed. For Maqiao, the lack of a named and 
                                                   
31 As a matter of fact, neither can Maqiao be completely exempt from the critique Xiaoyi is here waging 
against Banqiao. Ma Tong, a leading expert on Sufism in northwest China, has argued, for instance, that 
even Ma Zhenwu, the last murshid of Maqiao, should not have been the last and the Ja riyya sainthood 
should have sealed after Ma Yuanzhang (Shagou Papa) (Ma, 2000b, pp. 319-20). However, he gives no 
reason for this and merely says that “those who knew” said so.  
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visible murshid and his replacement by a “doorkeeper” does not reduc  the power of 
murshid-hood as much as transforms and sublimates it.  
Quoting Daba (“the big father”) who was the oldest son of the last “doorkeeper” Ma 
Liesun, Xiaoyi extended this view of sainthood to the question of the miraculous power 
many Sufi followers consider to be possessed by murshids: “Daba said all miracles are 
the work of Allah, and murshids are merely the mediation, the agents through whom 
Allah intervenes in this world. They are the hands of Allah, not vice versa. If a murshid 
can unfailingly conjure miracles of his own will, then what’s the difference between 
Islam and magic? And who is the servant, who the Lord? Are you making Allah serve 
you? Daba said whenever you see someone amassing a b g following by demonstrating 
his ability in producing miracles, then you know that e is definitely a fake.” After a short 
pause, he continued, “Jahriyya does not want a big following. In fact, Daba said we are 
now cutting people out instead of inviting people in. Faith is not easy, and people can 
seek comfort elsewhere. ” 
Obviously, not all Maqiao Jahriyya Hui could or are willing to inhabit the world 
instituted by the aporetic logic that sublimates the absence of a named saint into the 
general rule of anonymous sainthood itself. And the suspicious attitude to miracles – the 
latter being the very condition for “worshipping” the murshid to many ordinary rural 
Jahriyya followers – might indeed have pushed some away: the critique of miraculous 
power could be read against its advocate and the suspicion could be seen as an excuse for 
one’s inability to perform any miracle due to the loss of sainthood. “Daba does not want 
to debate,” Xiaoyi told me after I put to him the above thought which I heard among the 
Banqiao followers,  
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If you engage them in a debate, you have already lost. You cannot beat 
them, and you will necessarily be tripped up by their logic. Daba refuses 
to speak to them. Jahriyya does not speak. We are cutting people out. 
“You can follow whomever you want,” Daba often says, “My followers 
will not leave me, and those who leave me are not my followers.” 
In contrast to the proliferation among some Banqiao followers of discourses that 
emphasize ritual minutiae as a way to demonstrate the authenticity and continuity of their 
Dao, both Xiaoyi and Daba assume a position that resists speaking. This insistence on 
silence is not seen as an evasive compromise as much as required precisely by the 
internal logic of faith itself. The possibility of miracle is not ruled out as much as re-
located in a space marked by a radical unpredictability that in fact restores to God and to 
the murshid as the “secret friend” and faithful servant of God a form of sacredness lost in 
“magical” manipulations. We should take note of a critical logic of recognition at work in 
this sublimation of sainthood: according to Daba, a murshid does not and never should 
(or could) demonstrate his sainthood by performing fantastic miracles. A murshid is a 
murshid, and one either believes or does not believe: “My followers will not leave me, 
and those who leave me are not my followers.” He stands out as a test – those who follow 
him only for who he is or what he stands for instead of what he actually does or can do 
are not granting their recognition to a concrete person with essentially charismatic power 
(as it might not surprise anyone, most murshids – but not all “doorkeepers” – do have 
charisma accrued to them). To accept unconditionally a certain figure as the murshid 
simply because he is the murshid and to treat seriously this apparent tautology as an 
essential component of the Sufi mystic teaching is precisely to realize the ultimate rule of 
an abstract sainthood. 
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A story which was recounted to me for multiple times by Sufi followers, both of 
Jahriyya and other menhuans, condenses this lesson into a beautiful parable: it was said 
that once there was a Sufi who, in his enraptured state after long meditation in a cave, 
hastened through the busy market, holding a burning torch in one hand and a bucket of 
water in another. When stopped and questioned by the bewildered onlookers on why he 
held these two objects in his hands, he replied, “Both Heaven and Hell are fantasies. I use 
the torch to burn down the Heaven and the water to pu  out the fire in Hell.” Perhaps 
bordering upon apostasy in the eyes of those for whom both Heaven and Hell are actual 
existences created and maintained by the infallible God as indispensible places for 
distributing rewards and punishments in the hereafter, the Sufi in the parable drives a 
hole in the world precisely with his unconditional f ith – his gaze is fixed exclusively on 
God which remains and must remain essentially inaccessible. Both Heaven and Hell, one 
as the place where the faithful will be awarded while the other as the site where the 
disobeying will receive their due punishment, make God accessible and God’s will at 
least partially predictable. To this legendary Sufi whose story is still being narrated and 
pondered and its “secret meaning” still pursued with passion, true faith is ultimately 
impossible without denying the faithful any access to the knowledge of salvation, and he 
will not be saved until he has completely extricated himself from the language of 
redemption. He does not speak – he even refuses to speak. The Sufi in the story does not 
explain to others why he wants to burn down the Heaven and quells the fire in Hell. He 
simply says he is going to. Perhaps to him as much as to Daba, his followers will not 




Materiality of Faith 
The gendered genealogy of sainthood is not merely printed on paper and narrated in 
oral recollections. It is, more specifically, bodie forth by the concrete existence of 
gongbeis and daotangs. The memory of a Sufi is anchored in these significant sites and 
externalized by their consistent endurance of the wear and tear of time. To maintain the 
work of memory is simultaneously to attend to their demands for regular repair and at 
times complete reconstruction after devastating geolo ical catastrophe (such as an 
earthquake). The upkeep of these highly important sites is sustained primarily by the 
voluntary donations contributed by menhuan followers. In order to understand how these 
donations are collected and distributed and to have an idea of the specific constitution of 
these donations (not all of which are in monetary forms), we need to briefly discuss the 
historical and contemporary organizations of menhuan economy. The shifts in this 
economy directly influence the frequency and quality of the repair work and put much 
pressure on the concrete organizational form of a menhuan.   
Before the 1950s, most menhuans possessed its land and the amount varied according 
to the size and influence of the respective m nhuan. These lands were often purchased by 
the close entourage of the murshid who thus transformed the tribute of the followers into 
landed property seen to be owned only by the murshid as the embodiment of the 
menhuan as a whole. The murshid, though in principle wielding the highest authority – 
both religious and secular – in a menhuan, did not manage these properties on his own 
but was helped by a team of councilors who were also hi  closest disciples. These lands 
were rented out in most cases to followers of one’s own menhuan and the tenants paid the 
rent on an annual basis as a separate payment completely distinguished from both their 
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voluntary donation (sadaqah) and alms-tax (zakat), with the menhuan again being the 
sole receiver of both. Even those who were not in arel tionship of tenancy with their 
menhuan often had to contribute their labor service in the variety of daily family chores if 
they happened to live (as many did and preferred to) close to the residence of the murshid. 
These jobs, perhaps unsurprisingly, were almost exclusively distributed to female 
followers. Xiaoyi’s mother, for instance, used to provide regular laundry service for the 
family of Ma Liesun (“the Second Papa of Yinchuan,” the first “doorkeeper” of Jahriyya 
Maqiao after the passing of its last murshid Ma Zhenwu) and she worked under the 
directorship of a certain “Laundry Nana” (Xiyi Nainai) until the state-imposed communist 
collectivization set in in late 1950s that completely transformed the mode of production 
and form of organization that Jahriyya Maqiao had maintained since late imperial days. 
According to a record, after the execution of the Tirteenth Papa in 1871, the Qing troops 
confiscated over 190,000 tales of silver, but shortly afterwards during the reign of Shagou 
Papa, Maqiao regained its economic power in a remarkable pace: by early 20th century, it 
possessed over 160,000 mu (≈26,358 acres) of fertile land, a pasture of over 100,0 0 mu 
(≈16,474 acres), about 10,000 mu (≈1647 acres) of forest, 1200 cattle, over 12,000 goats 
and about 600 horses, mules and camels. The number of its total tenants reached as many 
as 300 at a time and the annual rent in kind as high as 300,000 jin (150,000 kilograms) of 
wheat (Ma, 2000b, pp. 328; 1991, pp. 104). Maqiao als engaged in trans-local business 
activities, and the wide distribution of Jahriyya followers only conduced to the expansion 
of its vast business network. Not only were camels used for transportation, they were 
increasingly displaced by modern vehicles such as trucks. Shagou Papa was able to 
command an immense business empire whose outposts reached as far as Shanghai, 
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Tianjin, Lanzhou, and Baotou, amassing a huge amount f wealth as the firm economic 
basis for maintaining the existence of Jahriyya Maqiao menhuan.   
This well-organized and self-sustaining economic system was dismantled almost 
overnight in late 1950s by the communist state thatprofessed to carry the message of 
land reform to the peasant followers of menhuan. The economic power of Maqiao never 
recovered, and the small amount of land it now possesses (at most several hundred mu,
and much of this land is not as fertile as what it used to own) is only leased to three or 
four Jahriyya households who recently moved from the mountainous area to the northern 
Ningxia plain where the central daotang of Maqiao is located. With the loss of a stable 
source of income previously offered by the business nterprise it controlled, the 
“doorkeepers” of Maqiao could only depend upon the haidiye (hadīa, “gift”) contributed 
by its followers on a purely voluntary basis. Compared to its past affluence, Maqiao 
menhuan is now much less able to subject its followers to its almost all-encompassing 
governance buttressed by its unification of religious and socio-economic power. The 
upkeep of gongbeis and daotangs has not completely lost its regularity, but the current 
“doorkeeper” of Maqiao (Ma Jie, or “Sanba,” the third son of Ma Liesun) has to plan 
ahead and use the tributes wisely and thriftily so a  not to overpay his balance. The 
dissolution of an organic economic relationship that more concretely binds the followers 
to the menhuan only reinforces the importance of the religious connection in continuing 
to maintain its organizational solidary, and perhaps unprecedentedly, the menhuan itself 
begins to depend almost exclusively upon the ad hoc voluntary donations of its followers 
in sustaining its own existence.  
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I have already noted that not all contemporary haidiye contributed by menhuan 
followers are in monetary terms. Many in fact choose to make their contribution in kind. 
Instead of cash, they often donate large quantities of oil and flour (to a lesser degree meat, 
fresh vegetables and dairy products) to the menhuan mosques and aotangs, which, save 
the amount they consume, would often transport these donations to the central daotang 
where there might be a larger demand. That oil and flour are the two most popular items 
for haidiye has directly to do with their functions associated with ritual performances. 
Almost every ritual – either those grand commemorati n rituals involving a large number 
of menhuan followers or annual familial rituals commemorating deceased relatives – is 
followed by a communal meal. Youxiang, a kind of fried pancake used invariably as the 
staple food eaten with mutton or beef stock on ritual occasions, is an indispensable 
component of the Hui cuisine and the two major ingredients of it are precisely oil and 
flour. Although the use of youxiang for communal meal is not confined to Sufi menhuan 
and has become – at least to my ethnographic knowledge – a culinary marker of Hui 
Islamic ritual in general, it is framed in different terms according to different Hui Islamic 
traditions. One major character that distinguishes t  making of youxiang in menhuan is 
the latter’s much stricter stipulations as to what specific ritual steps one needs to follow 
in order to make youxiangs that could meet the religiously mediated demands of the 
communal meal. In addition to cleansing oneself completely before touching the utensils 
and the ingredients (ghusl, or the “full ablution,” in contrast to wuḍū, the “partial 
ablution,” performed before every of the five daily prayers), every subsequent step is 
framed by recitations of particular Quranic verses (or, as is more often the case, sections 
of them) and other commonly used expressions in the praise of Allah and the Prophet. 
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Different menhuan may choose different verses or sections of them and may also break 
up extant verses and re-mix them in particular ways. Some might even choose to use non-
Quranic verses extracted from their own textual sources or pre-designated by their own 
murshids for the specific purpose of making youxiang. These recitations elevate the 
youxiangs thus made above the mundane world of daily consumption and render them 
into “clean” food qualified to fulfill the function of being consumed after a ritual 
performance.  
I will say more on youxiang in a moment. But it is its inscription in the economic 
system of contemporary menhuan that I now focus upon. The specific material nature of 
the haidiye in kind determines that the food items contributed could be used largely (not 
exclusively, since they can also be objects for daily consumption) only for communal 
consumption after collective rituals, and seldom do the central daotangs where these 
rituals often take place exchange the donated food r cash on the market. More often 
than not, these food items, though usually of an enormous amount especially before 
significant dates, could hardly meet the huge demand for communal consumption, since 
most collective rituals at central daotangs could draw in an immense number of followers 
that could be anywhere from several to tens or even hundreds of thousands. This further 
limits the amount of cash that could be put to use by the menhuan murshids and 
doorkeepers. This certainly does not mean that mostenhuans are currently on the verge 
of bankruptcy – which is far from the case, and it is in fact not uncommon for Jahriyya 
Maqiao, for instance, to have an annual cash income f one or two million exclusively as 
a result of the haidiye contribution from its followers.  What I do want to emphasize at 
this point, however, is that the disintegration of the old economic mode by which 
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menhuans had sustained their existence for centuries up until late 1950s has rendered 
them more dependent upon the voluntary donations of their followers and made their 
economic maintenance more uncertain and vulnerable to the general socio-economic 
changes that may cause difficulties to their predominantly rural followers (the prevalence 
of haidiye in kind must also be situated squarely in this rural context – though Ningxia 
and northwest China in general are not exempt from the state-imposed rapid urbanization 
since 1990s). The regular upkeep of the material markers of the saintly genealogy is 
subject to this regime of economic uncertainty and fi ancial fluctuation. 
But gongbeis and daotangs are not the only material objects that substantiate the 
gendered genealogy of a Sufi menhuan. Perishable foods, when framed in ritual terms 
and located within a ritual or ritually mediated space, could also – certainly to a lesser 
degree due precisely to their perishable character – fulfill the function of instituting the 
formation of a Sufi lifeworld. Youxiang, the indispensible component of any Hui cuisine 
that accompanies a Hui Islamic ritual performance, is particularly significant in this 
respect. In one familial ritual which I participated in Tianjin that commemorated a 
recently deceased relative, the hot air bump on the dough as it was inflated when fried in 
the boiling oil was interpreted as a sign of the happiness of the dead. “See how she 
smiles!” I was told by the woman who was turning the dough upside down to even out 
the heat. The aura of youxiang increases as one moves away from the confined context of 
a family to the larger world of collective rituals that can be performed only in central 
daotangs of a menhuan. After each Panchi Shanpan held every Wednesday night at 
Banqiao daotang in Wuzhong, not only are youxiangs consumed on the spot with fentang 
(a kind of mutton broth made from the goats slain particularly for the weekly ritual 
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[which is why Banqiao daotang, like most other daotangs, still keeps a flock large 
enough to accommodate this regular ritual need], with potatoes, tomatoes, carrots, and 
firm soy jellies put in to add to its texture), they are also distributed among the 
participants in packs that also contain chunks of boiled mutton seasoned with peppercorn 
and anise star. This sharing beyond the ritual context confined within the actual environ 
of the daotang is an internal part of the communal sociality conjured by the collective 
rituals. It is often described as an act of zhanji, or “sharing the auspiciousness,” implying 
that those who have not participated in the actual ritual but who have consumed these 
youxiangs and mutton in part consecrated by the ritual performances for which they are 
prepared according to established procedures will also have accrued to them the 
exceptional mercy and blessing of God resulting from the correct performance of the 
ritual. One has to consume these foods before they spoil and with a pious heart. Even 
those “lapsed Muslims” who might not obey the Islamic restriction on the consumption 
of alcohol in their daily life would not risk eating these youxiangs and mutton with liquor.  
There is an additional use of youxiang which perhaps shows in the most convincing 
way the partially sacred character (not for all, and to different extent for those Hui who 
accept its sacredness) of this apparently mundane food made with the simple ingredients 
of oil and flour. Many rural menhuan followers would dehydrate the youxiangs given 
them after major commemoration rituals at the central daotang and grind them into fine 
powder with a small family mill used for food preparation. When sickness hits someone 
in the family, some of these powders will be sprinkled in a glass of water to make the 
latter into an elixir thought to possess an extraordinary healing power. The 
“auspiciousness” of the ritual is seen to be preserved by the granular particles into which 
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the youxiangs have been physically dissolved, and the abstract s intly genealogy now 
functions precisely through the minutest grain of fl ur. To a certain extent, what one 
previously contributed to the daotang (the haidiye in kind) is transformed and 
consecrated by the collective ritual practice and then returned to oneself with this extra 
magical power that saturates every single particle of the ground youxiangs. It is as if one 
could not fully absorb the “auspiciousness” unless the youxiangs are fully broken down 
into the smallest pieces possible whose charm could then be magnified by being liquefied 
in water. 
Youxiang, though perhaps one of the most significant food items with ritual 
significance in Hui Islam, is nonetheless not the only substance whose powdered form is 
given such magical value. Ashes from incenses burnt in major rituals are also seen to be 
able to fulfill a similar function. Yiming, the young Jahriyya imam who were eager to 
prove to me the authenticity of Banqian’s daotong by demonstrating to me its insistence 
on ritual minutiae, also had a particular liking for these ashes. During my first visit to 
Banqiao daotang, Yiming insisted that all the incense bowls he showed me that were 
placed on the table around which the dayi’er sat were precious historical relics (guwu) 
that bodied forth the long continuity of Banqiao Jahriyya, although, as it soon became 
clear to me and somehow to his embarrassment, some of th m were manufactured merely 
a decade ago in local workshops. “But all the rest are old stuff,” he winked and put down 
the one on whose bottom was the mark of its recent fabrication. There were three bowls 
placed on the long table around which the dayi’er would sit. The big one in the middle 
was flanked by a smaller one on each side. These bowls play different roles in the course 
of ritual performance: a thick incense would be planted in the major one in the middle, 
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signifying, according to Yiming “either Allah or the Prophet, or perhaps the murshid” 
and the two thin incenses planted in each of the two minor bowls signifies “either the four 
angels of Islam or the four Caliphs who assisted the Prophet, or perhaps the r yisis 
appointed by the murshid.” Yiming was not sure of the exact meaning of these incenses 
and neither did he think that it was important to have a fixed meaning – “you can read 
whatever you like into it.” Compared to his insistenc  upon ritual details, his 
interpretations of them were surprisingly lacking i coherency and this insufficiency did 
not seem to bother him as much as it did me, who was trying, largely in vain, to press him 
and his colleagues (e.g. Laoma at the beginning of this chapter, who was a close friend of 
Yiming) to give me coherent explanations on every ritual practice they were engaged in. 
The fetish of historical continuity moved quickly from the bowls to the ashes 
contained in them. The major bowl, made from pure copper “darkened because of years 
of use,” was filled with fine grit of incense ash stacked up into a white heap evened out at 
its top to prevent an avalanche as more ash would fall from the thick incense to be burnt 
in future rituals. A small box that contained bits of chopped wood was placed right next 
to the bowl. “When the incense burns down to its bottom [i.e. when the ritual reaches a 
particular stage], we will bury it in the ashes. Wecall this fenghuo (“sealing the fire”). To 
keep it burning, we will insert some of these wood pieces into the mound, and the fire 
would burn calmly, hidden under the ashes.” After a short pause as if pondering the 
meaning of this “sealing,” Yiming proceeded, again to offer an explanation which he did 
not claim to be authoritative: “Perhaps this is an indication that Jahriyya does not attempt 
to reveal the truth to broad daylight. Perhaps truth exists only in secret. During our 
weekly rituals, we also shut the drapes at particular moments – maybe that follows the 
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same logic. Think about that.” But as always, Yiming did not dwell for too long on 
interpretation. He rather moved on to tell me how he once yaxianghui (“pressed the ash”) 
for the “exquisite bowl” that belonged to Ma Guoquan (“Papa of Present Times,” the 
current murshid of Banqiao Jahriyya) after a familial ritual conducted in the latter’s home. 
“Not everyone could do this,” Yiming did not hide his pride,  
The ashes are from years of accumulation, from countless ermaili. You have to 
be very careful, especially with your breath. It is al o a form of training that one 
has to go through, and it is obviously a rare chance that you can be allowed to 
yaxianghui for a murshid. I still remember that I made it into a beautiful heap – 
not a single grit dropped from the pile. Quan Papa was glad. In fact, many 
Jahriyya followers would sprinkle incense ashes in water, and drink the water to 
heal their sickness. I haven’t tried it, but I know people who do that. They say it’s 
effective. 
Yiming did not deny the efficacy of the ashes, but neither, it seems, did he completely 
believe in it. But these ashes nonetheless matter to him as a Jahriyya disciple in at least 
two ways: on the one hand, yaxianghui is seen as an intrinsic component of the training a 
Sufi has to go through. The specific material condition of the ashes makes this task 
particularly demanding, and one has to remain calm nd stable, controlling both the 
minute movement of one’s hands and the rhythm and strength of one’s breath. Patience in 
this case is not merely a spiritual virtue learned through meditation, but a bodily 
disposition that can only be produced through performing subtle tasks such as yaxianghui. 
The “beauty” of the heap is a material expression of the “beauty” of Yiming’s own Dao. 
On the other, the ashes, precisely because their quantity has reached such a level as to 
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require “pressing,” is turned into a metonym of thecontinuity of ritual performances 
which themselves are the material substantiations of the defining saintly genealogy that 
marks a menhuan. The accumulated remains are not made to refer to an external 
historical process of continuous ritual performance as much as they are seen as having to 
the contrary enfolded that very history into its most concrete material existence and 
compressed it into every single granule of its sabulous body. It’s not the ashes as much as 
history itself that one drinks. It is the saintly genealogy and its continuous substantiation 
that possesses the healing power desired by the Jahriyya followers. The fetish of the 
ashes in this case is the fetish of history. 
The articulation of materiality and history in a Sufi menhuan can at times entail 
surprising epiphanies for those who have not completely grasped its literality. Luojie, 
who was from a Qadiriyya family in the rural county of Tongxin in Ningxia (it is 
important to note at this point that I know few cases of individual conversions to Sufi 
menhuan – it is always a question of familial affiliation and kinship connections), spent 
much of her adult life away from home. Obtaining her undergraduate, master’s and 
eventually doctoral degrees in history from Beijing Normal University, she returned to 
Yinchuan, the provincial capital of Ningxia, to take up a job in Ningxia University of 
Medicine. She was much interested in the tradition of “Hui medicine” which, according 
to her, was a complex mixture of Arabian, Persian and Chinese medicine. Highly 
suspicious of the healing efficacy of incense ashes, she nonetheless proceeded to tell me 
an impressive experience of hers that pertained to the fetish of a different kind of 
powdered substance among her own order, namely, the dirt from the sacred gongbeis –  
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When I was small, whenever I got sick, my family would take some dirt, 
sprinkle them in water and let me drink it. They told me the dirt was from 
the gongbei of my great grandfather. Over the years, I took this for granted, 
but always thought that the dirt might come from a particular designated 
site in the gongbei – for instance, from upon the surface of his tombstone. 
Or, I even thought that this might be merely a metaphor, and the dirt I 
drank was not actual dirt, but perhaps something else altogether which has 
been called “dirt.” The powder might be from the plants that have grown 
in the vicinity of the gongbei, or it might have been made from other 
edible substances that may be related to the gongbei or to my great 
grandfather.  I thought there should have been some ritual procedures 
involved in making these powders. But no! One day when I was walking 
with my paternal uncle (bofu) past the gongbei, he told me to wait for him 
for a minute and he needed to “take some dirt.” I saw with my own eyes 
that he scraped some dirt just from the wall of the gongbei – I mean, 
literally, really, just dirt! I asked him, “Really? This is what I have been 
drinking since I was a kid? Just dirt, scraped off the wall?” “Of course. 
What did you think it was?” he replied as if I should have known all along. 
Luojie’s surprise comes from the apparent lack of ritual framing by means of which the 
“actual dirt” can metamorphosize into “magical substance” that can heal diseases. No 
specific procedures were followed on the spot and no spatial distinctions were made as to 
where the dirt should be extracted. She had thought that the “dirt” might still bear a 
character of edibility and might still thus qualify as a kind of “medicine” not 
fundamentally different from the herbs and spices often used in the Chinese medicinal 
world. Both the anticipation of ritual procedure and the assumption of edibility are efforts 
to frame the “dirt” in a way that could render it acceptable to the imaginary to which 
Luojie has been given, before that unexpected moment kicked in when she saw her uncle 
scraping dirt off the gongbei’s wall. For her, it is not the materiality of dirt as much as the 
sudden and unmediated manifestation of the literality in the articulation of materiality and 
sainthood that struck her in her face. The dirt, precisely because of its inedible material 
character and its supposed distance from the world of human consumption, does not 
merely “express” the sainthood of the interred Sufi master as much as imposes its 
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magical power upon the world in such a way as to induce amazement and epiphany. “Dirt” 
is just that, dirt – it is certainly already integrated into the Sufi world and has arguably 
already been transformed by being associated with the passed murshid. But this magical 
metamorphosis and its particular efficacy also presuppose that the specificity of its 
materiality is not reduced by this transformation: it is and must continue to remain “actual 
dirt” so that its magical efficacy can acquire its most fantastic power both in healing 
sickness and, perhaps more importantly, in producing precisely the kind of striking 
epiphany which gripped Luojie at that impressive moment.  
But the materiality of other sacred objects associated with sainthood might not be as 
so clear as we have seen with the powdered substance , and neither does the magical 
power in re-invigorating life always manifest itself in the healing of human ailments. 
Cash notes of various values – from 10 RMB, 20 RMB, to 50 RMB and occasionally 
even 100 RMB – are often (not always) handed out to all the participants after every 
menhuan collective ritual, and the actual amount given varies according to the 
importance of the ritual performed. Each participant receives only one bill, and the 
money is often prepared in advance by the daotang where these rituals take place. 
Because of this large and regular demand for currency notes of the same value, most of 
the paper bills distributed to the ritual participants are brand new and withdrawn all at 
once from the local bank, some even bearing consecutiv  serial numbers.  
It is not this commonplace act of sadaqah (“voluntary charity”) as much as the 
particular use to which this charitable money is usually put that I am interested in. Many 
rural menhuan followers would mix the money into the larger amount they have saved to 
purchase crop seeds – it is supposed that the money rec ived after the collective ritual 
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could give to the entire amount a special magical power which, when put into an 
exchange relationship, can be transferred to the seeds purchased, and condense into the 
latter an extraordinary fertility which could then tail a good harvest at the end of the 
agricultural cycle. The efficacy of this exchange hinges upon two indispensable 
conditions: first, it must be presumed that the magical power of the ritual note, confined 
in the material existence of the bill, is nonetheless contagious, and that the whole 
“amount” can be transformed by this particular compnent. On the one hand, 
quantification appears to be a necessary step so that the contagiousness of the ritual 
money can be magnified. No particular rituals (such as rubbing) – at least to my 
knowledge – are performed in order to literally pass the power of the ritual bill to other 
notes. It is not physical contiguity as much as quantification that seems to fulfill the 
function of amplifying the contagiousness of the ritual note. This specific inflection of the 
logic of sympathetic magic is rendered possible precisely because the object involved is a 
“special” kind of object whose exchange value almost c mpletely overruns its use-value. 
Quantification is not resisted as much as invited precisely to assist the realization of 
sympathetic magic. On the other, it is precisely because the paper money still possesses 
not so much a “use-value” as a concrete material bering that it can be made to carry the 
magical power endowed upon it by the ritual performances. A 10 RMB note given by the 
daotang must be distinguished from any other notes of the same value, despite the fact 
that they appear exactly the same to the anonymous market. This individualization 
necessarily presupposes that the specific materialiy of the ritual notes can become 
recognizable, and this recognition cannot be realizd unless one attends exactingly to the 
material details of the ritual notes. But it is also true that the visibility and thematization 
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of this materiality would not obtain except when it is re-situated in a ritual space and 
transformed by the ritual performances. The material be ring has to be structured in a 
particular ritual space in order for it to be recognized as such – one does not see the actual 
note as distinct from its exchange value up until the moment when it is given the magical 
power by the collective rituals. This dialectic of materiality and ritual transformation is 
the first condition one has to presume in order to understand the magical value of the 
ritual notes. 
The second condition requires us to pay more attention to the exchange relationship 
itself. The fertility of the ritual money does not manifest itself in the form of an increase 
in its exchange-value: a 50 RMB bill does not become a 100 RMB bill after ritual 
transformation. It is not, in other words, purely as money that ritual notes acquire their 
fertility. They cannot buy more seeds, as their exchange value remains unchanged after 
the ritual, and it is to the use-value of the seeds purchased that their magical power is 
accrued. The particular kind of exchange relationship t at thus emerges therefore bears a 
dual and perhaps transitional character that could in part be seen to speak to the living 
condition of many rural menhuan followers still leading a primarily agricultural life: on 
the one hand, exchange has practically become an indispensable and crucial component 
of life, to the point where one even has to purchase seeds on the market without being 
able to produce them from one’s own crops.32  On the other, however, a certain 
physiocratic imaginary still persists among these followers according to which nature 
continues to be seen as the source where economic value originates. Although they well 
                                                   
32 The seeds purchased have often been genetically modified and the crops that grow from them cannot 
produce fertile seeds. This agricultural technology has forced many Chinese peasants to buy their seeds 
from the market and has literally created the dependence of the peasants on market exchange. 
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know that their seeds cannot breed new seeds and have to be replaced by newly 
purchased seeds after their fertility is inevitably exhausted after the agricultural cycle, 
they nonetheless expect that the magical power thus transferred to them by the ritual 
notes can increase their limited fertility and eventually bring about a good harvest. 
By venturing a conjecture on the possible relationship between the magical power of 
ritual notes and the economic condition of menhuan followers, I do not mean to imply 
that we can find a direct correspondence between th two. I merely want to gesture to the 
possible direction in investigating the articulation f two economic logics (the economy 
of Sufi magical power and the economy of agricultural life in transition) which I cannot 
explore in this chapter (nor in this dissertation). My primary focus here is still on the 
symbolic and organizational conditions that give to a menhuan its relative solidarity that 
centers upon its murshid. The dual character of exchange manifested in the use of ritual 
bills in fact points to a more general Sufi logic that could also be observed at a different 
site, namely, the site of language. In addition to performing the five daily prayers 
following the designated schedule, a committed Sufi disciple often has to engage in 
highly personalized obligations. One such obligation – and the easier one compared to 
zuojing (“meditation,” often involving weeks or even months of seclusion devoted 
completely to praying and continuous remembrance of Allah, with a small amount of 
food and water) – is to recite niantou almost incessantly for one’s entire life. Niantous are 
short incantations that establish an exclusive connection between the murshid and his 
disciples on a purely individual basis. The specific content of a niantou could be a 
common expression used frequently in prayers or praises of Allah and the Prophet (e.g. 
Allahu Akbar, Allahamdu lilliahi, or even the Shahadah), or sections of a Quranic verses, 
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or any other words and sentences which the murshid prefers to pass on to his disciples. 
The critical point is that each disciple has taught him or her (female followers, noticeably, 
are not excluded – but they are confined to this highly personalized individual self-
cultivation and continue to be assigned a marginal position [not completely excluded] in 
male-centered collective rituals) a particular niantou by the murshid that belongs to him 
or her exclusively. No one else, except the disciple and the murshid (or his reyisi – 
niantou could also be taught by the delegates of murshid, in the same way that rituals can 
be conducted by his local representatives), knows the content of the niantou, and it is 
strictly forbidden that disciples reveal their niantous either among themselves or to the 
outside world. Verbal exchanges in this respect are invariably seen as gross violations 
that could seriously compromise the result of one’s cultivation and render oneself 
suspicious as to the sincerity of one’s intention. 
The exclusivity of niantou, however, is not based upon its content. It is completely 
possible that two disciples who know each other faily well share exactly the same 
niantou. The murshid might also distribute the same set of niantous to different disciples 
so there are always people who recite the same niantous. The individualization of niantou 
for each disciple is effected only by an imposed secrecy that strictly forbids 
communication. Although most disciples may know that is or her niantou is not unique 
in its content, it is nonetheless made unique by the exclusive line that binds him or her to 
the murshid. It is specifically him or her that recites, and the niantou, as an incantation 
shared with many others, is nonetheless subtracted from the world of language and 
rendered unique despite its content that can be appropriated by one’s fellow disciples. 
The murshid or his delegate also dictates when one should recite the niantou (e.g. at what 
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time during the day, whether before or after certain prayers), how many times one should 
recite it at each specific time point, how fast one should progress, and when it might be 
the time to add more obligations. Each disciple has his or her own schedule which may or 
may not be the same as those of others’. There doesn t exist – and must not exist 
according to the principle of secrecy – an established procedure or a written manual that 
outlines a general training process which can be applied indifferently to everyone.  
The prohibition against the publication of niantou is reinforced by another concern 
that cuts deep into the nature and function of it in he system of Sufi self-cultivation. 
Honglefu, the central daotang of Jahriyya Maqiao menhuan, located in the rural outskirts 
of the city of Qingtongxia in Ningxia, holds a training school of around 300 students. 
Many of these students have their home in Ningxia, while the rest come from as far as 
Gansu, Guizhou and Xinjiang Provinces. Both tuition and accommodation are free of 
charge – the funding comes exclusively from the donati  of Maqiao followers (the 
annual expense of this school, as I was told, is around two million RMB). The program 
lasts three years (though some students, especially those who want to devote themselves 
to the clerical job, choose to stay beyond the third year) and teaches basic Arabic, 
Quranic recitation and interpretation, Ḥadīth, Islamic jurisprudence, and classics that 
belong exclusively to the Jahriyya order. “But we ar  not taught niantou,” Marui, a 
student in his third-year with whom I shared the room on my visit, told me. “The old 
teachers here no long teach that.” Another student from Guizhou picked up where Marui 
dropped off. He then continued, 
They used to teach that to students, but now they have stopped. There are 
so many temptations (youhuo) in this world, and many students prefer to 
do something else than to be a real Sufi. If the teach rs continue to teach 
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niantou, what if the students cannot persevere in their rec tation according 
to the procedure laid down for them? To know the niantou without 
practicing the recitation is tantamount to sinning while knowing that one is 
committing sin. The teachers know we cannot do it, and we also know we 
are not ready for it. So they won’t teach, and we don’t want to learn. This 
is good for all of us: they won’t commit sin for teaching niantou to those 
who could not recite, and we won’t commit sin for learning what we 
cannot bear. 
“In Jahriyya,” another student in his fifth year kic ed in, “knowing and practicing are one 
and the same thing (zhixing heyi). You don’t really know until you can actually do it. If 
you cannot do it, then you knowledge is imperfect.” 
The actual act of recitation, therefore, is an intrinsic component of niantou. It both 
substantiates and individualizes niantou for the self-cultivation of a Sufi. A niantou 
remains in principle an anonymous text which is still appropriatable by anyone until the 
moment it is singularized by the silent recitation f a particular Sufi disciple, made 
unique by his or her own voice which could be heard only by him or herself. An un-
singularized niantou, i.e. one that is not incessantly recited and not given a particular life 
by one’s own irreplaceable voice, becomes at once the mark of one’s sin – and this 
sinning is irrevocable, since one can never again extricate oneself from the snare of 
“imperfect knowledge.” The subtraction of niantou from the general world of language in 
which open communication and anonymous appropriation reign supreme depends for its 
life essentially on the living voice of the reciting Sufi. The real test for a Sufi hinges 
precisely upon this tension between the anonymity of language and the singularity of 




Luojie was not always negative about her mother. In two stories which she gave me, 
her mother even figured as the wise protagonist. In he first one, her mother offered a 
convincing answer to a question which had befuddled her for a long time –  
The doorkeeper of our menhuan is a jerk. He spent liberally the money 
given him by the followers. I have myself seen with my own eyes how he 
spent 10,000 RMB in a department store just within one day. How could 
he do that? Many followers of our menhuan know this, but they still 
continue to pay tribute to him. I don’t understand. So I asked my mom. 
She said that she gave him money not because who he was or what he had 
done. She was not giving money to him. She was showing her respect and 
veneration to the history which he represented d spite himself. Whatever 
he did, that history remains unchanged. He was there to stand in for that 
history. Well, I think this makes sense. 
In the second story, it was again her mother who knew before she did – 
Once when I was at home, a neighbor dropped by for a visit. He was not a 
murshid, just a common follower. But he could zuojing for 120 days – this 
means his Dao is already pretty strong. One of my sister  boiled some 
water to make him tea. But the moment he drank it, he began to vomit and 
could not stop it. Eventually, he had to leave. My mom immediately 
started to blame my sister – the moment she saw him vo iting, she 
suddenly realized that my sister was having a period. She knew it must be 
it. Isn’t it uncanny? He just kept vomiting. He did not know my sister was 
bleeding, but he just could not stop vomiting! My mo  knew it all along. 
It is only when her mother is well integrated into the saintly genealogy and assumes a 
position in the masculinist world by speaking its gendered language that Luojie could 
give her a positive image, even when this language its lf is predicated upon a 
marginalization of woman. Luojie did not tell me what her sister said, whether she 
accepted her mother’s scolding, or if she also believ d it was her period that caused the 
mysterious vomiting. The woman speaks, but it is nonetheless a male voice that speaks 
through her.  
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In this chapter, I have studied the institution of sainthood (murshid-hood) and secrecy, 
paying specific attention to its various manifestations and expressions in the world of Hui 
Sufi menhuan. This predominantly rural world is different from the world of urban 
mosques in at least three ways: first, instead of being confined with a localized mosque 
constrained by state administrative regulations and turned into a certain segregated local 
autonomy closing in upon itself, the influence of a menhuan radiates across immense 
geographical distance and integrates an enormous number of followers into an imaginary 
structured by its saintly genealogy which, more concretely, is materialized by the 
gongbeis and daotangs that dot its trans-local landscape. Second, in contrast to an urban 
mosque managed primarily by a state-recognized secular institution (“the commission for 
the democratic management of the mosque”) which increasingly displaces both popular 
consensus and clerical power from their previously primal positions in the local mosque, 
both the religious and the secular authority of a Sufi menhuan still resides firmly in the 
hands of its murshid or doorkeeper, despite the fact that the incompetenc  – even 
corruption – of many of these leaders is not unbeknown to their followers. Their authority 
is only reinforced by the reserved recognition often granted them by the state in the form 
of largely nominal and honorary political posts in the local, provincial, or even national 
governments. Ma Guoquan, the current murshid of Jahriyya Banqiao menhuan, is a 
commissioner in the National CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference) and vice chair of the Ningxia CPPCC. Hong Yang (b. 1964), the 
extraordinary murshid of Hongmen menhuan which belongs to the general Khufiyya 
order, is also a vice chair of Ningxia CPPCC, in addition to other lower positions in 
Wuzhong and Tongxin. Both live in well-guarded luxurio s residential buildings where 
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high government officials and wealthy merchants concentrate. Third, contrary to an urban 
mosque where the open competition for the control of communal property triggers the 
emergence of a social space marked by public exposure and anxiously pursued 
transparency, the binding power of a Sufi menhuan hinges upon an actively maintained 
blockage of both seeing and knowing. This blockage is realized by systematically 
transforming what knowing is and how knowing can be accomplished.  
History is a critical component of a Sufi menhuan, either in the form of a substantive 
genealogy remembered and commemorated on an annual basis according to an 
established calendar, or in the form of an abstract and sublimated consciousness of 
history that does not necessarily concretize itself in any substantive memory. This history, 
as I have tried to show at various points in this chapter, is strongly masculinist, and the 
figure of the woman occasionally appears in this histor cal narrative merely to gesture to 
its exclusion. Even when some of these unnamed – and perhaps unnamable in this 
masculine imaginary – women are remembered (such as Xifu Taitai), they are 
remembered only through their “heroes” who are invariably male. Secrecy is not gender-
neutral, and neither is its organizational power in instituting a Sufi lifeworld. It is 
underwritten by sexual difference, and every grain of its powdered youxiang, incense 
ashes, and gongbei dirt narrates the marginalization and exclusion of w man upon which 







Servant of God: The Clerical World of Hui 
Islam 
 
A somewhat strange ritual is performed in almost every Hui funerary rite I 
participated in during my fieldwork in Henan and Ningxia. Those who happen to be 
present for the Janāza prayer often participate in the performance of this ritual by 
standing in a circle, and a Quran wrapped in cloth will be given by an imam and passed 
around, accompanied on each step by silent recitations of short Quranic verses, or – 
which is less common – by a Persian saying which means “I have taken this from you, 
and now I give it away,” recited also quietly by every participant who has laid hands on 
the Quran. This ritual, according to some imams I talked to, is a variation of another, in 
which it is not the Holy Quran as much as money that is passed around.  
The general rationale of the rite, according to the view shared unanimously by all 
imams whom I interviewed, is to make monetary donati s to the poor in the name of the 
deceased, in the hope that this charitable act performed in his or her stead can compensate 
for the prayers and fasts he or she missed in lifetime and by virtue of this compensation 
can earn him or her blessings from God in the Hereafter. This interpretation, however, 
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can hardly explain why the money, instead of being distributed directly to the poor, is 
passed around in a circle, recycled multiple times before being broken down for 
distribution (there’s no fixed amount to be passed an  distributed, and the sum each 
family is able and willing to contribute can vary widely, from tens of RMB to tens or 
even hundreds of thousands). Another explanation that goes further in this respect argues 
that because the number of the prayers and fasts many deceased Hui have missed in their 
lifetime is so immense that it is practically impossible – however rich his or her family 
might be – to make up with ordinary monetary contributions given directly to the needy. 
The money is passed around in order to “represent” (daibiao) that the contribution has 
reached a significant number of people and has beensubject to circulation by means of 
which its effect is magnified and its return in the afterlife maximized. That the ritual 
could remain felicitous despite the fact that the money passed around the circle is not 
spent and does not materialize into any concrete assist nce for the poor (and not all those 
who participate in the ritual qualify as “needy”) depends upon the acceptance of a basic 
Islamic doctrine by all participants and onlookers: that the real source, true generator, and 
only possessor of all wealth is God, and all humans in this world are merely temporary 
watchers who “look after” the wealth and who therefo  must pass on his or her riches to 
others because these riches don’t fundamentally belong to him or her. The ritual is a 
literal (perhaps too literal) rendition of this doctrine, a faithful (perhaps too faithful) 
performance of it in a confined and contracted space of a mosque.  
The literality of this ritual makes it an easy target for a variety of criticisms that all 
take issue with the tenability of the “passing on” of money as a way to increase the 
efficacy of the donation – whether, that is, the circulation of money on the spot, without 
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actually integrating the process of labor, exchange and consumption, can indeed be seen 
as a felicitous rendition of the Islamic doctrine on charity. But my interest is not in these 
dispersed disputes. The replacement of money by the Quran is an important inflection in 
the evolution of this ritual, and the reason I was often given for this somewhat surprising 
shift is in fact in line with its internal logic: that even the circulation of money cannot 
fulfill the function anticipated of it. There are simply too many prayers missed, too many 
fasts ignored, too much “work” (gongke) left undone, too much sin still awaiting 
repentance. Nothing can compensate for that – unless, as the very last means one could 
resort to, one replaces the money with the Quran, since “you cannot put a price on the 
Quran – it is a priceless treasure, a miracle from God,” said Imam Mai of Down Mosque 
in Zhengzhou. The immense gap that separates one from one’s atonement, the 
incommensurability between what one has done (or perha s what one could ever do) and 
what is required to be done for the attainment of salvation, prompts the use of the Quran, 
itself seen as a “priceless treasure” that can never be commensurably exchanged with any 
other worldly objects, the general equivalent included. The entry of the Holy Quran upon 
the scene is somewhat a desperate gesture, the culmination of an anxiety of not being able 
to bring to the dead the atonement so eagerly desired by his or her living family.  
Nonetheless, all these still could not prevent those imams involved in this ritual from 
being criticized for “selling out” the Quran, as “trading” the Islamic religion in exchange 
for eternal blessing. Both young Hui Muslim activists who acquire their knowledge on 
Islam from Internet reading and reform-minded Hui cleri s who have received their 
religious education from Islamic countries (the most vehement criticism comes from 
those who are trained in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) are among the most outspoken in 
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voicing their critique, and they often relate this ritual to another common practice that can 
be found in almost every Hui Islamic ritual, especially those commemorating the 
deceased that take place on an annual basis in most Hui families: the imams invited to 
perform the ritual and to recite the Quran are presented with monetary gifts (jingli , “the 
gift for the Quran”) and treated with exquisite banquets. The amount of the gift varies 
across different families, but the common amount is between 10-50 RMB for each 
participating imam. The critique focuses not upon the act of giving as much as upon the 
act of receiving, and it is not the contribution ofhaidiye (hadīa, “gift”) that is 
objectionable, but the routinization of this supposedly “voluntary” donation and its 
transformation into a normal and regular source of income for the clerics that are most 
severely denounced. “The Quran is given a price (mingma biaojia), and they recite it to 
get paid,” I was once told by a young Hui in Zhengzhou.  
This critique is made all the more convincing by the fact that indeed many imams 
who engage in this “relationship of exchange” are living in woeful economic conditions: 
they are poorly paid by the mosque commissions that hire them and the haidiye from 
ritual performance do constitute an important source of income that could help maintain a 
form of life otherwise unlivable. Those who wage criti isms either do not (care to) 
understand the economic condition of the imams (e.g. the young Hui activists whose sole 
concern is to “purify” Islam) or do not at all depend upon haidiye for their survival (the 
clerics with a foreign education often have international connections that can help them 
acquire foreign funding – this is particularly the case for those who come back from 
Saudi Arabia and are funded by the latter to spread W hhabism among the Hui). In the 
absence of such social institutional arrangements as w qf (an inalienable religious 
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endowment that in traditional Muslim majority societies supports the existence of a 
politically independent class of Islamic clerics and judges),33 the routinization of haidiye 
plays a crucial role in providing a relatively stable economic foundation for the existence 
of the Hui clerics, supplementing their often meager remuneration paid reluctantly by the 
local mosque commissions. To “purify” Islam in this context amounts to eliminating the 
material conditions for the continual existence of a large number of ground-level Hui 
imams (for very few are able to acquire external funding) and it might even pose a grave 
threat to the basic institutional survival of Hui Islam in the local social world – for what 
is a mosque without a cleric? The “purification,” when mediated by these institutional 
conditions, might well entail eradication. 
It is the complex institutional space in which Hui clerics are inextricably situated that 
I propose to study in this chapter. I start from discussing how Hui clerics are trained, and 
how both this training and the positions available aft r this training are exclusively male-
centered, in spite of the existence of the so-called “f male imams.” That women could 
take up clerical positions only within certain institutional contexts and that they are 
confined exclusively within these contexts and given names indexical of such 
confinement merely reinforces the masculinist imagin ry that structures the world of Hui 
clerical power. In contrast to the strong tendency of localization that can be observed in 
the mosques that hire them, Hui clerics are involved in a trans-local network 
characterized by continuous mobility, though some prominent and well established 
clerics might be able to stay at one mosque for a considerable period of time in their 
                                                   
33 For the mutual entanglement of the social institution of waqf and the Islamic legal system as relatively 
independent from political intervention, see Hallaq, 2009, pp. 25-221; 2005b, pp. 178-93; 2005a. For the 
conflicts between modern statehood and the form of social organization upon which the sharī’a is 
predicated, see Hallaq, 2013. 
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career (and this long sojourn is ridden with controve sies and confrontations, especially 
clashes with the localized “commission for the democratic management of the mosque” 
which I have studied in the first chapter). The mobile nature of the clerical position is 
institutionally determined by the specific position assigned to the clerical power in a 
mosque and by the network of personal relations the clerics have established in the course 
of their religious training. In the second section, therefore, I move on to unpack the 
mobile nature of the clerical position, focusing particularly upon why and how the Hui 
clerics move, whether they take their families while they are moving, how they sustain 
their livelihood in this incessant movement, for what social insurance and medical 
benefits – if any – they qualify as forms of protection against unpredictable adversities in 
life, and who pays for this critical financial support indispensable for the maintenance of 
a livable life. By way of conclusion, I circle back to the question of ritual performance 
and the ritual functions a Hui cleric often has to fulfill as a crucial component of his job 
obligation. I hope the reader can be more able to situate this ritual role of clerics within 
the general institutional space I have outlined in th s chapter.  
Training the Cleric 
Imam Zhu, one of the clerics working in Down Mosque in Zhengzhou, always 
insisted to me that “a mosque is nothing if it does not have its own school.” To him, “a 
mosque is defined by the kind of education it is able to offer.” But it is not always clear, 
however, what kind of education he was proposing and more specifically, who should be 
the students that he thought need to be educated and for what particular purpose. 
Although it is generally clear that he meant an “Islamic education,” a “religious education” 
distinguished from the “secular education” propagated by the Chinese state and taught in 
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the official public educational system, there are nonetheless at least two kinds of “Islamic 
education” which a mosque often offers and which are not always compatible in their 
competition to share faculty and economic resources. One kind, dubbed as jingtang 
jiaoyu (“scriptural hall education”), intends specifically to train Hui clerics and to provide 
a comprehensive education in Quranic recitation and interpretation, critical reading and 
analysis of Ḥadīth, the grammar and rhetoric of classical Arabic and classical Persian 
(with emphasis placed on Arabic)34, Islamic jurisprudence and a basic knowledge of the 
enormous corpus of legal commentaries in the Islamic tradition (primarily the Ḥanafī 
school, the dominant madhhad among the Hui). The second kind, much less professional 
and demanding, is more of a popular educational program that features recitation (instead 
of interpretation) of short and commonly used Quranic verses (such as Al-Ikhlāṣ, the 
112th and one of the most widely used suwar [plural of sūra] of the Quran) and accessible 
Chinese commentaries on Ḥadīth. Instead of systematically training a young student into 
a qualified and knowledgeable cleric able to presid over the variety of rituals that often 
take place in the context of a local mosque, the program for popular education intends to 
pass on to those who attend a basic knowledge of the Islamic religion and to build a local 
community of lay believers in the fang where the mosque is located. With completely 
different purposes and speaking to totally different people, these two types of education 
which often run parallel in a mosque nonetheless co-exist in a relationship of uneasy 
tension, with the training of clerics and the monopoly of specialized religious expertise 
                                                   
34 An important exception needs to be registered. According to Shui Jingjun, Hui Muslim women’s 
education and the training of female clerics put much emphasis on Persian religious texts: “All traditional 
textbooks for women’s education were in Persian, the most fundamental five of which were called 
nvrenjing (scriptures for women).” (Jaschok & Shui, 2000, pp. 87). See Jaschok & Shui, 2000, pp. 68-99; 
Jaschok, 2012. I will discuss more extensively the training of female clerics later in this chapter. 
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increasingly marginalized by the daily growing demand for the popularization of easily 
accessible and memorable knowledge of the Islamic tea hing.  
This marginalization acquires its vividness in a scenario which involved precisely 
Imam Zhu. Although Down Mosque still held at least four to five students in residence 
who would line up in front of the prayer hall to collectively perform the call for prayer at 
designated times, Imam Zhu still insisted that “there are no more students under training 
in Zhengzhou.” “Those you see,” he explained as I put to him the counter-evidence, “they 
will eventually leave this profession. They are here just for a temporary stay, and they are 
not motivated to learn. Many of those who graduated in the past several years have turned 
to a different path, and few remain to become a cleric. Everyone wants to make money, 
and it’s not worth staying in a mosque.” 
Before I had time to ask Zhu why those who had found other jobs upon graduation 
decided to receive clerical training in the first place, Laozhang, director of Down’s 
“commission for democratic management,” rushed in from outside and interrupted our 
conversation with his characteristically high-pitched voice, announcing that the form for 
the “annual self-check” (niandu zijian) had been distributed by the district bureau of 
religious affairs and must be filled in time and retu ned within three days. “Can you help 
us with this damn form?” Pleased to find me with Imam Zhu, Laozhang did not hesitate 
to ask me for a favor. 
In addition to the basic information such as name of the presiding cleric, number of 
houses owned by the mosque, annual income from rents and voluntary donations, and the 
specific street address of the mosque, the form also demanded detailed information on 
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every single one of the students who had studied or were then studying in the mosque for 
the past five years. Aside from name, age of entry, and years spent in Down, the form 
also asked for the hometown of each student, as most of them were in fact from outside 
Zhengzhou – some even from provinces other than Henan (one student, particularly, 
came from Liaoning Province in northeast China). Since clerical training was not 
considered to be a “normal” job and the Down commission, as a “civil organization” 
distinguished from a registered “employer,” was not qualified to provide legal 
sponsorship that could move the household registry (hukou) of the students from their 
hometowns to Zhengzhou, all outside students, just like their non-local teachers (Imam 
Zhu was not registered in Zhengzhou either), had to obtain a “certificate for temporary 
residence” (zanzhu zheng) from the Municipal Public Security Bureau. The “annual self-
check,” though prescribed primarily by the local bureau of religious affairs, nonetheless 
went beyond the “religious field” – the control of the movement of population and the 
surveillance of flows that might be seen as potentially disruptive to the “stable social 
order” painstakingly maintained by the local government were equally crucial 
components of this administratively imposed screening of sites for religious activities 
(zongjiao huodong changsuo). 
But it was hard to keep track of things, especially when, as Imam Zhu said, “there are 
no more students under training in Zhengzhou” and “everyone wants to make money.” 
“Can you remember how many we’ve had in the past five years?” Laozhang asked Zhu, 
but before waiting for the latter to reply, he continued, “I know Malin graduated last year, 
and there might have been another two…No, perhaps four…Is it four? Where are they 
now?” Imam Zhu remained silent.  
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“Perhaps they have taken up clerical positions somewhere?” I probed hesitantly. 
“No, I don’t think so. I don’t recall any of that.” Laozhang seemed pretty sure, “Malin 
is still dangling out there (zai waimian huang zhe ne). He still doesn’t have a job. I heard 
he wanted to continue his studies in Saudi Arabia. But he needs to find a job first. He 
spent three years here. But there are just too many students – there aren’t that many 
clerical openings. They just have to find some other job. Well, speaking of jobs, why 
don’t you get a job? Why are you here all the time?”  
Embarrassed by this unsolicited question and wary of having every time to remind 
him of my job as an anthropologist (in fact, his conflation of me with the students was 
indicative of how my work – talking to the imams, staying all day observing the daily 
happenings in the mosque, posing questions that were so obvious as not to deserve to be 
answered, etc. – fit into the local imaginary, and my age and interest made this conflation 
all the more smooth), I only said that I was still in a job search. To Laozhang, three years 
was a long time for Islamic training, especially for young students: “They could learn 
much faster than we old people do – it takes us a few weeks to memorize one or two 
verses, but they can do it in days. And we have to spend months to learn the Arabic 
alphabet, but it takes them merely one or two weeks. What’s the point of staying that 
long?”  
It is somewhat surprising to find two diametrically opposed views on such a central 
question within the apparently limited context of a local mosque and between two figures 
that know each other well and work closely on a daily basis. Contrary to Zhu’s 
pessimistic view that jingtang jiaoyu is in a state of stagnation and deterioration in the 
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face of alternative economic options, Laozhang insisted that three years – “too short” 
according to Zhu’s ideal standard – was still too lng, and the lack of clerical openings 
and the superfluity of graduates (instead of their shortage) demanded the latter assume a 
more positive attitude in seeking opportunities elsewhere beyond the pursuit of religious 
knowledge (which was precisely what Imam Zhu criticized). The insufficiency of clerical 
openings was a fact well acknowledged by both Laozhng and Imam Zhu, but it was the 
solution and the reason behind this solution that set hem apart and reveal the divergence 
in view entailed largely by the respective institutional position each occupies in the 
mosque. Note how Laozhang compared the students to “we the old people.” The point of 
comparison he found most salient was the memorization of commonly used Quranic 
verses and the mastery of basic Arabic alphabet. He did not mention the advanced work 
of interpretation and commentary on the textual subtleties of the Quran; neither was he 
concerned with the more demanding work in acquiring a firm knowledge of Arabic 
grammar and rhetoric, both crucial for a comprehensiv  clerical training and required 
especially for critically addressing jurisprudential questions. That three years is “too long” 
is an evaluation that can make sense only when this complex system of training is 
reduced completely to the framework of a popular education. For Laozhang, it seems, the 
only form of Islamic education imaginable, or at least worth working for, is the wide 
popularization of a basic understanding of Quran and  preliminary knowledge of the 
rules and methods of its recitation (not necessarily the whole Quran, and more often only 
its abridged selections). In order to understand how this point of view comes to be shared 
by him and many of his other fellow non-clerical Hui Muslims, and why there exists such 
a blatant disparity between this view and that represented by Imam Zhu, we need to 
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compare more carefully both the substantive content and the institutional conditions of 
jingtang jiaoyu with the popular educational program, both taking the local mosque as 
their major front but pulling it in essentially different – even opposed – directions. 
The emergence of jingtang jiaoyu is often located by scholars at a particularly 
significant juncture in the history of the Hui. It is said to have been established by Hu 
Dengzhou (1522-1597), a learned Hui Confucian scholar born in Shaanxi Province in late 
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), at a time when “there was a shortage of books [and] learned 
man were few and far between and the transmission and interpretation [of the texts] were 
not clear” (Ben-Dor Benite, 2005, pp. 41; see also Zhao, 1989). Well trained in 
Confucian classics and frustrated by his incapacity (like many of his fellow Hui) to read 
the Islamic classics written in Arabic and Persian, Hu travelled – according to popular 
historical narrative whose truthfulness could hardly be verified – to Mecca and Medina 
for a systematic religious training. The curriculum he formulated upon his return and 
which took the mosque as its primary location for development is divided into three parts 
each following the other as an advancement along the ladder of Islamic learning. The first 
phase, often dubbed qingzhen xiaoxue (“the elementary schooling of the pure and true 
[religion]”) 35, consists primarily of a basic education in Arabic alphabet, recitation of 
short Quranic verses (these recitations are not necessarily accompanied by interpretations, 
                                                   
35 The term qingzhen (“pure and true”) cuts across different religious traditions in China. Although it might 
have originated from Daoism, both Judaism and Islam in China have appropriated this word to designate 
their own religious tradition. A synagogue, for instance, used to be called a qingzhen si, exactly the same 
name as a mosque was and continues to be called in Chinese. Islam, in addition to being named “the Hui
religion” (huijiao) in the imperial period, was also called qingzhen jiao (“the pure and true 
teaching/religion”). It was only up until 1956 after the Communist Party assumed power that both huijiao 
and qingzhen jiao were officially abolished and replaced by the transliteration yisilan jiao, now accepted as 
the authoritative Chinese rendition of Islam (State Council, 1956). For a general overview of the Jewish 
diaspora in China, with a particular focus on Henan, see Xu, 2003. See Gladney, 1991pp. 7-15 for a brief
discussion on the significance of the word qingzhen among Hui Muslims. Instead of designating a religious 
tradition in general, qingzhen now becomes increasingly synonymous with halal among the Hui, 
particularly in reference to the Islamic dietary rest iction against the consumption of pork. 
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and the students might only have a vague idea of the general meanings of the verses 
recited – mechanical recitation instead of intellectual understanding takes center stage), 
and affirmation of one’s faith in the Oneness of God without, however, being taught the 
more advanced knowledge in tawḥīd. Two textbooks are most commonly used in this 
phase, and both are pamphlets complied by an enormous number of teachers whose 
names have over the years been consigned to oblivion: zaxue (“miscellaneous studies”), a 
collection of basic points that demonstrate succinctly the essence of the Islamic religion 
and the ritual details in performing daily prayers, and haitie (khātim, “conclusion”), a 
selection of 18 short and easily memorable verses at the end of the Quran, in addition to 
other commonly used verses such as Al-Fātiḥa. The time spent on this first phase ranges 
from one to three years, depending on the effort put in by the students.  
The second phase, qingzhen zhongxue (“the secondary schooling of the pure and true 
[religion]”), is de facto the inception of the systematic training that distinguishes jingtang 
jiaoyu from a popular Islamic education to which the primary schooling still in part 
belongs. The mark of this transformation is the teaching of suanlefu (ṣarf), the Arabic 
morphology in the constitution of words. In a twisted manner, however, this book was 
initially taught not in Chinese – which was already the native language spoken by the Hui 
at the time when Hu founded jingtang jiaoyu – but in Persian, due largely to the heavy 
influence of Persian migrants in the Chinese medieval era on the teaching and 
interpretation of Islam among the Hui. The difficulty in learning the basics of a new 
language (Arabic) by means of another no less unfamiliar language (Persia) made the 
study of suanlefu particularly demanding and forced many students to quit shortly after 
they entered the second phase. This linguistic barrier was gradually eliminated in the 
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1950s by reform-minded Hui imams who replaced Persia with Chinese as the dominant 
language in teaching Arabic morphology (Ding, 2006, pp. 52; 2012; Yu, 1986). The 
emphasis of the secondary schooling is on linguistic training, equipping the students with 
solid language skills (Arabic taking center stage, and Persian on the side as an ancillary 
assistance, increasingly marginalized in the curriclum especially due to Iran’s Shi’ism) 
required by advanced learning in the interpretation of Quran and legal commentaries. The 
third phase, qingzhen daxue (“the grand learning of the pure and true [religion]”), focuses 
upon Arabic rhetoric, the enormous corpus of legal commentaries that belong specifically 
to the Ḥanafī school, critical analysis and interpretation of Ḥadīth, Islamic theology, and 
Sufi classics.36 Although a core curriculum of thirteen books (shisan ben jing) are often 
prescribed for a complete clerical training, in actu l practice, each teacher might either 
subtract certain books or, as is more often the cas, incorporate works of his or her own 
choice. Advanced Quranic commentaries, such as T fsir al Kabir ("The Great 
Interpretation") by Muqatil ibn Sulayman and Tafsir ibn Kathir ("The Ibn Kathir 
Interpretation") by Ibn Kathir, are also used as indispensable references and occasionally 
textbooks treated with utter care and rigorous intellectual exercise. 
The higher one progresses in this three-tiered educational system, the more time one 
needs to spend in order to attain the goal of mastery, naturally for the reason that the 
further one approaches the top, the more difficult the materials one has to study. Not a 
single imam that I have known in my fieldwork – however bright and hard-working he 
                                                   
36 Certain Sufi classics, such as ‘Abd Rahman Jami’s Ashi’at Al-Lamā’at [Rays of the Flashes], are also 
taught and studied among self-avowedly non-Sufi Hui clerics. It is also critical to note that most of these 
works are written in Persian and continue to be studied in this language in contemporary mosque education, 
although, as I have mentioned previously, Persian is be ng increasingly peripheralized in this curriculum. 
For the influence of Sufi thought on key figures in Hui Islam in the late imperial period, see Murata e  al., 
2000, 2009; Frankel, 2011; Petersen, 2006, 2013, 2012. 
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might be – can finish this curriculum within five years, and some even argued, without 
hesitation, that one had to put in ten to fifteen yars in order to have a real idea of what 
jingtang jiaoyu actually taught, and this duration was only for those “who are smart 
enough.” Zhengfeng, a brilliant Hui born into a prestigious imam family in Gansu 
Province in northwest China, decided to turn to cleri al training upon graduation from the 
prestigious Peking University with a Bachelor’s degree in philosophy and religious 
studies. I knew him while I was in college (he was two years below me) and met him 
again when I was in Henan, when he was on a trip to visit his mother who was a female 
imam in a small mosque on the outskirts of Zhengzhou (more on the female imams later 
in this chapter). Already quite knowledgeable befor he embarked upon jingtang jiaoyu 
due primarily to his family education, Zhengfeng was in the phase of qingzheng zhongxue 
(“the secondary schooling”) after only one year’s study. “I have been working very hard 
in the past year,” he told me, “I got sick multiple times because of long hours of incessant 
working. An acute rash almost killed me once. The mosque where I studied was too 
humid, and my body was covered in sores. I tried to persist, but finally had to give in. I 
was in a coma and was hospitalized for weeks, before my family came and took me 
home.” He then proceeded to tell me about his aspirtion, 
I can already engage in in-depth discussions with learned imams, and the 
one year I spent is tantamount to three to four yeas for a regular student. 
But still, it will take a long time. There are so many books to read and to 
study carefully, and there are still many classics which I now do not 
understand. Some people think one can finish j ngtang jiaoyu in three 
years. They are dead wrong. It’s not a question of talent. You just need at 
least ten years, because that’s simply the minimum time for you to know 
all this stuff. It’s a matter of time. If you want to be a serious student and 
an eminent cleric, you have to put in that much time. There’s absolutely 
no shortcut (meiyou jiejing). 
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This view was shared by Imam Zhu, who insisted that “you have to be able to persevere – 
no one can shorten the journey.” But jingtang jiaoyu does not happen in a pure space of 
religious learning exempt from the complexity of con rete socio-economic institutional 
arrangements. Different from many traditional Muslim majority societies where a self-
sustaining system of social charity called waqf (an inalienable religious endowment) 
supports the existence of a politically independent (to different extents in accordance with 
different places and historical epochs) class of religious clerics, juris-consultants (muftī), 
and authoritative judges (qāḍī), mosques and their landed property have never been 
completely subject to the control of religious clerics among the Hui, despite that in pre-
Communist days, the Hui clerics in certain places did possess more power than their 
colleagues elsewhere. There certainly existed and co tinue to exist regional variations, 
and clerics in northwest China, at least according to my fieldwork, generally wield more 
power than their counterparts in eastern China. But H i imams have never been and 
continue not to be economically independent in their clerical position. As I have argued 
in the first chapter, mosques in contemporary China are legally prescribed to be the 
communal property of the fangs in which they are located. The localized “commission for 
the democratic management of the mosque,” staffed completely by local elders, de jure 
excludes the intervention of clerical power in deciing on the disposal of mosque 
property. How many students an imam could take on and what logistical condition he can 
be offered depend upon how much funding is allotted o him by the commission for 
whom he works. Since jingtang jiaoyu is free of charge and all student expenses – from 
food and lodging, to clothes and daily utilities – are covered by the grants assigned by the 
commission, both the clerical power and the training of the prospective clerics have to 
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succumb to the whim and stinginess of the local “trustees.” Although all students are 
provided basic sustenance, most students continue to d pend upon the funding of their 
own families for daily expenses that go beyond accomm dation. In some cases when the 
commission is particularly stingy due to the limited amount of income it could collect, it 
is the students who often have to suffer the gravest consequences (their teachers, on the 
other hand, are slightly better paid).  
Zhengfeng’s first teacher was an imam in the county of Minhe in Qinghai Province. 
“The imam was quite knowledgeable in the interpretation of the Holy Quran and was 
known for this in the clerical circle,” he told me, “so my family wanted him to lead me 
into jingtang jiaoyu.”  But the mosque where the imam served his term, however, was in 
abject economic condition and could hardly afford to provide him and his students with 
comfortable accommodation. “I ate tons of cabbage, nd almost forgot what meat tasted 
like.” Zhengfeng sighed, and then proceeded to describe what according to him was a 
“nightmare:” “They have eight huge water tanks. Befor  the winter came, we were given 
the money to buy cabbages. I mean, just cabbages. W bought as many as we can and 
spent all the money – which was not much. We then marinated the cabbages with salt, 
only salt – because that’s the only seasoning we had. Then we stuffed all the salted 
cabbages into the eight water tanks and pressed them with heavy rocks. We ate cabbages 
with steamed bread (mantou) for every meal every single day. And we had to calcul te 
carefully, since that’s all we had for the entire winter. If we ate up all the cabbages before 
spring came, I didn’t know what would happen.” He paused, and then continued, “Well, I 
fell sick when we were at the fourth, and I left befor  that one was emptied.” 
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Students are often closely watched by members of the commission, who seize every 
possible chance to blame them for improper behaviors such as indulgence in playing, 
liberal spending (such as buying a new cell phone with the money sent by their families), 
and most often, indolence and lack of interest in learning. Zhengfeng, because of his 
college degree from a renowned university and his family background, was well 
respected by the commission of the mosque where he studied. But most other students 
did not share this fortune. Coming predominantly from rural families (at least those I 
interviewed), most of them are in their mid-teens when they are sent for jingtang jiaoyu 
by their families (in contrast to Zhengfeng, who was in his early twenties when he began 
his clerical training). With merely a junior high diploma (many in fact have not even 
finished junior high school), they are often seen by the commission as “losers” and 
“drop-outs” who could not find other possible options than being set on a path to 
becoming a Hui cleric, which could at least earn them a living and might even provide 
them with a decent job if they could persist through the difficult years. A knowledgeable 
and well-connected imam still commands much respect, specially if his position is 
buttressed by a nominal political post such as representative in the local CPPCC (Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference). But stdents, only very few of whom could 
after years of struggling eventually land in one of those positions, are invariably looked 
upon with much suspicion and contempt. The training of the Hui clerics is indeed funded 
by the local commission on the income from the communal property possessed by the 
mosque, but this precarious endowment is ridden with reluctance and disdain. Even 
Zhengfeng was occasionally questioned in a contemptuous tone: “You have a college 
degree from Peking University. Why not find a real job?” 
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Women are not completely excluded from receiving cleri al education, and some can 
even become imams after rigorous training. Maria Jaschok and Shui Jingjun have 
documented and investigated a large number of women’s mosques and interviewed 
numerous female imams (“nv ahong” 37) primarily in Henan Province, which has a long 
tradition in developing women’s Islamic education. Most women’s mosques which I 
came across in my fieldwork bear one of two modes of relationship with the men’s 
mosques from which they initially split off: either they still keep a nominally dependent 
relationship with the latter (this dependence could at times take more concrete forms such 
as sharing a fraction of the latter’s annual budget), or they acquire complete 
independence by being registered with the local burea  of religious affairs and obtaining 
official recognition from the state as self-sustaining “sites for religious activities” 
(zongjiao huodong changsuo). Although a women’s mosque and a men’s mosque might 
share the same fang, the former could nonetheless apply to the local government for an 
independent status, seeking its “self-determination” on the basis of gender equality. Most 
women’s mosques, however, are short in funding. Practically sharing the same fangs with 
their male counterparts, they often do not possess as much property as the latter, for the 
simple reason that the strained resources of one local community could hardly support 
two mosques in equal measure and most donations are directed towards men’s mosques. 
Women’s mosques often evolved from women’s Islamic schools previously held in 
segregated quarters of men’s mosques, and this primary concentration on education that 
still remains dominant in contemporary women’s mosques relegates the latter to an 
                                                   
37 The Persian word ahong (or akhong, “the scholar”) is commonly used among the Hui to designate 
Islamic clerics. In contrast to imam which is occasionally reserved only for those who are actually 
employed by a mosque commission to lead prayers, ahong can be used more widely, without necessarily 
implying whether the one thus designated is indeed pr siding over a mosque. 
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obscure position that only partially qualifies as a re l “mosque” in the local patriarchal 
world. We need to be more careful as to how this partiality manifests itself and whether 
the women’s mosque, though apparently a sign of the improvement upon Muslim 
women’s status in the male-centered local Hui world, is nonetheless marked by 
fundamental insufficiencies that should make us pause before celebrating them as 
commendable instances of a more general Chinese Islamic feminist tradition awaiting 
excavation (Tatlow, 2012a; 2012b. I will discuss the question of gender in the epilogue.). 
What a female imam could do is not necessarily confined within the women’s 
mosque where she assumes her clerical position. It is not uncommon to see a female 
imam addressing a mixed audience consisting both of Hui men and women in a 
classroom provided by the men’s mosque. In the domain of popular Islamic education, 
segregation of gender is seldom observed either in the student body or in the employment 
of teachers. In contrast to this apparent gender-neutrality in the realm of education, the 
ritual space is strictly segregated along gender lines. A woman can pray in a men’s 
mosque and follow the lead of a male imam, standing behind all the males, separated 
from them by a heavy curtain and covered by a ḥijāb (niqāb, “the veil,” on the other hand, 
is rare), but a man is strictly forbidden from praying in a women’s mosque and following 
the instruction of a female imam in his daily observance of Islamic duties. On the one 
hand, it might appear that women are given more fredom and in addition to a religious 
space that belongs to them exclusively, they are also free to share a segregated quarter of 
the male space. The patriarchal structure upon which male authority is predicated 
paradoxically confines the spatial expanse of the masculinist world and assigns to the 
Muslim women a more protected and even privileged place in the distribution of religious 
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space. On the other, however, the picture shifts completely if we do not stop at marveling 
at the “independence” of the women’s mosque, however much a remarkable achievement 
it might appear to be. The “protected” space of the women’s mosque presupposes its utter 
irrelevance for the male-centered world – women’s mosques are not so much protected as 
ignored. The exclusivity of the female space does not necessarily mean the success of 
resistance or the firm establishment of a female standing within the masculinist world. 
This exclusivity could itself be a sign of its exclusion – independence does not 
necessarily bring about the transformation of the patriarchal world. It could equally mean 
separation and segregation – it does not change the male world as much as it retreats into 
its own isolation, closing in upon itself and rendered impertinent and negligible. 
A female imam can preside over daily prayers and the weekly Jumu’ah for her female 
followers within the small space of her own mosque. But she cannot – at least I haven’t 
known a single case that contradicts this proposition – lead other collective rituals that 
figure prominently in the life cycle of a Hui Muslim, either male or female. She is never 
invited to recite Quranic verses on annual familial rituals commemorating deceased 
relatives. Neither is she qualified to lead Janāza prayers, even when the departed is a 
woman. All communal rituals that take place outside the female religious space (– and all 
communal rituals, as a matter of fact, take place outside this space) are presided over 
exclusively by male clerics. Women are certainly not excluded from participating in these 
rituals (Janāza prayer, however, is exclusively male both in its leadership and in its 
participation), but women’s mosques are invariably devoted to the self-enclosed 
education of Hui women and the performance of highly personal religious duties. They 
exist materially side by side with the dominant masculinist world, but they remain 
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symbolically invisible to the latter, not to mention integrated into it in such a way as to 
fundamentally transform its structural organization. Once when I personally encountered 
a scenario when a few Hui women were engaged in a particularly heated dispute on the 
management of the women’s mosque that still partially depended upon Down Mosque for 
its daily maintenance, Imam Hai, a young male cleri of Down who witnessed this scene 
right by my side, smirked and whispered to me, “They are people of the women’s 
mosque.” Seeing that I still could not understand, he added, “You know [with a wink – as 
if I should have known all along, as if this is purely common sense], women’s mosques 
always have more trouble. (nvsi shi bijiao duo)”  
It is therefore a questionable stance in arguing that t e existence of women’s mosques 
in Zhengzhou (or in other places – for they also exist both in Yunnan and Ningxia, where 
I have encountered them in the fieldtrips) is necessarily conducive to the improvement 
upon Hui Muslim women’s status in the patriarchal world. Marginalization and exclusion 
could well entail a spatial domestication which precis ly requires the institution of a 
materially rooted space of confinement in which sexual difference is given a legible form 
which nonetheless is seen (suppose it is seen at all) not to deserve recognition. The 
critical point that I think we should pay attention to is not merely how Muslim women 
carve out a “space of their own” in the male-centered world, but whether their 
intervention can relocate them within the patriarchal world and whether this relocation 
can be structurally cathected in such a way as to induce a foundational restructuration of 
the libidinal economy that underwrites the organization of the masculinist world. 
Women’s mosques, given their contemporary self-enclosure and continual exclusion 
from the male-centered world, can hardly produce the necessary focalization that brings 
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sexual difference into the visible field and re-struc ures the symbolic of the Hui 
patriarchal world. 
The complex arrangement of jingtang jiaoyu, especially its demanding curriculum, is 
rarely the concern of the localized commission. They surely provide the minimum 
funding necessary for its normal operation, but they are not as worried about the training 
of prospective clerics as the disgruntled clerics themselves do, often complaining about 
the stinginess of the commission in their refusal to expand the budget distributed to 
jingtang jiaoyu. But in contrast to this lukewarm attitude to the raining of future clerics, 
the commission is much more passionate and generous in f nding popular educational 
programs. Every weekday after the Maghrib prayer, Down Mosque offers a one-hour 
class on Arabic alphabet and Quranic recitation. Every Thursday morning from 9 am to 
11 am, a longer class on the interpretation of Ḥadīth is provided for those who are 
interested. Other courses such as Arabic and Chinese calligraphy are also taught by 
prominent local calligraphers invited both by the cl ri s and by the well-connected 
members of the commission. Imam Mai, the leading cleric of Down, was particularly 
proud of these courses which he saw as laudable achievements unrivalled by other 
mosques: “People from as far as Hebei Province would ca l in and place orders on our 
textbook. They all want to learn from us.”  
Different from jingtang jiaoyu whose benefits accrue to the students who will sooner 
or later graduate or move to a different mosque and follow a different teacher for more 
advanced studies, a well-organized and multi-tiered popular educational program would 
benefit the ordinary Hui Muslims living in the fang and by virtue of this boost the 
popularity of the local commission. Fangs located close to each other often engage in an 
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undeclared competition, vying for prestige in spreading basic knowledge of Islam in their 
local communities. The primary goal is to produce a high degree of familiarity with zaxue 
and haitie among the general population in the local community. Those fangs that include 
a considerable number of Hui residents who could recite more Quranic verses beyond the 
commonly used 18 suwar are often looked upon with admiration and the commission that 
serves that fang is often commended for this remarkable accomplishment. Laozhang, the 
director of Down’s commission, could recite the whole Quran and was among the most 
avid supporters for expanding the current popular educational program of his mosque. 
Compared to jingtang jiaoyu, whose long cycle is necessitated by the complexity of its 
curriculum and which, moreover, only produces students such as Malin who “are still 
dangling out there” due to the lack of openings andthe excessive number of graduates, 
the positive effect of popular education is much more tangible and immediately 
perceptible to the commission. The costs of popular education are much lower, too. Only 
a classroom has to be provided, and no food and lodging are required.  
An important tendency gradually emerges out of thissharp contrast whose future 
ramifications might well transform the institutional existence of Hui Islam in the local 
world. The popularization of Islamic knowledge and the rise in religious consciousness in 
the local Hui population as a result of this spread of knowledge are predicated precisely 
upon the draining of economic and faculty resources from the training of religious clerics. 
Imam Mai of Down Mosque, for instance, was so busy teaching the popular courses as to 
have little time left to instruct his own students. Both rigorous Islamic scholarship and 
specialized religious expertise are increasingly displaced by the desire for the 
popularization of accessible knowledge simplified for easy memorization. “Perhaps after 
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a decade,” Imam Zhu once told me, “many ordinary Hui would have a higher level of 
Islamic knowledge, but where would you be able to find clerics? And what is a mosque 
without an imam?” It was not “the decline of Islam” – an obscure conception that could 
mean many different things – as much as the gradual dissolution of the most concrete and 
actual institutional existence of Hui Islam, i.e. the mosque and the clerics that staff it, that 
he was most concerned with. Below the surface of the vibrant popular Islamic education, 
he discerned a hidden danger that with the progression of time might seriously threaten 
the continual flourishing of Hui Islam in the local social world. The commission which 
hired him did not know, and neither did they seem to care. But seen from the position of a 
Hui cleric, Islam does not acquire its traction merely by clinging to people’s minds. It has 
to rely on robust institutional arrangements such as the mosque and the clerical institution 
for its continual existence and tenacity. To Imam Zhu, it is precisely these arrangements 
that are endangered by the rapid growth of popular education. 
Mobile Islam 
Few students of jingtang jiaoyu acquire their complete education only at one mosque 
and from only one teacher. More commonly, they travel vast distances in pursuit of 
knowledge, often with a recommendation from their old teachers who direct them to new 
places where they could find the mentor able to lead them further down the road. Imam 
Shui, who was the presiding cleric in a mosque in Hubei Province but whose home was 
in Luoyang, Henan Province, recounted to me his own experience in seeking out 
prominent religious scholars in his student years. “I travelled extensively in the 
Northwest when I was a student,” he said, “We had a team, me and several of my 
classmates from the mosque where I used to study. Each of us carried a bundle – all our 
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properties were in them. We were well treated at every mosque we visited, although – of 
course – there was a difference between the attitude of the imams and the attitude of the 
local people.” Then he proceeded to relate to me a particularly impressive scenario which 
continued to amaze him at the moment of our conversation, 
Once we visited an old imam in Qinghai. He was no longer leading a 
mosque, but continued to teach students. We had already heard that he was 
an expert on the interpretation and critical analysis of Ḥadīth. Upon 
knowing that we were students, he was quite happy and insisted that we 
have lunch at his place. He demonstrated to us how he taught Ḥadīth. It 
was amazing: whenever you asked him about a particular piece, he would 
open up his books, and for every single time – I don’t know how he did 
that – the page that turned up was precisely the one where this piece could 
be found. He then proceeded, effortlessly with words flowing like clear 
water from the mouth of an inexhaustible spring, to explain to us the 
background behind this piece, the particular category under which it was 
subsumed in the general system of Ḥadīth classification, from whom it 
was initially recorded and the line of reporters – even including who were 
more reliable than others, what had been said and written on this piece by 
previous scholars and whose views might be more persuasive than others. 
He was accurate yet his tone soft. He was strict yet not intimidating. He 
had been teaching Ḥadīth for his entire life, and the words have practically 
melted in his blood. He is still the best teacher I have ever met. 
Few Hui families choose to send their children to a local mosque for clerical training. 
Although it is often one’s own communal mosque that lays the foundation for the first 
phase of jingtang jiaoyu, many families choose to send their children afar and 
deliberately to unfamiliar locales so they could be effectively cut off from any familial 
comfort into which they could retreat when the study becomes too demanding and escape 
almost inevitably becomes an attractive option. Before the commencement of the official 
training, separation is the first lesson they need to take to heart, and this at times heart-
wrenching separation initiates a career which itself i  marked by numerous partitions and 
incessant movements. The private family lost is compensated by the communal family 
gained in the mosque where jingtang jiaoyu takes place. Imam Chen, currently working 
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in Yunnan Province but whose home was also in Luoyang, Henan Province, still 
remembered the happy yet austere days in the 1980s when he and his classmates often 
woke up at midnight to look for food in the mosque kitchen: “We were in our teens, and 
you know how much you can eat at that age. But the mosque only provided two meals – 
one in the morning around 9 am, the other in the aft rnoon around 5 pm, and we in fact 
had to cook ourselves. There was not much to eat, actually. Just steamed bread and 
pickles, every day. We didn’t have any fat (youshui) or protein (danbai). So we were 
always hungry. We often woke up around midnight and tried painstakingly to find 
whatever food that could still be found in the mosque. Sometimes we would cluster 
together and one of us would tell a story on a particularly delicious dish which he had 
before. He had to describe it really vividly, to the point where we could almost taste it. 
Imagine the saliva! How can you forget that?” 
To follow the same teacher and to suffer hunger together (which is a common 
experience among most imams whom I have interviewed) at a place where one could 
only rely on one’s peers for both material and moral support creates a strong and long-
lasting friendship among the young students that rech s far beyond the years of their 
clerical training. The extensiveness of an imam’s collegial network depends largely upon 
how many classmates he has had and how many teachers he has followed in his training, 
and these two translate directly into how widely he travelled and whether he was able in 
his student years to integrate himself into the immense web of relations that connect Hui 
clerics and teachers across vast geographical distance. This Hui tradition of trans-local 
networking in the pursuit of Islamic knowledge and clerical training dates back to late 
imperial days, reaching as far back as the late Ming (1368-1644) and early Qing (1644-
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1911) Dynasties. Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, for instance, has meticulously documented the 
formation and specific constitution of this networking among the so-called “Hui 
Confucians” (huiru) in the imperial period, focusing more particularly on the urban 
context in eastern China where the Chinese literary tradition figured prominently and 
placed much influence on the particular form Hui Islamic learning assumed at that 
historical juncture (Ben-Dor Benite, 2005). 
But the network an imam slowly built up in his student years functions not merely as 
a crucial source for the pursuit of knowledge. Perhaps no less importantly, it could also 
provide possible job opportunities. Information on clerical openings are not posted on 
newspapers, but passed on among closely related imams. Both Imam Yang of Journey 
Mosque and Imam Li of a small mosque in Liaoning Province in northeast China were 
students of Imam Mai Rongxi, an eminent Hui cleric in Henan renowned for his 
extraordinary contribution to the restoration and re-invigoration of Islamic scholarship 
and clerical training in Henan after the devastation of the Cultural Revolution. On a short 
vacation to pay his old classmate a visit and to share his working experience, Imam Li 
also brought news on a clerical opening in a small Hui village close to where he worked. 
That it was him and not others who brought the news wa  not irrelevant to the job itself. 
As I have previously mentioned, although a total of thirteen textbooks are often addressed 
in jingtang jiaoyu, each particular teacher, due to his own preference, personal training, 
and academic judgment, might subtract certain books while incorporating others which 
he considers important. The particular way the Quran is recited (the speed, the tone, the 
melody, etc.) might also differ between different schools initiated by different teachers 
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who acquire their training from different Islamic traditions.38 The job Imam Li brought to 
the attention of Imam Yang was specifically tailored for a student trained in the scholarly 
tradition from which both of them emerged, and it was perhaps unsurprising that they 
wanted to reserve the position exclusively for their own students – or in this case, 
students of Imam Yang. Both the accessibility of job opportunities and the particular 
requirements of job openings are deeply embedded in the collegial network of Hui clerics. 
A good teacher must be able not only to pass on to his students a body of rigorous Islamic 
scholarship. He must also be able to land them in clerical positions which in turn add to 
his own eminence and the influence of his own school.  
It is precisely at this place that the world of a “female imam” (nv ahong) differs 
perhaps most drastically from that of her male colleagues. There hardly exists a “network” 
among the widely scattered women’s mosques, and travelling, moreover, figures much 
less prominently for a female cleric than it does for a male one. The predominance of 
“education” in a women’s mosque and the common assumption that it is built primarily 
and perhaps even exclusively only for spreading the knowledge of Islam among the local 
Hui women seriously limit the range of activities a female imam can engage in and her 
scope of travel. More often than not, the most a femal  imam could do (and not 
necessarily with success) is to pass her own position to one of her students when she 
decides to retire. There might be potential job openings which may come up occasionally 
                                                   
38 Both Imam Yang and Imam Li belong to the Yihewani tradition, established in China by Ma Wanfu 
(guoyuan hazhi, “the Orchard Hajj”) in late 19th century, after the latter adopted Wahhbi teaching o  his 
Hajj to Mecca. Although Yihewani is a transliteration of the Arabic word ikhwan (“brothers”), the Chinese 
Hui Yihewani movement did not and still does not name itself “Muslim brotherhood” and is 
organizationally independent from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood established by Hasan al-Banna. The 
rise of Yihewani in northwest China in late 19th and early 20th centuries was particularly instrumental for 
the rising Hui warlords in breaking the organizational and military power of Sufi menhuans, accused by the 
“reformers” as “backward” and “superstitious” with t eir “saint worship.” See Lipman, 1997, pp. 200-11; 
Lipman, 1984; Chang, 2007. 
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thanks primarily to the limited connections a female imam might possess with her 
colleagues (both male and female) elsewhere, but the lack of a systematic network of 
enduring relations in which information and personnel keep constant circulation 
ultimately renders these opportunities rare and difficult to track down. 
More can be said on the marginal position of the femal  imam. The common 
designation they bear is nv ahong. The marker of gender, nv (“female”), instead of 
functioning merely as a descriptive indication of sexual difference (suppose that this 
constative “description” is at all possible – which itself is a masculinist ideological 
gesture), is an indispensable component that points up the specific position that women 
are given to inhabit – the word nan ahong (“male ahong”) is a redundant doubling, while 
one cannot omit nv (“female”) in nv ahong. An ahong is immediately assumed to be a 
man – the existence and circulation of the word nv ahong does not change as much as 
reinforces the foundational gender dissymmetry which defines the classificatory scheme 
subtending the usage of the word ahong (and “imam”). The patriarchal game of the 
signifier goes ever further. The wife of a male hong is often given the name shimu. The 
literal rendition of the word is “mother of the teacher,” but mu, in addition to meaning 
“mother,” is also a generalized marker of the female gender (a hen, for instance, is called 
mu-ji). Shimu, therefore, could mean “the female [dependent] of he [male] master.” The 
insertion of “dependent” in this gloss is supported by another linguistic asymmetry that 
runs parallel to the one that defines nv ahong: although the wife of a male ahong is called 
shimu, there is a blatant lack of term to designate the male spouse of a nv ahong. The 
literal opposite of shimu is shifu, which merely means “the master/teacher.” But not all 
husbands of nv ahongs are themselves male ahongs, and to use shifu as a general term to 
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designate the husbands of nv ahongs in the same manner as shimu is used as the uniform 
term to name all wives of the male ahongs would simply run contradictory to what can 
often be empirically observed on the ground. Shimu does not have a male counterpart, 
and the husband of a nv ahong gets to keep his own name without being rendered into a 
subsidiary position, simply because the word does not exist that could fulfill that specific 
symbolic function. 
One crucial distinction, however, has to be drawn between nv ahong and shimu as 
two terms that fulfill similar (but not completely the same) symbolic functions in 
domesticating sexual difference. Contrary to shimu which appears in a pair with (male) 
ahong and always refers to the latter, nv ahong appears only on its own, standing alone 
and occupying a somewhat jarring position in the masculinist world. The unease that 
often accompanies the use of this word is partially dissipated when the actual nv ahong 
designated is married and her husband is also an aho g (“male” is as usual omitted) – in 
other words, when nv ahong is simultaneously a shimu. The unease is equally 
ameliorated if the nv ahong is a widow, in which case the actual absence of her husband 
in part renders her sexual identity invisible and her position as an ahong – somehow 
situated outside the gendered social world (note that her male colleague does not have to 
be thus excluded in order to be recognized) – more imaginable. The symbolic tension 
built into the term acquires its most manifest form when it is used to designate a nv ahong 
who is married and whose living husband is known to be a lay Hui. Wang Rong, a 
prominent nv ahong born in Henan whose social activism during the Second Sino-
Japanese War earned her much respect, was and continues o be known under the name 
Yang Huizhen, which she was given after being married to Yang Fengxiang, a drug 
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addict who drained his family of its wealth with his daily increasing appetite for opium. 
Wang presided over a small women’s mosque in Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province, and was 
often addressed by ordinary Muslims – male and femal  alike – as Yang shiniang 
(shiniang was and is still used interchangeably with shimu), despite the well-known fact 
that her husband was not a male hong. Wang was also occasionally referred to as an 
ahong, but she was not called Wang ahong – her last name was completely overwritten 
by that of her husband: she was called by the name Yang ahong, as if, ironically, it was 
her husband, the locally notorious drug-addict, who was the real ahong. In an account 
given by a female disciple of Imam Wang, she was said to have once protested against 
this gendered hegemony of naming: “He [meaning her husband] is not an ahong. Why 
call me Yang shiniang? Call me Wang ahong.” Nonetheless, according to the account, 
“most people still called her Yang ahong rather than Wang ahong” (Jaschok & Shui, 
2000, pp. 277). 
We need to be particularly careful as to how one is situated, or perhaps more 
precisely, how one symbolically situates oneself, when one uses the word shimu and 
shiniang to address a female imam. The prevalence and tenaci y of this dual term point to 
a deeper structural configuration that gives it its symbolic power in domesticating sexual 
difference. To address a female imam as shimu/shiniang is simultaneously to situate 
oneself in the patrilineal line which her husband signifies. The teaching of Hui Islam is so 
symbolically imbricated with this foregrounding of the patriliny that the rule of the 
patronym can hardly be contradicted by the empirical evidence to the contrary – that her 
husband was not a male ahong did not prevent others from continuing to call Wang Rong 
Yang shiniang. The identification with the patronym locates the addresser (instead of the 
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addressee) within the patrilineal line and locates him (this “him” could be a male or a 
female Hui) on the side which only receives women in an essentially dissymmetrical 
affinal relationship predicated upon a symbolically fundamental exchange of women. 
Shimu/shiniang is always the woman who marries into the “door” (jinmen) of the (male) 
ahong and who, therefore, acquires her learning only because of being thus incorporated 
into the patrilineal line (again, whether empirically speaking she obtains her education 
before this symbolically foundational marriage is irrelevant to the persistence of this 
structural configuration). A woman cannot be an imam until she is included in the male-
centered world by means of exclusion – it is only as a shimu/shiniang that she could 
assume the necessarily partial position of a female teacher in the masculinist Hui Islamic 
teaching.  
Occasionally, a Hui woman might also be thrown – either willfully or against her will 
(it’s not always easy to tell the difference) – into a more literal marriage that substantiates 
this symbolic exchange of women. Imam Mai, the leading cleric of Down Mosque in 
Zhengzhou, studied for eight months while he was a student in the 1980s at a locally 
influential mosque in the small city of Changzhi in Shanxi Province. Near the end of his 
training and while he was preparing to leave for his next destination, his teacher, out of 
love for a promising and hard-working student who might well become an eminent cleric 
in the years to come, wanted him to stay. “He has a be utiful daughter,” Mai told me 
while we were driving towards Changzhi for a visit, “and some of my classmates leaked 
to me that they heard our teacher wanted to give his daughter to me (ba nv’er gei wo) so 
as to chain me to that place. You know, when you have a family there, it’s much more 
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difficult to move on. He wanted me to take his positi n when he retired.” But Mai did not 
want to stay in Changzhi,  
My home is in Henan. So why on earth would I want to s ay there? I 
called my family to let them know my teacher’s plan, and they all 
suggested I leave immediately, before my teacher evn mentioned the 
marriage to me – you know, you cannot refuse that in his face. I still 
pretended I didn’t know, but one midnight, when everyone was asleep, I 
quietly packed all my stuff and sneaked out. No one, i cluding my closest 
classmates, knew that I was leaving on that night. Bu  I succeeded, and 
they did not find out until the next morning! Haha! My teacher could find 
some other student to give his daughter to! But it was not going to be me! 
As I have argued previously, a male imam, due both t  is often extensive travel in his 
student years and his collegial connections as a reult of his teachers’ training of multiple 
students, is wired to an expansive network in which information and personnel keep 
constant circulating. But the mobility of Hui clerics is not merely a result of clerical 
training. It is also prompted by the particularly marginal position of the clerical power in 
the local mosque. This institutional marginalization prompts many imams to look for 
emotional comfort beyond the circle of their own mosques and within the trans-local 
network where they find their old classmates and colleagues, many of whom in fact 
suffer from the same predicament. The peripheral position of clerical power in a mosque 
is first and foremost grounded in the basic economic relationship that binds the imam to 
the mosque commission (see chapter 1). There does not exist an established application 
procedure in the hiring of clerics, and few newly graduated students from jingtang jiaoyu 
would risk self-recommendation – a practice that would at once disqualify him, since a 
“good graduate” would almost invariably receive a recommendation from his own 
teacher and the lack of supportive connection is seen as already indicative of his 
immaturity. Although the recommendation of an eminent imam might land one in a 
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decent position, it is nonetheless the mosque commission that possesses the legally 
prescribed and officially recognized power for making the final decision. It is them who 
hire the imam, extending to him a contract with terms and conditions laid down in 
advance and with the space for negotiation often reduc d to minimum (depending upon 
whether the hired cleric is a prominent imam and whether, in other words, he has more 
wager in arguing for conditions more advantageous t him).  
This relationship of employment is substantiated in clearly defined monetary terms. A 
new graduate in Zhengzhou might have a salary of 500 RMB per month, while a young 
but established imam might be paid twice of this amount. 1500 RMB/month is a common 
amount paid to an experienced imam in his 40s, and few of those clerics whom I 
interviewed – both in Zhengzhou and in Yinchuan – are paid beyond 2000 RMB. Those 
who could receive this maximum compensation are oftn in their mid-40s and highly 
experienced in maneuvering through the dense human rel tions that often engulf a local 
mosque. Whether this amount is sufficient for an imam to sustain his livelihood must be 
seen in relation to the form of life he is used to and whether he moves with his own 
family. Imams of different age brackets have different things to worry about and the 
amount they are paid is often spent in divergent ways:  young and newly graduated 
cleric would surely find 500 RMB/month an outrageously low salary, since even a bowl 
of noodles in a cheap restaurant would cost at least 5 RMB in Zhengzhou, and the 
numerous attractions an urban life brings only make 500 RMB appear unbelievably 
meager. But for those established imams, a relativey higher monthly salary does not 
necessarily mean a higher living standard or, for that matter, a more decent life. Imam 
Hai, the leading and in fact only cleric of Qing Mosque in Zhengzhou (located only 
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minutes’ walk away from Down Mosque and farther away from February 7th Square) and 
a man in his mid-30s, only received a monthly payment of 900 RMB – certainly higher 
than new graduates, but hardly sufficient to support his life. His young wife, jobless 
because she always had to remain ready to move on short notice with her husband to a 
new position wherever it might be, lived with him in the mosque and cooked for him. 
They did not have a child – perhaps they could not,since 900 RMB was barely enough 
for two adults to get by on and absolutely no money could be spared to raise a child (900 
RMB was not enough even to pay for half a month’s cost for daycare at most 
kindergartens in Zhengzhou).  
Like Imam Hai, many clerics in their 30s and 40s travel with their families in 
assuming whatever clerical positions that may turn up. Very often, the salary they receive 
is the only source of income for the entire family, f the shimus/shiniangs could not find 
short-term temporary jobs that could offer alternative compensation to plug the financial 
hole (which is also one reason why many shimus/shiniangs turn to Islamic learning and 
teach classes to Muslim women in order both to spread ligious knowledge and to earn a 
small amount of remuneration for family use). The regular term for the employment of an 
imam is three years, occasionally extended to five,and a well-established imam on good 
terms with the local commission might be able to obtain contracts of multiple terms, in 
which case his family may be more able to acquire a firm footing in the local community 
and the shimu/shiniang may therefore be able to find long-term jobs that could provide a 
stable source of income. But this possibility is necessarily limited by the rigid household 
registration system (hukou) which only very few select imams (those who have be n so 
successful as to have been given nominal or honorary political posts by the state) have 
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the privilege and the fortune to bypass. Separation in this context remains the only viable 
option for many less privileged imams who have to surrender to the relentless fact of 
social and economic deprivation. Leaving their wives and children in their hometown, 
they travel across vast distances to assume clerical positions on their own, visiting their 
families only occasionally on short vacations or other pretenses (such as the gathering of 
old classmates and close colleagues).  
Not all clerics are paid by the local commissions, however. The state has in the past 
decade engaged in a transformative re-organization in its management of the Hui Islamic 
clerics by moving the power of economic control gradu lly away from the local Hui 
communities and into the hands of the local Islamic associations, regional outposts of the 
All-China Islamic Association located in Beijing. Nominally a “civil organization” 
formed on a voluntary basis among China’s Muslims, the All-China Islamic Association 
is nonetheless a thinly veiled state institution designed specifically to co-opt influential 
religious figures and to render them into “bridges” (qiaoliang) that could relay state 
policies to the general Muslim population (not only Hui) in a language acceptable to both 
sides. Each province, city and county has its own Islamic association, all integrated into a 
hierarchical system subject to the centralized control of the All-China Islamic 
Association in Beijing. Jinbo, secretary of the Henan Provincial Islamic Association, 
provided a remarkable description of what he thought yixie (short for yisilanjiao xiehui, 
“the Islamic association”) was, after several rounds of wine without which he might not 
have been as honest, 
We are in fact an administrative organ (xingzheng jiguan) of the state. Our 
mission is to assist in executing state policies on religion and ethnicity. 
The government knows that we are part of the state m chine, and we know 
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it as well. As a matter of fact, the whole world knows it, including the 
Arabs [note how Jinbo conflates Muslim identity with a monolithic “Arab” 
identity – a common confusion both among government officials and 
many ordinary Hui]. But this is merely what you “know,” and your 
knowing it does not change the official nature of yixie. We are “in fact” an 
administrative organ, but we are not defined as one. W  function as a 
bridge and a link between the state and China’s Muslims – this is the 
official definition. You see, the foreigners still do not trust the Communist 
Party, they don’t trust the Chinese state. They have to turn to us, since 
there is no one else they can turn to. They know we are part of the state 
machine, but they have to pretend not to know, inasmuch as they still want 
to have any officially recognized relationship with Muslims in China. I am 
a member of the Communist Party, and I work for the Communist Party. 
But I also want to do something for us Muslims.  
One thing he had yet to do but which had been done by many of his colleagues elsewhere 
is to subject all Hui clerics under one’s jurisdiction to a uniform economic control by 
making the local Islamic association the sole institution from which the Hui imams 
procure their monthly payments. The realization of this plan is enabled by the daily 
growing bank accounts of the local and the national Isl mic associations. In addition to 
state funding, the countless Islamic associations in China also acquire their income from 
foreign Muslim donations and the supervision of domestic production and distribution of 
Halal food products – an increasingly lucrative industry as more Chinese food processing 
enterprises are looking to the Muslim population as a potentially huge market and trying 
also to export their merchandises to the Middle East.  The administrative re-organization 
in the governance of Hui clerics receives little financial resistance and is invariably 
celebrated by the local governments as an important advancement towards building a 
“good environment” (lianghao de huanjing) for the “healthy development” (jiankang 
fazhan) of Islam under the socialist condition. “We are not yet there,” Majie, an official 
in the Guangcheng District Bureau of Religious Affairs in Zhengzhou, told me, “But 
we’ll be there. We are working on that.” 
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An imam funded by the local Islamic association will receive a monthly salary that 
keeps more closely with the local price level. An eminent and locally influential cleric 
may receive 2,000 to 3,000 RMB per month, and the amount an entry-level imam 
receives is considerably higher than the 500 RMB which I mentioned previously. The 
training of clerics would also undergo critical transformations: instead of depending 
completely upon jingtang jiaoyu, all clerics have to receive some form of training – both 
religious and secular – in the local Quranic colleges (jingxueyuan) organized and funded 
by the local Islamic associations, whose curriculum includes a considerable portion on 
the official state policies on religion and ethnicity. All clerics, to be sure, have to acquire 
a certificate from the state in order to be a legally qualified imam hirable to a mosque 
commission, and this process of certification existed long before the onset of the 
administrative re-organization. But what the latter accomplishes is to integrate the Hui 
clerics into a much more rigorously organized system of management in which both the 
religious education and the most concrete livelihood of a Hui imam are subject to 
effective state control. He is not merely watched an surveilled. He is fed and attended to 
– in fact in a way much better than he ever has been. 
An additional dimension makes this state corporatism all the more attractive to many 
Hui clerics. Since 2010, the State Bureau of Religious Affairs has promulgated a myriad 
of administrative regulations that attempt to enroll all religious clerics in the state-funded 
national healthcare and social insurance plan (shehui baozhang). The purpose of this 
enrollment, according to an official document distributed in 2010, is “to clear their [i.e. 
clerics’] worries about life after retirement and to make sure that they can see a doctor 
when sick and have a pension to depend on when they ar  old” (State Bureau of 
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Religious Affairs, 2010). Although many imams whom I interviewed commended this 
policy as a significant advancement in the treatmen of religious clerics by the 
Communist Party, the plan itself, however, is not cmpletely funded by the state. A 
fraction of the total costs nonetheless has to be paid by the clerics themselves. The 
common way of doing things is to divide the total exp nse into three parts paid by three 
different parties: the state budget pays about one third, while the rest is shared between 
the local commission and the cleric they have hired. An established imam with more 
wagers in his bargaining with the commission might be able to convince the latter to 
cover all the remaining costs left unpaid by the state budget, and the commission – 
especially those who attempt to subject the imams more effectively to their 
institutionalized control – are also willing to bear these extra expenses, both to show their 
generosity and to gain an initial upper hand by assuming the role of the “giver.” This 
arrangement binds the Hui clerics materially to the local commissions which hire them 
and to which they are legally subject in providing religious and ritual services. A 
consequence of this relationship of economic bondage is that in addition to being limited 
in their mobility by the state orchestrated household registration system, Hui imams are 
also bound to the localized mosque commissions in their social insurance and medical 
benefits. They cannot take their plan with them when they move to a different mosque or 
assume a position at a different place – it will not be the same commission that continues 
to pay for his benefits and the procedure for transferring the plan across different 
locations is dauntingly complicated and time-consuming (especially when the new 
position is located in a different city or even a different province, in which case the 
question also emerges as to under which particular municipal or provincial budget should 
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his benefits be subsumed – the establishment of a national healthcare network 
unencumbered by local budget segregations has yet to take place [although it is underway 
at the time of my writing]). 
It is in this context that when the local Islamic associations suggest they replace the 
local mosque commissions in paying for the social and medical benefits of the clerics, the 
suggestion acquires wide popularity among Hui imams. Special state grants are set aside 
each year to be distributed to the countless Islamic associations in China specifically for 
this purpose. In addition to being assured of the continuity of their benefits by the 
enormous financial power of the wealthy state, the Hui clerics also find another 
advantage in having the Islamic associations pay for their social insurance and healthcare: 
placed under the centralized control of the All-China Islamic Association in Beijing, all 
local Islamic associations are interconnected within e same hierarchical system in the 
performance of their administrative responsibilities. The trans-local network in which the 
Islamic associations are situated makes the transferenc  of insurance plans across 
different locations considerably easier and passes the burden from the individual cleric to 
the machine of state administration. The plan no loger travels between organizationally 
independent mosque commissions that are each economically closing in upon itself, but 
between different local branches of the same state administrative organ. Perhaps 
incidentally, the trans-local network of the Islamic associations speaks directly to the 
mobile character of the clerical position, and state corporatism, somewhat paradoxically, 
solves a critical problem that chains the imams to the commissions that hire them. 
To Imam Han, the presiding cleric at Garden Mosque in Zhengzhou, this is a moment 
of decision that draws a sharp line separating those who are willing “to work with the 
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state” from those who are not. “A great divergence is underway,” said he, “in a decade, 
you will see the outcome – an internal split among the clerical circle, and an impassible 
gap between the two sides. Some will become state imams (guojia ahong), working for 
the Communist Party because they depend on it for thei livelihood. These people will 
assume prominent positions and be well fed. Those who choose not to cooperate, on the 
other hand, will be pushed out of the picture – they might not even be able to obtain the 
official certificate. Everyone has to make a decision. It’s not easy.” No black and white 
answer can be given to this question, and even though Imam Han’s tone might sound 
confrontational and he might have leaned towards the “non-cooperative” side, what we 
are dealing with is not entirely a question of state oppression or even unilateral political 
imposition. The state registration of the clerics’ names for the purpose of signing them up 
for social insurance, for instance, has reminded many Hui imams of the worst years of 
political persecution when names were copied down and violent abuses followed shortly 
afterwards. But many are nonetheless happy to have their names registered – especially 
those who have yet to be insured by their commission . “The Communist Party will not 
risk doing that again,” said Imam Zhu of Down Mosque, who insisted that “now is the 
best era in decades for the development of Islam in Chi a.”  
Whether that is true might depend on what kind of “decision” (to use the word of 
Imam Han) one is willing to make and with what particular perspective one chooses to 
look at the various state regulations and the mode of institutional relationship between the 
clerics, the local mosque commissions, the Islamic associations, and the state 
administration. But the story, as it should have become clear by now, is much more 
complex and nuanced than either political oppression or state corporatism. The Hui 
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imams will continue to move around, and the network in which they find their classmates 
and colleagues will continue to be re-configured by the dense web of relations that 
materially constitute their lifeworld. And what they do specifically in a particular mosque, 
even the ritual practices they are often hired to perform, must be seen as inextricably 
imbricated with these dense relations – recall the critique I mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter that imams are “selling out” the Holy Quran in exchange for economic 
benefits to supplement their meager salary.  
Conclusion: Bearing the Unbearable 
Xiaodong (“Minor East”) Mosque was located right on the side of a busy road at the 
center of Yinchuan. A grand hotel was under construction just next door, and more 
magnificent hotels, luxurious restaurants, and shiny n ght clubs were merely steps away. 
The rising hotel, even when still unfinished and unadorned, nonetheless overshadowed 
the small courtyard which enclosed the few low and u assuming houses that constituted 
Xiaodong Mosque.  For a long time, I could not recognize it – a friend of mine told me its 
exact location and I walked past it countless times in my search, never being able to find 
it on my own. I thought the courtyard was merely appended to the new hotel, perhaps its 
backyard left to be filled by trashcans waiting to be vacated by midnight trash collectors 
– until my friend literally drove me to this place and pointed to me, “See? This is 
Xiaodong Mosque! How could you not see it? It’s right on the side of the road!”  
It was a quiet place, at least quiet most of the time, when there were no major rituals 
such as the annual Eid prayer or the weekly Jumu’ah every Friday at noon. Imam Yang, a 
man in his mid-40s, was the leading cleric. In addition to conducting funerary rites and 
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teaching the few students who were residing in the mosque, his obligation also included 
presiding over small familial rituals in commemorating the deceased and at times 
accepting the repentance of those who had not been abl  to observe their daily duties of 
prayer. “Being an imam is not easy,” he often told me. But he seldom complained. What 
he did remain constantly unsure of, however, was whether he could at all perform what 
he was often expected to. In one story he recounted to me, Imam Yang was invited by a 
few young Hui men to their temporary residence in the suburb of Yinchuan to conduct a 
ritual called taobai (tawba in Arabic, “repentance”). “I didn’t realize until I arrived at 
their home that in fact, they were living with many other young men and women. They 
lived in poor condition, just to save the expenses. They were all working in the city, 
perhaps for the same employer. I don’t know.” He paused, and then proceeded, 
I mean, they were practically still kids, boys and girls, some in their teens, 
others in their early twenties. When I was about to recite the Quranic 
verses for taobai, the older ones who sat closer to me shouted to those 
standing outside in the courtyard, “Stop talking! Silence! The imam is 
about to read taobai!” I saw the courtyard was filled with people, all kids. 
Just like that, they all at once fell down on their knees, all of them. 
Huala— [Yang imitated the sound of a concerted action] I don’t know 
how to describe that scene. While I was reciting the verses, I could not 
help thinking, “These kids invite me for taobai, because they simply could 
not perform the daily prayers. They have prepared an expensive meal and 
give me jingli  for my service. They want to seek pardon from the merciful 
Lord, and they need me to intercede so they could be forgiven for the 
prayers they missed, the fasts they ignored, the sins they committed, and 
the transgressions they were guilty of.” But, 
Imam Yang paused, and turned away to wipe off his tears, 
Can I really do that? Am I able to do that? Oh my Lord, do I have the 
ability for that? How can I bear such heavy responsibilities? These kids 
could only depend on me, and they thought my intercession would work. 
But when the day comes, who will intercede for me? And wouldn’t I be 
punished for having interceded precisely where my intercession simply 
would not work and would not be accepted? Even if I pray all the time, 
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perhaps I will never be able to wash off all the sins thus given to me to 
shoulder. I am now 46, and maybe it’s time to quit. I only have two to 
three decades left in this world. I need to work for my own salvation. This 
is just too heavy – it’s humanly impossible. 
Surely, not all Hui imams have to perform rituals of atonement for migrant workers, but 
taobai is nonetheless a common ritual in the Hui Islamic world. Many ordinary Hui still 
think that the imam’s intercession will be accepted – and they are eager to pay them for 
this. The efficacy of clerical intercession is framed and thought to be intensified by a 
monetary exchange – the supposedly unpredictable destiny in the Hereafter is pinned 
down by encircling the divine in a controllable relationship of exchange, and the imam is 
seen as the hinge: “I have paid you, and if it doesn’t work, it’s you who will be punished, 
not me.” The instructions of the clerics are closely fo lowed (when, of course, it is not too 
much trouble), because – Imam Yang told me – “they t ink that if they cannot be saved, 
they have the imams to blame in front of God.” Putting he hope of one’s salvation on the 
other is simultaneously to leave oneself an excuse in the face of possible divine 
punishment. The responsibility is completely transferred to the clerics, and redemption is 
“outsourced” to their ritual performances especially by those who could not observe the 
daily prayers and the Ramaḍān fasts. Imam Yang was paid for his work, and this 
payment constituted an important source of income that supported his life as a Hui cleric. 
He could not refuse to preside over taobai and other similar rituals (such as reciting the 
Quran in order to plead to God for blessings on the dead), for both religious and secular 
economic reasons. The paradox is that in order for the Hui clerics to sustain the 
institutional persistence of Hui Islam in the local social world, they are bound to assume 
this impossible position of bearing the unbearable and performing the unperformable. 
Perhaps the state orchestrated re-configuration of their economic condition might indeed 
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in part extricate them from this onerous paradox. Perhaps Hui Islam might indeed 
undergo a certain “purification” when Hui clerics no longer have to depend upon ritual 
payment to complement the scanty salary they receiv from mosque commissions. But 
that story still remains to be written, and one is also left wondering if it is at all “humanly 





Introduction to Part II 
CHAPTER 5 
Spectres of Socialism, Politics of Ethnicity 
 
The four chapters in Part I examine the various historical, sociological, and political 
conditions that sustain the social existence of Hui Islam and concretize the imbrication of 
religion with ethnicity among the Hui. Though the state – whether imperial, republican, 
or communist – is not absent from these accounts, I have not emphasized the role of the 
state and have not, for that matter, moved my analytic  gaze above the mundane social 
world of the Hui. Part II, on the other hand, shifts its focus to the state and its more 
general policies in the governance of ethno-religious difference. In order to clear the 
ground for the next two chapters (each dealing with a distinct aspect of this governance), 
I will provide in this transitional chapter a succin t and non-exhaustive historical tracing 
of the preliminary contours of the socialist politics of ethnicity, focusing particularly 
upon its intrinsic paradox and the long shadow this specifically socialist paradox casts on 
the contemporary governance of ethno-religious difference in China.  
Since the question of Islam in China is heavily mediated by “the ethnic question” 
(minzu wenti), it is crucial that we pay attention to the particular political publicity 
accrued to “ethnicity” in the Chinese socialist tradition, and demonstrate why it cannot be 
reduced to the liberal genealogy of self-determinatio . Although current debates around 
256 
 
the “ethnic question” in China often pivot on ethno- ationalist “separatism” (mizu fenlie) 
– which already indicates that only certain ethnic groups, in fact, only a small number of 
them, would be considered worthy of such debates and worthy, therefore, of any attention 
at all – any proposition of a change of ethnic policies in China necessarily comes up 
against this socialist legacy, even to the point where a change of ethnic policy might elicit 
doubts as to the Chinese state’s overt political allegiance to socialism. There seems to be 
an intrinsic connection between the ethnic question and state socialism, and the spectres 
of socialism, largely exorcised from the economic domain and daily displaced by an 
authoritarian financial oligarchy, still loom large in the realm of ethnic affairs. The ethnic 
question – and the “religious question” which is entwi ed with it – has almost become 
the site for politics. If the study of other religions (Han Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, etc.) can still leave the ethnic question untouched and presume with 
relative ease that it may still be possible to discus  something called the “religious 
question,” a study of Islam (and certainly Tibetan Buddhism) in China must confront the 
complex genealogy of the ethnic question, and the particularly long shadow that the 
socialist past casts upon it.  
Despite the drastic changes China has undergone sinc 1949, and especially since 
1979, the basic political configuration in which the ethnic question is inscribed remains 
largely intact and the CCP still accounts for its ethnic policy by recourse to the political 
principles laid down in the 1930s. Absurd and ahistor cal this might sound, I nonetheless 
believe that this particular history still weighs heavily upon the current political purchase 
of the ethnic question. At least one question needs to be addressed: why does the ethnic 
question seem to strike such a sensitive cord and appear to be perhaps one of the last 
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fortresses (together with the “religious question”) where a socialist façade can be secured? 
This chapter attempts at least to offer some inroads in answering this difficult yet critical 
question. In the same way that a study of contemporary European Islam cannot ignore the 
still much-alive legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism, and just as it must also take 
into account the question of immigrant labor and racial discrimination (not to mention 
gender, which shall be located at a different regist r altogether), a study of contemporary 
Islam in China should attend to the convoluted history of the ethnic question. 
In the preface to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1954 
(hereafter ’54 Constitution), the first of its kind and later succeeded by three others, the 
ethnic question, or minzu wenti, is presumed to have already been solved. Although the 
Chinese language is not marked by grammatical conjugations that indicate tense, the 
strong present perfect implication of the article on the ethnic question is nonetheless 
unmistakable: “All the ethnic groups in our country have already been (yijing) united on a 
free and equal basis into a big family.” In spite of the analogy of kinship, this unification 
is presumed to be neither the result of a cultural homogenization nor the outcome of a 
top-down statist project of nation-building. It is supposed to have naturally grown out of 
the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial socialist revolution which also overthrew the rule of 
the nationalist bourgeoisie acting as comprador class of the Western capitalist powers. 
The unification does not necessarily presuppose homogenization – at least theoretically – 
but merely delineates a strategic alliance among subjugated races, nations, and ethnic 
groups which, with the progression of time, is thought to inevitably give rise to a certain 
“class consciousness” that prompts the formation of “a big (proletarian) family.” The 
presumption in the ’54 Constitution that the ethnic question is already solved persists in 
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all successive constitutions despite countless revisions in other respects. This assumption 
of finality is constitutive of the socialist attitude to the ethnic question: all the conditions 
that would induce the structural oppression and margin lization of ethnic minorities in 
the bourgeois social formation have completely disappe red under the socialist condition, 
and ethnicity, even though it might continue to exist for a long historical period, would 
become politically irrelevant. The proletarians might still be marked by ethnic 
distinctions, but they are not grouped and cannot be segmented along ethnic lines. In the 
imaginary regime of an accomplished socialism, the qu stion of ethnicity is necessarily a 
survival from the past and cannot be given its specificity outside the hegemonic – and 
often dogmatic – discourse (not necessarily the actual politics) of class analysis.  
The stance taken by the ’54 Constitution on the ethnic question does not differ 
substantially from the position of the CCP before th Long March in the 1930s. In the 
resolution passed during the CCP’s Second National Congress in 1922, the ethnic 
question was framed in the vague idiom of “autonomy (zizhi),” and “self-determination 
(zijue)” did not appear in this document. The basic stance of the CCP was summarized 
thus: “…(3) Unify China Proper (including Manchuria) into a real democratic republic; 
(4) Acknowledge the right to autonomy of Mongolia, Tibet and Huijiang (i.e. Xinjiang), 
to the point where they can establish their own democratic autonomous state (minzu zizhi 
bang); (5) Unify China Proper, Mongolia, Tibet and Huijiang into a Federal Republic of 
China on the basis of free confederation…” (Central P rty School, 1991, pp. 18) The 
verbal ambiguity hinges not only upon the ambivalent meaning of “autonomy,” but also 
on the disputable meaning of bang, which I have translated as “state,” following the 
political idiomatic convention in the US (in the sen  that New Jersey is a “state” – the 
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ambiguity of “state” in the American context captures precisely the double meaning of 
bang in this resolution). The ethnic “state” is implicitly confined within the institution of 
a federal “state,” and their “autonomy” appears to be contained within a “tolerable” limit 
that deliberately separates it from complete “independence.” The possibility that the new 
“democratic autonomous states” might prefer not to participate in the new confederation 
envisioned by the CCP was glossed over in this resolution. One is tempted to surmise that 
this omission was in part an indication of the still trong grip on the Communists of the 
desire for preserving China’s territorial integrity, but a closer look provides a slightly 
different reading. 
In general terms, the Communists in the 1920s were highly consistent in their view of 
the ethnic question. Their avid support for the political struggle of ethnic minorities was 
certainly not unconditional, but it should nonetheless be carefully distinguished from the 
reserved position of the Nationalist KMT (the nationalist party established by Sun Yat-
sen and later controlled by Chiang Kai-shek). If a certain Sino-centric nationalism was 
hegemonic among the latter, it was a clearly delineated Communist strategic concern that 
underwrote the decisions and propaganda of the former. Framed either in terms of 
“autonomy” or “self-determination,” the political support of the CCP was based upon and 
constantly returned to a classically Marxist-Leninist class analysis: the revolutionary 
significance of the political struggle of ethnic minorities must presuppose the preliminary 
condition that these struggles are under the sole leadership of and reliant upon the 
independent organizational forces of the ethnic proletarians. This principal judgment 
should be situated in a larger strategic field in which the Communists were trying to 
make their tactical intervention. 
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First, although the Communists, following the instruc ion of the Third International, 
considered the Chinese anti-imperialist struggle in th s period as a bourgeois democratic 
revolution by definition, the particularity of the world situation and the specificity of the 
Chinese social formation – its forced insertion into the world capitalist market, a weak 
national capitalism, and the socially determined political untrustworthiness of the 
Chinese big landed property and the new comprador bou geois – prompted them to make 
a key strategic assessment which followed closely the orthodox Leninist position 
sharpened by the triumph of the October Revolution: that the complete success of the 
bourgeois democratic revolution and the accomplishment of full national independence 
must depend upon the power of a social group that possesses the most unreserved 
revolutionary force and occupies the most uncompromising – as socially determined and 
structurally defined – position in relation to the aggressive Western imperialism. It 
followed from this judgment that it was the proletarians, and the proletarians alone, who 
could accomplish what the national bourgeois attempd to but necessarily could not 
accomplish. The bourgeois democratic revolution was in this context necessarily 
transformed by the socialist revolution: the latter did not follow from the success of the 
former (i.e. the “stages of revolution” thesis). Tothe contrary, it created the conditions 
for the realization of the former and meanwhile canceled the conditions for the continual 
existence of the bourgeois as a class. In this revolutionary scheme, it was only the 
triumph of the socialist revolution that would both realize the political interest of the 
bourgeois and with the same stroke foreclose the possibility for the formation of the class 
hegemony of the bourgeois (which had never existed in the first place). The moment that 
the interest of the bourgeoisie was realized for them and by the proletarians was also the 
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moment that they resigned from the historical stage nd passed into obsolescence. This 
strategic assessment of the CCP therefore crystalized into an either/or decision: either the 
bourgeois democratic revolution and the struggle for national independence necessarily 
failed under the intrinsically concessionary leadership of the national bourgeois 
represented by the KMT, or one turned to an apparently more radical socialist revolution 
which was in fact more urgently called for by the sociological necessity that inhered in 
the particular revolutionary situation in China. This position was succinctly summarized 
in the resolution on the national revolution passed on the CCP’s Fourth National 
Congress in 1924, 
Contemporary national liberation movements are different from the 
archaic, vague, and generally xenophobic national revolutions. The 
national liberation movements among the oppressed nations are intimately 
linked to the class liberation struggles within the oppressed countries. 
Therefore, the solitary statist nationalism is no longer suitable for 
contemporary national liberation movements. The oppressing classes in 
each country also utilize the force of the workers and the peasants in their 
own struggles, but when push comes to shove, they always betray the 
proletarians and surrender to the enemies, obstructing the ultimate success 
of national liberation. Hence, it is only the active participation of the 
proletarians in the national liberation that could prevent the formation of 
reactionary compromise, and the development of the forces of national 
liberation is directly proportional to the development of the class struggle 
and the strengthening of the power of the working classes.  
(Ibid., pp. 32) 
This is one point where the position of the Chinese Communists in the 1920s came closer 
to Trotskyism (the “permanent revolution” thesis) than Stalinism which reigned supreme 
in the Comintern of this period.39 That the “oppressing classes” (both the big landed 
property and the national and comprador bourgeois) would necessarily betray the 
proletarians who were deceived into forging an alliance with the former in the democratic 
                                                   
39 For the vicissitudes of Trotskyism in China, see Png, 1990, 1974; Benton, 1996; Miller, 1979. 
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revolution was an appraisal not unfamiliar in the Marxian tradition. The lesson of the 
Eighteen Brumaire was readily brought into discussion on the Chinese r volution in the 
work of Trotsky in the 1920s and early 1930s, embodied in a series of scathing critiques 
he waged against the Stalinist position which, according to Trotsky, practically annulled 
the independent organizational status of the CCP and ssimilated the force of the 
proletarians into the party of the national and comprador bourgeois (the KMT) (Trotsky, 
Evans, & Block, 1976; Trotsky & Shachtman, 1967). The above quote is retrieved from 
the Fourth National Congress of the CCP in 1924, which was also the occasion when the 
official decision was made – certainly under the threat of “discipline” brandished by the 
Comintern representative working among the Chinese Communists – to collaborate with 
the Nationalist KMT by having Communists join the KMT on an individual basis. What 
happened subsequently was self-censorship on the Communist side and a decline in the 
class struggle of the urban proletarians, self-imposed by the CCP to maintain the 
precarious collaboration with the KMT under the command of the Stalinist Comintern. In 
other words, although the 1924 resolution insisted strongly that the success of 
contemporary national liberation movement depend primarily upon the strength of the 
independent organization of the proletarians, what happened in fact was precisely the 
contrary: that under the command of the Stalinist Comintern, the Communists were set on 
a path to progressively losing their independent organizational power and giving in to the 
bourgeois KMT. This progressive debilitation of the Communist organization culminated 
in the 1927 coup carried out by Chiang Kai-shek, which dealt a devastating blow to the 




Second, and parallel to the assessment that the ultimate triumph of the democratic 
revolution must presuppose and actively accelerate the intensification of class struggle 
within the Chinese society, the CCP’s support for the autonomy and self-determination of 
China’s ethnic minorities followed the same line of strategic reasoning. The year 1924 
was again critical in this respect: the Mongolian People’s Republic was officially 
declared in this year under the leadership of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(the Mongolian communist party) with close collaboration with the Soviet Union and the 
Comintern. The CCP was particularly supportive of this new political arrangement, 
despite the fact that Mongolia (or “outer Mongolia” n the conventional China-centered 
political idiom of the time – ironically, the word “inner Mongolia” is still under official 
use to designate the part of Mongolia that continues to remain within the boundary of the 
contemporary People’s Republic of China) partially seceded from China and declared its 
nominal independence shortly after the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.). On 
the one hand, the nationalist KMT – this was at a time when it just started its 
collaboration with the Communists under the moderation of the Comintern – constantly 
vacillated between its acknowledgement of the right to self-determination of China’s 
ethnic minorities, officially proclaimed – as a result of the compromise struck with the 
CCP and the Comintern – in the resolution reached on its First National Congress in 1924, 
and its strong nationalistic desire to keep intact he vast territory of China passed off by 
the Qing Dynasty. On the other and compared to this ambivalent position, the stance of 
the CCP was much more unequivocal, and their unwavering support derived from two 
interlinked strategic concerns: first, the independent Mongolian People’s Republic was a 
socialist state where the proletarians and the peasants had supposedly conquered state 
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power, and their secession from China and alliance with the Soviet Union would 
strengthen the power of the international Communist movement. Seen in this strategic 
light, the separation of the “outer” Mongolia worked precisely in favor of the socialist 
revolution within China, and was conducive to the development of class struggle and by 
extension the democratic national independence of the Chinese people. According to the 
Chinese Communists of this period, an independent socialist state would by definition be 
an unfailing ally of their own struggles. Second – and directly corresponding to the first 
point – the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic was thought to necessarily 
undermine the power of China’s national bourgeois and “feudal forces,” especially the 
big landed proprietors whose political representatives were thought to be the militant 
warlords. The secession of Mongolia was supposed to eprive the warlords of a vast 
territory for the extraction of natural resources and contract the segmented space in which 
they strove to establish their own personal kingdoms. Situating their maneuvering 
squarely in the field of international Communism that transformed the political 
significance of any and every local struggle, the Communists did not think in nationalistic 
terms. They were indifferent to the (bourgeois) nationalistic cause upheld by the KMT, 
and harbored a transnational political vision which was again closer to Trotsky’s version 
of Communism as an intrinsically international project that must not base itself off the 
conviction that socialism should depart from establishing itself in a particular country as 
the “first step” towards internationalization. 
It is against this general background that we shall understand the Communists’ 
political vision of a free confederation with “democratic autonomous states” established 
by ethnic minorities in an imaginary future. In the words of Qu Qiubai, the General 
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Secretariat of the CCP during 1927-1928, “only after th  political rule of the bourgeois is 
completely overthrown can the condition for the free association of all nationalities 
obtain,” and “the dictatorship of the proletarians is the sole guarantee for the happiness 
and freedom of all nationalities” (Central Party School, 1991, pp. 63). The ethnic 
question is posed in this dual proposition as a fundamentally marginal question: insofar 
as the class struggle reaches its teleological end in its historical progression towards 
Communism, the ethnic question will correlatively solve itself. Whether there would 
ultimately emerge a new Federal Republic of China does not matter significantly in this 
political imaginary; in fact, if all of China’s ethnic minorities could accomplish the 
dictatorship of the proletariats in their own “state” and realize the socialist revolution in 
their own class struggle, the strategic need to streng hen the power of the socialist camp 
would inevitably induce the formation of such a confederation. It was ultimately 
irrelevant whether a federal state or a loose multi-ethnic union would appear among the 
future socialist states – socialism was in principle and by definition an international 
enterprise, and “socialist state” was de jure a contradiction in term. The ethnic question 
was in this way completely reduced to the class question.  
This in part explains why before the mid-1930s the Chinese Communists were 
exempt from the necessarily inconclusive debate on what constituted a “nation” and how 
one should distill the core characteristics that could distinguish a nationality from all 
others. There has been a tremendous amount of work on this multifarious and enormously 
influential debate (whose influence still looms large in the surge of [Han] nationalism in 
contemporary China), and I would not recapitulate th  vast amount of historical, 
anthropological, and archeological narratives produce  therein. What I am interested in 
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here is the particular register at which the early Chinese Communists located the 
specificity (or the lack thereof) of the ethnic question in the whole socialist revolutionary 
scheme. The kind of self-determination they supported among the ethnic minorities 
always presupposed an irreducible class struggle among the latter, and this presupposition 
secured beforehand that the seceded and independent ethnic “states” – the “socialist” 
ethnic states – were necessarily allies of the Communists of “China Proper.” A sequel to 
this Communist position is that the Chinese Han proletarians must actively assist the 
ethnic proletarians and peasants in overthrowing the rule of their own nobilities, 
landlords, or religious priests (e.g. lamas in Tibet). It was presumed by the Communists 
that only when the movements of self-determination among the ethnic minorities were 
led primarily by the ethnic proletarians that the independence eventually accomplished 
could be seen as an “authentic” emancipation. If the ethnic proletarians could not assume 
the responsibility that history had given them, a tr ns-ethnic alliance with the Han 
proletarians was not merely preferable or optional, but strongly demanded by 
theoretically projected historical necessity (Ibid., pp. 103, 113-114).  
This Communist narrative follows closely the Leninist nstruction adopted by the 
Soviet Union in its own attitude to the ethno-national minorities included in its 
confederated republics. It amounts to a redundant platitude to state that the Chinese 
Communists, owing both to their acceptance of Leninism as the fundamental principle of 
organization and to their disciplinary submission t the Comintern in the international 
Communist movement, based their position regarding China’s ethnic minorities directly 
off the Soviet experience in contradistinction to the liberal (bourgeois) tradition of self-
determination. But this cliché misses a critical paradox – perhaps even an irony – that 
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inheres in this position which would later haunt any proposed solution to the ethnic 
question under the (post)socialist condition. The point is not merely that by 
acknowledging the right to self-determination/autonomy of ethnic minorities, the Leninist 
approach would almost unexceptionally – in the former Soviet Union and in China – 
backfire and intensify ethno-national consciousness in tead of producing the condition 
under which it might gradually abate and disappear into class consciousness. What 
perhaps deserves more analytical attention and is particularly important for my discussion 
in this dissertation is another irony: that the Chinese Communists were so forthright and 
unreserved in their avid support for the self-determination of China’s ethnic minorities – 
to the point where they explicitly celebrated the secession of “outer” Mongolia – 
primarily because for them, the ethnic question wasirrelevant. It was precisely because it 
did not matter as a fundamental question that it could be given such overt political 
publicity and made the site for the most resolute and unfaltering pronouncement. 
Paradoxically, the marginal question, because of its peripherality in the Communist 
vision, was given a political visibility perhaps unrivaled by its place in the liberal 
tradition. It was made into a political question because it did not matter to Communist 
politics; it was given the particular power to mark the radicality of the Chinese 
Communist movement and to distinguish the Communists from the “hypocritical” KMT 
only because it was presumed that the ethnic question would necessarily be solved when 
the class struggle reached its teleological endpoint. What we read in the ’54 Constitution 
is only a revamp mutatis mutandis – surely in a completely different political context – of 
this old presumption: it is because the ethnic question was supposed to have already been 
solved that it was and continues to be attributed a particularly intense and necessarily 
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spectral (because it is theoretically presumed that in the “actually existing socialism,” the 
politics of ethnicity is necessarily devoid of substance) political publicity. It was 
passionately offered to the gaze of the politically minded because it was presumed that 
fundamentally there was nothing to be seen. 
This vital point has to be complemented by another inflection in the CCP’s position 
on the ethnic question after the mid-1930s. This inflection was derived primarily from the 
Communist experience during the Long March, which crossed both Southwest and 
Northwest China where an enormous amount and variety of China’s ethnic minorities 
concentrated. In this introduction which serves only to clear the ground for subsequent 
chapters, I can only provide a schematic account of he basic political and military 
conditions that prompted this inflection and the critical ideological work conducted by 
the CCP (especially the intervention of Mao Zedong) i  relation to this inflection. This 
account does not mean to be exhaustive, but merely int nds to offer a general historical 
background to situate the spectral politics of ethnicity in contemporary China. 
Two basic conditions foregrounded the Long March of the Communist Red Army in 
mid-1930s. First, although the area they traversed w re far away from the central 
authority of the KMT and the ethnic minorities they came across were mostly illiterate 
both in the Chinese language and in the political policies of the Nationalist state, the 
KMT propaganda had nonetheless reached far deep into the rugged mountains in 
Southwest and Northwest China. The Red Army was portrayed in this propaganda as 
aggressive and demonic bandits who looted the relativ y rich and confiscated properties 
by sheer force. Some ethnic minorities, upon knowing that the Red Army was 
approaching their villages, would immediately set their livestock roaming in the 
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mountain, hide their grain crops between the walls of their abode (a secret soon to be 
discovered at their peril by the starving soldiers of the Red Army), and avoid by all 
means any contact with the Communists (Ibid., pp. 292-5). Second, the Long March, 
although marked in the history of the CCP as the turning point of the Chinese socialist 
revolution, was in effect only a narrow escape from the clutch of the KMT military force 
equipped with much advanced weaponry. The military f ilure of the Red Army was 
aggravated by perhaps the most concrete problem of all long-term military operations – 
logistics, especially as they were moving away from the fertile Eastern China into the 
barren hinterland. Between 1927 and the Long March in mid-1930s, the major source of 
income for the Red Army was the confiscated properties (excluding land, which was 
often distributed to the poor and middle peasants) of the rich landlords and local gentries. 
Land reform was not merely a political program that characterized the Communist 
movement, but also, and more practically, a way to fund the lasting military confrontation 
of the CCP with the KMT government.  
This dual condition, together with the urgent need to alleviate the antagonism of 
ethnic minorities – especially the upper classes who still commanded the submission and 
loyalty of their own ethnic groups (e.g. lamas among the ordinary Tibetans, princes and 
nobilities among the Mongolians) – long cultivated by the KMT propaganda, entailed a 
particularly tense and demanding situation for the gasping Red Army: on the one hand, 
the soldiers were starving and eager to resort to the old method, i.e. violent land reform, 
to ease hunger and fund their military operation. The straightforwardness of this method 
and the quick return it could generate rendered it par icularly attractive in a situation 
where basic sustenance had become a major problem. The utter strangeness of the “exotic” 
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ethnic minorities to the Communist soldiers – a majority of whom came from Eastern and 
Southeastern China – and the almost impassable linguistic barrier only made the 
minorities more vulnerable to the Red Army predators (Ibid., pp. 436-440). Many “land 
reforms” – perhaps unabashed robbery might be a more appropriate word – happened 
without or against the command of higher military authorities in the Red Army. A short 
telegram dated July 1935 and buried in the vast archive of the Communist documents of 
this period might give us a rough idea of what was h ppening, 
To the political departments of all regiments, 
In order to strengthen the discipline of the troops and polish our image in 
the eyes of the masses – especially the ethnic minorities – in the southwest, 
it is strictly prohibited that individual companies carry out land reform and 
confiscate the properties of landlords in the course of their march. The 
acquirement of food and other logistical materials should be centrally 
organized and controlled by the authority at the regim nt-level, and placed 
under the leadership of the local party committees. The companies could 
still conduct investigations of local landlords, but they must not confiscate 
their properties without the order issued by higher authority.  
(Ibid., pp. 343, cf. 423) 
On the other hand, as this telegram already reveals, it was precisely at the time when the 
ordinary soldiers were in dire need of the arbitrary confiscation of food and other 
properties for their basic survival that the Central Committee of the CCP began to change 
their previous policy and became highly cautious as to the possible outcome of 
conducting “land reform” among ethnic minorities (Ibid., pp. 360, 394). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the consequence of observing Han soldiers robbing ethnic landlords was 
not so much the wake-up of ethnic peasants and pastorali s to their own class 
consciousness as the simmering of anti-Han ethno-nati nal sentiments. It soon became 
clear to the Communists that ethnic elites – lamas (among the Tibetans and Mongolians), 
tusis (nobilities among many different southwestern ethnic minorities, but primarily 
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among the “Yi”), akhongs (imams among Hui Muslims), and even ethnic warlords (e.g. 
the multitude of Hui warlords in Northwest China), ll of whom being the major targets 
for “land reform” – still commanded a strong loyalt among their own ethnic group. The 
force of the discontent in regard to exploitative tenancy and financial usury, even the 
resentment owing to the prevalence of oppression and slavery among some groups, was 
far weaker compared to the affective power commanded by ethnic identity – or so in the 
eyes of the Chinese Communists. Although the Communist propaganda of minorities’ 
right to self-determination presupposed that the genuine self-determination could not be 
established without the full realization of the proletarian dictatorship, this propaganda 
itself could not escape an important irony: those to which it was directed – the “oppressed 
masses” among the ethnic minorities – were hardly concerned with the abstract concept 
of self-determination, and many were illiterate and could not understand the slogans often 
chalked on the walls of their houses by the passing Communist soldiers. It was to the 
contrary the ethnic elites, the presumed “enemies” of the Red Army, who were most 
interested in the political possibilities afforded by this vague term. It appeared that the 
CCP was caught between a rock and a hard place: either they continued to provoke the 
ethnic oppressed classes and conduct relentless land reform to fund their military 
operation – which, according to their evaluation of the situation, would almost inevitably 
fail and put the Red Army in a more difficult position, or they set out on a different path 
and started to probe the possibility of a conditional collaboration with ethnic elites, a 
collaboration that would require a virtuoso strategist and tactician who would be able to 
maneuver over this necessarily unstable ground. Previously, the CCP could assume in a 
purely theoretical manner that the future “socialist states” established by the triumphant 
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ethnic proletarians would necessarily be their allies, although this alliance was deferred to 
an indefinite future (this specific temporal dimensio  was a key character of this 
teleological political vision). Now, the coalition was re-located to the present moment, 
with the only – and critical – difference that it was founded upon uncertain compromises 
and insincere commitments, because the ally had becom  the inherently untrustworthy 
ethnic elites. The theoretical certainty of class analysis gave way to the practical 
unpredictability of coalitional politics. This is the basic shift in the socialist strategy of 
the CCP in this turning historical period. 
The political coalition with the ethnic elites was dubbed the “United Front with the 
upper classes (shangceng tongyizhanxian),” in contradistinction to the more classical 
Bolshevik position in forging alliances exclusively with the ethnic proletarians and 
oppressed masses. As a consequence of this strategic shift, the CCP transformed its actual 
tactics on the ground: it issued a multitude of orders to painstakingly curb the tendency 
among the ordinary Red Army soldiers to continue with the old policy of land reform and 
arbitrary confiscation previously executed in Eastern China among the Han. In a working 
report submitted for intraparty general circulation in 1937 by the CCP’s Committee on 
the Work among Ethnic Minorities, it was explicitly proposed, without any conditional 
qualifier, that “our Red Army is strongly opposed to confiscating the properties of the 
Hui landlords and gentries” (Ibid., pp. 569).  
The effects – and the confusion – entailed by this historical turn were unevenly 
distributed among the upper echelon of the CCP and the ordinary party cadres who 
remained responsible for the daily work on the political frontline. The link between 
Communism and the Communist Party, on the one hand,  the violent and arbitrary 
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confiscation of the locally rich and powerful, on the other, was irretrievably reified at the 
ground level in the course of actual political work. For those even less careful – 
especially the ordinary Red Army soldiers, many of whom were recruited from among 
the downtrodden poor peasants considered “natural allies” of the numerically weak 
Chinese proletarians – confiscation and robbery were made to stand in for Communism 
in general. Communism was seen as synonymous with the looting of the rich; the 
question “What else could/should the Communist Party do except for looting the 
landlords and the gentries? (gongchandang buda tuhao hai gan shenme?)” was 
frequently posed among the fighters and the propagandists as a response to the 
increasingly strict ban (especially as the Second Si o-Japanese War was approaching) on 
looting the ethnic rich issued by the higher authori y. (Ibid., pp. 523) The extent of this 
reification may in part be gauged by a somewhat farcic l scenario (which involves, 
interestingly, the question of translation) described in a report on the work among the 
Mongolians filed in July 1936 by a veteran CCP cadre, 
We shall promote the political education among our cadres – especially 
the translators – that were involved in the work among ethnic minorities. 
For instance, we once talked to a Mongolian Lama in the course of our 
work, and the translator who worked with us reduced the many important 
political questions we addressed to the simple principle he summarized as 
that of “looting the locally rich and saving the poor people (da tuhao jiu 
qiongren).” He was not able to translate all the rest. We were practically 
fuming.  
(Ibid., pp. 513) 
The tenacity of this reification of the CCP’s position made it particularly difficult for it to 
convince both its own army of cadres and soldiers and its proposed allies – i.e. the ethnic 
elites – that the new policy was completely consistent with its old and more radical stance. 
With the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War in mid-1930s (the official event that 
274 
 
marked its inception took place in 1937, but the war long preceded this date), the urgency 
of consolidating the leadership of the upper echelon of the CCP became particularly 
critical. The Leninist Bolshevik principle of strict discipline as the organizational 
guarantee for the ultimate triumph of the Communist cause required a more rigorous 
ideological re-alignment, in addition to a more robust mechanism in rooting out direct 
disobedience for the pursuit of petty self-interest ( .g. the embezzlement in land reform). 
More particularly, a strong positive reason must be provided to buttress the fundamental 
strategic shift from portraying the ethnic elites as the main target for violent confiscation 
to treating them as the major coalitional force that should be courted even at the expense 
of the ethnic “oppressed masses.” The expedient proposition which argued that this 
concession was required by the passive military survival of the Red Army did not possess 
sufficient persuasive power, since many lower cadres and ordinary soldiers were 
practically starving as a result of this shift. A new ideological justification – one that 
would turn a “compromise” into a “necessity” – was therefore urgently needed among the 
CCP higher authority during this period.  
This particular demand was met by a general ideological re-alignment in which the 
ethnic question in fact figured much less prominently compared to other more burning 
issues of the day. The paramount concern of the CCP between 1937 and 1945 – the entire 
duration of the Second Sino-Japanese War – was to maintain an intrinsically unstable 
collaboration with the KMT in resisting the imperialist invasion of the Japanese forces. 
But the forging of this “Anti-Japanese National United Front (kangri minzu 
tongyizhanxian),” as this collaboration was named by the CCP, wasfrom the beginning 
haunted by the memory of the blood-drenched failure of the recent past: the memory of 
275 
 
the 1927 coup of Chiang Kai-shek, which ended in particularly violent terms the first 
CCP-KMT collaboration, still evoked among many CCP members a strong suspicion of 
the KMT. This suspicion was cast in the idiom of a set of strongly Trotskyist questions 
that cut deeply into the center of the Chinese Communist Movement: was this new 
collaboration merely a repetition of the previous mistake? Did it demand, just like last 
time, forfeiting (either officially or as an unintended but inevitable consequence) the 
independent status of the Chinese proletarians as acompromise necessitated by the 
coalition with the national and comprador bourgeois represented by the KMT? In what 
way was this new collaboration different and how could it be verified that it would not 
tread the same path as the first collaboration did? 
It is in this political space that I think we should locate the ideological intervention of 
Mao Zedong and his followers. The very first point to note is that this intervention was 
situated in and constantly resorted to a fundamental shift in the political and military 
status of the CCP: still a weak political party in the 1920s struggling to develop its 
fledgling organization among the urban proletarians with neither an independent military 
force nor the support of the vast reserve of the peasants, the CCP in the 1930s, on the 
other hand, possessed a much stronger base upon which they could build and sustain their 
organizational independence. It is certainly true that the number of the CCP troops had 
considerably dwindled due to the difficulty they had to endure in the onerous Long 
March, but this temporary military frustration only reinforced the CCP’s conviction that 
they must by all means maintain their independent organizational status in any future 
cooperation with the KMT, or any other political force for that matter. The dispute 
around the second CCP-KMT collaboration – i.e. the formation of the Anti-Japanese 
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National United Front – hinged precisely upon whether and how this independence could 
be secured, and what conditions could prevent it from eplicating the political destiny of 
the first. In a speech on November 5, 1938, delivered precisely on the question of the 
CCP’s independent status in the new United Front, Mao laid out in clear terms the gist of 
his intervention, 
We should use long-term collaboration [with the KMT] to support the 
lasting war [with the Japanese], which means, more specifically, that the 
class struggle should be made to serve the interest of the anti-Japanese 
national struggle. This is the fundamental criterion of the United Front. 
Under this general criterion, it was a necessity that we must maintain the 
independence of our party and the class perspective within this United 
Front, without sacrificing it for the sake of collaboration and unification 
[with the KMT]. This critical independence is conducive to the 
collaboration; it in fact defines this collaboration. The loss of it means 
assimilation [into the KMT] and would inevitably destroy the United Front. 
Under the present circumstance, the class struggle manifests itself through 
the the national struggle, and this points to their consistency.  
(Ibid., pp. 607) 
The last sentence in this quote was particularly critical, but it was – perhaps intentionally 
– extremely ambiguous. We shall note that Mao wrote On Contradiction one year before 
this speech, and it was written precisely at the time when the Second Sino-Japanese War 
openly broke out at full scale.40 The distinction between “major contradiction” and 
“minor contradiction,” for instance, was addressed pecifically to this vital transformation 
in the historical juncture, and was proposed as a theoretical practice – in the sense that 
Althusser gives to this term – to reformulate the historically situated relationship between 
the class struggle and the national liberation movement in China in the 1930s. The 
concept of “manifestation” was especially intriguing. A different topological relationship 
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between the class struggle and the national revolution seemed to be implicated in the 
mediatory logic inferred by this word: that the phenomenality of the class struggle, 
because of the objective shift in the historical junct re, was necessarily mediated by the 
national revolutionary struggle; that the class struggle, in other words, was strictly 
speaking overdetermined by the national revolution. In another speech Mao delivered in 
the same year, the critical significance of the national revolution for the class struggle 
(instead of the other way around) was again proposed, and this time, in a more overt and 
unambiguous manner: 
The CCP members must reconcile patriotism with internationalism. We 
are patriots as well as internationalists. We fight for our motherland 
against invaders….Only after national liberation ca the possibility obtain 
for the emancipation of the proletarians and the laboring masses. If China 
wins [the war against imperialism] and defeats the imperialists, this would 
necessarily help the oppressed masses of other countries. Therefore, 
patriotism is the realization of internationalism in the national 
liberation….All the patriotic acts on our side are justified, and all are the 
realization of internationalism specifically in the Chinese context. Not a 
bit of them is against internationalism. Only political imbeciles or 
provocateurs would accuse us of repudiating the international line.  
(Ibid., pp. 599) 
Since what I intend to do in this section of the introduction is to situate the general 
political space in which the ethnic question was addressed and debated among the 
Chinese Communists, I would not digress into a more detailed discussion of the political 
purges, ideological infighting, and power struggles within the upper echelon of the CCP. 
Mao’s critique of “political imbeciles,” especially his designation of his opponents as 
“provocateurs,” strongly implied the insertion of his ideological work on the United Front 
into the concrete political gaming he was then engaging with Chen Shaoyu (“Wang 
Ming”) who was soon to be disgraced and named as a major “ultra-leftist” on whom 
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many defeats of the CCP was blamed. But it is not this political power struggle – on 
which has been spilled quite a lot of ink – that I am interested in.41 What I find rather 
more critical is the particular structure of the argument that Mao put forth. Patriotism was 
not portrayed as contradictory to internationalism; it was construed neither as an 
expedient concession to the historical juncture noras a necessary step that would 
eventually be overcome by internationalism. To the contrary, a different form of 
temporality was propounded: internationalism was not postponed to an indefinite future. 
It was already realized in and by an apparently provincial patriotism. This means that the 
exclusive focus upon China’s own war with the Japanese and the political collaboration 
with the KMT (with conditional compromises the CCP Central Committee publicly 
reckoned with), both required by the United Front, were always already internationalism 
in the Maoist formulation. It was precisely because of this that Mao could take perhaps 
the ultimate step in declaring that “the line of the United Front is the class line;” that the 
United Front was not a compromise (although “local” compromises were certainly 
involved) but an intrinsic necessity to the eventual riumph of the class struggle.  
This Maoist position killed two birds with one stone and completely transformed the 
ideological field in which the CCP maneuvered: on the one hand, the national revolution 
was not understood to be the “first step” towards internationalization. Mao’s stance, 
strictly speaking, could not be subsumed under the “stage theory” which was the Stalinist 
position in the 1920s and 1930s. On the other, this Maoist position was equally different 
from the classical Trotskyist stance committed to a radical internationalist vision 
(Trotsky’s critique of Stalin’s international policy in the 1920s hinged precisely upon the 
                                                   
41 See Gao, 2000 for a detailed historiographical study of the fierce power struggles in the upper echelon of 
the CCP during this period.  
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latter’s efforts at protecting the particular state interests of the Soviet Union in the world 
communist movement). Mao differed from Trotsky – in fact, the 1930s witnessed one of 
the most violent suppressions of the Trotskyites among the CCP (the “provocateurs” 
certainly included the Trotskyites) – in the sense that he established a completely 
different mode of relationship between nationalism (what he called “patriotism”) and 
internationalism. If Trotsky was committed to a more literal Communist internationalism, 
i.e. the unrelenting position that insisted on cultivating transnational coalitions with world 
proletarians without giving in to parochial national interests, Mao’s internationalism 
amounted almost to a complete reversal of Trotsky’s (and the early CCP’s) position. 
Nationalism was re-conceptualized as the manifestation and realization – or perhaps the 
mediation – of internationalism in the particular historical juncture that was China in the 
1930s and 1940s. In this new light, the United Front and the coalition with the national 
and comprador bourgeois were theoretically assimilated into the Communist strategy. In 
a certain sense, and surely with much political andconceptual difference, what Mao did 
in the 1930s may be comparable to what Althusser did among the PCF (the French 
Communist Party) in the 1960s before the onset of 1968. 
It is in relation to this general conceptual shift in the Communist strategy that I want 
to situate the change of the CCP’s ethnic policy after the Long March and especially 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The “Upper Class United Front” the CCP 
painstakingly sought with the ethnic elites fit tightly into this general strategic shift. What 
was a practical impossibility – that it was extremely difficult, if at all possible, to lead the 
ethnic oppressed masses into a self-conscious land reform against their own upper classes, 
hence overriding their ethnic identity with a strong class consciousness – now became a 
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theoretically grounded strategic choice: a coalition with the ethnic elites was no longer a 
temporary and passive compromise to conserve the decrepit Red Army. It became a 
necessity that was required by the class politics itself – it was class politics. To 
paraphrase Mao, “the line of Upper Class United Front is the class line.” By means of the 
Maoist intervention, the class politics was not eradic ted. It was transformed and re-
situated, with the ethnic question reformulated accordingly.  
To be sure, in neither of the two historical periods that I have discussed in this section 
(before the Long March and after 1949 on the one hand, nd between the Long March 
and mid-1940s on the other) did the ethnic question take center stage. But as I have 
demonstrated above, it was marginal in irreducibly different – at times inverse – ways 
across these two historical epochs. The account I have given is definitely non-exhaustive. 
But these at times fragmented historical scenarios serve only to demonstrate why I 
consider it critical not to reduce the itinerary of the ethnic question in the (post)socialist 
China to a liberal genealogy of self-determination, which perhaps has become the 
hegemonic political imaginary in theorizing and analyzing the politics of ethnicity after 
the Second World War and the decolonization movements.  
However, my intention to displace the dominant liberal imaginary on the politics of 
ethnicity with a socialist past that still looms large in contemporary China is necessarily 
limited by the partiality and exclusivity that mark this history from the outset. Despite (or 
precisely because of) the fact that I paint the picture in quite broad strokes, the limit of 
my attempt becomes acutely visible even with a brief look at the particular level at which 
the history I recount unfolds. The “ethnic elites” which Mao included in the “Upper Class 
United Front” were almost exclusively from four ethnic groups: the Hui, the Mongols, 
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the Tibetans, and the so-called “Yi.” Uyghur elites were added to the laundry list in the 
1950s, for a brief time before Xinjiang was violently placed under the ruthless rule of the 
CCP. The Red Army certainly encountered many more ethnic groups in the Long March 
– some they might have heard of, while others were simply unbeknown to them – but not 
all mattered, and only a selected few were given the “privilege” to inhabit the marginal 
and insignificant political position assigned to them in the “Upper Class United Front.” In 
other words, it must be registered and given due attention that the potential theoretical 
and political insight that might be gained from excavating the socialist politics of 
ethnicity as an alternative to the hegemonic liberal im ginary necessarily presupposes an 
exclusion from this tradition of those ethnic minorities who simply did not and perhaps 
could not appear in this story. The site of those who have been excluded even from 
inhabiting the marginal position instituted by the socialist politics of ethnicity must 






In the Name of Autonomy, or, Does “the Ethnic 
Question” Exist? 
 
Haiyuan is a small county in southern Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. In the 
ecological terms now often used to refer to this area, Haiyuan is located within the 
“southern mountainous region” (nanbu shanqu), a phrase that immediately conjures the 
rural-urban division in China, with all the connotations of poverty, migrant labor, and 
environmental vulnerability. According to various Chinese reports, Haiyuan, together 
with Xiji and Guyuan, was listed by the United Nations Development Program in 1972 as 
one of the areas in the world deemed “unsuitable for human survival.” Its low 
precipitation rate and coarse soil have rendered making a living unbearably difficult. The 
conditions have earned Haiyuan the designation of a state-level poverty-stricken county 
(guojiaji pinkunxian) eligible for national relief funds. Around 69% ofthe population is 
Hui, which makes Haiyuan one of the few places in the entire Hui Autonomous Region 
where the minority actually constitutes a majority.  
In 2009, news of a new round of administrative delimitation started to spread among 
the local people, and this time, it was in the name of poverty reduction. To those in 
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positions within government bureaucracy, the determination of devastating poverty can 
be a double-edged sword. The county governments are the lowest level at which local 
governance can be effectively administered, and poverty renders them eligible for state 
funding and preferential policies, often rich soil for embezzlement. Stories abound of 
how neighboring counties compete to make the life of local population appear miserable 
so as to be labeled by the state as a poverty-stricken ounty. Misery, real or fake – but of 
course never fake for the really poor who in turn will have to bear the all-too-real cost of 
faking – is turned into capital, a basis on which grows the misappropriation of local 
officials. However, there is also a flip side to the story: being funded is certainly a good 
thing, but one must be careful not to play the card too often or too much. Poverty can 
attract government investment, but it can also be an apparent statement of administrative 
incompetence and the incapacity to develop the local e onomy. In a bureaucracy driven 
primarily by the pursuit of ever higher GDP figures, continuing local poverty could easily 
jeopardize the career of local officials thirsty for promotion. Different approaches for 
alleviating poverty (or at the very least the appearance of it) are often tried out, and 
administrative re-demarcation is one particularly attractive option. 
As part of the “southern mountainous region,” Haiyun is notorious for its poverty. 
The very name “southern mountainous region” alludes to extreme poverty and intolerable 
livelihood. It’s a term that sticks in the mind of all those who know Ningxia. In other 
words – and this is the administrative sleight of hand at stake – if poverty is so intimately 
tied to a local name, the relief of poverty likewise does not necessarily have to work with 
concrete numbers (which in themselves are manipulable names). As long as Haiyuan is 
no longer considered part of the “southern mountainous region,” and as long as there still 
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remain places which are, a change of administrative boundary could change the political 
situation. On the one hand, such a change could easily free Haiyuan from its disrepute. 
On the other, it could further appear to reduce the siz  of the “southern mountainous 
region.” This is exactly what was accomplished in 2009: Haiyuan was cut from its 
previous administrative connection with the city of Guyuan and subject to the jurisdiction 
of Zhongwei, a city in the middle of Ningxia with a name of agricultural prosperity. 
Compared to the “southern mountainous region,” the northern plain of Ningxia is widely 
considered to be the fertile Yangtze delta in northwest China.  
But Zhongwei is not yet “the north,” which centers upon Yinchuan, the capital city of 
Ningxia. Zhongwei is located in what has been called the “middle arid area” (zhongbu 
ganhandai), between the northern plain and the southern mountains. Furthermore, it is 
also in the middle in terms of the ratio of Hui population. Lower than the 69% of Haiyuan 
county but higher than the 23% of the capital Yinchuan, Zhongwei has a Hui population 
of 35%.  
A change of name brings more than a nominal change of administrative status. In 
addition to no longer being considered part of the notoriously poor “southern 
mountainous region,” Haiyuan also expanded. The city of Zhongwei redrew its internal 
borders and transferred two townships to the newly appended Haiyuan. The crucial point 
is, that in contrast to the predominantly crevasse-lad n landscape of Haiyuan, the two 
new towns are fertile plains. Eventually given an opp rtunity to move outside the bleak 
mountains, officials of Haiyuan drooled over the newly appended towns and even 
planned to move the county seat from the trench to the plain. They intended to change 
one town, Heicheng, into a district of the new county seat and move all government 
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offices to this new district. All this was done behind closed doors – any governmental 
action that might stir up suspicion among the governed is considered to be potentially 
disruptive of social stability. If the change of county seat involves little more than the 
relocation of government offices and the old county seat will remain largely intact despite 
this administrative shift, there is no point of making a big fuss out of this change. The 
Haiyuan county government wanted to make any move unnoticed. They wanted to leave 
before the people became aware.  
As it turned out, the county government was barely able to hide the news from local 
residents. Suspicion was already widespread. To the Haiyuan residents, the relocation of 
government meant not only the mere physical removal f offices: it indicated the change 
of focus and the redistribution of developmental resources monopolized by the 
government. The old county seat would remain stuck, stopped in its premature plan for 
development, abandoned by a government now moved to a fertile plain. Discontent 
seathed until June 10th, 2009, when the news was finally confirmed, not by an official 
public notice, but by a far more explosive scenario: a local resident suddenly noticed that 
the national emblem used to be hung at the front of the county government building was 
missing. Without informing the local residents, it seemed, the county government was 
simply gone. It suggested that this was already a fait accompli, an irreversible fact. 
People were furious – they felt cheated, duped. Indeed they had been. They gathered in 
front of the emptied building, demanding an official reply from the government. 
One crucial fact that should not be overlooked is, that in the Haiyuan county seat 
where over 60% of the population is Hui, the Han noetheless make up over 30%. Many 
of these Han mixed themselves up with the Hui in the mass gathering by wearing a skull 
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cap or a headscarf, donning conventionally Hui Muslim garments in order to pass for the 
Hui. It seemed that if what was at stake were merely a general case of a dispute between 
the governing and the governed over the relocation of an administrative seat in a remote 
and poverty-stricken county, the balance of power would more likely tilt toward the side 
of the government, which commanded all the forces ncessary to bring down minor 
unrest. However, to reframe the situation in terms of an “ethnic question” would appear 
to be a wiser strategy: from an “ordinary” conflict nvolving socio-economic concerns, 
the incident would be re-positioned in the “extraordinary” realm of the politics of 
ethnicity. That 60% of the population was Hui provided a handy demographic condition: 
if most of the population affected was Hui, then why couldn’t we consider it an instance 
of the “ethnic question?” But what is an “ethnic question”? How does one distinguish 
between questions that merely involve ethnic minorities and those other questions that 
might be termed “properly ethnic” hence situated squarely in the political space given to 
ethnicity in China’s socialism? What form would a “properly ethnic question” assume? 
And what are the institutional and legal frameworks out of which a “properly ethnic 
question” might emerge?  
These questions will be addressed either explicitly or implicitly in this chapter. First, 
though, we should finish our story. It turned out that it was not only the local residents 
who were intent on spinning the issue into a politically sensitive “ethnic question.” The 
county government did not rebuff this attempt at politicization. Instead, they took it up 
and carried it even further. The explosive power of an “ethnic unrest” paradoxically 
served to absolve the county government of its culpabi ity in eliciting the crisis with their 
arbitrary and sneaky decision to relocate their offices. Instead, it was reports of a “Hui 
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revolt” that were sent to the higher authority, requ sting police and military 
reinforcement. A vice-governor of Ningxia Autonomous Region was pushed to the public 
forefront to deliver a speech, but his accusatory tne only made things worse. He was 
literally chased off the podium and hid behind the buffer zone that the local police 
formed between the deserted county government and the furious crowd. The protest was 
mainly peaceful, but the fermentation of anger and frustration also caused occasional 
outbursts of violence. The local police force was quickly outnumbered. The desperate 
vice-governor issued an ultimatum to the county Huicadres: either they would personally 
step out to appease the vociferous Hui, risking their lives, but appealing to the “natural 
bond” presumed to exist between ethnic cadres and the people they were seen to 
“represent,” or else they would face the irremediable fate of demotion for committing a 
“political” mistake. The chair of the standing committee of the Haiyuan People’s 
Congress, a Hui cadre for that matter, appeared briefly in front of the crowd, only to 
prove that the unfolding of the event had already reached a point of no return and the 
“natural bond” hardly sufficed to avert a crisis. As troops were dispatched to suppress 
what was supposed to be a “revolt” of an ethnic minority and to restore a stable social 
order, it seemed that a violent clash would soon engulf the small county of Haiyuan.  
What might have seemed like an inevitable bloodshed came to an abrupt end before it 
even broke out. As the troops were approaching the disoriented crowd scared by the 
arrival of the military, one old man jumped on top f a car, and in a surprisingly 
exhilarating tone, announced to the crowd, 
Look out, people! The central government has sent the troops to our aid! 
The Liberation Army (jiefang jun) is coming to liberate us! Folks! Make 
way for our beloved soldiers! Here come our reinforcements! 
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Out of either complicity that formed instantaneously or simply being pushed by others 
unaware of what was happening, the crowd split intotw  and a path emerged in the 
middle. Someone in the crowd cheered “Long lives the Liberation Army!” Others 
promptly picked up and passed it on. The celebratory atmosphere confused the troops, as 
what they were told was a “revolt” had become less a rebellion than a hyperbolic 
declaration of loyalty to the central government. The CCP Central Committee in Beijing 
was immediately informed of the disparity between what was witnessed by the troops on 
the ground and what transpired in the reports sent to the provincial and the central 
governments. A conclusion was eventually reached by the CCP Central Committee: the 
county government had extravagantly exaggerated and distorted the incident. It was 
determined to have been less an “ethnic revolt” than the result of an inappropriate 
governmental action. The Central Committee now put the provincial government in full 
charge of addressing the after-effects and offering a response acceptable to the local 
population without unnecessary politicization.  
I tell the story with all its details because it presents a lively image of almost all the 
key points that will be addressed in this chapter and the next: the institutional 
characteristics and limitations of ethnic regional autonomy in China, the predicament of 
ethnic cadres that cannot be described as merely caught between contradictory forces, 
and most important of all, the spectral existence, th  apparitional nature of the “ethnic 
question” and its particularly significant relation with “the political” in the specifically 




First, it is tempting to insert the story into the familiar “redistribution” debate that 
revolves around the issue of minority rights, especially their socio-economic rights. 
Although this debate unfolds primarily in the domain of liberal politics, it might seem 
that one could read this story as an instance of the subaltern’s demand for redistribution 
in a non-liberal political configuration. Indeed, the Hui were making purely socio-
economic requests, and their main concern was that the relocation of government offices 
might entail the freeze on local development. They were indeed demanding a 
redistribution of resources that might be conducive to the local economic growth. The 
most interesting point of the story, however, is not what was demanded as much as how 
the people – the Hui and the Han – went about making their demands and why they 
considered that a certain re-framing of the demands might be more effective than others. 
That this re-framing backfired perhaps demonstrates not so much its ineffectiveness as its 
over-effectiveness. Its failure was only a negative and monstrous demonstration of its 
political potential. The content of the demand might point to the socio-economic rights of 
an ethnic group, but the form of the demand points to the socio-economic rights of an 
ethnic group, as a group distinct from the generally impoverished. This change of 
accentuation requires that one go beyond a simple argument for redistribution and pay 
attention to the particularly “political” nature ofthe “ethnic question” under the socialist 
condition. 
Second, what might appear no less appealing would be to treat my story as another 
example of how the weak, the ruled, or the oppressed are not pure victims of 
authoritarian power and to argue that they can, notwithstanding possible or perhaps 
frequent failures, appropriate a public political discourse for their own benefits. That in 
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my story the efforts to reframe the incident in terms of an “ethnic question” backfired 
cannot in itself dismiss this argument as invalid. Correct as it might be within certain 
limits, this argument nonetheless fails to capture th  subtle meaning of the particular 
backfiring. The point is not merely to locate the agency of the oppressed, but to trace the 
contour of the political space in which the “ethnic question” appears in such a form that 
its apparitional nature entails specific equivocations and ambiguities. The closer one gets 
to the “ethnic question,” the farther it recedes into ever distant background; the keener 
one wants to get hold of it, the faster it disappears into nothingness.  
Third, it has often been argued that the legal and political institution of ethnic 
regional autonomy in China is merely a replication of Soviet confederated republics. True 
as this proposition might be, it tells us little by painting the entire picture in broad strokes. 
This chapter attempts to examine more carefully the internal logics and contradictions of 
this particularly Chinese institution. Though, as should become clear subsequently, ethnic 
regional autonomy in China might have given ethnic m norities only a “nominal” right to 
autonomy, we can also ask: what are the concrete ins itutional arrangements that might 
on the one hand keep the this autonomy within the realm of pure name, while on the other 
intensify the very attraction of this name, making t ever more tenacious and alluring? In 
other words, what are the substantial structures that might magnify the illusive effects of 
the illusion without changing its fundamentally illusive nature? It is precisely because 
ethnic regional autonomy in China both follows and differs from the Soviet model that 
we are particularly well situated to study the lifeof nominal autonomy.  
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Twin Pillars of Autonomy: Territory and Population 
Although all accounts of ethnic regional autonomy (minzu quyu zizhi) start from a 
rehearsal of its prehistory, its early embryonic forms in the 1930s, I would like to start 
from its first systemic formulation in the Outlines for Ethnic Regional Autonomy in 1952. 
I choose this document as my point of departure in order to emphasize the particular 
space in which I want to locate my discussion. Although one could find examples of 
“ethnic autonomous government” before the Communists assumed power in 1949 
(Central Party School, 1991), those examples were eith r inconsistent or short-lived and 
served more as archetypes intended for political propaganda than instances of serious 
institutional arrangements. Therefore, by starting from the 1952 document, I am setting 
out to study ethnic regional autonomy as an establihed institution formulated by a 
system of rules, regulations and administrative dirct ves after the CCP had achieved and 
consolidated the monopoly of state power.  
The 1952 document came as a direct sequel to the 1949 Common Outlines of Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (hereafter Common Outlines), which then 
served as the provisional constitution of the newly established People’s Republic of 
China. The entire sixth chapter of the Common Outlines dictates the foundational 
framework of ethnic regional autonomy. Article 51 states: 
In regions where ethnic minorities live in concentrated communities, each 
should execute ethnic regional autonomy. Each should establish its own 
ethnic autonomous government, the administrative statu  of which is 
determined by the amount of population included and the size of the 
territory covered. In all places where either a particular ethnic group 
executes autonomy or multiple ethnic groups share the same region, each 
and every ethnic group should have an appropriate number of their own 
representatives in the local political organs.  
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(People Publishing House, 1958b, p.1) 
The provisional constitution provides little more than a general scheme for ethnic 
regional autonomy. Key questions are presented but not answered: How does one define 
a region where “ethnic minorities live in concentrated communities?” It might appear 
easy to judge at the first sight, but the question of counting population is immediately 
complicated by how one divides the territory. If by “living in concentrated communities” 
one means that the number of a particular ethnic minority should reach a certain 
proportion in the total local population, then one must in the first place re-define the 
scope of this “local,” and this re-definition would inevitably involve much more than the 
drawing of administrative boundaries. Note that in Article 51, population is intimately 
tied to territory. It is a strange circularity: one cannot deal with population unless all 
reach an agreement on territory; correlatively, one cannot decide on the territorial 
regional autonomy of an ethnic group unless the minority population that inhabits that 
region can be considered to “live in concentrated communities.” Additionally, the size of 
a “concentrated community” directly determines its administrative status. It dictates 
whether the autonomous government should be legally considered on a par with a town 
government, a county one, or a provincial one. On top of all this, there is also the 
question of political representation, of guaranteeing that “every ethnic group should have 
an appropriate number of their own representatives in the local political organs.” 
The Common Outlines in general and Article 51 in particular are merely general 
principles of a constitutional nature. It is, on the other hand, the 1952 Outlines of Ethnic 
Regional Autonomy that provides a more detailed elaboration. Consider th  following 
four entries extracted from the Outlines: 
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Article 4 With due consideration of the state of relationship between local 
ethnic minorities, level of economic development, ad particular historical 
conditions, all areas where ethnic minorities live in concentrated 
communities should establish one of the following forms of autonomous 
region: 
i. An autonomous region based primarily upon the concentrated 
community of one particular ethnic minority. 
ii.  An autonomous region based primarily upon the concentrated 
community of one ethnic minority, but which also includes other 
proportionally smaller ethnic minorities on the same territory. 
Those areas within this form of autonomous region where the 
proportionally smaller minorities live in their own concentrated 
communities should execute regional autonomy as well.
iii.  An autonomous region based primarily upon the unity of the 
concentrated communities of two or more ethnic minorities. 
Whether the concentrated communities of the ethnic minorities 
living in this form of autonomous region should each establish 
separate ethnic autonomous regions on their own ought to be 
determined according to the particularities of circumstances and 
the will of the minorities themselves. 
Article 5 In accordance with the local economic and political demands, 
and with due consideration of historical conditions, each ethnic 
autonomous region should include both rural and urban inhabitations of 
the Han. The form of government in those places in an ethnic autonomous 
region where the Han live in concentrated communities should follow the 
ordinary governmental form shared nationwide, instead of executing Han 
regional autonomy. But where there is a large Han population in an 
autonomous region, a coalitional democratic governmt of relevant 
ethnic groups should be established. 
Article 6 The administrative boundary of each ethnic autonomous region 
should be appropriately demarcated according to Articles 4 and 5 in this 
Outlines. If time does not permit appropriate demarcation at the time of 
the establishment of certain autonomous regions, expedients are allowed 
for later adjustments. 
Article 7 The administrative status of each national autonomous region, 
that is, whether it is equivalent to a Town (village), a Region, a County, a 
Special Region or beyond, should be determined according to the 
population included, territory covered and other relevant conditions. 
 (People Publishing House, 1958b, p. 67-8) 
Article 4 does chart out a brief typology, but a finer distinction between types does not 
answer the crucial question that we posed previously. If one is caught within the 
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circularity between territory and population when oe tries to define the “concentrated 
communities” of one single ethnic minority, the predicament is exacerbated when it 
comes to a judgment on places where two or more ethnic minorities “share the same 
region.” To what extent and in what way, based upon what criteria of dividing both 
population and territory, can one say that “multiple ethnic groups share the same region?” 
I deliberately return to the wording of the 1949 Common Outlines in order to accentuate 
the fact that the elaboration of ethnic regional autonomy in the 1952 Outlines, instead of 
spotting and clarifying the ambiguities in the provisional constitution, only increases the 
confusion. When we read Article 4 alongside Articles 5, 6, and 7, a set of questions 
immediately arise. 
First, why does an ethnic autonomous region, institutionalized by law and intended 
for the minorities to “administer their own internal affairs” (People Publishing House, 
1958b, p. 67), necessarily have to include Han areas? Why do Han settlements within 
ethnic autonomous regions seem to matter to such a degree that it has to be legalized 
immediately after the article that grants autonomous rights to ethnic minorities? How 
does the CCP reconcile this stipulation with its public support for the autonomy of ethnic 
minorities? In short, how does it convince the minorities and all those who advocate for 
minority rights that this jarring clause works not so much against ethnic autonomy as 
fundamentally for it? Second, Article 6 justifies expedient measures in case “time does 
not permit appropriate demarcation at the time of the establishment of certain 
autonomous regions.” But how could an ethnic autonomous region be establi hed even 
before its administrative boundary is settled? If, indeed, there was a rush, foremost 
among ethnic minorities, to have their own regional autonomy in the 1950s, then why did 
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boundaries still need to be re-adjusted and re-drawn l ter, on some occasions perhaps 
even against the will of the autonomy-seeking minorities? In other words, what are the 
considerations that necessitate more time and more deliberation? Third and this is the 
purloined letter of the Outlines: what is ever present is the vexing absence of any specific 
numerical standard. We are never told up to what point, what percentage a certain 
minority or a multiplicity of minorities should share in the total local population in order 
for a region to qualify for ethnic autonomy. There is, in other words, a critical 
contradiction that lies at the center of the Outlines: if ethnic regional autonomy hinges 
precisely upon the notion of “concentrated communities,” should the very first item listed 
in the founding law of this political institution not be an articulate stipulation of a 
numerical threshold? It seems that all the entries in the Outlines circle around this all too 
visible central void, and special care is taken not to touch on this foundational opacity. 
A 1951 report to the State Commission of Ethnic Affairs authored by Li Weihan, then 
head of the CCP Central Department of the United Front, offers a hint: 
The regional autonomy of ethnic minorities advances within the territorial 
bound of the People’s Republic of China, under the centralized leadership 
of the central government, and follows the route se down by the Common 
Outlines of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. It is 
an autonomy founded upon the concentrated communities of ethnic 
minorities (Its criteria should not be founded upon a certain percentage 
that minorities share in the local population. Such criteria would be wrong 
and in violation of the Common Outlines.) This is a general principle and a 
major premise. No equivocation is permitted in regad to this general 
principle and major premise. 
(Li, 1981, p. 510) 
A caveat is offered in parenthesis, but it’s strange that a parenthesis should appear in such 
a crucial passage, right after the major premise on which “no equivocation is allowed.” It 
seems that misconception of the general principle is so prevalent that it must be pointed 
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out and avoided at all costs. The confusion is ever pr sent, but its presence must not be 
allowed to breach the confinement of the grammatical device of parenthesis. Why though 
would a numerical standard be in violation of the Common Outlines? What are the 
political concerns that necessitate the foundational p city of the first law on ethnic 
regional autonomy? 
A 1952 lecture given by Ulanhuu on a meeting of the central government provides a 
relatively more elaborate answer. Ulanhuu was vice-chair of the State Commission of 
Ethnic Affairs in the 1950s, a veteran Mongolian Party member and founding leader of 
the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 1947 before th  Communists officially 
assumed power in Beijing. He was one of a few ethnic cadres that ever rose to the top 
levels of the Party. The lecture was a brief report of he main concerns and procedures 
involved in drafting the Outlines of Ethnic Regional Autonomy: 
What kind of place should exercise ethnic regional autonomy? According 
to the stipulations of the Common Outlines, all areas where ethnic 
minorities live in concentrated communities should qualify. But because 
of the residential patterns of ethnic minorities in China, the question 
immediately arises of the ethnic composition of particular autonomous 
regions. This is a complex and serious matter… [W]hat principles should 
be heeded in deciding on the ethnic composition of an autonomous region? 
The draft of the Outlines states that this should be decided according to the 
relationship between ethnic groups, locally specific economic conditions 
and historical circumstances, on the basis of the equality and free will of 
the minorities. Some places have over-emphasized th importance of 
relationship between ethnic groups without paying due attention to 
economic conditions and historical circumstances, while others have 
accentuated historical circumstances, overlooking relations between 
different ethnic groups and economic conditions. But the most common 
mistake has been a disregard of local economic conditi s. All these are 
inappropriate.  
(People Publishing House, 1958b, p. 75-6) 
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I shall now unpack each critical point in this deceptively simple passage. First, the 
residential pattern of ethnic minorities in China is often dubbed in official discourse as 
“mostly scattered, yet concentrated in compact communities wherever they reside, or 
living mixed and criss-crossed with one another andwith the Han” (da zaju/da fen san, 
xiao juju, jiaocuo zaju) (State Commission of Ethnic Affairs, 2010, p. 1).In an essay 
published in the early 1960s by Li Weihan, out of the six characterizations of minorities 
in China, the very first two are the difference in the amount of their population and their 
complex geographical distribution (Li, 1980, p. 1-2). On the one hand, ethnic minorities 
are scattered all over China and except for a few places such as Tibet, their number is in 
general statistically minor compared to the local Hn population. On the other hand, they 
are often widely distributed over the vast Chinese territory, and some ethnic groups, such 
as the Hui, are so dispersed that the majority of their population fall into discrete villages 
in rural areas or no more than a few neighborhoods in a city. One can imagine a map of 
dots of various sizes randomly scattered, to the point where it is impossible to find any 
clear-cut pattern of distribution. This is a major problem in designing the institutional 
plan for ethnic regional autonomy.  
Second, what appeared in Ulanhuu’s report also appeared in the official Outlines, but 
with a crucial difference: in the Outlines, what seemed to be a marginal note, namely that 
the design of an autonomous region should stay “in accordance with the local economic 
and political demand” and give due attention to histor cal conditions, became in Ulanhuu’s 
report a major concern. Note how he framed these critical elements: relations between 
ethnic groups, historical circumstances, and the most important and neglected of all, 
economic conditions. These are general and abstract cautions, but they nonetheless reveal 
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a thread that runs through the particular space in which the “ethnic question” is construed: 
the very object that will be worked on, the “raw material” which the political scheme of 
ethnic regional autonomy intends to transform is not particular minorities, but relations 
among minorities and between the minorities and the Han majority. The point is not 
recognizing the limited political sovereignty of any specific ethnic minority as much as 
organizing relations between and among ethnic groups in such a way as to be conducive 
to the local “economic conditions.”  
Two specific examples can substantiate this general point. First, around 1956, a 
debate among the CCP committee of Guangxi Province o  the details of establishing a 
Zhuang Autonomous Region culminated in a competition between two contrastive plans. 
Both of them revolved around the future of Guixi Zhuang Autonomous Region which 
had already existed for a couple of years in the western half of the Guangxi Province. The 
dispute boiled down to this: should the Guixi Zhuang Autonomous Region remain intact 
and break from the Guangxi Province and be established as an independent provincial 
autonomous region administratively on a par with the newly contracted Guangxi 
Province which will include only the eastern half of the current province? Or, should one 
opt for the other plan, and instead of elevating Guixi to a provincial autonomous region, 
transform the entire Guangxi Province into a single Zhuang Autonomous Region? In 
other words, should one, instead of keeping Guixi intact, expand it to such an extent that 
the entire eastern half of Guangxi is included within the new Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region? Li Weihan endorsed the second option, and he called this plan “the 
one of unification.” How he justified this preference reveals in a particularly intriguing 
way the concrete deliberative procedure in establishing ethnic autonomous regions.  
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According to Li, the main reason behind the plan of “division,” as the first plan was 
referred to, was that in Guangxi Province in general, the Han constituted the majority, 
with the Zhuang population sharing a mere 36.9%. Li did not deny this demographic fact, 
but the turn of his argument was somewhat surprising: if this difference of population 
should become the reason for division, then how do we justify the establishment of the 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where the ratio of the Han population is even 
higher, around 83%, or countless other autonomous prefectures and counties where the 
percentage of minority population is even lower? Countering the argument for numerical 
threshold, Li did not propose what shall be done. To the contrary, he was merely pointing 
out what had already been done. He wanted to remind his opponents and to make them 
realize retrospectively the very logic that had from the outset operated the plan for ethnic 
regional autonomy: if a numerical standard was set, it would be highly possible that none 
of the already existing ethnic autonomous regions, even those that had up to now 
remained unanimously undisputable, would make sense. I  order to buttress his argument 
against the setting of a numerical standard, Li went o  to provide a more or less 
mythological account of how ethnic minorities had in the course of history been coerced 
by the dominant Han into barren mountainous areas and how this geographical 
marginalization constituted a proof of the oppression they had been subjected to before 
the coming of the CCP. Situated in the context of this story, the first plan amounted to an 
evasion of the responsibility that the Han ought now t  assume to make up for their past 
mistake – an argument that echoed Premier Zhou Enlai’s announcement that the Han 
should “repay the debts” they had incurred on the et nic minorities (People Publishing 
House, 1958a, p.142-3). Equality between different ethnic groups, declared in the 1954 
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Constitution and in the Outlines, is defined not merely as a legal-juridical stricture, but 
also as a call to achieve the so-called “equality in fact” (State Commission of Ethnic 
Affairs, 2009, p.278-84). Leaving the minorities ontheir own, argued Li, was precisely 
contrary to what was intended by the institution of ethnic regional autonomy and would 
not be conducive to the well-being of the impoverished minorities. The general 
distribution of population in Guangxi was considerably uneven, with the Han half 
densely populated and the Zhuang half sparsely inhab ted. What further complicated the 
picture was that the Han half actually amounted to less than a literal half – the Han area 
occupied only 30% of the total Guangxi territory. Li reframed this demography in an 
interesting proposition: that the percent of the Han population is in reverse proportion to 
the percent of the Han territory in Guangxi. Therefo , he argued, it made perfect sense to 
unify both the population and the territory of the Han and the Zhuang.  
Li justified this option by recourse to a concern with the local economic condition. 
The Han area was agriculturally more developed and technologically advanced, but the 
dense population and the scarcity of land would undo btedly become the bottleneck for 
future development. The Zhuang area, on the other hand, was literally a virgin land, with 
both fertile farmland and, more important, enormous re erves of mineral resources 
crucial for industrialization. The “equality in fact” between ethnic groups required that 
the Han work closely with the Zhuang and unconditionally share their more advanced 
technology necessary for exploiting the resources buried underground. This was seen as a 
concrete rendition of the abstract political slogan “the joint prosperity of all ethnic groups 
in China,” enshrined in successive Chinese constitutions. To Li, this could not be 
accomplished except when the entire Guangxi was turned into a unified administrative 
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zone – in other words, an expanded Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. A rigid 
insistence on numerical standard was replaced by a concern with how one should 
organize the population and the territory and how one should appropriately draw the 
boundaries of administrative zones, in order that the local economic circulation –
dominated initially by state plans but later released from the “cage” in the 1980s – could 
happen in such a manner that the impoverished were provided and the advanced given a 
more capacious space. An insistence on numerical standard in this case would necessarily 
be counterproductive and work precisely contrary to the goal of ethnic regional autonomy. 
My elaboration on the first example saves me from an equally extensive discussion of 
the second. Yet a crucial element is nonetheless miing in the first: Li was primarily 
concerned with economic conditions. Although considerations of relations between 
ethnic groups were not entirely absent, they were nonetheless not thematized. This is 
where the second example comes in. According to a report given by Ulanhuu on a 1957 
meeting of the National People’s Congress, there were two different plans for a 
provincial Hui autonomous region as well. Aside from all the geographical details and 
without laying out all the economic concerns (the hydro-power project, the distribution of 
mineral resources, oil reserve, pasture, etc.) whose importance was covered in the first 
example, I shall emphasize another crucial difference between the two plans: Plan A, the 
one that was eventually adopted, excluded certain cou ties in Pingliang and Tianshui of 
Gansu Province, which were included in Plan B. To be sure, in the prospective Hui 
autonomous region outlined by Plan A, the Hui would take up one third of the total 
population, and one might expect this number to go up if the excluded counties were to 
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be included, since both Pingliang and Tianshui were predominantly Hui areas. But the 
primary concern of Plan A was not to dilute Hui population. In the words of Ulanhuu, 
Plan B is of course not without its advantages. However, if we include 
those counties in Pingliang and Tianshui, the question will become more 
complicated. Because the reactionary ruling classes had in the past sowed 
discords among the Hui and the Han in Pingliang, the relations between 
these two groups have remained sour for ages. Althoug  the Emancipation 
has fundamentally alleviated the conflicts, a long period of time is still 
needed for the dissolution of mutual distrust. Taking into account such a 
circumstance of inter-ethnic relations, it was unanimously agreed upon by 
all sides in the negotiation that Plan B is off theable. 
(People Publishing House, 1958a, p. 164-5) 
In other words, the administrative zoning of an autonomous region works not by 
integrating all closely located “concentrated communities” of minorities as much as 
precisely against this: the zoning should exclude those areas where inter-ethnic relations 
are tense no matter the composition of local population. The point is not to divide the Hui 
from the Han, but to divide the areas where the Hui and the Han are on good terms from 
those where they are not. The basic unit of isolatin is not individual ethnic group, but a 
space in which the relations between multiple ethnic groups can be balanced and 
peaceful. It is not a matter of ethnic regional autonomy as much as one of ethnic regional 
autonomy. However, if this is the case, why did theCCP have to go with “ethnic” 
autonomy in the first place? 
Two key words were ubiquitous in the CCP documents o  the ethnic question in the 
1950s: democratic reform (minzhu gaige) and socialist reform (shehuizhuyi gaizao). The 
former was intended to eliminate social and economic institutions presumed to exist upon 
the basis of exploitation; it was carried out relentl ssly to create a classless society. The 
latter built upon the ground leveled by the former and took a step forward towards the 
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socialization of production. This dual reform, generalized in the Han area, was initially 
cautiously adapted in minority regions. Consider the example of Tibet. In the protocol 
between the CCP and the Tibetan government in 1951, it was agreed upon that the 
contemporary political system of Tibet remained intact and the political power of Dalai 
Lama stayed unimpaired (People Publishing House, 1958b, p. 31). In a 1956 lecture on a 
Politburo meeting, Li Weihan raised eight suggestions for what was called “peaceful 
reform,” a term reserved particularly for the democrati  and socialist reforms among 
ethnic minorities. “The peaceful reform,” said Li, “is a special form of class struggle. It’s 
fundamentally revolutionary in terms whether of its purpose, its content, or its nature. But 
the specific form it takes can be gentle, roundabout and progressive” (Li, 1987, p. 317). 
One reason behind this gentle approach is that the reforms would inevitably transform the 
political structures of certain minority regions and it was presumed that possibly violent 
uprisings incited primarily by the powerful elites might ensue were care not taken (Li, 
1980). Democratic and socialist reforms, even thoug for the good of the ethnic masses, 
should nonetheless be executed in a roundabout way – a stance soon to be forfeited in 
actual politics.   
The dual reform also produced its own ideological consequences. A profound 
theoretical confusion was common among the CCP cadres in the 1950s: if the dual 
reform had been duly achieved among the minorities; if institutions of exploitation and 
oppression had been completely eradicated and all ethnic groups had therefore been 
initiated into a socialist society; if the national economy had been placed in a “cage” and 
organized centrally by the government, then why wasit still necessary to establish ethnic 
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autonomous regions? According to a 1953 report by the State Commission of Ethnic 
Affairs, 
It must be abided that all work among the minorities should adequately 
take into account the special characteristics and particular conditions of 
each ethnic group. The specific situation of each ethnic minority is highly 
complex. They are different not only from the Han in regard to politics, 
economy, culture, religious belief, customs and habits. They are even 
different among themselves. Different clans or different religious 
denominations within a single minority might differ to different extent; 
different economic occupations (agriculture or husbandry) might also 
entail internal differences. Therefore, when we work among the minorities, 
care must be taken with the particular circumstance of ach ethnic group, 
with the political, economic, cultural, customary and habitual specificities 
of each and every minority. One should not mechanistically transfer the 
experience gained in the Han areas to the minority a eas. Neither should 
one transfer experience that works within one particular ethnic 
autonomous region to a different ethnic autonomous region.  
…According to what we see currently, the mechanistic transference of the 
experience that works only in Han areas to minority areas without regard 
for the particularities of the autonomous regions is not an exception. It’s a 
common phenomenon that exists in a large number of places.  
(People Publishing House, 1958b, p. 103-4)  
“Cultures, customs and habits” should be “respected,” but respected in such a way 
as to be treated as “facts,” as something that was simply there and should be taken 
into account just like the climatic conditions or geo raphic locations. That the 
Tibetans were habitual consumers of tsampa or the Mongolians were fond of 
hursen aamu was presumed to be determined by the particular natural conditions 
of their life (State Commission of Ethnic Affairs, 1990, p. 69). The most 
appropriate way to address these differences was not to change them, as had been 
done by many Han cadres, but to “respect” them, to work with them, to intervene 
in such a manner that these “facts” worked not against the intervention but for it. 
Han chauvinism (da hanzu zhuyi) in this case was given a particular meaning and 
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situated within a particular discursive space: it was defined as an administrative 
failure in organizing local economy. A Han chauvinist made the same kind 
mistake as committed by a governor who ignored the particular geographical 
location and natural landscape of his jurisdiction when he designed plans for local 
development. On the surface, it seems that the “respect” granted ethnic “customs 
and habits” is indeed directed specifically at ethnic minorities, but what is actually 
the object that is brought to bear these administrat ve acts and governmental 
interventions? What conceptual zooming – in or out – is needed in order for us to 
find the most appropriate focal length by means of which the object can be 
constituted by becoming visible in front of our eyes? 
If the establishment of an autonomous region must not follow a numerical 
standard; if the demarcation of an autonomous region is determined by a concern 
with the optimal organization of local economic circulation and the relations 
between ethnic groups; if the “cultures, customs, and habits” are respected as 
organic components of the local environment and incorporated into a general 
economy, it is arguable that the very object which takes shape under the 
institution of ethnic regional autonomy is precisely not ethnic minorities treated as 
distinct groups bound by historically formed identities. To the contrary, the object 
that forms the counterpoint that receives the governm ntal intervention is a 
particularly conceived and openly dynamic space. It is this space, this field of 
relations of circulation that is altered and worked upon. The point is not to change 
the status of a particular ethnic group, but to organize the space between a 
multiplicity of ethnic groups; to “respect” the specific customs and habits of the 
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minorities from an external point of view; and to financially assist the production 
and distribution of special commodities that cater to the demands of ethnic 
consumption patterns – in other words, to intervene indirectly by way of market 
exchange. According to this framework, it is essential to intervene in a way that 
benefits each and every ethnic group, not separately, but as a unity, and unified in 
a dynamic sphere infused with relations that weave the fabric of circulation. It is 
in this specific sense that the institution of ethnic regional autonomy is designed 
to facilitate the joint prosperity of all ethnic groups in China, and the pattern of 
distribution of ethnic minorities in China (that they are highly dispersed) which 
might appear at the first sight to be a major – perhaps the major – obstacle to a 
territorially based ethnic regional autonomy, is turned in this framework into an 
advantage. What initially set out in name as a political scheme informed by 
Bolshevik Marxism ultimately boils down in substance to an administrative 
arrangement.  
What this means first and foremost is that we can no longer treat ethnic 
regional autonomy in China as primarily a question of the political rights of ethnic 
minorities, if one continues to locate political rights in a purely legal-juridical 
space. It is now clear that the subject who bears the “preferential treatments” in an 
autonomous region is not an actual ethnic minority as much as the space of 
economic circulation that exists between a multiplicity of ethnic groups. A legal-
juridical definition of rights necessarily presupposes one particular ethnic group to 
be the bearer of preferential treatments and the receiv r of governmental 
intervention (Sautman, 2010; Potter, 2005; Sautman, 1999, 1998; Lundberg, 2009; 
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Lundberg & Zhou, 2009b, 2009a; Leijonhufvud & ran, 2009; Zhang, 2009; Zhou, 
2009). One could – perhaps should – debate on whether a legal-juridical 
framework would be conducive to the politics of ethnic difference in China, but 
we should nonetheless have a clear idea of what ethnic regional autonomy is in 
and of itself, as a fact that has existed for over fifty years.  
Second, just as the dispersed distribution of minority population is turned 
from a disadvantage into an advantage, given that te very purpose of ethnic 
regional autonomy is the organization of inter-ethnic relations and the facilitation 
of local economic circulation, the very circularity of population and territory 
which I mentioned as a predicament at the beginning of this section is also 
resolved. In the mid-1950s, the State Council promulgated a series of 
administrative directives that addressed the ambiguous administrative status of 
autonomous regions. On the one hand, the word “region” (qu) was reserved only 
for provincial-level autonomous areas; on the other, previous autonomous areas  
which in terms of territory and population were merely the size of towns were no 
longer called “autonomous,” but simply “ethnic towns” (minzu xiang). It was 
presumed that a town could not effectively exercise any right to autonomy 
(People Publishing House, 1958a, p. 58-61). Autonomous areas were integrated 
into the general administrative system, each assigned a place in the regulatory 
grid, as a province, a prefecture, a county, or a town. This was the first step 
toward an optimal organization of resources and relations and also explained why 
ethnic towns were not considered to be capable of exercising the right to 
autonomy: the town, as an administrative level immediat ly above often dispersed 
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villages, was merely too small and confined, with resources and powers too 
limited for it to constitute a “field.” It was incap ble of organizing inter-ethnic 
relations and economic circulation on its own. It always had to depend upon the 
county administration for all its concrete interventio s. That ethnic towns were 
not labeled “autonomous” was due primarily to how lcal governance worked and 
continues to work in rural China and not on any abstr ct legal-juridical notion of 
ethnic autonomy. The circuitry of territory and population was rendered irrelevant 
by being relocated in a space of practical administration. 
Foucault’s notion of biopolitics becomes in this context a particularly 
important and appropriate concept in characterizing the basic parameters of the 
institution of ethnic regional autonomy. When one considers the logic behind the 
denial of an “autonomous” status to ethnic towns, one can indeed find a strong 
case of the biopolitics at work – recall Foucault’s argument on the fundamental 
change from the management of family to the governance of state, a shift that is 
impossible without the emergence of a set of “human sciences,” foremost among 
which is “statistics,” the science of the “statist,” and how a change of scale is by 
no means merely a quantitative expansion (Foucault, 1973, 2007). However, there 
are at least two reasons for which one should be cautious in applying this concept 
to ethnic regional autonomy in China.  
First, the concept of the biopolitical is embedded in Foucault’s study of the 
historical transformations of govermentality and administrative modernity. But it 
does not cover the entire range of administrative modernity, which also includes, 
for example, “police state” in 18th century Europe. Furthermore, biopolitics has a 
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special affinity – if not an exclusive affiliation – with liberal and neoliberal 
governance, and Foucault is always hesitant to speak of “socialist govermentality.” 
In his 1979 lecture at Collège de France on the birth of biopolitics, Foucault 
raised the following questions: 
What would really be the governmentality appropriate to socialism? 
Is there a governmentality appropriate to socialism? What 
governmentality is possible as a strictly, intrinsically, and 
autonomously socialist govermentality? 
To these questions, Foucault replied, 
In any case, we know only that if there is a really socialist 
governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. 
It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented.  
(Foucault, 2008, p. 94) 
Therefore, to what extent can we say that the stateorganization of population and 
territory, the planned distribution of natural and social resources in China’s ethnic 
autonomous regions in the 1950s, belonged to a biopolitical framework? 
Furthermore, given that some scholars have chosen the post-1980 China as one 
exemplar of the neoliberal model (cf. Harvey, 2005; also Ong, 2006, to a lesser 
extent), can we therefore argue perhaps with more cnfidence that because of the 
general change induced by the economic and social reform after the Cultural 
Revolution, the institution of ethnic regional autonomy has finally taken up the 
feature of a biopolitics in contemporary times?   
Second, according to Foucault, biopolitics is “a set of mechanisms through 
which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a 
political strategy, of a general strategy of power” (Foucault, 2007, p. 1). But inter-
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ethnic relations and the “cultures, customs and habits” of ethnic minorities cannot 
be seen as “biological facts” of “the human species.” The Foucauldian “milieu” 
does not include these features which do not belong t  the human as “a species.” 
But this does not necessarily mean that we should completely abandon the 
concept. If the “cultures” of ethnic minorities influence the flow of commodities 
and their ways of life; if some goods (for example, barley to the Tibetans) are 
inherently painted with an “ethnic” color; if the continuity of customs and habits 
always requires material carriers (for example, when the possibility of attaining 
certain kinds of goods determines whether one can hold certain rituals) and will 
consequently impact the production, circulation, and consumption of certain 
commodities, the organization of inter-ethnic relations and the respect given to 
ethnic customs and habits are not so much outside biopolitics as forming a 
necessary extension of it. They do not negate the biopolitical as much as 
complicate it. They are located in a biopolitical regime and follow the lines of 
forces regulated by the biopolitical way of intervention.  
If now we can at least cautiously use the term “biopolitics” to point out the 
general direction in which ethnic regional autonomy can be conceptualized, we 
can also walk the path in the opposite direction. Even if it is the space between 
different ethnic groups that constitutes the major object of intervention, it is 
nonetheless a space between different ethnic groups. Although the question of 
ethnic regional autonomy is located in a biopolitical space, it is nonetheless an 
ethnic autonomy that still bears a political significance. The predominance of the 
biopolitical regime does not exclude or dilute politics as much as reinforce it. An 
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administrative institution intended to organize relations between ethnic groups 
and facilitate joint prosperity of all nonetheless gives rise to an inflation of ethno-
national consciousness, to the point where some scholars are so alarmed as to 
propound for the total abolition of ethnic regional autonomy (Ma, 2004). For if 
one must in one’s governmental intervention respect ethnic customs and habits 
taken as ready-made facts or reconcile with the pattern in which local inter-ethnic 
relations have been maintained for centuries, one must come to terms with this 
central predicament: the more one descends into the specific local conditions of 
ethnic minorities, the more a biopolitical administration will look like a political 
preference. A plan that does not deal immediately with ethnic minorities 
nonetheless produces a real effect that divides and dissociates along ethnic lines. 
The “ethnic question,” seen through the prism of ethnic regional autonomy, bears 
precisely this spectral character. 
Neither Liberalism nor Soviet Socialism, or, the Translation between the Political 
and the Biopolitical 
The biopolitical logic in the governance of ethnic minorities in China goes far 
beyond the regulation of the literal economy, and the respect for ethnic “customs 
and habits” sometimes reaches an extent that even exceeds that afforded by liberal 
politics. This can be seen particularly in the field of criminal law. A general 
principle often followed by the court in adjudicating criminal cases involving 
ethnic minorities is dubbed liang shao yi kuan (“less arrests, less death penalties, 
more leniency”). This is not a legal sanction but a general principle laid down by 
the CCP as part of the “preferential treatments” granted ethnic minorities. An 
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essay published in 2001 on the Journals of China University of Political Science 
and Law and widely circulated and cited among both academic dis ussions and 
governmental websites argued that this obscure princi le should be replaced by 
“legislative accommodation.” It argued that each etnic autonomous region 
should promulgate its own local laws or local accommodations of state criminal 
law that address more specifically their own particular conditions –  
Ethnic minorities have been living in their particular social orders 
formed over a long period of time. Their mental state nd modes of 
behavior are confined and influenced by myriad custom , habits 
and religious beliefs. This determines that the behaviors of ethnic 
minorities cannot break loose from the circumscription of the 
conventions and ideas of their social world. The kind of criminal 
acts they may commit against the law is primarily a product of 
their unreflective compliance with the customs and ideas of their 
particular societies. Their motivation is often innocent; there is no 
or little intention to disrupt the social order. Objectively speaking, 
these behaviors often have minor negative impacts on the social 
order of the minority areas; no unease of the people r social chaos 
is entailed, no harm to the society done. Taking into account both 
the subjective lack of intention and the minor objective impacts of 
the criminal acts, it is therefore necessary that te legal judgments 
on criminal acts by ethnic minorities should be differentiated from 
the general case and addressed by means of legal accommodation.  
(Liang & Shi, 2001, p. 32-3) 
The argument is two-fold: on the one hand, it is presumed that there is no active 
intention behind the possibly criminal acts of the ethnic minorities. Their actions 
are not supposed to emanate from a sovereignty subject capable of pre-meditation 
and self-reflective decision. It is their social conventions that throughout time 
have permeated their modes of behavior and states of mind. On the other, if there 
is no pre-meditated intention on the part of the actor, there is equally no social 
order that can be disrupted. Since the criminal acts re nothing but the effects of 
313 
 
social conventions and ideational norms within minority societies, they are only 
absorbed back into a circuitry which, instead of disrupting social order, merely 
reinforces it. The lack of agency on the part of actors is coupled with the 
hegemony of social conventions – it is because the minorities are thought to be 
tightly bound by particular social orders that they can be acquitted of their 
criminal acts. This is fundamentally an anthropological argument: they don’t 
mean to disrupt social order, and neither will the social order be disrupted. The 
essay continues to offer examples of these ethnic “cr minal acts” predisposed by 
“customs and habits:” early teen marriage and forced s xual intercourse, 
widespread polygamy and bigamy, circulation of localy made weapons, and 
murder prompted by witchcraft accusation. All these ar  adjudicated according to 
the dual consideration I mentioned previously: whether these acts grow out of a 
submissive compliance with ethnic conventions and whether they constitute 
significant disruptions of the local social order.  
The interesting point is that the very moment that might induce the searing 
debate on recognition and moral sensibility in liberal politics (Brown, 2006; 
Taylor, 1992; Taylor & Gutmann, 1992; Fraser, 2009; Povinelli, 2002; Fraser, 
1995, 2000), is turned into one for anthropological evaluation in this biopolitical 
regime. The Taylorian type of argument is not suppressed as much as missing 
altogether: it is neither a question of toleration nor one of the re-distribution of 
recognition as a common good. The question at stake is not the 
incommensurability of radically different worlds. There might be repulsions and 
condemnations, but they are never politically thematized and always remain 
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subterraneous. Neither the politics of recognition nor the “politics of 
acknowledgement” (Markell, 2003) can emerge in thisspace. Both “affirmative” 
recognition and “transformative” re-structuration – to borrow the words of Nancy 
Fraser – do not and cannot exist in this space (Fraser, 1997). This absence cannot 
be attributed to the authoritarian oppression by the CCP. In fact, one can find the 
very opposite: to a Western liberal like Charles Taylor, the ethnic minorities in 
China might be seen as enjoying too much instead of too little freedom; they are 
given free rein to their “customs and habits,” to the point where even criminal law 
has to be “accommodated” to local particularities. An authoritarian political 
structure now looks more “liberal” than a liberal politics. A radical “relativism” 
emerges in the form of a biopolitical recasting of the “ethnic question.” Ethnic 
minorities are free on their own to be bound by their binding customs and habits 
insofar as they are considered to be confined by “the genealogical society” 
(Povinelli, 2006). 
It is precisely at the site of this radical “relativism” that the biopolitical 
arrangement of ethnic regional autonomy most acutely encounters its internal 
contradiction. Should one interpret “legal accommodation” merely as a pretext for 
granting ethnic minorities juridical privileges tha exempt them from legal 
prosecution which others are nonetheless subjected to in a similar situation? Or 
should one interpret it as an administrative measure which aims at maintaining 
social order? When we move from socio-economic development and organization 
of inter-ethnic relations to the question of ethnic “customs and habits” and of 
“legal accommodation,” the administrative governance of ethnic minorities also 
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moves increasingly away from the strictly Foucauldian biopolitics. The interesting 
point is that the more we move away from the biopolitical core to the margin of 
its regulatory network, the more easily the entire biopolitical regime can be 
overturned. Put differently, one can take the logic of legislative accommodation 
as a principle of intelligibility and turn one’s eys back on the organization of 
socio-economic development and ask: is it not nonethel ss the socio-economic 
development of an ethnic autonomous region that is organized? Can we argue that 
the biopolitical, when it comes to the “ethnic question,” is always overdetermined 
by the political?  
The name of ethnic regional autonomy is articulated with the substance of 
ethnic regional autonomy. The crucial point is that although the substance is 
opposed to the name, it works not so much against it as much as reinforces it, 
making the name ever more substantial without leading it beyond the threshold of 
spectral existence. The mode of relationship between politics and biopolitics 
seems less an external articulation than an internal contamination or indeterminate 
translation: the more one descends into the biopolitical, the more one rises up to 
the political; the more one looks into the substance, the more one is dazzled by an 
apparitional name. 
I began this chapter with a long story; now I shall end it with a short one. 
Different from Haiyuan which is a rural county in a provincial Hui autonomous 
region, Guancheng is only a Hui district (huizu qu) in Zhengzhou. The name of 
the district does not include “autonomous.” Neither does it enjoy any autonomous 
status. According to official statistics in 2011, the Hui population in Guangcheng 
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district constitutes merely 5.9% of the total local population. I was befuddled by 
this considerably low number when I was doing my fieldwork, and I did hear 
some Hui officials were worried that this low number might prompt the higher 
authorities to consider taking “Hui” off the name of Guangcheng District. In my 
interview with the director of the District Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, 
I asked, “Now that the Hui occupy only 6% of the total population, and that some 
have been worrying that this might induce the change of the district’s name, are 
you worried as well?” She grinned. But immediately, she lowered her voice,  
I don’t think that can be done. Yes, the number is low. But if you 
change the name, people will start to ask questions: will the policy 
change again? Will the state no longer recognize the rights of 
ethnic minorities? Does this mean that the Hui will no longer be 
respected and considered equal to the Han? Is a new tid  of Han 








Good Sentiment, Bad Sentiment: Political 
Representation and Ethnic Cadre 
 
In chapter six, I have examined ethnic regional autonomy as a major socialist 
institution in the governance of ethnic difference in China and have distinguished it from 
both the classical Leninist model and the liberal politics of redistribution and recognition. 
I have argued that it is based upon a biopolitical regime, one which does not address as 
much as deny the existence and political relevance of thnic difference. This denial, 
however, produces its own irony by paradoxically intensifying ethnic consciousness and 
accentuating the spectral character of ethnicity in the Chinese socialist politics. In this 
chapter, I study another key institution that demonstrates in a different way the internal 
contradictions and paradoxes of the socialist politics of ethnicity: the appointment of 
ethnic cadres into the administrative body of the state. I examine the particular subject 
position of ethnic cadres in the Chinese state bureaucracy and try to analyze this position 
by mapping out the bureaucratic institutional landscape in which it is inscribed. This 
institutional landscape both mediates and defines th  terms which frame the “ethnic 
question” as it is seen by the Chinese state in its routine governmental acts. I will 
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describe how the “ethnic question” is conceived as governable by means of bureaucratic 
institutional mediation and how the subjectivity of ethnic cadres – in fact the foreclosure 
of subject formation in the position they are given to inhabit in the bureaucratic machine 
– is carved out by this institutional logic.  
Becoming an Ethnic Cadre: the Story of Qixiang  
I met Qixiang a month into my fieldwork in the city of Zhengzhou, in his small 
makeshift office located in a hotel room instead of a government building. It was a 
gloomy day, and I was called upon to meet him an hour earlier than the time we had 
originally decided when we spoke the day before over th  phone. “I forgot that lunch 
ends at 2 instead of 3 p.m.” He told me on the phone, “So come. Let’s talk.” Short and 
hasty, his voice sounded a bit anxious. He knew that I was a Hui doing a PhD at 
Columbia, and that I was in Zhengzhou for my dissertation fieldwork. He had been 
briefed a week ago by the secretary of the Henan Provincial Islamic Association by way 
of whose introduction I was first connected to Qixiang.  
Qixiang was the deputy chief (u chuzhang) of a newly established division in the 
Henan Provincial Commission of Ethnic Affairs (henansheng minzu shiwu weiyuanhui). 
A young Hui cadre, he had an impressive and promising record of bureaucratic career: 
rising from a low position as the deputy head of a rural town in his late 20s, he worked 
his way steadily and patiently up the hierarchy, first from a suburban town to an urban 
district, and then eventually into the provincial government. It is perhaps not far-fetched 
to presume that a splendid career awaits him, and his young age and experience in 
navigating the political minefield would make him a competitive candidate for new 
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rounds of political promotion. But the irony of his career trajectory, however, did not take 
long to surface. The story was much more complicated than the linear progression it 
might at first appear to an outside observer unversed in the cunning wit of China’s 
bureaucracy.  
I did not expect to meet him in a hotel room. Neithr ad I prepared myself for a 
somewhat embarrassing fact: that his new division, established in 2009, was staffed only 
by three persons. For unknown reasons, one of those t re  had been appointed to another 
government office and held a merely nominal institutional affiliation with Qixiang’s 
division. As the deputy chief, therefore, Qixiang was a leader only of himself. Compared 
to the tepid attitude I received on the phone, his pa sionate welcome and encouraging 
support in person caught me in a pleasant surprise. Knowing full well that I was still a 
graduate student, he insisted on calling me “Doctor Ha,” and not just for the purpose of 
propriety. As we spoke, I was amazed by his rich knowledge of classical anthropology 
and the tumultuous history of ethnology in China. To demonstrate his qualification in 
engaging in this more or less academic conversation, Qixiang proudly announced to me 
that he received his undergraduate degree in cultural anthropology from South-Central 
University for Nationalities, located in Hubei Province and one of a nationwide network 
of nationality universities and colleges (minzu daxue/minzu xueyuan) established by the 
state for training ethnic cadres. But Qixiang, perhaps different from many of his minority 
classmates, did not immediately land in a position after graduation that related to his Hui 
ethnic identity. He became, on the other hand, a cadre from an ethnic group, but not an 
ethnic cadre per se – a distinction that will be explained as this chapter moves along.  
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Qixiang earned his party membership while he was still in college. By the age of 
thirty, he was already the vice party secretary and deputy head of a suburban town soon 
to be included in the expansive urban planning project of Zhengzhou. The town he 
presided over was integrated into the industrial developmental plan devised by the 
Zhengzhou Municipal Government, and Qixiang was promoted, as someone who had a 
college degree and presumed to be capable of handling the new and rapidly changing 
socio-economic situation, to the position of deputy director of the newly established 
industrial park zoned in the very town where he served his term. The change was a 
turning point in his career: instead of governing a rural town, he had in his early 30s a 
newly urbanized area with enormous potential for ecnomic growth under his jurisdiction. 
He might still be positioned low in the official hierarchy for a few years to come, but his 
power in commanding much needed political and economic resources had won him a 
critical edge over his peers in future promotions. “In those years”, Qixiang recounted to 
me, in a proud tone nonetheless tainted by a somber nostalgia, “I worked like a machine, 
like a steam ship always in full power. Every day was different. New things kept coming 
up. I slept little but I seldom felt exhausted. Have you seen the Dehua Pedestrian Street?” 
He was referring to the flourishing shopping district at the center of February 7th Square, 
now the landmark of the commercial success of Zhengzhou. “It was I who almost single-
handedly worked out the entire project!” said him, “I know every single detail of the 
whole plan. I already realized how profitable it could be even back then! Now everyone 
sees it. It yields a tremendous amount of revenue for the municipal government, and the 
commercial opportunities it offers are immense.” “Now,” he added, “when you drink 
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water from the well, you should never forget who dug it in the first place. (chi shui bu 
wang wa jing ren)”  
I was a bit tired, and listening to his long autobiographical story was draining, 
especially when it seemed to pertain to my research only obliquely. I tried to steer him 
back to the present, but all I could get out of him was a lengthy recitation of his past 
achievements. It seemed that Qixiang had no intention to wind his personal recollection 
in the direction I would favor – it looked like he had little to say about his current job, 
which was the reason I had sought out talking to him. I was growing weary of his lengthy 
recounting of the “golden days” of his past. The first encounter ended in his impassioned 
suggestion for a second meeting, and a disappointing frustration of my research plan.  
But it later turned out that we did keep a relatively continuous relation throughout my 
work. I occasionally received calls from him late at night, telling me that he was still in 
his office. He would also complain to me that due to long hours’ typing in front of a 
computer, now and then he would lose control of his own hands. He worried that the 
feeling of numbness and paralysis is an early sympto  of Alzheimer’s disease. I 
volunteered to help with the paperwork, and during the days and nights that followed, he 
started to take me as a “little brother” who, according to him, was also a “workaholic” 
(pin ming san lang).  “I can see in you my own image, the image of me in those early 
years!” He often said to me. My interviews were often conducted in the same office while 
we were both busy typing in front of computer screens. Every once in a while, we would 
stop, and he might treat me to a bowl of noodles. He would have them delivered to the 
room, and we would get into a more or less focused conversation.   
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Qixiang was assigned to the Henan Provincial Commission of Ethnic Affairs in 2005, 
from his low position in the suburban town. The change that caused this bureaucratic 
relocation came the year before by way of a violent Hui-Han conflict whose particular 
ferocity immediately caught the attention of international media (BBC News; Al-Jazeera; 
Khan & Buckley, 2004). “No one will tell you this,” Qixiang preceded his tale with a 
caution, “I was there in person, seeing all and experiencing everything.” He continued, 
It was near mid-night and I was sleeping, when I got a call, directly from 
the head of Department of Organization of the Provincial Party Committee. 
I was surprised since this was truly rare -- you never receive calls from 
such a high-level leader directly. The call was short, and I was summoned 
for an emergency. I was told to pack my things, bring thick coats and three 
days’ ration (ganliang), and prepare myself for a formidable mission. I 
was later briefed that we were called upon to drive into the village of 
Nanren in Zhongmou County and to stop a Hui-Han confrontation that 
was quickly escalating. 
Nanren is a small Hui village on the outskirts of Zhengzhou with a population of around 
5000, surrounded by Han villages that extend to the vicinity of the neighboring city of 
Kaifeng. A major occupation of the Hui in Nanren is short-distance freight transport, and 
their trucks have to travel daily through the Han villages so as to gain access to the 
outside world. Over the years the surrounding Han villagers had become increasingly 
resentful since the frequent passes of heavy loaded trucks had rendered the task of road 
maintenance too back-breaking and costly and they had to bear the piling expenses all on 
their own. The simmering discontent eventually exploded with a small incident as the 
fuse. On October 27, 2004, when a truck driven by a Hui tried to get through, a Han 
parked his car in the middle of the road, blocking the pass and refusing to move. The 
minor friction quickly escalated into a violent fight and drew in scores of Han villagers. 
The Hui truck was burnt down and the Hui driver fled to Nanren. Later that night, the 
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humiliated Hui driver convened a large number of his Hui villagers and the group 
marched back to the Han village for revenge, but were defeated and chased away. The 
morning of the 28th saw a huge return of the Hui villagers. They were a poorly armed yet 
ferociously angered peasant army of approximately 300 people confronting a much larger 
army consisting of the disgruntled Han from most of he surrounding villages. One Hui 
man was killed in the chaos, two badly injured, onef whom later died on the way to the 
local hospital. The third death on the Hui side occurred when a Hui man tried to escort 
his wife home through a Han village after her shift. The man was seized by the angry 
mob and brutally killed, his head cut off and defacd. News of the conflict spread fast: 
nearby Hui villages with marriage ties to Naren Hui became key sites where outside 
support were enlisted to assist the besieged Nanren. In response, the Han villagers set up 
road blocks and checkpoints to stall any outside Hui support. A group of Hui supporters 
from a nearby village killed a Han guard when their truck tried to break through the road 
block. As the sun was setting on the night of 27th, the confrontation saw no signs of 
subsiding, though the two sides had temporarily retreated. They seemed to be merely 
recouping for the next round. The silence of deadlock was haunted by the smell of an 
impending bloodshed. It was at this crucial moment, i  the middle of the night, that 
Qixiang received the call from his supervisor. 
However, the officials’ cars were also blocked at the checkpoint. The Han villagers 
were highly suspicious, and they did not believe that Qixiang and his colleagues came not 
to save the Hui but to seek peaceful resolution and mutual concession. On that very night, 
about one thousand Hui cadres – all of those who could be found in the city of 
Zhengzhou regardless of their specific position andresponsibility – were transported to 
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Nanren and stationed there to appease the Hui. A tedious working method was 
nonetheless faithfully followed: they dropped by every household and knocked on every 
door to convince the Hui to put down the arm and accept the intervention of the 
government. Suspected by the Han, they were no less unwelcomed by the Hui. Most 
could not find accommodation in the village, despite the fact that they belonged to the 
same ethnic group and shared the same ethnic identity wi h the Hui in Nanren. “We had 
to take naps in our cars,” said Qixiang, “the Director of the Provincial Commission of 
Ethnic Affairs, a man over sixty, shared the same car with me, wrapped up in a worn 
coat.” 
Although Qixiang narrated the story from the perspectiv  of a Hui cadre, we should 
note that a significant number of Han cadres were also involved in this massive 
governmental intervention. An ethnic division of labor was strictly observed: the Han 
cadres were stationed in the neighboring Han villages and charged with the responsibility 
to disarm and appease the enraged Han. The hard work seemed to have born its fruit – the 
morning of the 29th did not see any breakout in Nanren. Shortly before the dawn, after a 
brief rest, Qixiang and his other Hui colleagues were once again on their way to a new 
round of persuasion and placation. Things had been progressing steadily and smoothly, 
until they heard the anxious voice from the loudspeaker installed on the minaret of the 
village mosque. Instead of the call to prayer, they ard a call to arms, 
Folks of Nanren, are you still staying home unarmed, waiting for your 
own deaths? Do you still believe that these Hui cadres, the people of the 
government, are here to help us? Come out and see for yourselves! The 
Han are getting themselves organized and armed, they ar  marching 
towards our village, they are here to slaughter us! We have been cheated! 
We are besieged like the stuffing of a dumpling (bao jiaozi)! 
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“It was actually true!” Qixiang recalled to me. The Han in the surrounding villages had 
formed organized units despite the painstaking effort of the Han cadres, and some Hui 
cadres – including Qixiang – even suspected that the Han cadres themselves had in fact 
offered their silent assistance. All that had by then been done by Qixiang and his 
colleagues were completely overturned, and they nowbecame to the Hui villagers less 
the peace-making ally than the disguised agent sent by the Han-dominated government to 
dupe the ill-informed Hui. The shared ethnic identity, instead of conducing to the 
production of an “ethnic sentiment” that may increas  the efficacy of political work, 
merely intensified the antagonism between the Hui cadres and those whom they were 
supposed to “represent” and whose language they were pr sumed to be able to speak.   
Paramilitary forces and anti-revolt police were brought in, and the usual tactic of 
segregation was again deployed. The police force, standing behind the fragile protection 
of shields, dug trenches and formed walls of human flesh to separate the crowds. The 
Han amounted to over ten thousand, and kept battering the police wall. Hui houses were 
set ablaze, cars burnt down. “You can hear the cracks, the pit-a-pats that resulted from the 
burning of home appliances,” Qixiang recalled, “I saw the explosion of a car, the fire and 
smoke shadowed the sun. It was insane, it was insane…We had to look on, we could do 
nothing. The provincial governor and the Party secretary just watched – they could do 
nothing, just like us.” 
Two regiments from the 128th Division arrived around 5 p.m. on the 29th. Replacing 
the crumbling police forces, the troops stayed in and round Nanren for four days, 
patrolling the streets and passing the security respon ibility to the local police as the 
conflict gradually subsided in the week that followed. Qixiang was scrupulous in his 
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recounting the details of the incident; he was especially assiduous with the number of 
deaths, insisting on informing me of the reason behind each death and rejecting the 
“unfounded conjectures” of “some Western media.” “Three Hui died before the 
confrontation on the 29th; three Han died during it.” He told me. Qixiang’s prudence 
impressed his supervisors. The Nanren conflict was the turning point where Qixiang 
eventually crossed the threshold to become an ethnic cadre per se. His Hui identity now 
became the existential marker of his institutional position and figured prominently in 
what he was expected to do and how he was supposed t  do it.  
For Qixiang, the valorization of ethnic identity and his becoming an ethnic cadre 
occur in an emergency, at the moment when a crisis urgently demand a large number of 
ethnic cadres who are seen by the state to be able to communicate with “their own people” 
because they share with them a “natural ethnic sentim .” It is neither logical reasoning 
nor public deliberation as much as an immediate affctive bonding that is presumed by 
the state to define what an ethnic cadre is or should be and determines the particular use 
to which ethnic cadres can be subjected in state bur aucracy. Qixiang was not appointed 
into the Provincial Commission for Ethnic Affairs because he was particularly able to 
“represent” the Hui in Henan – the Commission itself is a branch of the Henan Provincial 
Government and a cog within the massive administratve machine which is not intended 
to be a “representative body” in the first place. He was promoted primarily because he 
was considered able to utilize his “ethnic sentiment” a d his “natural bond” with the Hui 
in a particularly masterful way that could help thegovernment efficiently and effectively 
manage inter-ethnic crisis. The limited political rep esentation allowed him is equally 
based upon this presumption of immediate affective connection: that Qixiang could 
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represent the Hui because, quite “naturally,” he himself is one of them and knows or 
should know from his own being what the Hui want. He is presumed to speak not so 
much for them than as one of them, and the ground upon which he stands – the “natural 
bond” – both validates his position of enunciation a d at one and the same time 
provincializes the term and content of the discourse he would enunciate as an ethnic 
cadre.  
Qixiang is certainly not the only Hui cadre changed by the crisis. The intensity of the 
Zhongmou conflict also forced Li Chengyu, then Governor of Henan Province, into a 
politically testing and tactically demanding predicament from which perhaps no one 
could emerge unscathed. Born as a Hui in Haiyuan County, Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region, Li rose steadily up the bureaucratic hierarchy and was appointed Governor of 
Henan in 2003, after years of service in lower positi ns in the provincial government. 
Bearing a good name of immunity in contrast to the dark economy of bribery prevalent in 
the Chinese bureaucracy, Li was also thought by many Hui as one of the few Hui cadres 
that could ever make it to the top. “He often brought his own utensils in the trunk of his 
car when he was on official visits,” a Hui imam told me, and “he tried his best to abstain 
from pork and alcohol, and would reject any offer of illegal (harem) entertainment.” His 
good name among the Hui, however, became precisely that which silenced him in the 
maelstrom of the Zhongmou conflict. Another well-connected Hui imam, after the 
evening prayer when we were sitting on the carpet, elated to me: 
Shortly after the Zhongmou incident, some Hui blocked the entrance to the 
provincial government and publicly accused Li Chengyu of his immoral 
betrayal of his own people. There were much finger-pointing and talks of 
his knees-bending, his surrender to the Han superiors, his silence in the 
face of the suffering of the Hui. But what can he do? Many of his political 
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foes were looking on attentively. They were eager to seize upon any hint 
of “ethnic sentiment” (minzu ganqing) that might slip out of Li’s reaction 
in order to accuse him of parochial ethno-nationalism (difang minzu zhuyi). 
He had to remain silent. He did nothing and could have done nothing. 
Li Chengyu was not an ethnic cadre. His Hui identity did not figure significantly in his 
bureaucratic position as the Governor of Henan. But he was nonetheless hailed to respond 
and to assume at the moment of this response the very role of an ethnic cadre. Being 
himself a Hui and with a name of cherishing his ethnic identity, he was seen to be a rare 
representative of the Hui in the Chinese political machine who could speak up for his 
own people at the critical time of crisis. He had to respond to a situation that acutely 
exposed the dilemma of his institutional position and may with one single stroke end his 
political career. The point is not whether he should have come out or even whether 
indeed the Hui had suffered unjust violence that demanded legal redress. Li could not 
intervene to right a wrong even if such a wrong hadbeen committed to the Hui, because 
his intervention, inherently tainted by an “ethnic sentiment” attributed to all ethnic cadres 
and seen as the definitive character of such position , would necessarily elicit suspicion 
and retroactively invalidate the legitimacy of any claim of retributive justice that might 
have held before his intervention. Although “ethnic sentiment” is defined by the state as 
the marker of ethnic cadres and the condition for the effective performance of their 
representative role, the same “sentiment,” given its presumed immediacy, equally 
silences their voices and necessarily invalidates th ir discourses. An unmediated political 
representation predicated upon “sentiment” is intrinsically self-contradictory, and ethnic 
cadres are situated precisely in this excruciatingly paradoxical position. 
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Paradox of Representation 
In this section, I trace a history of the present ad provide an account of the 
beginnings and immediate ramifications of the institutional arrangements that carve out 
the bureaucratic space in which the ethnic cadre is located. Although one should not 
underestimate the significance of successive governm ntal reforms in the past several 
decades prompted by the broader social, economic, and political transformations, I would 
nonetheless maintain that the paradoxical subject position of the ethnic cadre has 
remained fundamentally intact since the Communist takeover in 1949. As a matter of fact, 
what is considered exceptional during the “ultra-leftist” Anti-Rightist Campaign in the 
1950s is merely a particularly striking manifestation of the general institutional dilemma 
faced by ethnic cadres that has yet to be resolved. In the realm of the ethnic question, one 
has good reasons to wonder if the spectres of socialism have ever been conjured away.  
Often associated with but not exclusively tied to the political institution of ethnic 
regional autonomy, the appointment of ethnic minorities into the Chinese state 
bureaucracy often follows two different political logics. On the one hand, it is construed 
as a measure to achieve administrative efficiency in places where minorities are 
concentrated. Ethnic cadres, according to this biopol tical logic, are better equipped in 
their linguistic skills and knowledge of local specificities; they are presumed to know 
better than Han cadres how the general forces of economic circulation should be inflected 
in order to account for the particularity of local conditions and in what ways minority 
areas can be differentially integrated into the broader network of national economy. But 
this biopolitical logic is inherently inadequate. There is no strong reason to suppose that a 
smart and responsible Han cadre cannot through appropriate training acquire a working 
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knowledge of local conditions at least sufficient for increasing administrative efficiency. 
Throughout the 1950s, an enormous number of Han cadres were recruited by the CCP 
precisely for such training, and inter-ethnic collaborations were actively facilitated in the 
bureaucratic system of ethnic autonomous areas. Therefor , the dominant official 
discourse in justifying the appointment of ethnic cadres since the 1950s, instead of 
focusing upon their administrative usefulness, often rames it as enhancing the political 
representation of ethnic minorities in state organs d governmental institutions. The 
often statistically significant presence of ethnic cadres in the government of ethnic 
autonomous regions is presumed to indicate the fundamental change in the political status 
accorded ethnic minorities: they are now free to “administer their own affairs” and given 
the concrete power to do so, since they have “their own cadres” working in state 
institutions and “their own people” speaking up for them whenever policies were devised 
that might impact them.  
To be sure, the appointment of ethnic cadres is not the only state policy in expanding 
the political representation of ethnic minorities. As Thomas Mullaney has shown in his 
recent book, the Ethnic Identification Project (minzu shibie) in the early 1950s was not 
simply a social scientific endeavor to render China’s ethno-scape legible to the governing 
state. A more urgent task was at stake: in order to draft an election law for the inaugural 
session of the National People’s Congress (remin daibiao dahui) and to decide on the 
quota that should be reserved for ethnic representatives, the ruling CCP must first acquire 
a reliable knowledge of how many ethnic minorities China has and the number of 
population of each, a knowledge indispensable for reaching a numerically judicious 
distribution of ethnic representatives (Mullaney, 2011, pp.18-21). But the 
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straightforwardness of the quota system, set up by the Chinese state to demonstrate the 
directness of their effort to grant ethnic minorities political equality and preferential 
policies, only belies its fundamental drawback: no institutionally guaranteed link (such as 
legally prescribed and procedurally felicitous elections) is established between the ethnic 
identity of ethnic cadres and their representative function. A female Hui university 
professor might be selected as a deputy to the National Congress, but her proposal might 
be about the reform of college education and she may sit in the same discussion room 
with other non-Hui (though not necessarily all Han) i tellectuals debating the state 
governance of universities. She might also be a repres ntative who speaks in the role of 
an educated woman and participates in Congressional debate as a member of the All-
China Women’s Federation. In both cases, however, sh  would continue to be counted as 
an “ethnic representative” although ethnic identity itself is irrelevant to her specific role 
as a political deputy.  
Compared to ethnic deputies, ethnic cadres in state administrative bodies are often 
seen to possess more concrete power. It is by setting the institutional position of ethnic 
cadres against that of ethnic deputies that we can ex mine more specifically the particular 
dilemma that grips the former. In the 1950s, the CCP established a vast number of 
“nationality colleges” and professional schools designed specifically to train ethnic 
cadres, intellectuals and technical personnel. Thisfirst generation of ethnic cadres played 
particularly critical roles in the profoundly influential Ethnic Identification Project: those 
from whom the social scientific state extracted “local knowledge” upon which it 
developed a more comprehensive ethnic categorization were often not ordinary minorities 
but ethnic cadres and intellectuals who were able to narrate who they were or dispute 
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who they were not in the language they were taught in nationality colleges and 
professional schools (cf. Litzinger, 2000). This does not mean that the Ethnic 
Identification Project in the 1950s was exclusively an intra-governmental campaign. But 
it nonetheless demonstrates the sandwiched position of ethnic cadres: on the one hand, 
they were (and continue to be) treated by the Han-mjority state as coming from 
elsewhere and bearing a difference that needed to be known and governed; on the other, 
they were equally detached from the ethnic “mass” (qunzhong) and distanced from the 
latter by the official education they received and the language they were thus enabled to 
speak. They function as a middle layer that translate  ethnic difference into something 
legible and governable to the modernizing state – but not too legible and too governable 
as to become eventually assimilated into the Han. Their special treatment by the state is 
predicated upon the constant and precarious maintenc  of a particular modality of 
ethnic difference: on the one hand, they must remain different in order to demonstrate 
that they are still keeping that “natural bond” with their own ethnic groups from which 
they are enlisted and to which they are still supposed to be inextricably connected. The 
gradual disappearance of recognizable difference or the perceived intention to renounce 
one’s ethnic identity would deprive them of the definitive character that marks their 
bureaucratic position and could prematurely end their political career. On the other, 
however, they must not become too different as to invite the suspicion and accusation of 
“parochial ethno-nationalism,” a particularly pernicious term whose history I will 
examine in a moment.  
Being different but not so much – this is one way of characterizing the particular 
structural dilemma that traps ethnic cadres (cf. Bhabha, 1994). But this is far from the 
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whole story. Stevan Harrell once remarked on the difference between an ordinary Han 
cadre and an ethnic cadre, “[s/he, i.e. the ethnic cadre] was a broker not only between the 
state and local community but also between a local culture and a modernizing state 
dominated by a hegemonic national culture associated primarily with the majority Han 
nationality” (Harrell, 2007, pp. 222). And this, according to Harrell, locates ethnic cadres 
in the contemporary variation of the “civilizing project” that have over the centuries been 
given different faces by the Chines state, imperial, Republican, or Communist (Harrell, 
1995, pp. 3-36; 2007, pp. 223). The story often narrated is one of how ethnic cadres have 
to mediate between contradictory forces (Han state vs. ethnic minorities) and how they 
“represent” the presumably far-away state to the minorities at the margin (Mueggler, 
2001). However, little attention has been paid to the institutional conditions that have 
practically produced for the ethnic cadres a paradoxical position which is not caught 
between contradictory forces (as Harrell argues) as much as it forecloses the possibility 
for subject formation. In order to substantiate this point, I will now return to a key 
moment in the making of ethnic cadre in the early history of Communist China, namely, 
the Anti-Parochial-Ethno-Nationalism Campaign (fan difang minzu zhuyi yundong, 
hereafter the APEN Campaign) in late 1950s and early 1960s.  
The APEN Campaign is a particular aspect of the more general Anti-Rightist 
Movement in the late 1950s which in turn was merely a prelude to the more radical years 
of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Though situated in this general background and 
necessarily influenced by the vulgar class analysis dominant in the official discourse of 
this period, the APEN campaign nonetheless bears its own irreducible specificity that 
cannot be completely subsumed under the Anti-Rightist Movement (cf. Das, 1979, pp. 
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132-3). We should certainly not underestimate the rol  of intra-party factionalism and the 
complex mechanisms of social mobilization and class politics in the APEN Campaign. 
But this should not hold us from examining more carefully how accusations were 
specifically framed, what discursive logic was followed, and in what ways certain 
criticisms were rendered convincing and hard to argue against. Although the “ethnic 
question” is often seen as subsumed under the “class question” during this period, there 
nonetheless exists, as I shall try to show subsequently, a relatively autonomous discursive 
domain in which the accusation of parochial ethno-natio alism sharpens its particularly 
powerful rhetoric.  
In 1958, Liu Chun, a veteran Party member then working in the State Commission of 
Ethnic Affairs, delivered a lecture in the heyday of the APEN Campaign. The title of the 
lecture was “Rectify Ethnic Sentiment, Criticize Parochial Ethno-Nationalism.” The 
grammatical form of the title says much about the discursive manipulation that pervades 
political struggles of this period: an imperative without a subject that abstracts a local 
criticism into a general movement supposed to be bas d upon mass participation. As to 
what counts as “ethnic sentiment,” Liu Chun’s deceptiv ly straightforward definition 
belies its ominous message: 
Ethnic sentiment is different from ethno-nationalism. The former is 
usually expressed as a feeling for the interests of one’s own ethnic group, 
including, of course, the love of one’s ethno-history, cultural tradition, or 
other forms that reflect one’s ethnic identity. Generally speaking, we can 
allow the existence of ethnic sentiment. Sometimes, such sentiment is 
even necessary – for example, when the rights to equality of one’s own 
ethnic group are unfairly impinged upon or interfered with, or when one’s 
own ethnic group is prejudiced against or inappropriately criticized. Ethnic 
sentiment in this case is completely understandable when it is expressed as 
a form of discontent. However, the bourgeois ethnic sentiment is 
fundamentally different from the proletarian ethnic sentiment: the former 
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is merely an expression of the interest of the exploitative class, while the 
latter is that of the interest of the general mass. Accordingly, the bourgeois 
ethnic sentiment is fundamentally different from the proletarian ethnic 
sentiment.  
(Department of Propaganda, 1960, pp. 81-2) 
Liu Chun’s disambiguation was not addressed to the “general mass.” His lecture was 
delivered on a Party meeting and was directed specifically towards ethnic cadres. But the 
distinction he made between “bourgeois ethnic sentiment” and “proletarian ethnic 
sentiment” is highly ambiguous, and this ambiguity is made all the more sinister since the 
object is “a feeling” whose presumed spontaneity merely excludes those who have such a 
“feeling” from defining what it means by themselves. An “ethnic sentiment,” given its 
presumed naturalness and immediacy, necessarily passes the power of definition and 
interpretation to the hands of those who observe it from the outside. The paradox is that 
only a particular kind of “natural feeling” is allowed, while all “natural feelings” are seen 
to be beyond conscious intervention. It is not always clear what particular kind of 
“natural feeling” ethnic cadres are supposed to demonstrate to their supervisors and Han 
colleagues, and how they could strike a difficult – if at all possible – balance between the 
appearance of spontaneity and the aspiration to the Communist ideal. One could hardly 
know when a “proletarian ethnic sentiment” may slip into a “bourgeois” one, and the 
moment of recognition in retrospect might come after – instead of before – the moment 
of political accusation and subsequent purge. Presum d to be speaking always from 
“ethnic sentiment” in their role of as political mediators, the institutional position of 
ethnic cadres is marked by the definitive uncertainty attached to the “natural feeling” 
which perhaps is not and can never be “natural” in political struggles.   
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Four years before Liu Chun’s lecture, on the CCP’s 8th National Congress in 1956, 
Ulanhuu, then Director of the State Commission of Ethnic Affairs, announced the CCP’s 
official attitude to ethnic cadres: “The major point for training ethnic cadres is to trust 
them, to use and promote them without suspicion. We should not only help them improve 
their abilities and enhance their progress; we should tr st the improvements and the 
progresses that they have made, letting them take responsibilities independently. We 
should cherish their love for their own ethnic groups and appreciate their ethnic sentiment 
when it comes to the interests of their ethnic groups. We shouldn’t blame this sentiment.  
The importance of ethnic cadres lies in that they have an especially intimate affinity with 
the people of their own ethnic groups and uphold particularly impassioned anticipation 
for the emancipation and development of their own ethnic groups. They, therefore, are 
uniquely positioned to express the will and interest of their own people” (People 
Publishing House, 1958a, pp. 51). What Ulanhuu termed “especially intimate affinity” 
(tebie miqie de lianxi) was also named “natural bond” (tianran lianxi) in other 
Communist documents of this period. The condescending tone is unmistakable. The 
pervasive modal verb is “should” – the flip side of “we shouldn’t blame this sentiment” is 
that “the ethnic cadres are naturally inclined to side with their own people.” They are 
useful not merely because of what they do or can do, but what they are able to do is 
always pre-determined by who they are. To Ulanhuu, “we shouldn’t” blame this “natural 
inclination,” but work with it, and turn this “nature” into an advantage for “our” 
governance. On the one hand, it is supposed that there exists an immediate and 
“especially intimate affinity,” a natural bond, between ethnic cadres and “their own 
people,” and this “nature” defines their institutional being. On the other, however, this 
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immediate nature is given the heavy duty of mediating the political representation of 
ethnic minorities, and it has to mediate in a particular way: ethnic cadres must represent 
the demand of “their own people” and frame it in the idiom of a Communist vision by 
definition removed from “natural feeling.” If the institutionally-structured being of ethnic 
cadres is fundamentally determined by an “immediate n ture” and their political career is 
founded precisely upon this unmediated “intimate affinity,” how can they achieve a non-
natural and impartial representation in this intrinsically partial position? Could “ethnic 
sentiment” ever be a justifiable ground for defending the allegedly unbiased political 
equality promised to all ethnic minorities? Can universality, impartiality, neutrality, and 
disinterestedness – values that are located and can only be located within a public sphere 
(the specific form and limit of this public sphere can be subject to permanent dispute) – 
be derived from within particularity, and from a particularly “private” particularity that is 
“natural sentiment?” (cf. Arendt, 1958, pp. 22-78; cf. Hegel & Baillie, 1967, pp. 228-240; 
Marx, 1972[1843]) 
We are no longer trudging the waters of contradictory f rces, either between state and 
local community, or between dominant majority culture and marginalized minority 
culture. The point that deserves more attention is rather the internal structural 
contradiction that marks the bureaucratic position o which the ethnic cadres are assigned 
by the Chinese state. Liu Chun’s ominous critique, delivered in the heyday of the APEN 
Campaign and which initiated a devastating strike against a group of senior Communist 
ethnic cadres, was not an aberrant exception in the years of socialist “ultra-leftism.” 
Neither was Ulanhuu’s advisory suggestion the last remnant of an ephemeral golden era 
of the new China, before the onset of totalitarian monstrosity. To defend a public equality 
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and a political justice by means of a private bond and a natural ethnic sentiment – this is 
bound to fail from the very beginning. The division between the public and the private, a 
structural character presumed by the CCP to belong t  the bygone era of bourgeois 
hegemony, is uncannily recuperated – though publicly denied – when it comes to the 
institutional position of ethnic cadres. There is, n other words, a line that runs 
consistently through Ulanhuu’s suggestion and Liu Ch n’s accusation.   
Ethnic cadres necessarily have to walk on thin ice wh ther before, during, or after the 
APEN Campaign. The duel between Liu Geping and Yang Ji ren, two eminent ethnic 
cadres of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in the 1960s, reveals with much concrete 
detail how the paradoxical institutional position of ethnic cadres is materialized in actual 
political battle. Both Liu and Yang were veteran Party members from the Hui, and both 
were core members in Ningxia Party Committee in late 1950s. Coming from two 
different provinces (Liu from Hebei, and Yang from Gansu) and each being the major 
patron of a large clique formed over years of work before the CCP assumed power, Liu 
and Yang were located at the center of factionalist struggles in Ningxia both before and 
during the Cultural Revolution. One of the attacks waged against Liu in late 1950s, for 
instance, accused him of being strongly inclined to appoint cadres from his own clique 
which consisted predominantly of people from Hebei and Shandong Provinces, where 
Liu worked as a commander of guerilla warfare before moving to Ningxia (Red Guard, 
1967). But the major and most catastrophic criticism from which Liu could not emerge 
unscathed came in 1960.  
It all started with the 1959 National Olympics. The opening ceremony was a splendid 
pageant of the cultural particularity of each province, embodied by its own athletes and 
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materialized specifically in the carefully designed costumes. What was especially eye-
catching, as many expected, was the traditional costumes donned by ethnic athletes to 
demonstrate the multi-ethnic character of the new Rpublic. But compared to the colorful 
costumes worn by the Tibetans and the Uyghur, those of the Hui athletes (taqiya for men, 
and hijab for women) appeared in the eyes of those expecting a spectacle to be overly 
unassuming and inadequate in marking out the Hui as an ethnic group and Ningxia as an 
ethnic autonomous region. In an attempt to stage a spectacular performance in similar 
occasions in the future, Liu Geping, then Governor of Ningxia, threw his support behind 
the establishment of a new government office responible specifically for designing a 
new Hui costume. Things went smoothly, and in the same year, the new consume was 
ready for demonstration. A conference was convened a d many Hui cadres, Liu included, 
happily played the role of models. Photographers and documentary filmmakers were 
invited to capture this wonderful moment – no one expected, however, that these 
apparently innocent photographs and footages would become the evidence that abruptly 
truncated the political career of many. 
Political wind soon changed its direction. Yang Jingren seized the chance and 
targeted Liu with a barrage of accusations. Members of his clique both in Ningxia and in 
the Central Party Committee in Beijing insinuated that Liu deliberately consolidated and 
expanded ethnic distinctions by creating a new Hui costume. To demonstrate his own 
credential in making this argument and to set himself diametrically opposed to the 
reactionary position ascribed to Liu, Yang publicly announced his impassioned support of 
the national movement that both coaxed and coerced th  Hui into raising pigs either in 
individual homesteads or on the collective farm (as pork was considered the major source 
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of protein for all Chinese and pig-raising a key site to demonstrate loyal allegiance to the 
Communist cause in Maoist China). He enthusiastically propagated for Hui-Han marriage 
and even tried to find his own daughter a Han husband – a practice seen by many Hui to 
be outrageous and scandalous. Seeking avidly to play the “woman-giver” and thus 
locating himself on the other side in the imagined asymmetrical exchange of women that 
structures the Hui imaginary, Yang was not merely ignoring his Hui identity. He was 
zealously negating it, deliberately revoking his ethnicity in the most radical manner 
imaginable to a Hui.  
Though Yang Jingren might be considered, as many Hui tended to see him, an 
extreme example, he was not fundamentally an exception from the “norm”. To the 
contrary, he substantiated the paradoxical “norm” in an intriguing way and dramatically 
illustrated the latent structural paradox that inheres in the position of ethnic cadre: the 
only possible way to preempt once and for all the accusation of “parochial ethno-
nationalism” is by recourse to a compulsive negation of one’s ethnic identity and a 
complete rejection of one’s ethnicity. The only way to appear as a legitimate ethnic cadre 
qualified to make impartial judgments and disinterested decisions is precisely to 
consciously and painstakingly repudiate that “natural bond” only for which they are 
appointed into the government in the first place. In order to bear the credential to deliver 
justice and equality and to speak for “their own peopl ,” ethnic cadres must necessarily 
fly in the face of justice and equality. They must always speak against their “own people” 
in order to be able to speak for them, though the moment of speaking-for is indefinitely 
deferred due to the paradoxical logic of their positi n. The very condition for speaking 
goes precisely against that which is to be spoken: ethnic cadres are given an obligation to 
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speak that which is rendered strictly unspeakable by their institutional position.  Yang 
Jingren was detested by many Hui. He seemed to have testified to an old wisdom passed 
down generations among the Hui: that the higher a Hui gets in the state bureaucracy 
(imperial or otherwise), the more reluctant he would become to speak for his own people. 
But this old wisdom now speaks to a new institutional arrangement previously 
nonexistent in any imperial bureaucracy. There might ndeed have been plenty of Hui 
imperial officials who had betrayed their own people, but none had done it from a 
position structured in such a way that the possibility for political speaking is strictly 
foreclosed. The institution of ethnic cadre works precisely against the political 
representation of ethnic minorities. To a Hui cadre, th  only safe route, the only infallible 
option, it seems, is to either remain silent or to speak deliberately against one’s “own 
people” – but not too much, not too hard, unless one becomes “too similar” to the point 
where one is no longer different enough to qualify as an “ethnic cadre.” The limited 
political representation that might occasionally be achieved by ethnic cadres has to 
breathe in this tiny and precarious space.  
Politics of Denial 
Xinhua was a Han cadre who had been working in the Henan Provincial Commission 
of Ethnic Affairs for sixteen years. He started hisjob in 1995, when the provincial 
government first moved into the current building, then newly completed with all state-of-
the-art facilities. Now, when he was approaching the end of his career and preparing for 
retirement, the provincial government was again set for relocation, again to a state-of-the-
art complex recently completed in the new developmental zone located east of 
Zhengzhou. Xinhua was Director of the Office of Law nd Policy when I met him, a 
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short and skinny old man, quiet but determined with his own principles. In his small 
office, he didn’t mind breaking open the conversation with a critique of many young 
cadres who were taking over the provincial commission. “They know nothing about the 
laws and policies regarding ethnic minorities,” said he. “We used to have study sessions 
First weekly, and then monthly. Everyone had to be familiar with all the documents, all 
the rules and regulations. All administrative decision  might be in accordance with these 
laws. But now, no one cares. My office is turning ito a consulting firm – they would 
simply drop by and confirm with me whether what they have already planned or even 
started to do is lawful. They don’t start with law, but law seems to be a marginal concern.”  
The marginalization of law in the routine governance of ethnic difference is a 
concrete fact. Specifically for Henan, the only provincial law regarding ethnic minorities 
was promulgated in 1994, one year before Xinhua assumed office. All his efforts in 
subsequent years to get his proposal for revisions pas ed in the Provincial Congress were 
to no avail. An exhaustive search of the official on ine database set up by the National 
Congress of all laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China shows that since 
the mid-1990s, no new laws or significant revisions f old ones have been recorded either 
at the national level or below, and the “ethnic question” has practically been stuck in a 
legal dead water, despite the tumultuous mutations of the broader social and economic 
environment, as if all laws that are ever needed in this regard have already been set down 
and all that is left is merely effective execution.  
One institutional puzzle that one has to grapple with while studying the Chinese 
governance of ethnic minorities is a strange devolution and concentration in one single 
institution or even individual of governmental functions that nonetheless remain split 
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between different state departments when one turns one’s gaze to the national level. The 
State Commission of Ethnic Affairs, established in the 1950s, takes full charge in 
supervising the governance of ethnic minorities at the national level. The State Bureau of 
Religious Affairs, established during the same period and with the same administrative 
status as the former, is given the responsibility of supervising the governance of religious 
affairs. Both are departments of the State Council and both have branch offices in lower-
level governments. However, the distinction between thnic and religious affairs, highly 
visible at the national level, becomes administratively blurred when we move to the 
provincial level. Instead of reinforcing this crucial and politically charged split by 
distributing the two types of affairs to two different administrative bodies, most 
provincial governments subsume the governance of both under one single institution, 
often named Commission of Ethnic Affairs, which is then internally divided into different 
divisions that separately address ethnic and religious affairs. The tendency for 
governmental convergence becomes more conspicuous when one goes even further down 
to the county level, where an administrative division of labor almost invariably gives way 
to a confusion of responsibilities due to a shortage of personnel. In other words, 
immediately below the national level, the governance of religious and ethnic affairs are 
often combined in a single institution whose internal division of labor progressively 
breaks down and verges upon complete disappearance as one moves down the hierarchy.  
This institutional devolution is not the only, nor the most befuddling puzzle we need 
to come to terms with if we want to pry open the institutional logic in the governance of 
ethnic difference in China. Different levels of government often play different roles and 
the complex interactional dynamics between them further complicate the picture. A 
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young Hui cadre in the Henan Provincial Commission of Ethnic Affairs once described to 
me the particular function assigned to the Provincial Commission, in contrast to its lower 
offices: 
Our job is primarily propaganda. We seldom deal with concrete issues, 
although one crucial function of the Commission is administrative re-
adjudication. But almost invariably, all disputes and discontents are 
resolved primarily at the county level. Very few cases will be forwarded to 
us for re-adjudication. When reports reach us, they are often tepid 
accounts of things of the past. If you really want to study the ethnic 
question, I recommend that you go down to the rural counties.  
This was not the first time, nor the last, that I was given the injunction to “go down” 
because “we don’t work with concrete issues.” Qixiang, as another Hui cadre in the 
Provincial Commission, always suggested that I stay in a rural county for a couple of 
weeks to observe the “authentic life” of the Hui and to experience the “reality” of the 
ethnic question, as if his own life as a Hui cadre, or the life of many other urban Hui, is 
by definition “inauthentic.” However, the injunction nevertheless reveals a critical point: 
on the one hand, where a relatively elaborate division of governmental labor exists, i.e. at 
the national and provincial level, the obligation is primarily one of propaganda (that is, a 
singular simple function of monologue, speaking without having to listen). On the other, 
where such a division is almost nonexistent and a severe shortage of both personnel and 
funding is almost the norm, i.e. at the county and township level, the responsibilities that 
have to be born are overwhelmingly numerous and minute, ranging from arbitrating 
minor ethnic frictions to negotiating preferential policies for local businesses run by 
ethnic entrepreneurs.  
The institutional disadvantage of the county bureaus in charge of ethnic and religious 
affairs far exceeds their tight budget, lack of personnel, and grinding workload. In 2008, a 
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bill was passed in the National Congress that allowed the State Council to implement its 
new plan for intra-government institutional reform, intended for the reduction of 
superfluous and dysfunctional offices and the re-arangement of the internal division of 
administrative labor for higher efficiency. Although primarily an effort at re-organizing 
the structure of the central government, the effects nonetheless rippled to the extremes of 
the gigantic bureaucratic machine. “We are always the last to stay and the first to go,” a 
middle-aged Hui cadre in a county bureau of religious affairs once complained to me. 
“We are always at the forefront of any government downsize, as if what we do is by 
nature expendable.” A critical outcome of the 2008 reform is the abolition of the 
independent institutional status of the county burea s and their subsidiary incorporation 
into the CCP’s department of the United Front at the county level. The 2008 institutional 
reform therefore excludes the routinized governance of ethnic difference from the 
government and subjects it to the intervention of the ground-level Party committees. The 
county bureaus, no longer part of the governmental body, meanwhile lose the legally 
prescribed administrative power in managing routine ethnic and religious affairs.  
Despite all constitutional stipulations that dictate the unconditional and absolute 
power of the Party in China, it is, officially speaking, nonetheless not part of the 
government. The CCP runs behind the government, parallel to it, dictates its commands 
to it, but for all that does not collapse into it. Whether it is beyond the law or whether it 
operates in a field where the rule of law is sidestepped, the Party itself cannot publicly 
and directly exercise administrative power on a daily basis. A local Party secretariat 
cannot intervene in daily administration in his role as a Party secretariat. He must act 
through the mediation of those who hold governmental positions, or in the role he might 
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himself assume in the government. It is the governmnt that can officially claim any legal 
status; the Party, for all its power, must necessarily remain in the shadow, relegated to a 
domain not necessarily illegal, but fundamentally -legal. The subordinate integration of 
the county bureaus – previously a government institution – into the county department of 
the United Front thus pushes the former into a shadowy domain. “What we used to be 
able to do, we can no longer do it now,” a Hui cadre in a newly Party-ized county bureau 
in Henan told me. “We used to have the legal power for administrative intervention 
(xingzheng zhifa quan). But now, whenever we try to intervene, we always have to be 
prepared for a question we cannot answer: you are no longer a government agency with 
legally prescribed power, so who gives you the power to intervene? We can no longer 
work directly, but have to beat around the bush. This is the major problem after the 
institutional reform.” This is not to say that the Party’s power is truncated and restrained 
by its lack of a publicly recognized lawful status. It merely means that its a-legal form of 
operation would render certain of its peripheral appurtenances susceptible to a lack of 
direct power – they have to, as the Hui cadre said, “beat around the bush.” The very form 
in which the CCP exercises its unhampered power nevertheless restricts its operation at 
certain points. 
The predicament of the county bureaus after the 2008 reform is only the most recent 
manifestation of a general principle in the governance of ethnic difference that has been 
followed for a long time at the township and village levels. If the county bureau occupies 
a precarious position in the governmental machine ad lways remains vulnerable to 
abolition and subordinate enfolding into the Party, even a semblance of this weak 
institution does not exist when we reach the township level, where the governance of 
347 
 
ethnic and religious affairs is and has always been only one among many other 
responsibilities of an individual cadre, who performs his/her obligations principally as a 
member of the department of the United Front of his town Party committee. The loss of 
the independent governmental and legal status of the county bureau only indicates the 
ascension of an underlying governmental logic that has long been at work at the ground 
level. Since the practical governance of ethnic and religious affairs operates primarily at 
levels below that of the county, it is arguable that this governance follows a 
fundamentally a-legal Party logic. The rule of law, though not entirely absent, 
nonetheless does not form the backbone for such governance. In contrast to the law 
which operates mainly in the public domain where articulated rules and regulations are 
accorded determining importance and where the court is one of the most marked – 
certainly not the exclusive – location for settling disputes, the Party logic, expressed 
particularly in the practical methodology of the United Front as it manifests itself in the 
governance of ethnic and religious affairs, confounds the critical distinction between the 
public and the private. The politics of ethnic difference in this context is separate from 
both the realm of law and the public domain in general, characterized by hyper-visibility 
and a language whose limit and condition of existence are constantly subject to critical 
examination.  That which is revealed to the public gaze or for the inquiry of the higher 
authority is already the end result of a battle fought elsewhere and in the past – “when 
reports reach us, they are often tepid accounts of things of the past.”  
It is tempting to argue that a privileging of invisibility and privatization marks 
perhaps all forms of authoritarian and dictatorial politics which depend for the 
reproduction of their rule precisely upon the absence and active forestalling of the 
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formation of a public domain. Nonetheless, we should pay attention to the particular form 
in which this privatization manifests itself in China’s governance of ethnic difference. 
The operation of this politics of invisibility is not confined to the ground level but 
extends to cover the entire field of this governance and defines its basic coordinates. In 
the words of Yang Jing – then Director of the State Commission of Ethnic Affairs – 
related to me by Jianguo, the supervisor of Qixiang in the Henan Provincial Commission, 
the governance of ethnic difference is always in a “subsidiary” position, and the 
commissions and bureaus, if they continue to be givn an independent institutional status 
in the administrative machine, should always stay “on the side” and in a position that 
“assists” other governmental bodies which play major r les in executing daily 
administration. The governance of ethnic difference is not and should never aspire to 
situate itself at the center of the stage, and its success lies precisely in the performance of 
a denial: that “ethnic question,” fundamentally speaking, does not and will not exist, and 
the governance of ethnic difference, therefore, is always and must always be marginal 
and auxiliary. Jianguo put this in particularly revealing terms, 
We are always assisting others. No job is properly ours. Neither should we 
try to zone out a domain distinctively ours. That’s not how you brag about 
your own importance. Some of us simply cannot come to terms with this 
truth. They want a dramatic show of their achievements, they want all to 
know that they have done a great deal. But you see, th  success of your 
job hinges precisely upon having nothing to be shown – as if nothing has 
happened and nothing will ever happen, as if you are useless and the 
commission itself completely superfluous. This is precisely what is desired 
in this job. You see, bluffing gets you nowhere.  
The institutional position of ethnic cadres, insofar as they work in the governance of 
ethnic difference, therefore necessarily relegates th m to a marginal status and merely 
intensifies the privatization of their role as political representatives of their ethnic groups 
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in the bureaucratic machine. Their work might be important, but it is important only to 
the extent that it cannot be revealed to the public gaze. The success of their work depends 
upon the appearance that there is simply no work to be done in the first place, as if “there 
is no such a thing as the ethnic question,” at least not one that would become relevant 
politically. The privatization of political representation is imbricated with this politics of 
denial, and the role of “ethnic sentiment” is merely reinforced in this governmental 
regime: everything needs to be resolved in a private manner and by recourse to an a-
political “natural bond.” That “nothing has happened” is the magical mantra; mediocrity, 
or the appearance of it, is the golden rule. Recall how Qixiang and his fellow Hui cadres 
worked in the Zhongmou conflict: they had to “knock on every door”, “drop by every 
household”. Work was done and was expected to be most effectively done behind the 
door, in the dark recess of the intimate family, in the most private of the private refuges 
where “sentiment” instead of public reasoning was presumed to reign supreme. 
Conclusion 
Though some legal scholars have in recent years used the term “affirmative action” to 
describe China’s governance of ethnic difference, its applicability to the state’s 
preferential appointment of ethnic cadres into the administrative body, however, remains 
problematic (Sautman, 2010, 1998). The previous chapter has already demonstrated why 
the institution of ethnic regional autonomy cannot be subsumed under the legal category 
of “affirmative action;” this chapter has taken up the task of showing that neither can the 
political representation of ethnic minorities by means of ethnic cadres be designated as 
“affirmative action” unless one ignores all the inst tutional complications I have 
described and analyzed. The institutional position of ethnic cadres is intrinsically 
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paradoxical precisely because the very nature of their job is by definition the privatization 
of a political representation which is possible only i  a public sphere. Ethnic cadres are 
officially summoned to work in the dark, to intervene in the shadow. They are called 
upon to rely on a fundamental partiality – an arresting and inescapable partiality thought 
to be rooted in their very being (their “natural bond” with their “own people”) – in order 
to reach a public impartiality (equality between all ethnic groups) which is structurally 
unreachable in their position. “Ethnic sentiment” is good only when ethnic cadres do not 
speak up “for their own people” though they are expected to. It becomes bad at the very 
moment when political representation materializes into actual words. One is given the 
right and the position to speak, but this right and this position necessarily occlude any 
actual speaking. One is given a mouth but deprived of a voice. 
The affective consequence entailed by this paradox is acutely felt – though not 
necessarily articulated – by the Hui cadres I worked with in my fieldwork. “Ethnic cadres 
often have to do their job with bound hands,” said Zunjie, one of the deputy directors of 
Henan Provincial Commission of Ethnic Affairs. “The point is, if you have an open-
minded leader, a supportive superior, you can unbind your hands and relax. It all depends 
on whether they trust you.” But “their” trust can oly be acquired on an ad hoc basis, and 
it is not rule so much as it is the rare exception. When I related Zunjie’s words to Qixiang, 
he sighed, but immediately followed up with a short ye  determined assertion, “right, 
that’s why we have to be there – otherwise, who would speak for our people?” An 
interpellation that summons the hailed to a place where the formation of a subject is 
foreclosed nevertheless institutes a non-subject position where the awareness of one’s 
own ethnic identity is not attenuated as much as intensified. This is ethno-nationalism 
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produced within the Chinese state bureaucracy and by means of the very intra-
government institutional logic which is supposed to work precisely against any 
“parochial ethno-nationalism” in the first place. A politics of denial only reinforces in its 
own way that which it tries painstakingly to deny, and a privatization of political 
representation merely exacerbates that which it attemp s to privatize. This is the paradox 







Two braided lines run through this dissertation: on the one hand, I have examined the 
institutional and symbolic conditions by means of which Hui Islam acquires particularly 
tenacious traction in the concrete social world. I have tried to show the internal 
contradictions and ironies that inhere in the precarious maintenance of religious 
difference in an environment where it constitutes merely a “minority religion.” The 
entwinement of Islam and ethnicity and the “ethnicization” of Islam among the Hui, as I 
have attempted to show in a variety of places in this dissertation, are predicated upon an 
imaginary relationship of exchange between the male Hui and the male Han, in which the 
(Han) woman functions ideologically as the silenced mediation by means of which Hui 
Islam could be imagined as the object desired by the Han male other. Ethnicization (and 
at times racialization) of religious difference in this context is intrinsically and 
structurally determined by gender and more specifically, by the domestication of sexual 
difference. On the other, I have studied how the ethnicization of Islam among the Hui is 
appropriated by the late socialist state and re-located in a particularly Chinese socialist 
politics of ethnicity. In this political space, it is precisely because ethnicity is politically 
irrelevant that it becomes paradoxically a key site where the façade of socialism is 
secured and the CCP’s overt political allegiance to socialism publicly claimed. The 
state’s appropriation of the regime of ethnic categorization, by officially recognizing and 
reifying the intertwinement of Islam and ethnicity among the Hui, merely reinforces the 
masculinist ideological conditions that structure the Hui imaginary. Neither ethnic 
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regional autonomy nor the appointment of ethnic cadres, due to the internal institutional 
arrangements that determine their operation, can fulfill the function anticipated of them. 
On the one hand, ethnic regional autonomy follows a biopolitical logic and intervenes at 
a level slightly removed from actual ethnic minorities taken as collective subjects bearing 
legal-juridical rights to special benefits. This biopolitical regime, however, also entails 
peculiar political effects that intensify the spectral character of ethnicity in socialist 
politics. On the other hand, the political representation of minorities by ethnic cadres is 
essentially privatized and the paradox intrinsic to the political appropriation of “ethnic 
sentiment” renders ethnic cadres structurally incapable of speaking out for their own 
people, to the point where they cannot not betray what they are expected to do. This 
structural silencing, as I have attempted to show in chapter seven, merely strengthens the 
ethnic sentiment of Hui cadres and actively produces th m as ethnicized subjects.  
Although I do acknowledge the immense power commanded by the modernizing 
Chinese state (first nationalist republican, then socialist) in introducing the modern 
Western discourses of nationalism and ethnicity into the governance of its multi-ethnic 
citizen subjects and the particular vicissitudes of the term minzu in contemporary Chinese 
politics, I have not treated the ethnicization of Islam among the Hui as completely 
determined by this state intervention. Gender becoms significant precisely when we 
begin to ask how the imbrication of religion with ethnicity, instead of being an empirical 
fact, can become libidinally cathected and acquire sp cific affective value among the Hui. 
The structural domestication of sexual difference, as I have argued in a variety of 
chapters, is constitutive – though in different yet interrelated ways – of the contemporary 
Hui imaginary, despite the vast socio-economic and religious sectarian diversities among 
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the Hui. The ethnicization of Hui Islam is constitutively engendered and enabled by an 
imagined asymmetrical exchange of women engaged with the male Han other. In treating 
the ethnicization of Islam as completely the result of modern state intervention, one 
would lose sight of the structural conditions that enable the modern Hui imaginary and 
overlook how the effectiveness of political policies hinges not (merely) upon forceful 
imposition as much as on incorporating and even streng hening that which already exists 
among the governed. The functioning of the socialist politics of ethnicity specifically 
among the Hui, therefore, also capitalizes on the structural domestication of sexual 
difference. The state does not contradict as much as affirm the masculinist ideology of 
Hui Islam by officially recognizing and reinforcing the minzu status of the Hui.  
Anthropologists of China have long noted the complex and profound vicissitudes of 
the term minzu in the history of modern China (Gladney, 2004, 1998b, 1991; Fan, 2001; 
Harrell, 1995, 2001a, 2001b; Mueggler, 2001; Schein, 2000; Litzinger, 2000; Blum, 
2001). Translated initially from Japanese and used in a variety of different contexts to 
designate human groupings that range from an “ethnic group,” a “race,” or a “nationality,” 
minzu is perhaps one of the few neologisms that still produce much resonation in 
contemporary Chinese politics, especially when an increasingly aggressive Chinese Han 
nationalism is again on the rise. But little attentio  has been paid to the particularly 
socialist context in which the word is inscribed and how socialism – more particularly its 
Chinese variation – transforms both its semantics and pragmatics in the past six decades. 
The “ethnic question” in China is often reduced to one of opposition between state 
oppression of ethnic minorities and the occasional outbreak of ethnic separatism and 
political ethno-nationalism. Socialism, however, seldom becomes the object of study and 
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the specificity of the socialist politics of ethnicity, especially in its Chinese variation, 
rarely receives the attention due to it. In this disertation, I have treated socialism 
seriously and have traced its contour in the particular domain of the “ethnic question.” 
The Chinese socialist politics does have its own internal logic which must be addressed in 
its own term, and one cannot reduce it completely to “authoritarianism” which only 
partially and inaccurately describes how China’s state power operates. 
By locating Hui Islam and its ethnicization within socialist politics, I have also tried 
in this dissertation to probe tentatively how Islam s an “ethnicized” religion can be 
studied under the socialist condition without reducing the mode of relationship between 
socialism and religion completely to one of coercive oppression. The mediation of 
ethnicity in the socialist governance of Hui Islam has created a particular political 
situation which is markedly different from that of liberal politics and which, therefore, 
gives the Western debate on secularism and secularization (primarily though not 
exclusively in a liberal political framework) only limited purchase in my discussion 
(Casanova, 1994; Asad, 2009, 2003, 1993; Mahmood, 2005, 2009, 2006; Connolly, 1999, 
1995; Gourgouris; Taylor, 2007; Bilgrami, 2011; Scott & Hirschkind, 2006; Habermas, 
2006, 2008). Though the ethnicization and even “racialization” of Islam can also be 
observed elsewhere in the world, the specific form in which it operates and the political 
consequences it entails vary across different contexts and differ especially between 
liberal and socialist politics. If studies of Islam in Europe have constantly to grapple with 
the historical legacy of colonialism and the contemporary vicissitudes of neocolonialism, 
racism, immigrant labor and the so-called “global war on terror” (Scott, 2007, 2005; 
Bowen, 2010, 2007; Ewing, 2008), the anthropological examination of Hui Islam in 
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China cannot avoid addressing the specificity of the socialist politics of ethnicity. This 
critical distinction determines how religious difference is defined and governed, what 
particular political language is spoken or allowed to be spoken, what kind of “public 
sphere” is instituted, and what political functions this public sphere can or cannot fulfill. 
Under the socialist condition, one cannot ask in a direct manner, as it is often done in 
liberal politics, whether “secularism” is a political ideal worth fighting for or how the 
idea of secularity can be extricated from both secularism as a political principle and 
secularization as a teleological social transformation. But this does not mean that 
secularism under the socialist condition is necessarily synonymous with the forced 
eradication or at the very least silent suppression of all religions. Mediated by the politics 
of ethnicity (hence applicable only to certain and surely not all religions), a socialist 
secularism within the particularly Chinese context would also possess its own internal 
logic and bear its own political possibilities and limitations.42 The distinction between the 
public and the private under the socialist condition would also differ in its specific 
modality from both the classical Greek iteration and the contemporary liberal variation. 
The very publicness of ethnicity in China’s socialism exceeds what is often meant by 
“public” in liberal politics, and Hui Islam is governed and produces its own exclusion and 
marginalization in this socialist “public space.” 
To be sure, different ethno-religious groups in China are differentially situated in 
relation to the socialist politics of ethnicity, and the political space afforded each by this 
politics would also differ accordingly. I have been able to examine the complexity of 
socialism in relation to Islam and the particularly subtle operation of the spectral politics 
                                                   
42 For studies on secularism in the socialist context, see Ballinger & Ghodsee, 2011; Buturovic, 2007 
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of ethnicity in China mainly because my primary object of study in this dissertation is the 
Hui. It is because the governance of Hui Islam is situated in a more flexible space than 
that allowed for either Uyghur Islam or Tibetan Buddhism that I am given the chance to 
dwell upon the contemporary ramifications of socialism instead of focusing merely upon 
authoritarian control, police surveillance, or even state terror. What is no less important is 
that the Han are rarely mentioned in the socialist politics of ethnicity, and Han religious 
traditions, be it Confucianism,43 Daoism, Shamanism, or other localized popular religions 
and cultic practices, are seldom subject to the same mediation of the politics of ethnicity 
as Hui Islam has been subjected to. This has made the Han religions more vulnerable to 
the socialist propagation and at times forceful imposition of atheism – it is not secularism 
as much as a coercive secularization that Han religions have often been subjected to since 
the 1950s (Goossaert, 2007; Goossaert & Palmer, 2011; Yang, 2008; Yang, 2012; Yang 
& Tamney, 2005; Chau, 2006; Ashiwa & Wank, 2009; Lozada, 2001; Palmer, 2007). 
Because of these vast variations and differences across different ethnic groups and 
religious traditions, a socialist secularism in China mediated by the politics of ethnicity 
would not have a relatively articulate shape as that possessed by liberal secularism, and 
the terms of governance and political debate would also differ.  
This dissertation has shown that the particular tenacity of Hui Islam in China hinges 
upon a series of institutional and symbolic conditions, and these conditions in turn 
depend for their reproduction upon structurally regimented exclusions. The story told, 
therefore, is not merely how a marginal religion of an ethnic minority persists in a Han-
centered world and what the local dynamics are thatenable this perhaps admirable 
                                                   
43 For debates on whether Confucianism constitutes a “religion” in the modern Western sense of the word, 
see Chen, 1999; Sun, 2013.  
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persistence. What must also be registered and paid due attention to is the hidden 
mechanism of exclusion that can at least in part explain the affective and libidinal 
conditions that structure the Hui imaginary. The exclusion and marginalization of woman 
subtends the politically profound Hui imagination that they are not “foreigners” but 
“Chinese” – neither completely Han nor completely non-Han. Focusing upon the Hui 
cannot necessarily help us “dislocate China” or find “other Chinas” which can then be 
used to criticize an imagined monolithic Han China (cf. Gladney, 2004; Litzinger, 2000). 
It merely demonstrates how “Han-ness” is distributed b yond the empirical Han and how 
“minorities” are not necessarily “minorities” in their imaginary relationship with the Han, 
to the point where some ethnic minorities – for insta ce the Hui – do not displace the 
masculinist Han ethno-centrism as much as reinforce it even while they are trying to 
carve out a space of their own. (cf. Wang, 2003, 1977) The socialist politics of ethnicity 
cannot thematize and critically intervene in this paradoxical intensification of Han ethno-
centrism. Neither can the socialist governance of Hui Islam produce the kind of politics 
able to address more adequately the exclusion of woman that lies at the core of the 
intertwinement of religion and ethnicity among the Hui. The critical question is not 
merely how an authoritarian regime works to suppress ethnic and religious difference, but 
what particular kind of public state and transformative politics are needed so that the 
internal complexities and limiting conditions of these differences themselves can be 
revealed and addressed. It is within the problematic gauged by this general question that I 






A key argument of this dissertation is that the ethnicization of Hui Islam is 
constitutively engendered and fundamentally enabled by an imagined asymmetrical 
exchange of women engaged with the Han male other. In my treatment of sexual 
difference, I have tried to draw a sharp distinction between the voice of the woman who 
speaks and the maternal voice that either speaks throug  her or is foreclosed by the 
position of enunciation she is given to inhabit. This means that I must be able to 
demonstrate what kind of voice counts as the maternl voice, why the voice of the 
woman does not necessarily converge with the maternl voice, and how we can tell the 
difference between the maternal voice and the patern l voice that possibly speaks through 
the woman. A more general question has to be addressed which pertains directly to these 
concerns: how can we study “woman” without reducing the irreducible specificity of 
sexual difference? Or, put slightly differently, how can we force open and keep intact the 
specific conceptual space where the examination of gender relations is not and cannot be 
collapsed into an empiricist study of “woman?”  
It is with these questions in mind that I have chosen to rely upon insights gained from 
Lévi-Straussian structuralist anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis in analyzing 
sexual difference and the position of woman in Hui Islam. This deliberate choice is 
justified by the particular form in which gender presents itself in the ethnicization of 
Islam among contemporary Hui: the theme of an exchange of women figures prominently 
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in the mode of relationship the Hui imagine to have obtained between them and the Han 
majority. The spiral entwinement of exchange as a quintessential form of the social and 
the constitutive function of the woman in mediating the foundational institution of a 
patriarchal social formation determines that the structuralist theories of Lévi-Strauss and 
Lacan are perhaps most appropriate in helping us gra p the specific modality in which 
gender acquires its significance in Hui Islam. On the one hand, if – in the idiom of 
Althusser – Marxism is a “scientific theory” of the social and its usage of “class” 
transforms the latter from a descriptive concept into an essentially analytical one (thus 
giving to “class” its critical conceptual and sociological specificity – it is not “class” as 
much as “class struggle” that marks the Marxian theoretical revolution) (Althusser, 1971, 
1970; Althusser & Balibar, 1970), Lacanian (and Freudian – but in a slightly different 
way) psychoanalysis also gives to sexual difference its irreducible conceptual specificity 
and locates it squarely at the core of the institution of sociality in general (Lacan, 
Mitchell, & Rose, 1985). On the other hand, Lévi-Strauss, primarily in his The 
Elementary Structures of Kinship, merely demonstrates the particular tenacity of the 
masculinist imaginary by arguing that all forms of sociality necessarily rely upon the 
exchange of women without probing the possibility that this sociality-instituting 
exchange is the necessary foundation only of a particular form of the social that is male-
centered (Lévi-Strauss, 1969). Levi-Strauss’s exquisite analysis in fact exposes how 
sociality and sexuality are deeply and inextricably intertwined, and how sexual difference 
is “a different difference” that must on the one hand be distinguished from racial, ethnic 
or cultural difference, and on the other, from class distinction which has its own 
conceptual and sociological specificity in the Marxi n theory. Both Marxism and 
361 
 
psychoanalysis are strictly speaking social theory, and both examine the constitutive 
condition of the social instead of merely studying empirically observable “social 
phenomena.” The specificity of sexual difference, in other words, can be found only in a 
structural(ist) analysis that unfolds at a level slightly removed from empiricist historicism 
(Copjec, 2002, 1994). 
The role of woman in Hui Islam has not gone unnoticed in international media. But 
this interest hardly goes beyond a telescoped empirical observation that merely abstracts 
the concrete world of the Hui women and relocates i in a discourse whose idiom is 
crafted at a level far removed from both Hui Islam nd China – although a nominal 
homage is paid to both. The existence of women’s moques in China, for instance, has 
been celebrated by some Western scholars as an indication of a more “liberal tradition” of 
contemporary Islam in contradistinction to the Saudi-centered “puritanical” Wahhabism. 
An article published in New York Times on October 9, 2012, while championing female 
imams and women’s mosques in China as offering a “vision of an older form of Islam 
that has inclusiveness and tolerance, not marginalization and extremism, at its core,” 
quotes Khaled Abou El Fadl, a prominent Islamic lega  scholar based at UCLA, 
Contemporary fundamentalist movements use the space rovided by the 
mosque to affirm all types of patriarchy and male power over 
women…When you have something like the Chinese example, which 
ultimately empowers women to work within their own space and lead 
prayer and manage that space on their own, it’s a significant form of 
women asserting themselves in the Islamic tradition, helping in 
constructing it and perpetuating it…I always see Islam in places in China 
as reminding Muslims of their authentic tradition before it was impacted 
by petrol dollars and this very gruff and dry form of Bedouin Islam that 
came out of Saudi Arabia…So the point is there’s an old, historically 
rooted tradition, and the Chinese, if they tap into this tradition, they can 




(Tatlow, 2012a; cf. Tatlow, 2012b) 
With the lack of locally rooted structural analysis of the position that female imams and 
women’s mosques are assigned to occupy in Hui Islam, their mere empirical existence, 
given its straightforward appearance, is made to speak to a transnational situation which 
perhaps more concerns Professor Abou El Fadl than te local Hui women themselves. 
The language is one of contrast: the “gruff and dry…Bedouin Islam” versus the 
“authentic tradition” indexed by Hui Islam, and the “puritanical” Wahhabism versus the 
“moderate” Hui tradition which “empowers women to wrk within their own space and 
lead prayers and manage that space on their own.” We should note in this compliment a 
specific mechanism in domesticating sexual difference which operates precisely by 
playing up the role of “woman:” in diametric opposition and speaking directly and 
perhaps exclusively to those who seize upon gender to accuse Islam of “intolerance,” 
“extremism,” or “archaism,” this apologetic comment merely re-appropriates “woman” 
in order to convey a message that reverses the negativ  image in which Islam has often 
been portrayed. The point is that in this mirroring, both the accusation and the apologetic 
have to depend for the transmission and affirmation of their message upon the mediation 
of the woman figure. Both have to speak through and by means of woman, meanwhile 
closing the very space where the irreducible specificity of sexual difference can be 
examined.  
This foreclosure of gender in favor of an empiricist study of “woman” perhaps 
culminates in Saba Mamood’s enormously influential Politics of Piety, a book that 
purports to study the role of “women” in the Egyptian mosque movement as a part of the 
more general Islamic Revival in the so-called “Islamic world.” At the beginning of her 
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study, she claims unequivocally that “the question of how the hierarchical system of 
gender relations that the mosque movement upholds should be practically transformed is, 
on the one hand, impossible to answer and, on the other hand, not ours to ask.” Mahmood 
insists that “any social and political transformation is always a function of local, 
contingent, and emplaced struggles whose blueprint ca not be worked out or predicted in 
advance” (Mahmood, 2005, pp. 36). She locates this caution within the lesson gained 
from the grave consequences caused by the telescoped and externally imposed vision of 
“colonial feminism” and “the politics of ‘global siterhood’,” seen as detached from the 
intricacies of the local worlds in which gender relations are concretely inscribed. In 
Mahmood’s project, the specification of the local world and the particularization of 
gender relations are accomplished by moving away from the problematic of “will” and 
“freedom” and into the domain of bodily disposition a d ethical self-cultivation. She does 
not want to debate whether the Egyptian Muslim women are “willing” to surrender to the 
patriarchal norm to which they have been subjected, and attempts to suspend the 
assumption of a “desire” that can be detached from the instituting force of social norm. 
For her, it is not locating the site and revealing the form of resistance as much as 
describing and analyzing the specific form in which norm is practiced, inhabited, and 
substantiated that deserve attention: “My goal is not to explain why this particular system 
of gender inequality exists [note she does acknowledge that gender inequality exists in 
the system she studies], but to ask: How did the women of the mosque movement 
practically work upon themselves in order to become th  desirous subject of this 




The account I have presented of the mosque movement shows that the 
distinction between the subject’s real desires and obligatory social 
conventions – a distinction at the center of liberal, and at times progressive, 
thought – cannot be assumed, precisely because socially prescribed forms 
of behavior constitute the conditions for the emergence of the self as such 
and are integral to its realization. One of the issue  such a conception of 
self raises is: How does one rethink the question of i dividual freedom in 
a context where the distinction between the subject’s own desires and 
socially prescribed performances cannot be so easily presumed, and where 
submission to certain forms of (external) authority is a condition for the 
self to achieve its potentiality. What kind of politics would be deemed 
desirable and viable in a discursive tradition that regards conventions 
(socially prescribed performances) as necessary to the self’s realization? 
(Ibid., pp. 149) 
The arguments are enticing and the questions provocati e. But in what way does this 
general critique of a certain “modern normative sovereign subject” pertain to gender, 
except that women in Mahmood’s project are seen as specific examples used merely to 
buttress a pre-fabricated philosophical argument which does not fundamentally concern 
sexual difference? By returning “feminism” back into “the liberal tradition,” what is 
equally obliterated is precisely the specificity of gender in the general problematic that 
interests Mahmood. Somewhat symptomatically, it is as if only by means of women and 
through their indispensible mediation that Mahmood can increase the persuasive power 
of her argument which in fact speaks merely of (male?) ethical self-cultivation and social 
convention. It is undoubtedly remarkable – perhaps even striking if we read its 
contemporary popularity as indexical of a more general domestication of sexual 
difference both in anthropology and beyond – that we find not so much a direct 
confrontation with sexual difference as its domestication and subtraction in a book that 
purports to study “Muslim women.” This irony is made all the more alarming since it is 
the Egyptian Muslim women who have been made to speak to a “liberal” tradition which 
is not theirs. Mahmood is acutely aware of the grave consequences of “global sisterhood” 
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and “colonial feminism.” Yet she merely mirrors – hence reproduces in an inverted 
manner – what she criticizes. The palimpsest of the “South Muslim women” – a doubly 
overwritten text because of the intricate intertwinement of international political economy 
and sexual difference – still awaits a reading that does not hasten to assimilate its 
obliterated message into transnational discourses in which women are appropriated in 
opposite yet interlocked ways (cf. Spivak, 1988). 
To be sure, there are “Muslim women” who fall outside this tight circuit and whose 
language, perhaps unsurprisingly, would prove largey unintelligible – hence hardly 
memorable – to those of us eager to locate them in a particular kind of politically-
informed discourse that will interest “the West.” Since the 1980s, the government of 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region has been engaged in a large-scale migration project 
that moves the agricultural population living in the arid and bleak mountainous area in its 
south to the relatively fertile north where livelihood might be more easily sought. A large 
portion of those who have thus been uprooted and dislocated belong to the Hui, and many 
in fact are affiliated with different religious sects or Sufi orders. Each community, after 
the massive relocation, has to rebuild their own mosque, and some communities, because 
of the co-existence of different sects and Sufi orders, have to build more than one mosque 
each with its own parish. Both the provincial and the local governments provide a meager 
subsidy to the displaced residents, but absolutely no funding can be allocated to support 
mosque construction as the state must remain officially “neutral” in any affair that 
pertains to religion. “The state just wants to choke Islam,” said Yiming, the Jahriyya Sufi 
cleric whom I have discussed in chapter three.  
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His view in fact is not uncommon among those I interviewed. Since each relocated 
community only has itself to fall back on in raising the money to build the new mosque(s) 
and most – if not all – residents are merely poor peasants many of whom do not even 
have enough money to build their own houses, the construction of a mosque, instead of 
solidifying communal linkages, very often only rends the communal social fabric, 
rendering some into local strangers upon whom rains suspicion and accusation. Those 
who are able to donate a designated amount (often calculated on a per capita basis, but 
collected with the family as the basic unit) are extended respect, whereas those who 
cannot are occasionally even excluded from entering the mosque for prayer, since they 
have not contributed what they should have and the mosque, therefore, cannot be made to 
serve his religious needs (women’s mosques, perhaps imaginably, hardly receive any 
attention, if at all). Hongsibao, a rural district n the city of Wuzhong surrounded by 
villages housing primarily “migrants for ecological reasons” (shengtai yimin) as the 
displaced residents are often called (or just yimin, “the migrants”), is one such place 
where one can find a multitude of relocated communities. I visited Hongsibao near the 
end of my stay in Ningxia, since I wanted to briefly study how the money for mosque 
reconstruction is collected, the usual amount needed, how much each family has to pay, 
and most importantly, how long it often takes for a mosque to be built and where the 
community of believers pray and conduct other colletiv  religious services before the 
eventual completion of the mosque. I wanted, in other words, to study how Hui Islam is 
maintained in a dynamic suburban context where the local socio-economic conditions are 
undergoing rapid and unprecedented transformations.  
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As I entered one of the villages that surrounded Hongsibao, an aged Hui woman in 
her sixties wearing a headscarf was sitting in front of her house. Seeing me approaching, 
she stood up. “Are you a migrant? (ninshi yimin ba?)” I asked, merely intending it to be a 
conversation opener.  
“I moved down from up there…(wo cong shangbian ban xialai de – note here that the 
word for “move” is ban, not yi, which is used in the word yimin, “migrant”)” She pointed 
in a direction which I supposed was south. “And we moved here two years ago.” 
“Oh, so you are a migrant.” I was merely mumbling ad getting prepared for the next 
round of questions. But somehow strangely, she was perceptibly hesitating, and before I 
found my voice for my questions, she asked,  
What is a migrant (shenme shi yimin)? 
Her voice was even lower than that of my meaningless mumbling, and I simply did not 
know how to explain it to her. She had much more intimate knowledge of what being a 
migrant meant and how migration was defined in the most concretely visceral terms. She 
was a migrant and she lived that life which was a migrant’s life. Nonetheless, he did not 
know what the term meant that had been used to name her in official discourses and in the 
academic discourse by means of which I first knew the general social transformation that 
had completely changed her life. Neither did she know, as I soon discovered, how much 
money her family had contributed to building the communal mosque, although the 
mosque itself was only five minutes’ walk away from her house. She wanted to help me, 
but she couldn’t. Nonetheless, she wanted me to stay for a while and waited for her 
husband. “He knows all this,” said she. 
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And she was right. Her husband, a man in his early seventies, could clearly recall that 
his family had donated 5000 RMB for the construction of the village mosque – it was he 
who gave the cash to the people who came to collect it. The word “migrant” he knew all 
too well, and he was able to give me a rich story of the local dynamics and tensions 
revealed by the negotiations involved in the bargaining. He kept talking, while his wife, 
the woman who initially welcomed me into their house, was merely standing on the side, 
interjecting “yes, yes” into the silence that punctuated my conversation with her husband. 
But her voice, silent and hesitant, yet precisely because of this silence and hesitation, 
resonates and unsettles, dislocates and disturbs. Perhaps it is incompatible with (or should 
we make it incompatible with?) the interlocked circuit tha appropriates “Muslim women” 
by paradoxically domesticating and surreptitiously subtracting sexual difference. Perhaps, 
as some of us may well argue, this voice is utterly ir elevant to Islam or to “Muslim 
women” and points to a question that does not at all pertain to gender. Unable to answer 
these questions and meanwhile suspecting their very answerability, I would nonetheless 
like to inscribe this somewhat strange and out-of-place voice at the end of this 
dissertation. And the voice, let’s remember, is materi lized by a question, speaking not to 
tell a story but to demonstrate the limit of languae: 
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